Messiah, Muselmann and the Return of Paul's Real: Evidence for a Trauma of Secularism by Principe, Concetta Valentina
 
 
MESSIAH, MUSELMANN AND THE RETURN OF PAUL’S REAL 
 
 















A Dissertation submitted to  
the Faculty of Graduate Studies  
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements  
for the Degree of  















© Concetta Valentina Principe, 2013  





This project addresses the anomaly evident in the use of religious terms 
for secular projects. If secularism was a system that intended to free the state 
from religion and the subject from religious superstition, then why would 
religious terminology be used in twentieth-century intellectual and cultural 
secular projects? For example, why would noted Marxist philosopher Walter 
Benjamin draw on the messianic figure in his “Theses on the Philosophy of 
History”? Moreover, what could be meant by the identification of the most 
abject inmate in Auschwitz, a Nazi death camp predominantly populated by 
European Jews, as the Muselmann? This project argues that the return of the 
religious terms, messiah and the Muselmann in twentieth-century secular texts 
is symptomatic of what psychoanalysts define as a trauma.  
Freud identifies trauma as evident only in its symptom of compulsive 
repetition, which motivates a working-through of what was missed. Lacan 
identifies trauma as the subject’s encounter with the real, where the real is 
inexplicable and missed, and what returns of the trauma is a remainder of the 
encounter: Lacan calls this remainder the objet a. The messiah and the 
Muselmann in secular texts are objets a and therefore, stand as a return of a 
trauma. Since these two religious terms seem to have no relation to each other 
apart from being of the religious within secularism, which is a system that has 
excluded religious presence in the operations of the state, then the objets a 
would suggest that the trauma is located within secularism itself. What is this 
trauma and where does it come from?   
Taking into account the limitations of psychoanalytic hermeneutics, 
which stresses that the original trauma is forever lost to us, this project traces a 
connection between contemporary secular messianism and the largest group of 
earliest-extant texts citing the messiah, St. Paul’s letters. On establishing the 
connection between Pauline messianism and the twentieth-century terms, 
messiah and Muselmann, I provide an analysis of four ‘case studies’ of the 
trauma of secularism expressed in twentieth-century philosophical texts and 
contemporary cultural works. 
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MESSIAH, MUSELMANN AND THE RETURN OF PAUL’S REAL: EVIDENCE 





In “The Theses of the Concept of History” (1940), Walter Benjamin provokes 
the dwarf from out of hiding its theological hand by naming the instigator of the 
revolution, ‘messiah’. Notable about Benjamin’s messiah is its ambiguous 
relation to the Christian messiah (against the anti-Christ in Thesis VI) and the 
Jewish figure, (B) as a vague entity associated with “now-time shot through with 
splinters of messianic time” (397). The messiah figure prevails in post WWII 
Marxist thinking, evidenced in Étienne Balibar’s suggestion that the 
universalistic in nationalism is possible through the secularized “messianic 
notion of brotherhood”,1 and by Jacques Derrida’s inhuman abstract promise of 
future justice in the noun, ‘messianicity’ (1994).2 Responding to this 
deconstruction of the savior, Slavoj Žižek puts the messiah back into play as a 
Christian figure in Puppet and the Dwarf, (2003, 3); as if taking issue with the 
turn to this figure in secular philosophy, Catherine Malabou deconstructs 
Christianity’s transcendent notion of transformation by arguing against 
messianic interference entirely (Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, 2010, 18 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Balibar, E: “Racism as Universalism”, Masses, Classes, Ideas: Studies in Politics and Philosophy 
Before and After Marx, translated by James Swenson. New York; NY: Routledge, 1994. PP 191-
204.  P 193. 
2 Derrida. Spectres of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New 
International. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. New York and London, Routledge, 1994; “On Faith and 
Knowledge: The Two Sources of “Religion” at the Limits of Reason Alone”, (40-101) Acts of 
Religion. Trans. Samuel Weber. New York and London: Routledge, 2010.	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44). Parallel to the messiah phenomenon infiltrating intellectual work3 is a 
messianic idea in science fiction film represented in figures such as the alien in 
The Day the Earth Stood Still, or the time-travelling human in The Terminator.4 
My interest is not merely in the apparently conscious use of this figure, but 
rather in the unconscious motivation that compels the iterations, ironically 
associated by Benjamin with the dwarf in hiding.  
 The figure of the Muselmann, another example of the anomalous use of 
religious terminology in a putatively secular environment, offers up a more 
striking example of unconscious expression. Coined in Auschwitz by no one 
knows who, to define the most abject of its inmates, the term is striking for 
several reasons; it is a religious term used to name Jews, both secular and 
religious; more dramatically, the term is resurrected by Agamben in his 
Remnants of Auschwitz, as the exception of the state who demands justice of 
the witness. The more recent iterations in contemporary thinking include 
Malabou’s association of the Muselmann with the schizophrenic and Alzheimer 
victim in the New Wounded and Žižek’s proposition that the Muselmann has 
come to stand for any version of the exception, from the rape victim to the autist 
(Living in the End Times).5 What does Auschwitz have to do with Islam? For that 
matter, what does Islam have to do with the exception and why does it return in 
different guises? The fact that these questions can be posed rationally about an 
irrational cluster of associations indicates the unconscious source of this term, 
which explains why its semantic value goes mainly unaddressed. More 
ambivalently, the fact that Agamben associates the exception of the Muselmann 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Bradley, Arthur and Paul Fletcher. “Introduction: On a Newly Arisen Messianic Tone in 
Philosophy”. Journal of Cultural Research Vol. 13, Issues 3-4 (2009): 183-189. 4	  Hugh Ruppersberg, “Alien Messiah in Recent Science Fiction Films”, Journal of Popular Film 
and Television, 14:4 (1987): 158-166,	  
5 Žižek draws a connection between the Muselmann and autistic ‘indifference’ in the face of 
suffering which then indicates other conditions of suffering: “The Muselmann is multiplying in 
the guise of refugees, terror victims, survivors of natural disasters or of family violence” (Living in 
End times 294). 
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with the messianic,6 an idea not addressed by Malabou’s or Žižek’s recent 
iterations, raises the first question of this project: What unconscious associations 
would link the Muselmann with the messiah? This question frames the 
psychoanalytic approach I take to my thesis that the return of these figures in 
secularism reflects a symptom of trauma.  
 
TRAUMA 
In this project, I use Jacques Lacan’s linguistic interpretation of Sigmund Freud’s 
science of pschoanalysis. Where Freud identified a stable subject, the ego, 
navigating the vicissitudes of the libido of the id and the prohibitions of the 
super-ego, Lacan saw instability within the configuration of subjectivity itself. 
The splitting (Spaltung) of the subject is caused by the law imposed by the 
Name of the Father (NOF) of the Oedipal event which demands that the subject 
gives up his/her desire (of the mother); the subject’s consent leads to the 
repression of desire which causes the formation of the unconscious. Lacan 
questioned Freud’s idea that the unconscious was simply the product of 
repression and, rather, emphasized that the unconscious reflected the subject’s 
life-long ambivalent relationship to the Other. The unconscious, structured like 
a language (Seminar XI 20), is “the discourse of the Other” (131) that reflects the 
symbolic history of signifiers. Moreover, Lacan argued, the fact that the 
unconscious “presents you with its enigma and speaks” (Seminar XI 26) explains 
its relation to ethics: “The status of the unconscious, which, as I have shown, is 
so fragile on the ontic plane, is ethical. In his thirst for truth, Freud says, 
Whatever it is, I must go there, because, somewhere, this unconscious reveals 
itself” (33).7 It is the relationship between ethics and the unconscious use of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The problematic implications with this association is discussed by Robert Eaglestone in “The 
Holocaust and the Messianic”, in The Politics to Come. 
7 The phrase “Whatever it is, I must go there” is Alan Sheridan’s translation of Freud’s “Wo es 
war, soll Ich warden” in Lacan’s Seminar XI. It has been brought to my attention that the first 
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messiah and Muselmann in secularism that will be an important component of 
my focus on trauma in secularism.  
Linguistic structuralism not only inspired Lacan to rethink the subject, 
but also led to his unique perspective of the three orders that determine psychic 
life. The symbolic order is in the jurisdiction of the law of the NOF, enabling 
the linguistic strategy of signification expressed in metaphor, allowing the 
subject to deal with loss (of the object of desire which is mother) by instating a 
symbolic replacement and also giving the subject the tools he/she needs to 
socialize, such as language and other modes of communication. The Imaginary, 
associated with the narcissism of the mirror stage, is the order determined by 
the image and reflects the metonymic strategies of displacement in the ‘ego’. 
Lacan disables the centrality of Freud’s ego by identifying it with the imaginary 
order, indicating the ego’s function as a misrecognition of the symbolic-
centered ‘self’. The relative clarity with which Lacan defined the Symbolic and 
Imaginary orders in his science is contrasted by the vagueness of the third order, 
the ‘real’, and explains why it has been received as an enigmatic element of his 
theory of the mind.  
The real, variously described as “what resists symbolization absolutely” 
(Seminar I 66), and is what is ‘inassimilable’ of experience (Seminar XI 55), has 
inspired various glossarial approaches. Dylan Evans references various 
definitions over time, such as “the real is in itself undifferentiated; ‘the real is 
absolutely without fissure’ (Seminar II 97)” and “The real is “the impossible” 
(Seminar XI 167) because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate 
into the symbolic order, and impossible to attain in any way”.8 Tom Eyers’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
verb “is” should technically be past tense, “was”, which means the phrase should read: 
Whatever it was, I must go there”. This translation better articulates the way the subject’s 
relation to the unconscious is squeezed between the past and the future. In future references to 
this quote, I shall use the corrected version.  
8 Evans, Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis 159. 
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highlights the “singular contribution” to psychoanalysis9 of Lacan’s ‘real’ by 
remaining open to its semantic indeterminacy: “This is not to deny the 
possibility of any definition of the Real, but to signal that singular or stable 
definitions must be held in suspicion in favour of an appreciation of the 
multiplicity of ways in which the Real is figured throughout Lacan’s work” (2). 
The reason for its multiple meanings, Eyers argues, is that it gains definition 
through its association with the other registers. Žižek ‘locates’ the real through 
its paradoxical effect on the formalizing principles of the symbolic: “the real… 
is the rock upon which every formalization fumbles. But it is necessarily 
through this failure that we can in a way encircle, locate the empty place of the 
real” (195).10 What is empty of the real is the ‘missed’ quality of its effect on the 
subject as trauma. 
Lacan’s idea of trauma is adapted from Freud’s seminal research in 
“Beyond the Pleasure Principle”. The compulsive repetition of bad experiences, 
Freud argued, “is attributed to the unconscious repressed within him [the 
subject]” (58). The return of the repressed makes people “the passive victim of 
something which they are powerless to influence, and yet which they suffer 
again and again in an endless repetition of the same fate” (60). This sense of 
fate, Freud argued, is indicated by the woman who married three times to men 
who subsequently fell ill and died; it is also poetically articulated in Tasso’s 
story of Tancred, who murders his fiancé by accident, and then accidentally 
murders her again as a voice in a tree (60-61). How trauma can happen 
unexpectedly and why, when it returns, it is not immediately recognizable, is 
explained by Freud through his theory of the process of consciousness. Freud 
understood that the mind actively seeks stimulation which means that what 
happens against the subject’s will, what is forced on the subject as unwanted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Eyers, Lacan and the Concept of the Real 8.	  10	  Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology 195.	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stimuli, causes a wound in the psyche: “We may use the term traumatic to 
describe those excitations from outside that are strong enough to break through 
the protective barrier [of consciousness]… An event such as external trauma 
will doubtless provoke a massive disturbance in the organism’s energy system… 
the pleasure principle is put in abeyance. It is no longer possible to prevent the 
psychic apparatus from being flooded by large quanta of stimulation” (68-69). 
In Freud’s terms, the unwanted stimuli are repressed in the unconscious which 
explains its delayed return, what Freud calls Nachträglichkeit. In this respect, 
the WWI Veterans’ nightmares “retrospectively generate the fear” (71) which 
they could not apprehend consciously; that is, the ‘missed’ event is repressed in 
the unconscious and returns as a nightmare and in waking life, as compulsive 
behaviour.  
Lacan refined Freud’s idea of the missed ‘cause’ of the trauma with the 
concept of the real: “The function of the tuché, of the real as encounter—the 
encounter in so far as it may be missed, in so far as it is essentially the missed 
encounter—first presented itself in the history of psychoanalysis in the form that 
which was in itself already enough to arouse our attention, that of the trauma” 
(Seminar XI 55). The tuché, or the first cause, signifies the mystery of the 
encounter with the real which explains how the traumatic event returns 
unexpectedly: “what is repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs—the 
experience tells us quite a lot about its relation to the tuché —as if by chance” 
(54). The problem is that what returns is often not recognized except in its 
repetitive effect: “we see preserved the insistence of the trauma in making us 
aware of its existence. The trauma reappears, in effect, frequently unveiled” 
(55). In effect, trauma is a paradox: its insistence explains the compulsive nature 
of the ‘event’’s return and so being ‘obvious’, while its unveiled quality points 
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to the predicament of its origin as being invisible at the time of the subject’s 
exposure to it since it is without symbolic value.11  
One of the first traumas a subject experiences is the Oedipal event, 
which, if successful, gives the subject the tools of the symbolic order to 
organize retroactively the initiating event through the signifying process of 
fantasy formation. Fantasy, or the symbolic retroactive work of the trauma, is 
Lacan’s term for the revision implied by Freud’s Nächtraglichkeit 
(afterwardsness or in the French as après coup). Fantasy is created from the 
subject’s relation to the Imaginary ($<>a) wherein the “remainder” or that 
‘inassimilable” element created by the subject’s encounter with the real is the 
objet (petit) a: “This a is presented precisely, in the field of the mirage of the 
narcissistic function of desire, as the object that cannot be swallowed, as it 
were, which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier” (Seminar XI 270). This 
stuck quality of the objet a is what Lacan called the ‘cause of desire’; it inspires 
the subject to seal over the hole made by the trauma and from it, create a 
fantasy which gestures to the coming into being of the remainder, by integrating 
the crisis into the subject’s symbolic universe. 
 The analysand’s work in therapy in “working-through” or narrativizing 
her condition, explains that the root of therapeutic work is the trauma: “trauma, 
fixation, reproduction, transference. What in analytic experience is called the 
intrusion of the past into the present pertains to this order ” (Seminar II 85). In 
psychoanalytic terms, while trauma is the cause of the analysand’s predicament, 
trauma remains secondary to the only thing knowable: the subject’s fantasy. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Žižek articulates the same paradoxical relation this way: “As Jacques-Alain Miller has already 
pointed out (in his unpublished seminar), the status of the Real is at the same time that of 
corporeal contingency and that of logical consistence. In a first approach, the Real is a shock of 
a contingent encounter which disrupts the automatic circulation of the symbolic mechanism; a 
grain of sand preventing its smooth functioning; a traumatic encounter which ruins the balance 
of the symbolic universe of the subject. But, as we have seen with regard to trauma… only 
afterwards can it be logically constructed as a point which escapes symbolization” (The Sublime 
Object of Ideology 192). 	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Moreover, what is implied in Freud’s “Beyond Pleasure” which Lacan’s 
theoretical framework accounts for but never theorizes, is the fact that many 
different kinds of experiences are considered traumas: the Oedipal event is 
considered a trauma, as is the figurative return of Tancred’s accidental murder 
of Clorinda, as well as the ‘fort-da’ game,12 the married widow’s marriages, and 
the impulse of ‘talking-through’ in the analytic session. While Lacan’s enigmatic 
‘real’ has given concrete value to fantasy as the primary evidence of a ‘cause’, it 
has consequently had an effect of broadening the scope of what might be 
considered trauma leading to the probability that trauma is actually a prevalent 
condition of living. The question about what experiences can be considered 
trauma is addressed by my consideration of how the use of messiah and 
Muselmann are indicative of a trauma of secularism. 
 
SECULARISM 
On first pass, these religious terms have very little in common, except for a 
loose unconscious association to the Holocaust. Of course, Agamben’s idea of 
the Muselmann as a messiah does not necessarily reflect on any other of the 
messianic phenomena; so whether this association says more about the 
Holocaust, the Jewish community in Europe, or post-Holocaust politics, remains 
a part of the conundrum of their appearance in secularism, which I shall 
consider in this project. As concepts, they reflect very different strategies in 
secularism. The messiah is associated with religion to the point that it is being 
used to redefine secularism; the Muselmann, on the other hand, has become so 
dissociated from its religious source, its significance points to the riddle I have 
already posed: What does Auschwitz have to do with Islam? In other words, 
one seems to stand out as a repressed religious association, while the other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The fact that this game is associated with the first stage of the Oedipal event suggests that 
there are several traumatic experiences associated with the Oedipal Complex. 
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stands out as a religious provocation in secularism. One thing that can clearly 
be said about both terms is that they are religious. Since secularism was meant 
to free the citizen from religious prejudice, and or, the scientist from 
superstition, and the state from God, both terms stand out as anomalies in 
secularism. 
 If there was a time that secularism was believed to neutralize religious 
differences in the public sphere, and so was heralded as a solution to political 
conflict as well as religious violence, those hopes have faltered in the face of 
criticism that has exposed secularism’s religious foundation. In Political 
Theology, Carl Schmitt argued that secularism did not free the state from 
religion, but had simply sublimated religious authority into itself; the sovereign 
ruled, not because of democracy, but because of a power bequeathed by the 
same divine source that authorized the monarch’s power. Subsequent to this 
revelation, Schmitt, Karl Löwith and Rudölf Bultmann brought forward the 
argument that the ideological foundation of secular history was determined by a 
Christo-centric eschatology. This scholarship has led Gil Anidjar to argue that 
secularism is a system of western imperialism that is prejudiced for Christian 
values, especially evident in light of the religious violence of the attack of the 
World Trade Centre. This event, otherwise known as 9/11, has exacerbated an 
existing political confrontation between the Christian secular west and the 
Muslim religious east, polarizing scholars about how to make secularism 
relevant in the multi-religious, multi-cultural world. On the one hand, Gayatri 
Spivak takes a post-colonial lead established by Edward Said, granting that 
secularism may be driven by a Kantian “Judeo-Christian” prejudice, but 
continues to be the system to withstand religious violence, and so needs to be 
worked on; on the other hand, Saba Mahmood, confronted by the atheist 
secularist neutral stance, makes the case that secularism is as ideologically 
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driven as any religious faith, which raises questions about what in secularism 
can be ‘worked out’ and in whose interest.  
Within the context of the larger debate of religious politics and 
secularism, a politically centered strain coined as post-secularism has arisen. 
Hent de Vries argues that it is a term that defines the ‘problem’ of secularism (2). 
On the one hand, de Vries notes post-secularism may point to secularism’s 
recognition that religion is not its enemy, and therefore, is trying to define a 
non-antagonistic relation to religion; or it may point to Habermas’s argument 
that secularism, fundamentally dependent on religion as a paradigm against 
which it works, is realizing its fragile future considering religion is diminishing 
in world politics; with the rise of atheism and the decline of religion proper, 
secularism no longer has a counter-point for development. The key is less a new 
relation to religion than a new understanding of itself, de Vries suggests, which 
means it must focus on self-identity that is, by nature, problematic to define. 
The messiah and the Muselmann may be seen as examples of this post-secular 
trouble. The religious signifiers may point to the rise of the religious turn or they 
may reflect the latest strategy of secular reinvention; both possibilities point to a 
tension within secularism the meaning of which is not yet clear. Is the messiah 
being stripped of its religious significance as in Benjamin’s dwarf, or is it a 
reactionary trope, as in Žižek’s Puppet? In naming the secular Jewish inmate of 
Auschwitz a Muselmann, what is the target, the inmate’s secularism or his 
Jewish culture, where we would interpret the former as indicative of religious 
reactionary, while the latter would be secular reactionary? The fact that the 
messiah is understood as a force or figure that resolves political oppression, and 
that the Muselmann is a figure of abuse that demands the ethical injunction of 
witnessing, leads me to suppose that these terms share one thing in being 
religious terms: they reflect an ethical dimension in their return which has 
bearing on an unconscious desire particular to secular subjects. Moreover, as 
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figures that encapsulate the ‘cause of desire’ in secular fantasies, the religious 
terms can be understood as objets a. 
 My thesis for seeing a trauma of secularism has a precedent in the work 
of two scholars who have considered trauma in our modern conditions from 
two very different perspectives. In the sixties, historian of philosophy Hans 
Blumenberg adapted Freud’s application of trauma in Moses and Monotheism 
to history by considering the legacy of modernism in his Legitimacy of the 
Modern Age, arguing that modernism is riddled with a trauma that dates to a 
second-century gnostic dilemma in Christianity on the matter of good and evil. 
More recently, and independently of Blumenberg’s thesis, philosopher, Alain 
Badiou takes a distinctly Lacanian approach to his review of the radical quality 
of twentieth-century crises in The Century, arguing they were examples of a 
‘passion for the real’, a fusion of the ‘encounter with the real’ with the passion 
expressed in confronting nineteenth-century promises. My project makes 
advances on these theses, with slight but significant variations. For one, I part 
ways with Blumemberg’s focus on modernism and Badiou’s vision of twentieth-
century events, to identify the trauma as specific to secularism. This semantic 
difference reflects my focus on the selected objet a as witnesses to secular life. 
Apart from this distinction, I follow Badiou’s lead by drawing several disciplines 
into the project, and thereby define a field of research that not only troubles 
disciplinary divisions, but also re-thinks the psychoanalytic understanding of 
trauma as a method for analysis. I follow Blumenberg’s long vision of history, 
borrowed from Freud’s Moses and Monotheism, to date the origin of secular 
trauma to the period of ancient Roman rule; I am also inspired by his retreat to 
early Christianity, and will make a case against his gnostic thesis by following 
the messianic trope to Paul of Tarsus’ contribution to Christianity.  
The messiah stands out for having a relatively short history, originating 
sometime between the 1st century BCE and 1st century CE, the period during 
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which Paul was making a contribution to Christianity; as it happens, Paul’s 
body of letters give us nearly direct access to the early use of ‘messiah’ in his 
naming of Jesus the “Christ”. I have chosen to focus on Paul as the source of an 
anterior ‘cause’ in this project for these reasons in combination with being 
drawn to the phenomenon I would describe as a compulsive return to Paul’s 
writing in twentieth-century intellectual works. For example, Freud references 
Paul’s part in addressing the Jewish trauma of guilt in his Moses and 
Monotheism; post-WWII historians revisit and problematize Paul’s theological 
and cultural contribution in the wave of scholarship dubbed, New Perspectives 
on Paul; and the works by Agamben, Badiou, Taubes, and Žižek, which aim to 
contemporize Paul’s message for political and social contemporary issues in 
secular society, are only the most famous of the ongoing work by philosophers 
on Paul.13 This return to Paul is as symptomatic as the compulsive return of the 
messiah and Muselmann, and for that reason, leads me to see an association 
between Paul’s ‘encounter with the real’ of Jesus and our contemporary secular 
trauma.  
 
PSYCHOANALYSIS AS METHOD  
In my objective to prove a trauma of secularism by drawing associations 
between the historical works of St. Paul and the unconscious use of the messiah 
and Muselmann in secular projects, a number of concerns about my use of the 
psychoanalytic method are raised. For one, being able to locate the ‘cause’ of 
trauma is, as Lacan has stressed, problematic because the source of that cause, 
the ‘real’, is inaccessible in its original moment, and its return is often in 
disguise. These problems with analysis call into question the value of analyzing 
Paul’s letters in this project as an anterior ‘cause’ of the secular trauma. Added 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ward Blanton and Hent de Vries are editors of the forthcoming, Paul and the Philosophers. 
Fordham Press, fall 2013. 
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to these aporias is the dilemma raised by my primary focus: seeking the trauma 
of secularism. How can one apply a psychoanalytic method of the mind of the 
individual to a social phenomenon? That question is especially significant since 
the mid-century American Freudian revisionists had tried this very thing and 
faltered.14 Each of these concerns shall be addressed in turn. 
My research is motivated by the same concerns that motivated the 
American social scientists such as Erich Fromm15 and Karen Horney,16 the 
leading Neo-Freudians: the contradictory forces of love and hate in human 
politics as introduced by Freud in Civilization and Discontents. My aim in this 
project is not to solve social ills, as was the case for these Neo-Freudianists. 
Their psychocultural approach which adapted Freudian psychoanalysis to 
sociology, aimed to resolve mankind’s discontent by promoting the normative 
force of the super-ego for its equalizing effect on the subject’s instinctual drives: 
the effect was that the volatile factors of the subject, the instincts, drives, and 
the unconscious, were ignored. The Neo-Freudians’ focus on the social 
environment was driven by the logic that individuals were not victims of 
biological determinism, but could be transformed to reach their potential as 
outlined by social ideals.17 As far as Herbert Marcuse was concerned, the Neo-
Freudiansts failed to address the suffering of Freud’s neurotic. In Eros and 
Civilization, Marcuse devotes a chapter to explain why these Neo-Freudians, far 
from solving social ills, perpetuated them: “The Neo-Freudian schools promote 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The Neo-Freudians, as they were called, were criticized for popularizing psychoanalytic ideas 
that turned the individual into types, for promoting behaviourist approaches to resolve mental 
health concerns, and generally for being unscientific. The popularity of David Reisman’s The 
Lonely Crowd that was on the best-seller list until the early 1970s, is a case in point. 
15 Fromm, Escape From Freedom. New York: Henry Holt, 1994. 
16 Horney, New Ways in Psychoanalysis. New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1966.  17	  The application of elements of Freud’s science to behaviorial psychology made the Neo-
Freudians a valuable asset for the U.S. government’s war efforts in WWII, leading one historian 
to conclude: “The spread of psychoculturalism in the U.S. is inseparable from the rise of fascism 
in Europe” Edward J. K. Gitre. “The Great Escape: World War II, Neo-Freudianism, and the 
Origins of U. S. Pyschocultural Analysis”. Journal of the History of Behavioural Sciences, Vol 47 
(1) (Winter), 2001: 19. 	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the very same values as cure against unfreedom and suffering—as the triumph 
over repression. The intellectual feat is accomplished by expurgating the 
instinctual dynamic and reducing its part in the mental life” (240). In more 
emphatic terms, he concludes: “The revisionist mutilation of the instinct theory 
leads to the traditional devaluation of the sphere of material needs in favor of 
the spiritual needs” (265). The Marxist in Marcuse critiqued the Neo-
Freudianists for carrying out a strategy that perpetuated the oppression of the 
worker by state ideology. Reading Freud’s proposition that neurosis was an 
illness, Marcuse promoted the Marxist cure of the neurotic subject as 
emancipation from repression through memory work; by remembering the 
original moment of repression, the chains of repression would be broken and, 
in turn, the repressive influence of civilization would be undone (18). Marcuse’s 
vision for mankind’s emancipation through psychoanalysis relied on the 
premise that psychoanalysis was a science devoted to curing individuals of their 
neuroses, an approach which Lacanians have come to consider simplistic. 
In The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek’s soft critique of Marcuse’s 
research as “psychoanalytic fundamentalism” aims to contextualize a “post-
Marxist” approach to cultural critique through Lacan’s anti-essentialist logic. In 
his preface, Žižek outlines his debt to Lacan’s interpretation of the antagonistic 
drives which Freud introduced in Civilization: “All ‘culture’ is in a way reaction-
formation, an attempt to limit, canalize — to cultivate this imbalance, this 
traumatic kernel, this radical antagonism through which man cuts his umbilical 
cord with nature, with animal homeostasis. It is not only that the aim is no 
longer to abolish this drive antagonism, but the aspiration to abolish it is 
precisely the totalitarian temptation” (xxviii). In short, Marcuse’s focus on 
repression as an illness that needs to be cured followed the Neo-Freudian logic 
as opposed to Freud’s logic; where Freud was convinced that conflict is at the 
centre of human life, the Neo-Freudians operated on the conviction that 
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harmony was the norm which was undermined by individual disorders. 
Following Freud’s thesis of the drives through Lacan’s anti-essentialism, Žižek 
focused on the dynamic relation between the subject and ideology, an idea 
introduced by Althusser in his application of Marx’s concept of ideology to 
psychoanalysis, “On Ideology”; the task of psychoanalysis is not to cure the 
subject of ideology’s effect, Žižek contends, but to uncover the antagonistic 
infrastructure managing ideology’s power over of the individual’s choices so 
that the subject may ‘work through’ it.  
Žižek identifies ideology as the illusion of the symbolic, which the 
subject misrecognizes as actually there (30).18 What is really there, Žižek 
argues, is the ‘real, impossible kernel’ hiding within ideology, apparent as the 
symptom of an inconsistency that sustains, rather than undermines, the 
ideological fantasy. Ideology is not a constant reliable force, Žižek argues, but a 
function of the symbolic order, prone to structural weaknesses, but engineered 
to survive that weakness: “An ideology really succeeds when even the facts 
which at first contradict it start to function as arguments in its favour” (50). 
Ideological critique involves “going through the fantasy” (132), or, moving 
through the interpellating structures contained by the paradoxical nature of the 
social fantasy so as to isolate the ‘real’ cause hiding inside the symptom. The 
Jew, for example, is the symptom of fascist ideology (143); by inverting “the 
linking of causality”, the Jew is no longer visible as the cause of “social 
antagonism” but a projection of ideology’s failure. “What is excluded from the 
Symbolic… returns in the Real as a paranoid construction of the Jew”, Žižek 
asserts. That is, fascism’s fantasy of unity causes the return of the Jew as the 
exception, which is used to reinforce the fascistic promise of unity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  “in its basic dimension [ideology] is a fantasy-construction which serves as a support for our 
‘reality’ itself: an ‘illusion’ which structures our effective, real social relations and thereby masks 
some insupportable, real, impossible kernel…” (45).   	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Having outlined the way in which ideology sustains itself as paradoxical, 
Žižek then reviews the subject’s relation to ideology through the subject’s 
relation to the Other. The Imaginary and the Symbolic determine how “the 
subject is integrated into a given socio-symbolic field” (123) through 
interpellation of the Other. The awkwardness of this interpellation is defined by 
Žižek as the “circle of a square” which creates a leftover that the leaves the 
subject asking, “che vuoi?”. This question articulates the subject’s desire, which 
is not to fulfill her own need but to fulfill what the Other lacks. The infant 
reasons that the mother keeps leaving because she lacks (desires) something; 
thus, the infant desires to be for the mother what she lacks so that she will not 
leave; thus, the subject desires what the Other wants. The way to understanding 
what the Other wants is through fantasy. Yet, as Žižek highlights, “The desire 
with regard to which we must no ‘give way’ is not the desire supported by 
fantasy, but the desire of the Other beyond fantasy” (132). In effect, ideology 
helps to understand what is desired of us, but desire itself originates beyond 
ideology in the ethical demand. In some cases, what the Other desires 
contradicts ideological fantasy. If the uses of the messiah and Muselmann can 
be seen as the returns of the ‘real’ in the social fantasy of secularism, or a 
contradiction within secularism, then what ethical demand is referenced in their 
use? That question drives my investigation in this project. 
In drawing a connection between the use of messiah and Muselmann 
and Paul’s historical ‘trauma’, questions about the viability of using 
psychoanalysis in the humanities-centered discipline of history are raised. I will 
start by noting that, as with historians, Freud relied on artifacts, written texts, for 
analysis, and his diagnosis of Paul Daniel Schreber as a paranoid-schizophrenic 
based on the psychotic’s memoir is a case in point. While, in Moses and 
Monotheism, Freud felt he had grounds for the “psychological probability” that 
“religious phenomena are to be understood only on the model of the 
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individual… and therefore derive their effect on mankind from the historical 
truth they contain” (71), which is to follow his argument in Totem and Taboo 
that the murder of the primordial father explains the initiation of the incest 
taboo with which we live today, he recognized a fundamentally weak link in 
his theory: the origin of monotheism being the murder of the first Moses relied 
on a tenuous historical element: “Sellin’s suggestion concerning Moses’ end”. 
The fact is, Sellin had only a ‘theory’ that Moses was murdered by the Israelites, 
which was based on interpreting a few artifacts. This is why Freud’s thesis that 
the persecution against the Jews for murdering Jesus as being symptomatic of 
the undocumented murder of the first Moses could not be proved in historical 
terms; moreover, psychoanalytically, since this murder was the ‘missed’ event 
of a trauma, it could only be posited in hypothetical terms. Freud’s aim to 
explain a contemporary psychological phenomenon with a historical past 
exposed the inherent incompatibility of two methods: the historical interest in 
fact and the psychoanalytic interest in the narratives, or fictions, caused by 
trauma. The difference between the historian and the analyst reflects a tension 
between their hermeneutic practices. The historian relies on facts to represent 
the past for the present and reaches the limits of what she can say about the 
past when certain facts prove to be unreliable. In contrast, the analyst is less 
interested in the facts the analysand presents about the past event than in how 
she articulates the past; the analysand’s access to the missed “encounter with 
the real” is a retrospective rendering of it in the symbolic which makes it a kind 
of fiction.  
Freud’s research indicates where my project intends to avoid shaky 
ground and where it aims for firm footing. Paul’s letters are the earliest extant 
witnesses to the formative years of Christianity, contextualized by other works 
we have access to, such as those by the Judean historian, Flavius Josephus, the 
Judean philosopher, Philo of Alexandria, and the scribes of the recently 
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accessed library of Qumran. While historians have developed a reliable library 
of scholarship about this period, the interpretations associated with the material 
of this time is hotly debated and attests to the fact that our accumulated 
knowledge of the ‘facts’ of the first century is incomplete and arguably will 
remain that way as long as we continue to do history as we have done. Thus, 
with respect to the historical method, my research is only less weak than 
Freud’s historical material in Moses and Monotheism. What my research can 
offer, however, is the same hermeneutic approach that Freud used in relying on 
testimonies as witnesses to the unconscious, my effort being analyzing Paul’s 
first-century letters for the trauma that inspired them.  
If Freud’s research could have isolated a problem with the use of history 
in psychoanalysis, the use of psychoanalytic theory in the humanities has had 
its own share of problems. The field of research known as Trauma Studies has 
incurred criticism both from outside and inside the field; medical professionals 
have highlighted where humanities scholars have used symptoms of trauma 
improperly and historian, Dominic LaCapra has warned against the use of 
trauma theory in Holocaust Studies for fostering a culture of victimhood. I shall 
address both criticisms in detail in Chapter 2, but for now, would like to make 
this point about LaCapra’s warning; while his is a valid concern since one 
hopes that research does not promote pathology, it is valid on the assumption 
that trauma is bad. In this project, I would like to dispel the assumptions that 
trauma is only a bad experience, and by extension, promote the idea that not all 
traumas are the same. This would mean that trauma is more prevalent than 
some applications, such as Holocaust Studies, would suggest.  
The prevalence of trauma is implied by Caruth’s idea of history in her 
approach to contemporary texts in Unclaimed Experience. In this work, her 
analysis of Freud’s Moses and Monotheism leads her to see a correlation 
between the long history of the Jewish people of the Exodus and Freud’s 
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departure from Vienna on the eve of WWII, as the iteration of the ‘fort-da’ 
game. In these traumatic returns, survival registers as a constant, what I would 
identify as the ‘unveiled’ real, which leads Caruth to hypothesize: “If history is 
to be understood as history of trauma, it is history that is experienced as the 
endless attempt to assume one’s survival as one’s own” (64). Caruth qualifies 
her assertion about history as conditional, yet what I identify as valuable in her 
suggestion is that, in human history, survival is a trauma which is repeatedly 
taken up by each individual, in every generation (71). The implication here is 
that trauma is not just a horrifying crisis, as would be understood by the use of 
this method for Holocaust Studies, for example, but is a persistent condition 
experienced by the individual in the diachronic vision of history. Moreover, in 
Lacanian terms, each individual experiences many traumas in his/her life 
beginning with the socializing trauma of the Oedipal event. To what extent 
trauma may be re-defined as different kinds of trauma, is a question I pursue in 
the chapters ahead in considering the relation between the messiah and the 
Muselmann and Paul’s trauma. 
Since trauma is of the real, proving that our trauma categorically 
originates in Paul’s encounter with the real of Jesus is impossible and so is not 
the goal of this project. I also do not intend to prove that the trauma of 
secularism is a product only of Paul’s ‘real’ and what I mean by this shall be 
discussed in the chapters ahead. This does not disqualify the value of 
understanding the unconscious return to Paul’s thinking alongside the use of 
messiah and Muselmann in secular projects, and I am impeded, as is any 
psychoanalyst in having no access to trauma except through the symbolic. 
Exploring to what extent there is a relationship between the use of messiah and 
Muselmann in works determined by secular ideology and Paul’s letters of the 
first century is the question that drives this project and points to the limit of my 
research which is this: the probability that Paul’s trauma is the return of a 
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trauma that originated with someone else, of his colleagues or in ancient 
history, is something that my research can only point to as the irresolvable raw 
edge for other scholars to pick up and explore. 
One last qualifying point needs to be made about my objectives. Since 
trauma is only apparent in its effect on the symbolic structure of fantasy as 
return and in Žižek’s terms, interference, this project is limited to evidence of 
the trauma which are the fantasies inspired by the objets a of the messiah and 
Muselmann. This limitation is qualified by the fact that, since secularism’s 
strategy of secularization involves transposing Christian paradigms into 
seemingly neutral forms, a form of sublimation, the objets a of the messiah and 
the Muselmann are symptoms of some kernel of the real in secularism; that is, 
since the ‘compulsive return’ of obviously religious concepts counters the rule 
that the real is consistently invisible and never returns the same way, then the 
messiah and the Muselmann must be understood as the disguise of a trauma’s 
return. The question is: can we determine a factor that is common to these 
disguises? Discovering what that factor is drives my reading of Paul’s messiah 
with the secular messiah and Muselmann, not as an inversion of the causal links 
diachronically, from now to an original first ‘cause’, but as an inversion of the 
causal links synchronically within each tuché (cause) of the objets a, by 
bringing these ‘causes’ together in a comparative sense, to see what may be 




Though I am guided by historical research on Paul in approaching the 
contemporary objet a under review, I concede to historians who have 
repeatedly raised confusion about what I am doing to stress that this not a 
historical project in the sense that it does not restrict its field of hermeneutics to 
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the analysis of historical artifacts, nor is its modus operandi aimed to fulfill a 
comprehensive understanding of historical debates of the period. The nature of 
this project, however, does not mean that it is not of value to Pauline scholars 
because, as I hope those historians who read this would recognize that this 
project contributes original research to certain irresolvable debates in Pauline 
studies. The caveat I make about the discipline of history in this project applies 
also to philosophy. This is a project that may not be strictly philosophical, but 
remains relevant to the discipline of philosophy because it addresses the 
prejudices and assumptions determining philosophers’ return to Paul’s idea of 
the universal, the law of love, and the messiah. What informs my perspective 
with these disciplines is yet another discipline which, because of my 
background, is the dominant discipline, and that is literature.  
I had the great fortune of doing my first Master’s degree just after the 
apex of the canon wars in English departments in North America. French 
feminist scholars such as Hélène Cixous, Catherine Clément, Luce Irigaray, and 
American figures, Teresa de Lauretis and Judith Butler, had already infiltrated 
the field of Literary studies, as had Derrida’s deconstructionism with post-
colonialist, Gayatri Spivak. The politics driving scholarship, that the personal is 
political, was our inspiration for breaking the scholarly mold dominated by 
white male hegemony. With the infusion of female-authored texts and 
feminine-centered readings of texts, canonic reading lists broke apart and so did 
generic prejudices, invigorating a critical interest in memoir, epistles, life-
writing and hybrid genres. This a literary project inspired by these approaches 
with a vested interest in a hermeneutic of the text. The fantasies under review in 
the pages ahead have been chosen for their objet a, messiah and Muselmann, 
which means that generic differences become secondary to reading texts as 
fantasies of trauma. The critical aspect of the symbolic that determines the lion’s 
share of my research is its point of failure: the text reflects the real which is 
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accessible only through the symbolic; that is, it is limited by a subject’s relation 
to the unconscious through desire, determined by her/his cultural access to the 
symbolic (ethnic background, language) and her/his particular life experiences, 
(family crises, national crises, disabilities, etc.). That is, the subject’s resolution 
of the real encounter through a fantasy remains bound to semantic inheritance. 
Since, semantically, the objets a are religious, they point to the ‘real’ of God in 
biblical literature, which has brought me to consider that the work I am doing 
in drawing out a connection between secular projects and Paul’s epistles is 
similar to research by Northrop Frye.  
Through his work with the Romantics, and especially William Blake, 
Frye developed a literary criticism based on the premise that literature had its 
typological and metaphorical roots in Biblical literature. In the Great Code, Frye 
contends that religious material belonged to the arts over other forms of 
expression, such as philosophy (37). In his last project, Frye continued to 
distinguish his interest and promotion of literature against the critical work done 
by “rather aimless paradoxes that take us from ‘everything is text’ to ‘nothing is 
text’ and back again” (Words With Power 13). What I have to say is neither as 
relative as Frye suggests, nor as radical as may be supposed. If, in 
psychoanalysis, the real is badly represented in fantasy, the symbolic handle for 
‘trauma’, then the Bible is the failed representation of the encounter with the 
real of God, where God is merely the objet a–-the remainder that would not let 
go, or which people would not give up. Since the Bible stands as a tradition of 
the ‘real’ integrated into society as conscious and unconscious (Other) culture, 
then contemporary fantasies can be seen to rely on the tradition of the real for 
fantasy formation, and so, taking my qualification about semantic inheritance 
above into consideration, fantasies repeat biblical or mythic narratives. Frye 
suggests as much when he acknowledges the biblical debt in Marxist thinking; 
and to that I add the example of Freud’s adaptation of Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. 
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For the reason that literary metaphors and typologies are integral to intellectual 
works, then on the metaphorical level, philosophy is on par with literature. 
Therefore, while Frye is correct to see that myth belongs to the arts, the 
exchange between poetry and other disciplines like philosophy, suggests that, at 
a certain level, philosophy and poetry are equal.  
With full debt to Frye’s contribution to the field of Biblical criticism, I 
have one more qualifying point to make, which is key to my research. Much 
like scholars who contend that, for good or bad, secularism is Christian, Frye’s 
thesis stands on the conviction that western literature is indebted to the 
Christian Bible. What Frye means by the influence of the Christian Bible is 
described in his Code as a ‘U’ narrative from the high point of Genesis 
descending through crises, and rising up through to the fulfillment implied in 
the redemption offered by Jesus Christ. As one of several examples of this 
narrative, Frye references Lot’s wife’s transformation into salt as the only 
equivalent to Ovid’s metamorphosis in the Bible (Code 97), acknowledging 
some paragraphs later that Jesus’s resurrection is a version of this kind of Greek 
transformation, but is not an example of Biblical metamorphosis. Jesus Christ is 
distinguished because he is the sacred, as opposed to profane (i.e. Greek) form 
of transformation; he embodies the intervention of the transcendent God in 
fulfilling promises of the Jewish faith.  
The Christo-centric dominance of western culture and the ubiquity of 
Christian paradigms describe the ground on which Frye’s thesis is built, and I 
agree with this ground not as de facto, but as symptom. That is, I do not 
question Frye’s analysis, his method or his acceptance of Christianity as the 
universal faith since Christianity sustains its dominance on that fact. Rather, I 
question Christianity’s ideological mystification in representing itself as fulfilling 
Judaism and being the author of the end of days. What we modernists receive 
as Christianity’s narrative coherence is the retrospective work of scholars over 
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centuries erasing or resolving critical tensions and contradictions born of 
political and personal experiences by key players of the movement in its 
incipience. By looking at texts not as products that sustain the coherence we 
see now, but as documents attesting to authorial fantasies, products of traumas 
of their time, the inheritance Frye has identified changes focus. By using history 
to dismantle the illusions ideology perpetuates, a more nuanced interpretation 
of the effect of the real on secular ideology may be visible. 
The project has been divided into three movements; the first centers on 
the debates within secular scholarship and clarifies my debt to Freud and Lacan 
on the psychoanalytic method and trauma studies. In the second movement I 
engage in a dialectical reading of the philosophers’ and the historians’ 
scholarship on Paul’s letters, through three of his terms: “messiah”, the “Law”, 
and “conversion”. In chapter 3, I review the significance of the messiah in 
Paul’s texts beginning with the premise of Agamben’s disclosure in The Time 
that Remains, that Benjamin’s “weak messianic power” is “a quote without 
quotation marks” of a Pauline passage. In chapter 4, I focus entirely on the 
concept of Paul’s Law by reading the philosopher with the historian; I review 
and take issue with Badiou’s and Žižek’s focus on Paul’s law of love at the 
expense of ignoring the other laws; then I review the historians’ quandary about 
the variety of and inconsistencies apparent in Paul’s laws, and offer an 
interpretation of the Law of Christ by returning to the philosophers. In the fifth 
chapter, I focus entirely on Paul’s concept of conversion in relation to his 
‘encounter with the Christ’; in aid of understanding his personal trauma, I 
conduct a comparative analysis of his letters with the contemporary Greek 
novel, Joseph and Aseneth.  
In the third and final movement, I apply the revelations of Paul’s trauma 
to four case studies, two of each of the objet a under review. One chapter 
focuses on philosophical projects and the other on cultural projects. By 
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identifying these analyses as ‘case studies’ I mean to allude to Freud’s work, in 
the simplest sense: texts under review represent fantasies which I consider 
exemplary of the trauma indicated by the use of religious objet a within limits of 
the research accomplished to date. In Chapter 6, I consider philosophical 
expressions of the messiah and Muselmann; specifically, I compare messianic 
representation in Franz Rosenzweig’s theologically driven, The Star of 
Redemption with Derrida’s political treatise, Specters of Marx, and follow this 
with a consideration of the paradox of the absent Muselmann in Sarah Kofman’s 
memoir of Auschwitz, Smothered Words (Paroles suffoquées). In Chapter 7, I 
consider how the objets a which I have traced in philosophical works, is 
expressed in cultural texts; namely, I focus on the messiah in Žižek’s analysis of 
the attack of 9/11 in Welcome to the Desert of the Real through Kubrick’s 1968 
science fiction film, 2001: A Space Odyssey and then I consider the protagonist 
in Anne Carson’s novella, Autobiography of Red, as a contemporary iteration of 
the exception. In focusing on these objets a as they have manifested in fantasies 
of different disciplines and genres, from theology, philosophy, film, memoir and 
fiction, I am driven by the ambiguous search: what has returned of Paul’s real? 
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CHAPTER ONE: THE TRAUMA OF SECULARISM 
 
INTRODUCTION 
If secularism began as a doctrine devised by enlightenment scholars to counter 
religious violence, and to free scientific and intellectual inquiry from the 
superstitions of religion,19 and then became interpreted as the manifestation or 
sublimation of Absolute Spirit in the self-conscious subject,20 its contribution to 
leveling inequalities of class (Marx), race (Said) and gender (Spivak et al,) 
exemplified its universal aspirations.21 Secularism’s promise to be applicable to 
all, to be a ‘universal’ paradigm in the political sphere, has been the mantra 
used to maintain its value for European states for centuries. As a rational system, 
however, secularism seems to have maintained an irrational resistance to 
sectarian presence in the public sphere. How does a secular state justify 
interfering in how a citizen practices her faith by imposing a prohibition on 
what she can wear? In Quebec and Paris, the justification is framed as liberating 
Moslem women from patriarchal oppression. Wendy Brown’s article troubles 
this argument, by drawing attention to the assumptions that have sustained 
secularism’s putative promise of freedom feigning neutrality for other religions.22 
The result, she argues, is that secularism’s profession of tolerance belies 
manipulation: “Tolerance does not resolve but rather manages these inequalities 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” (1784).  
20 G. W. F. Hegel. The Phenomenology of Spirit.	  
21 By way of introducing the notion of the plurality of secularisms in a global world, Janet 
Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini note: “The main points of the traditional secularization narrative—
that secularization is central to modernity, that it enables progress toward universalism, and that 
it represent development or emancipation—remained strong in Western social theory during 
much of the twentieth century” (Secularisms 9.) 22	  “Secularism generates tolerance as mutual respect among religions”. Wendy Brown, 
“Civilizational Delusions: Secularism, Tolerance, Equality”, paragraph 19. 
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and exclusions” (Paragraph 20). As exemplified in the issue of the hijab in 
French public schools, and most recently in the niqab issue in courtrooms in 
Canada,23 secularism’s promise to rectify conditions of oppression, persecution, 
discrimination and non-representation, is based on all citizens agreeing that 
private religion is subordinate to public secularism. The only equality expressed 
in this dynamic is that all religions are equally inferior to secularism and those 
who do not agree, that is, those who do not comply with secular authority, are 
perceived as threats. The threat as secularism understands it, is the irrational 
power of religion.  
While it goes without saying that the attack of the World Trade Centre 
on September 11, 2001, otherwise known as 9/11, was a threat to American 
security, President Bush’s response to ‘wage a war on terror’, manifesting in 
targeting Muslims at border crossings, signaled that the threat was not simply 
violence but Islamic violence. In academic circles, the conviction that 
secularism was necessary to combat events of religious violence such as 9/11, 
inspired counter-arguments pointing to secularism’s reactionary prejudice 
against religion. It is by way of the debates circulating about secularism as a 
result of 9/11 that I lead into the focus of this chapter, which is to review two 
theories of a trauma of secularism: one by historian of philosophy, Hans 
Blumenberg, and the other by Lacanian philosopher, Alain Badiou.  
 
 
POST-SECULARISM AND ANTI-SECULARISM 
In the face of religious violence exemplified in the event of 9/11, Aamir Mufti 
highlights in his introduction to the boundary 2 (2004) issue dedicated to 
Edward Said, that scholars need to reclaim secularism: “The recognition of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 In 2011, the French government passed a law banning the niqab, the full head cover, in 
public. 	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need to declare oneself for secularism appears now, in light of the escalating 
forms of religious politics and violence that have come to dominate political life 
in multiple locations and across the globe, to have been anachronistic in a 
double sense, both behind and ahead of its time” (2). The threat inspired by 
9/11 evident in Mufti’s call is echoed in Spivak’s contribution to the same issue, 
“On Terror”. In this article, she calls on readers not to see 9/11 as “just about 
religion,”24 highlighting the first response by western thinkers to dismiss the 
event as a terrorist act committed by religious fundamentalists. In this move, 
Spivak positions herself as ‘for’ secularism, and initiates her deconstructive 
practice of exposing and pulling at the binary of religion vs secularism. 
Secularism is “a mechanism to avoid violence,”25 Spivak claims; at the least, it 
promotes the ‘soft option of ‘teaching tolerance’ (106), even though it is riddled 
by Kant’s Christo-centrism26 which needs to be worked through. Fully conscious 
of secularism’s weaknesses, Spivak stands by it as the procedure in humanities 
discourse that can deal with religious violence. 
What I want to highlight about the secularistic response to 9/11, by Mufti 
and Spivak and others, is not its reaction to the terroristic violence of 9/11, but 
its branding of religious fundamentalism as something secularism is obligated 
and equipped to fight against. If Spivak may be said to have already articulated 
her ambivalent favouring of secularism against the violence of religious rite by 
both condemning and condoning the White imperialist move to prohibit Sati as 
violence against women in, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988), she hides her 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 “I would agree with Vijay Prasha that 9-11, as it is being called now, is not just about 
religion” (Spivak 88). 
25 “… secularism is a set of abstract reasonable laws that must be observed to avoid religious 
violence” (Spivak 107).	  
26 “… the Judeo-Christian is the secular religion, is the prejudice that still rides us…” (Spivak 
105.) While I acknowledge Spivak’s recognition of the Kantian religion at the root of the 
founding principles of secularism, I am troubled by her conflation of Judaism with Christianity 
because it indicates another ‘blind-spot’ encouraged by the Christo-centric ideology of 
secularism. 
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ambivalence behind a passivist dismissal of violence as chauvinist. The fact is, 
Spivak’s deconstructive project is activated by male dominated discourse; as a 
woman, and a Marxist, she can point to the eastern subaltern she claims is 
being silenced by western imperialism, herself exemplifying the emancipation 
of that subject to speak by using Imperialist culture (as a Marxist feminist), but 
ultimately colludes with the culture that creates the subaltern’s silence. Spivak 
knows her collusion. Perhaps it is the paradox of her privilege that leads Spivak 
to resist reading 9/11 for its political message against American imperialism, 
using the same excuse in 2001 as she used when speaking about Sati in the 80s: 
that being a personal abhorrence of the violence of suicide. Spivak’s anti-
Imperialist politics would align her with the anti-Imperialistic ideals that 
fomented 9/11, and she knows that; this is why she tries for an ‘ethical 
encounter’ with the politics of the suicide bomber, but the closest she can get is 
to parallel them with liberation theologists. In this parallel, we “Americans” 
have an essentially partial but ultimately ineffectual view of the politics behind 
the alleged twin towers attack. Through the sieve of this Christian movement, 
something of 9/11 is erased and it is not its leftist-like politics but its religion. 
That is, by the end of the article, Spivak’s request that we not see the event as 
‘just religion’ does not let us see the religion at all.27 Spivak’s strategy suggests 
that 9/11 stands out as a threat to secularism not because of its violence, but 
because of its religion. It is not Christian.  
Is Spivak at all aware that, in attempting to look at the Muslim alleged 
hijackers from the perspective of a Christian religious fundamentalism, she has 
simulated and even updated Kant’s pietistic influences at the core of secularism, 
even after having admitted that the Christianness of secularism needs to be 
addressed (105)? What is fascinating about 9/11 in the post-event environment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  For a more detailed analysis of this argument see Principe, “Spivak’s Fantasy of Silence: A 
Secular look at Suicide.” Journal of Cultural Research Vol 17, Issue 3 (2012.) Web.	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is how, being a spectre of the religious turn, it has drawn out prejudices and 
anxieties by secularists, as Spivak’s response exemplifies. In contrast to anxious 
scholars like Spivak, there are scholars like Žižek who embrace religious terms 
for secular purposes: “the theological dimension is given a new lease on life in 
the guise of ‘postsecular’ Messianic turn of deconstruction” (Puppet 3.) What 
has been called post-secularism ostensibly coincides with the religious turn that 
has infiltrated the strictly secular domains of politics, philosophy, and culture. 
That turn, anecdotally represented by Jeffrey Robbins as the ‘death of God’ 
movement in the sixties in the United States, echoed by the liberation theology 
movement in South America, was coincidental with the rise of post-structural 
thought known as deconstruction. As deconstructionism gained importance 
with the rise of postmodernism, a shift occurred, and scholars, theorists and 
philosophers with deep ties to secularism recognized a need to reconsider the 
religious. In effect, Robbins points out, by the 90s, Derrida, Vattimo and 
Caputo, were proclaiming the death of the death of God (After the Death of 
God, 13).  
According to Hent De Vries, post-secularism is not articulated to the 
‘historical amnesia’ of postmodernism but to the paradox of the self-conscious 
ceding to the place of religion in the public sphere, reflected in the move by 
Derrida et al: “… if one understands the term post-secular not as an attempt at 
historical periodization (following upon equally unfortunate designations such 
as ‘the post-modern’, ‘the post-historical’, or ‘the post-human’) but merely as a 
topical indicator for—well, a problem. In the words of Hans Joas: ‘post-secular 
doesn’t express a sudden increase in religiosity, after its epochal decrease, but 
rather a change in mindset of those who felt justified in considering religious to 
be moribund” (De Vries 3).28 This would clearly explain how atheists such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  The ‘trouble’ de Vries identifies can be seen as performed in the recent issue of Boundary 2 
40:1 (2013) in which five scholars address the statement, “Why I am not a Post-Secularist”. In 
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Derrida and Žižek could produce secular projects with explicit religious 
content, and thereby problematize the inclusion of what was once verboten in 
the public sphere; yet, is religion so atypical of secular discourse? The event of 
9/11 would suggest it cannot be if it ever was. The fact is, this event has put the 
squeeze on secularism, and secularism’s response is to buckle under pressure; 
what is visible is that, as Brown argued, secularism is not as neutral as it has 
professed to be. 
Secularism was a means for encouraging Kant’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ of 
modern society, translating the Christian paradigms for universal ends of 
freedom and equality. These same idealistic principles dominate the post-
secular discourse: “’religion and secularity’ are simply twin faces of the same 
European (and now American) discourse” (“Disturbing Politics”, 12), claims 
Blanton, a (Christian) religious scholar. Blanton’s universalism is equal to 
Habermas’ atheistic idea of ‘tolerance’: “The principle of tolerance is first freed 
of the suspicion of expressing mere condescension, when the conflicting parties 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reading all works together, what becomes apparent is that their arguments are tied to the 
problem of defining postsecularism. While it is associated with the religious turn, that direct 
relation is troubled by the different politics driving postsecular scholars and so complicating the 
‘horizon’. Lambropoulos was the most poetic in his response, in defining all the things he is not 
from religious affiliation to being ‘postpolitical’ (80), and thereby amplifying what is problematic 
with the post-secular. Gourgouris takes an equally enigmatic position to the statement, 
performing that enigma in the paradox of atheism and the trouble with the prefix ‘post’. Post-
secularism cannot mean leaving behind secularism, but describing something new is equally 
untenable (42), which is why he concludes with the new horizon promised by the vanishing of 
atheism as equal to the new horizon that is implied but yet unnamed in the idea of the post-
secular (54). Cooper troubles postsecularism from the Marxist position signaling that the 
religious turn is a reactionary move by capitalism to reinvent its attachment to tradition. Mufti 
concentrates on scholarship that sees secularism’s relationship to the Muslim Other, and thus 
problematizes who gains from the work done in the name of postsecularism. With the same 
distrust, Robbins raises issues with those postsecularists, like Mahmood and Asad, who critique 
secularism for unconsciously enforcing a Christian prejudice against non-Christian cultures, 
which he troubles further as a critique that plays the dangerous game of exploiting religion for 
its modern cause, as for example, when Ghandi claimed that the earthquake in North India in 
1934 was God’s judgment “for tolerating touchability” (75) in order to consolidate his campaign 
to erase the tradition. The cases made by scholars for not being postsecularists does not mean 
their work is not postsecular, especially if the postsecular is, like the postmodern, reflective of a 
larger debate whose ‘horizon’ as Gourgouris thoughtfully put it, is not yet defined. 
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meet as equals in the process of reaching an agreement with one another” 
(Habermas, “Crisis of Faith”, 23.)29 While these scholars reflect what from a 
distance seems to be an open dialogue of secularism today, where both 
religious and atheist scholars can agree on fundamental principles of universal 
equality, another scene is played out in the Public Forum 20:3 (2008) debate 
between Saba Mahmood and Stathis Gourgouris. They are both intellectuals; 
they seem to have read the same books, for the most part; their equality, in 
western terms, is a given, but the impasse which their exchange arrives at 
exemplifies that, if Habermas and Blanton believe in secularism to be the 
source of equality between believers and non-believers, there is no agreement 
between Gourgouris and Mahmood on what belief means. 
The conflict described by their exchange can be summed up by their 
positions: Gourgouris sees that belief blinds a subject to universal values, while 
Mahmood sees belief as a cultural infrastructure determining subjectivity, much 
like Althusser’s ideology. Gourgouris responds to Mahmood’s aim to question 
some of universalism’s suppositions by labeling her an anti-secularist: “I agree 
that a critique of secularism begins with de-Christianizing or perhaps even de-
Westernizing its content, but to assume an anti-secular position in the process 
of this critique would ultimately uphold this content as the demon opposite” 
(439). In Gourgouris terms, the post-colonial scholar who confronts secularism 
from a religious perspective is anti-secularist (440) because, while she brings to 
bear religious and private values to a secular public forum which breaks with 
the convention that the two domains are unequal and incomparable, she 
dominates secular discussion with religious discourse: “This is why I argue, 
bluntly, that the ultimate point is not merely to disrupt the antinomic complicity 
between the religious and the secular but to take away from the religious 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Clearly, Brown would disagree with Habermas and Blanton for ignoring how liberal authority 
manages and subjects minorities; and as will become clear, she seems to be in agreement, to an 
extent, with Mahmood.  
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agency of determining what is secular” (444). While Gourgouris’ project to 
dismantle the hold religion exerts over secularism sounds proactive, his 
stranglehold on the ‘anti-secular’, reflects more an unconscious antagonistic 
grip of Blanton’s “twin faces of the same European discourse”. 
Mahmood highlights that, for Gourgouris, secularism is the proper and 
neutralizing discourse for public debate, which forecloses debate along the for-
and-against dichotomy: “his rhetorical defense of secularism devolves upon a 
kind of liberal romantic imaginary through which we are routinely asked to 
recognize our more profound commitment (to autonomy, creativity, 
imagination, and freedom)” (451). She concludes by making the point that only 
this affective relation to secularism, this partisan position, could make him see a 
correlation where none exists between ‘normative impetus to secularism’ and 
‘proreligion’ and ‘antisecular’ (451). In response, he accuses her of bad method, 
unselfconscious of his own methodological weakness: “you cannot conduct an 
anti-secularist argument simply by attacking liberalism without falling into the 
habit of argumentation that advances the anti-liberal agendas of the U. S. 
Christian republicans” (455). The fact that he finds fault with her anti-secularist 
method, entirely misses the point that she is not arguing like an anti-secularist, 
and any association there is between her and anti-secularism is one he has 
imposed or constructed.  
Gourgouris’ ‘us or them’ binary limits him to ‘us’; it is lobbeyed to an 
already converted audience of secularists, very much like that addressed by 
Mufti in his call to scholars to support secularism against the religious violence 
of 9/11. Moreover, like Spivak and Habermas, Gourgouris supposes that 
secularism is the neutral ground for a dialogue with the religious, which means 
that when his ‘neutral ground’ is questioned, he assumes antagonism. Though 
Spivak failed miserably to meet the ‘alleged hi-jackers’ in performing her 
deconstruction of the religious/secular bind, she did so self-critically, conscious 
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of those assumptions she was aware of, which was all Mahmood wanted to 
highlight about Gourgouris’ misidentification of her research as ‘anti-secular’. 
Mahmood’s troubling of secularism as the common denominator for dialogue 
reflects what Gourgouris fails to recognize as a devout atheist secularist: that 
secularism is a choice that frees the subject from religion, and all people want 
that freedom. Secularism is a universal project of emancipation, after all. 
Mahmood argues in her article, “Religious Reason and Secular Affect” 
(Critical Inquiry, Summer 2009): “What I want to problematize here is the 
presumption that religion is ultimately a matter of choice; such a judgment is 
predicated on a prior notion, one I mentioned earlier, that religion is ultimately 
about belief in a set of propositions to which one gives one’s assent…. One can 
change one’s religion, but not one’s skin colour” (852). The fact that a Muslim’s 
religious difference would be reduced to a mere set of protocols and precepts 
reflects secularism’s inability to see Islam as culture; it is only a religion. In 
short, for an atheist and a western believer, the freedom to believe in one faith 
or another, or to believe in no religion at all, is a social right made possible 
because of secularism. What this right does not account for is that the cultural 
logic of religious thought is so ingrained in the subject as culture that, as 
Althusser has famously noted, there is no outside to it (ideology). Gourgouris’s 
blind promotion of secularism reflects his inability to see secularism as 
ideology, which leads to his misidentification with secularism/atheism as a 
belief he has freely chosen. Even as he professes to recognize its Christian 
infrastructure as extant, he believes this infrastructure is something that 
secularism can be emancipated from. This very delusion is exactly the thrust of 
Talal Asad’s critique: “In the discourse of modernity ‘the secular’ presents itself 
as the ground from which theological discourse was generated (as a form of 
false consciousness) and from which it gradually emancipated itself in its march 
to freedom” (Secularism, 192).  
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The movement in secular critique represented by scholars such as 
Mahmood and Asad, highlights a line of critique that has centered on 
uncovering secularism’s hidden secrets. Carl Schmitt, the first critic of 
secularism, noted that the contemporary democratically elected sovereign 
maintained authority not through the power vested in her or him by the people, 
but the power which had authorized the monarch’s stewardship: the divine 
power. A second wave of secular critics advanced on two ends; the historical 
political avenue lead by Karl Löwith, highlighted that the secular idea of 
progress is driven by a Christian eschatological vision of the future; and a 
postcolonial approach headed by Said, identified Western imperialists move to 
identify the Oriental as the conquered other. Anidjar can be said to reflect the 
confluence of the critique of secularism as fundamentally Christian, and the 
Imperialist relation to the conquered other. The western rewriting of the eastern 
other as Orientalism was possible because secularism made religion as the 
other that must be secularized: “Christianity (that is, to clarify this one last time, 
Western Christendom) judged and named itself, reincarnated itself, as 
‘secular’”.30 In short, Anidjar argues, “Orientalism is secularism, and secularism 
is Christianity” (62), and every other non-Christian religion is an incomplete or 
malformed ‘byproduct’ of secularism. 
 Asad and Anidjar argue that secularism is blind to its Christo-centric 
infrastructure. In that light, we can suppose that at the heart of Mahmood and 
Gourgouris dialogical impasse is secularism’s ideological core that Spivak 
glosses over in the 9/11 threat: its Christianism. Spivak’s project for a freedom 
from religion in 9/11 is also explained, somewhat, by what Anidjar observes in 
Said’s refusal to address religion in his Orientalism; there is the expectation that 
a critical secularism would eventually bring an end to religion. The feminist 
politics in Spivak’s “Can the Sublatern Speak?” expresses this expectation; the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Gil Anidjar, “Secularism”, Critical Inquiry 33 (2006): 60.  
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law passed by British rule against the rite of Sati was less dangerous than the 
pagan practice of violence against women and eventually, the secular promise 
for freedom and equality would overcome even its own infrastructure. Spivak’s 
distrust of religion, translated through Mahmood’s assertion that Imperial 
secularism imposes a Christo-centric discourse on the right of the individual to 
choose not to be subjected to Sati (the pagan practice), can be seen to be 
promoting secularism’s Christo-centric discourse. The same dynamic is 
described by Brown’s assessment of how the prohibition of the hijab in Paris, 
which promises to liberate the female Muslim citizen, simply enforces a non-
Muslim uniformity on her private rights.  
It could be argued that, for the reason secularism originated from 
Christianity, and because secularism identifies religion as a threat, critics are 
prone to seeing a religious exclusiveness indicative of secularism’s Christian 
infrastructure; that is, Anidjar’s claim that “Christianity is secularism” seems to 
be supported by examples of the continuity between Christian ideology and 
secularism against non-Christian subjects. What then can be made of examples 
of discontinuity? In other words, if Anidjar’s thesis stands, how does secularism 
justify promoting political movements counter to Christian principles, such as 
gay rights, women’s right to abortion, the right to practice witchcraft, or the 
right to reject the idea of God? These many real political movements in 
secularism trouble Anidjar’s definition of secularism. Blumenberg’s thesis that 
the trauma of secularism originates in a second-century Gnostic teacher may 
offer the burden of proof to support Anidjar’s thesis. 
 
GNOSTIC TRAUMAS 
Blumenberg’s The Legitimacy of the Modern Age was published in 1966, six 
years after the Eichmann Trial, which inspired Hannah Arendt to coin the 
phrase, ‘the banality of evil’. The fact this term can return in the mouth of 
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President Bush after 9/11, to identify the nations comprising the ‘axis of evil’ 
(coined by the Canadian political writer, David Frum) is not a coincidence. The 
return of ‘evil’ in secular practices not only highlights the linguistic pattern 
around which this project is focused--the return of religious terms in secular 
projects—it also recurs in Blumenberg’s thesis; he argues that a trauma being 
worked through in secular society originates with the Gnostic concern with 
good and evil. To what extent this reflects an unconscious response to the 
reference to evil in the last page of Löwith’s Meaning in History is not 
something I can address in this project, but is something I would note here for 
future consideration.  
 Published twenty years before Blumenberg’s Legitimacy, in the recent 
aftermath of WWII, Löwith’s Meaning and History (1949) argued that history is 
determined by the future and secular history is “determined by an 
eschatological motivation” which is Christian: “It is also only with this 
teleological, or rather eschatological scheme of historical process that history 
becomes ‘universal’” (18). Löwith proves this thesis by retreating, incrementally, 
through philosophical thinkers in history, like Marx, whose representation of the 
class struggle as finding resolution in a messianism (44) involved adapting 
Hegelian principles of the Aufhebung of the principle Christian concept of the 
crucifixion and resurrection; this Christian theme of the messiah’s return 
repeats, Löwith argues, back through the enlightenment philosophers, the 
medieval philosophers, to Augustine. Löwith concludes his thesis with the 
ominous statement: “There are in history not only ‘flowers of evil’ but also evils 
which are the fruit of too much good will and of a mistaken Christianity that 
confounds the fundamental distinction between redemptive events and profane 
happenings, between Heilsgeschehen and Weltgeschichte” (203). It is hard to 
know which evils Löwith is reflecting on here; it does not seem to suggest the 
Nazis were driven by ‘too much good will’, though the irony of seeing the 
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Nazis this way at all is possible though complicated by the fact that irony is 
always a hard tone to detect, but the expression may simply reflect on the 
global willful denial of the extent of the Nazi crimes in the expectation of divine 
acts of salvation.  
 Blumenberg’s project highlights that the legitimacy of the modern age is 
centered on recognizing that modernity owes everything to its Christian origins: 
“The chief thesis then, roughly put, would be that the modern age is 
unthinkable without Christianity” (30). Since legitimacy is based on this origin, 
the modern age runs into trouble, both of legitimacy and fulfillment, when 
forgetting or repressing this religious foundation (116). In the process of 
outlining the trajectories of influence by the medievalists, Blumenberg aims to 
discredit the secularist critics, namely, Löwith, the Biblical scholar, Bultmann, 
and political theologist, Schmitt. While Blumenberg does not disagree with 
these secularists’ fundamental precept of the religious content in secularism, he 
claims that Schmitt’s thesis is less bound to the semantic trouble that riddles 
Löwith’s and Bultmann’s use of the terms, eschatology and secularism. Of 
Löwith’s thesis, Blumenberg takes the historians’ position in arguing that it lacks 
‘the burden of proof’ (28.) This is Blumenberg’s greatest criticism, which, for its 
generality, is essentially weak since the terms of proof are determined by the 
scholar’s discipline, chosen method, and period of study.31 Blumenberg’s other 
criticisms, which never really refute the secularists’ essential point that 
secularism is founded on Christian paradigms, are in the end a means for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Stephen McKnight offers a portion of the burden of proof to support Löwith’s thesis. He 
explores the history of the transfer of ancient wisdom including early magic and Gnostic 
teachings, as well as other mystical practices, into western culture, noting how these co-existed 
with the more standard disciplines of philosophy and literature. He references the renaissance 
figure, Pico, on the god-power of man (190) and other magic literature, to explain “how the 
eschatological language of religion becomes immanentized into doctrines of progress” (“The 
Legitimacy of the Modern Age: The Löwith -Blumenberg Debate in Light of Recent Scholarship” 
193). 	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leading in to his thesis that contemporary society is working through a trauma 
established by Marcion’s Gnosticism.  
Blumenberg proves the failure of the eschatological thesis proposed by 
Löwith in semantic terms; if eschatology claims that the future redemption 
reflects an event that interrupts human history, then what use is mankind’s 
actions or plans, towards the envisioned progress? Everything about eschatology 
flies in the face of enlightenment principles of rational thought leading to 
‘infinite progress’; in short, eschatology references a transcendent event while 
modernism contends change is ‘immanent in history” (30), and the result of 
human action. Blumenberg emphatically resists the eschatological vision of 
history represented by Scholem: “No, it is not to be believed that ‘secularized as 
the belief in progress, Messianism still displayed unbroken and unique vigor’ ” 
(34). Moreover, he contends, there is no anxiety or acceleration of time into the 
future worth noting (50). Thus, Blumenberg concludes, Löwith’s concept of 
secularism not only implies the absence of human agency, which leaves society 
at the mercy of a false determinism, it reinstates a divine principle which is 
counter to modernism’s homocentricity.  
His non-eschatological vision of progress denies the facts of horrifying 
events of the twentieth century, including that referenced in Löwith’s 
concluding statement of the “flowers of evil”. Vincent Pecora notes the trouble 
Blumemberg’s neo-Kantian model of the future puts him in; it reflects a vision 
that was ridiculed by Benjamin in his “Theses of the Philosophy of History” 
(Pecora 62) and it is a model that seems to deny the reality that Löwith’s thesis 
accounts for (64).32 That is, while the expected return of the messiah has yet to 
materialize, historical events remain bound to this expectation. Take, for 
example, nineteenth-century French society that was riddled with self-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 In Secularization and Cultural Criticism, Pecora does a short treatment of the argument 
between Löwith and Blumenberg, focusing primarily on the ideas of the latter scholar (57-66). 
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proclaimed messiahs, charismatic figures such as Saint Simon and Fournier,33 
amongst others, all of whom inspired Marx’s vision of a future emancipation in 
his Communist Manifesto. Every year, every decade, and at every millennial 
turn, there is talk of apocalypse and global disaster but Blumenberg is not 
interested in this history; he promotes the idea of ‘infinite progress’ because the 
unfulfilled nature of this progress regulates the way society deals with crises, so 
that no one is used as a means to an end (Legitimacy 35) and man is the maker 
of his own destiny. Having said that, Blumenberg acknowledges the 
significance of eschatology in human consciousness as signaling a trauma. 
Blumenberg argues that the secularists’ focus on the eschatology of 
secularism as a relation to the future, must be inverted; instead of seeing history 
as determining, or creating the terms for, an eschatological future, history must 
be seen as motivated by the historical introduction of eschatology. In that way, 
the significance of ‘secular’ is not an eschatological hope, but a historical 
moment. The ‘unworldly’ of the saeculum expressed the conditions in which 
Christianity came to flourish: through St. Paul and St. John, the concept of the 
eschatological ‘unworldly’ future of the end of time loomed as imminent, 
arriving ‘like a thief in the night” (Thessalonians): “There was no worldliness 
before there was the opposite ‘unworldliness’” (47). Over the years, the 
imminent event of Christ’s return was delayed, and eventually was postponed 
into a distant future by a caring loving God: “Early Christianity found itself in 
what was, in view of its foundational documents, the difficult position of having 
to demonstrate the trustworthiness of its God to an unbelieving surrounding 
world not by the fulfillment of His promises, but by the postponement of this 
fulfillment…. In order to demonstrate its usefulness to the surrounding world, 
which, while it is a source of affliction, is also itself afflicted, the ancient Church 
‘secularizes’ itself into (takes on the worldly role of) a stabilizing force” (44). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 Talmon. Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase. 1960.	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Eschatology, therefore, changes from the imminent destruction of the world in 
salvation, to the work by God to stop the coming apocalypse. In effect, we do 
not see the secularism of eschatology, but secularism made visible by 
eschatology, Blumenberg argues. Anidjar’s contention that “Christianity 
reincarnated itself… as secular” (Anidjar 45) is affirmed by Bluemberg’s 
historical semantic review. What is also evident is that Blumenberg’s attempt to 
erase Löwith’s eschatology from secularism only affirms Löwith’s contention 
that secularism is overridden by Christian eschatology. As Pecora notes, evident 
in Blumenberg and Habermas both, there is no vision of how secularism may 
either exist with other cultural (read religious) input, or with no religious input 
at all (66). 
 At the crux of Blumenberg’s paradigmatic shift of the eschatological 
question as historical, the incommensurability of Christianity’s double vision of 
the world is made visible; the world that was made for man, by the original 
God, did not seem related to the one that would be destroyed by God with 
Jesus’ salvation. “Only the great Marcion could resolve this dilemma—
dualistically, and thus mythically. The dualism between the sphere of salvation 
and the created world was so unavoidable that it had to appear even in the 
orthodox systems, though mitigated by the allegorization of the counter power 
as a political entry, as in Augustine’s twofold civitas [city of man, city of God] 
just as there are genuine and false secularizations” (47). It is this dualism and 
what he suggests are its recurrences that point to weaknesses in secularism 
which are only visible through other ‘lines of inquiry” (113). Blumenberg wants 
to highlight that the recurring eschatological pattern represented by Bultmann’s 
secularism actually expresses an ‘undelt-with-past’: “The terms ‘Forgetfulness of 
Being” [Seinsvergessenheit] and ‘repression’ [Verdrängung] deriving from very 
different sources in the thought of our century, represent a common underlying 
circumstance, namely, that what is past and forgotten can have its own sort of 
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harmful presence. The idea of secularization belongs in this context too, within 
which its function becomes intelligible” (116). In short, secularization reflects 
the operation within modernism that is a working through of a trauma. 
Trauma, Blumenberg argues, is evident in the modern age as the 
continued trouble modernity has in addressing the ‘origin of what is bad in the 
world’ (127), a trouble which Marcion’s Gnostic teachings tried to resolve 
eighteen hundred years ago: “The fundamental thought that underlies Marcion’s 
Gnostic dogmatics is, I think, this: A theology that declares its God to be the 
omnipotent creator of the world and bases its trust in this God on the 
omnipotence thus exhibited cannot at the same time make the destruction of 
this world and the salvation of men from the world into the central activity of 
this God…. Marcion decided to make a radical incision. He found in Gnostic 
dualism the schema for the unequivocal character that he thought he could give 
to the Christian doctrine” (129). I highlight Blumenberg’s use of ‘incision’ here; 
it signifies the ‘psychic wound’ of Freud’s trauma in a particularly interesting 
way, and it is an idea repeated by Agamben and Santner, as the Apelles’ cut, or 
by Žižek as the cutting of the Gordian knot.  
Blumenberg argues that the repressed ‘trauma’ stems from the fact that 
Christianity found intolerable the idea that an evil god lived imprisoned in the 
world and that the good God refused to deliver mankind from this demon’s 
prison (131); Marcion (85-160 CE) aimed to resolve the problem with his 
Gnostic dualism. Several centuries later, Augustine (354-430 CE) would make 
the effort to bury the dualism posed by Marcion’s Gnosticism with the idea that 
man is responsible for his own sin: “In the very text that had convinced Marcion 
of the wickedness of the Old Testament lawgivers, in Paul’s epistle of the 
Romans, Augustine found the theological means by which to formulate the 
dogma of man’s universal guilt and to conceive of man’s justification [in the 
theological sense of the term] as an absolution that is granted by way of an act 
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of grace and that does not remove from the world the consequences of that 
guilt” (135). Augustine’s project, according to Blumenberg, covered over 
Marcion’s incision so that, though the dualism was erased in a metaphysical 
sense, “it lived in the bosom of mankind and its history as the absolute 
separation of the elect from the rejected” (135). That is, what has been 
repressed by Augustine’s sealing out of Marcion’s Gnosticism returns as ‘the 
absolute separation of the elect from the saved”. To understand Blumenberg’s 
thesis that the trauma of the modern age originates with Marcion, we need to 
translate what is meant by a separation of the ‘elect and saved’. While 
Blumenberg never explicitly identifies what is signaled as the return of the cut, 
various associations that I will now trace, point to that return being anti-
Semitism. 
It is notable that Blumenberg’s thesis of a rupture originating in the 
Christian faith is repeated independently by Žižek, but in much more abstract 
terms: “what is effectively ‘repressed’ with the established Christian doxa is not 
so much its Jewish roots, its indebtedness to Judaism, but, rather, the break 
itself, the true location of Christianity’s rupture with Judaism” (Puppet 10). Later 
in Puppet, Žižek will discuss the effect of the rupture rising as anti-Semitism. 
Where Žižek places the responsibility of that rupture is hard to know, though 
his attention to Jesus as the catalyst for change leads to my question: Why does 
Blumenberg identify the cut as originating before Augustine but not as far back 
as Jesus? Or, if Gnosticism is that significant, why Marcion and not some other 
Christian Gnostic like Augustine’s teacher, Mani (216-276 CE)? Or Marcion’s 
contemporary, the Egyptian Valentinus (100-160 CE)? Gnosticism is an unstable 
concept that proliferated in Christianity, and predated Christianity, as 
exemplified by some of the sectarian texts of the Dead Sea Scrolls, the Persian 
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and Babylonian myths, and the ancient Zoroastrian double deity religion.34 This 
variety may account for the reason Blumenberg qualifies his proposed traumatic 
source: “This outline, which I have given here only in order to show what is 
really ‘Gnostic’, need not concern itself with the broad range of speculative 
variants” (129). Blumenberg’s choice of Marcion is specific to Christianity but 
for that reason remains ambiguous and in certain respects, incomprehensible; 
for one, Marcion was a heretic who was probably executed for that crime, and 
our only knowledge of his heretical teachings come to us from Tertullian’s 
works against him. That is, we do not know exactly what Marcion taught. 
Moreover, even Blumenberg’s historical source, Harnack, admits Marcion was 
technically not a Gnostic, as his focus was more soteriological (History of 
Dogma 223). That is, while there were for Marcion two Gods, the one that 
retained propriety of the Jewish people, and the better one that looked after the 
Christians, Marcion’s theology was based on Paul’s teachings: “He believed that 
his own teaching was neither more nor less than a retrieval of the true Pauline 
gospel” (Wilson, Related Strangers, 212.) 
Scholars have not managed to agree if Macion’s particular brand of 
theology is more Gnostic than Pauline; that is, in the effort to resolve existing 
contradictions within Paul’s letters, Marcion took up the Gnostic lens and saw 
that the universe was divided by two gods, one good and one bad. Even so, by 
seeing Paul’s claim that the ‘the law engenders sin’ (Rom 5:20; 7-7), which 
signaled the division of the old God who founded sin, and the new God of 
Christ who would release people from sin, Marcion seems entirely Pauline, 
according to Räisänen (Räisänen, Blackwell Companion to Paul, 308). Wilson 
notes that Harnack contended Marcion’s views came from “an intense religious 
experience and exaggerated Paulinism” (Wilson 213). The most significant 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 A brief overview of the scholarship on Gnostic thought, and arguments for Zoroastrianism, is 
found in the Introduction to Elaine Pagel’s The Gnostic Gospels (xxx). 
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aspect of Marcion is his legacy; he was not anti-Semitic (221), but his argument 
that the Jewish God was inferior to the Christian was taken up by later Christian 
philosophers to condemn not the God but the Jews as “inferior” (220). Today, 
Marcion’s teachings represent the incipient origin of anti-Semitism which 
probably explains Blumenberg’s choice to locate the root of “elect and saved” 
in Gnostic thinking. 
Blumenberg’s use of Freud’s work on trauma to create an approach to 
uncovering the trauma of secularism affirms the anti-Semitic theme of Gnostic 
trouble. Blumenberg does not reference texts that focus on Freud’s foundational 
research on trauma, such as Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1926), nor does he 
mention critical concepts like Nachträglichkeit (delayed response), or the fort da 
game. Rather, using terms like ‘repression’ and ‘return’, Blumenberg focuses on 
Freud’s theory of trauma as the recurring pattern of the ‘repressed’, evident in 
the paternal murder in the primal horde, Totem and Taboo (1913), and central 
to his project defining once and for all the reason for anti-Semitic hate through 
the narrative of ‘Moses’ murder, and then Jesus’ murder in Moses and 
Monotheism (1938). The anti-Semitic theme explains why Blumenberg also 
briefly evokes Civilizations and its Discontents in his statement, “Discontent is 
given retrospective self-evidence,” (118) a project that foregrounded the anti-
Semitic focus in Moses. Integral to his theme of racial hatred in Freud’s work, 
Blumenberg highlights, is the place of guilt in the repressed past: “Freud traced 
the Christian idea of original sin, as an expression of a historically undealt with 
and growing consciousness of guilt and as a precursor of the return of the 
repressed content” (118).  As I will show, Blumenberg’s focus on Marcion’s 
Gnosticism as the origin of anti-Semitism takes its cues from Freud’s own 
interest in guilt as derivative of the repressive function of religious doctrine.  
Guilt is a key concept in Freud’s analysis of the Exodus story in Moses. 
The Exodus was for Freud the pivotal event of the Jewish faith. In Freud’s re-
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reading of this event, the crisis of the Jewish people came to a head when the 
Egyptian prince named Moses, took them into the desert to follow his 
monotheistic religion. In the desert, they rebelled and killed him, after which 
they continued roaming in the desert until they met a second Moses who they 
took to replace their first murdered leader. For Freud, the trauma of the Jewish 
people is revealed in the arrival of the second Moses, indicating the delayed 
return of the murdered Moses. The guilt of murder returns metaphorically 
buried in the narrative of the Exodus and later, it returns in the murder of Jesus.  
The history Freud wanted to tell of the Jewish people was a secular 
atheist’s revision of the delusion that was put in place to compensate for having 
murdered Moses; Judaism’s distinction of election was based on being chosen 
by a heretical Egyptian pharaoh, a putative fact which was buried in Moses’ 
murder and which returned in disguise as God’s election. In identifying a 
hypothetical first cause, adapting the principles of new science of archaeology 
to the new science of the mind, Freud actually offered a very persuasive 
explanation for the ongoing persecution of the Jewish people since the death of 
Jesus Christ, which explained in a perverse way, the reason for Jesus’ 
crucifixion, in non-deus terms. If the jealousy caused by the Jewish distinction 
of being chosen (116), is clearly defined in Freud’s revision of Judaism as a 
delusion of the Israelites being chosen by the man, Moses, and not God, then 
anti-Semitism is, for Freud, a tragic delusion by Christians about the significance 
of Jesus Christ’s sacrifice, as Freud paraphrases from St. Paul’s teachings: “We 
have been delivered from all guilt since one of us laid down his life to expiate 
our guilt” (174). The glad tidings (gospel) were meant for the Judeans, Freud 
argued; the guilt that had been the foundation of the faith was paid for by Jesus’ 
self-sacrifice. The trouble, Freud claimed, was that only those Judeans who 
accepted Jesus’ debt by becoming Christian were absolved, and the rest 
remained guilty: “In its full form, the reproach would run: ‘They will not admit 
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that they killed God, whereas we do and are cleansed from the guilt of it.’… 
Through this they have, so to speak, shouldered a tragic guilt. They have been 
made to suffer severely for it” (176).  
Considering Freud makes such a sound case for the fact that guilt is the 
product of a series of related delusions carried out by the Jewish faith and the 
Christian faith, wondering whether or not Freud actually felt the guilt he 
describes seems somewhat disrespectful. How could Freud be seduced by such 
blatantly bad logic as the religious causes of debt? Yet, in light of Lacan’s 
refocusing of guilt from the institution to the subject’s relation to his own desire, 
where guilt is caused not by the subject’s failure to meet the expectations of the 
religious system, but by giving ground to his desire, understanding Freud’s 
relation to this guilt he describes I think is valuable. Al the issues surrounding 
Freud and what I would define as an over-determinate of guilt will be delt with 
in the next chapter on methodology. 
Freud’s psychoanalytic material serves Blumenberg’s choice of Marcion 
as the one who cut and then through delayed effect, initiated effects Freud 
identified as anti-Semitism; it would seem, then, that Blumenberg is attempting 
to lift the responsibility of anti-Semitism from Jewish shoulders onto Christian 
shoulders; it was not the Jewish putative murder of Moses that started it all, but 
the failure of the early Church fathers to recognize Marcion’s heresy for a 
wound that required theological attention. In that respect, Blumenberg’s thesis 
of a trauma in secularism substantiates secularism as a Christian system, though 
the issue I raised about discontinuity has yet to be addressed, and will not be 
addressed until I have completed the Pauline chapters. The relation between 
trauma and guilt, adopted by Blumenberg in whole from Freud, is somewhat 
problematic in light of Lacan’s approach to guilt and will be addressed in 
Chapter 2. In the immediate terms, I would like to focus on seeing Marcion’s 
metaphysical cut in relation to the return of the religious terms, messiah and 
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Muselmann in secular projects. The secular context explains why I would agree 
with Blumenberg’s focus on secularism as originating in Christian culture, but I 
would trouble his focus on Marcion, especially in light of Žižek’s interest in 
Jesus being the origin of a break, an idea which recurs in secular interest in the 
‘death of God”. From the point-of-view of the crucifixion/resurrection narrative 
of Jesus, it would seem that Marcion’s position in the continuum moves from 
first cause into the position of a Nachträglichkeit.  
 
GOD IS DEAD 
In Seminar XI, Lacan contends that trauma is an “encounter with the real” (55). 
What is problematic about the real is its very indeterminacy, provoking anxiety 
in the subject who responds by representing it in the symbolic order as fantasy. 
Any representation, any discourse, is fundamentally of the real but is not the 
real: “The Real, or what is perceived as such,--is what resists symbolization 
absolutely” (Seminar 1 66).35 Žižek interprets Lacan’s enigmatic idea thus: “The 
impossibility of the Real refers to the failure of its symbolization: the Real is the 
virtual hard core around which symbolizations fluctuate; these symbolizations 
are always and by definition provisory and unstable, the only ‘certainty’ is that 
of the void of the Real which they (presup)pose” (Living in the End Times 107).36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  With respect to the psychotic, Lacan associates the real with the compulsive return of 
hallucination: “whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears 
in the real” (Seminar III 13). 	  36	  What Žižek identifies as a distinction between the real and the symbolic is problematized by 
Tom Eyers who, identifying a correspondence between Lacan’s real and Freud’s navel of the 
dream, that point in the dream narrative where signification is so tangled it is incomprehensible, 
identifies the real as the origin of the symbolic. As Eyers understands Lacan, there is reason to 
see that the symbolic takes its material nature from the real: “The binding that Lacan refers to 
here is the beginnings of a binding of ‘writing’—proto-signification—to relational language, and 
the source of this ‘writing’ is to be found in the Real, as a foundation or ground to later “effects 
of meaning”. It is the signifier in its material aspect (its being ‘in-isolation’) that provides this 
written, material ground to meaning. It is worth underlining here Lacan’s unequivocal 
association of such signifiers with the Real, an association that gives the lie to Nobus’ and others 
wish to definitively separate the instance of the Symbolic from that of the Real. (“The ‘Signifier-
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While the real is, as Žižek emphasizes, the disaster aroused by the ‘void’ of 
non-symbolic energy, it is also a force actualized in the system of moral law, 
Lacan argues (20). That is, there is order to this indeterminate force, an order 
adapted from Freud’s concept of the missed ‘cause’ of the compulsive return of 
the trauma; trauma always returns, and when it does, does so ‘as if by chance’ 
(Seminar XI 54). The accident of Badiou’s event, Alenka Zupancic argues, is the 
ethical demand found in Lacan’s real: “These terms [real and event] concern 
something which appears only in the guise of the encounter, as something that 
‘happens to us’, surprises us, throws us ’out of joint’, because it always inscribes 
itself in a given continuity as a rupture, a break or an interruption” (Ethics of the 
Real, 235). For Lacan, the ‘real’ remains a place-holder for the necessary or 
ethical interference in the symbolically structured order of reality. 
Badiou’s attention to the ethical nature of the event is the premise for his 
diagnosis that the twentieth century is crippled by a ‘passion for the real’. In his 
long essay, The Century, Badiou claims that this ‘passion’ reflects a suspicion 
with representations and discourses as pure simulacrum (52); that is, the subject 
ruled by ‘passion’ indiscriminately launches attacks on all symbolic systems as 
if to release or expose the real, to account for it or make it accountable. The 
modern subject has come to recognize that, as Althusser has articulated, 
ideology or discourse responding to the traumatic real may only ever ‘denote or 
conceal’ the real (49) even as the subject misrecognizes it as reality: “As 
Althusser observed, we are in the presence of a symptomal set-up; 
representation is a symptom (to be read or deciphered) of a real that it 
subjectively localizes in the guise of misrecognition” (49). As the events of the 
century have proven, from revolutions to wars to experimental projects in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
in-Relation’, the ‘Signifier-in-Isolation’, and the Concept of the ‘Real’ in Lacan”. Parrhesia, 
Numbers 14, 2012 p. 65.) 	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arts, science and war technologies, these ‘passions’ have led to traumas we are 
grappling with still. 
  Badiou argues that this ‘passion’ or suspicion of representation targets 
nineteenth-century promises: “the nineteenth century announced, dreamed, 
and promised; the twentieth century declared it would make man, here, now” 
(32). The compulsion behind modernism’s ‘now’--“the passion for the real is 
always the passion for the new” (56)—in confronting nineteenth-century 
promises takes two courses of action, purifying and destructive, or negating and 
subtractive (54), leading to radical and unplanned for outcomes. This 
compulsion for action, unburdened by a moral order, led to such devastating 
‘events’ as the Holocaust, Stalinism, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: “This is why our 
century, aroused by the passion for the real, has in all sorts of ways—and not 
just in politics—been the century of destruction” (54).  
Another key ‘passion for the real’ of the century is found, Badiou claims, 
in the promises of humanism in philosophy such as Nietzsche’s ‘overman’ 
which encouraged the disappearance of God so that ‘man’ could take over ‘his’ 
own destiny. In the twentieth-century passion, we are confronted with ‘man’s’ 
disappearance; alongside the two-hundred-year-old God is dead narrative, “the 
man of humanism has not survived” (166). The disappeared ‘man’ of secular 
humanism has, according to Badiou, led philosophy to focus on the future 
through anthropological or inhuman terms: “at the border between the fifties 
and sixties, and under the single slogan of the death of God”, there is Sartre’s 
anthropological emancipation, and Foucault’s thinking “which lets an inhuman 
beginning arrive” (173). What Badiou identifies as a “slogan”, God is Dead, 
points to a passion for the real relevant to my focus on a trauma of secularism. 
Lacan’s declaration that God is dead only temporarily (Seminar XX) is 
rooted in the principle of resurrection. Against the insistence and persistance of 
this cycle of death and rebirth of the divine, Badiou takes on the task of 
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unbinding the subject from the demands of the statement God is Dead by 
literalizing the expression in his article, “God is Dead” (Briefings and Existence). 
If God is immortal and cannot die, Badiou points out ironically (22), religion 
convinces us that God dies because he is a ‘living God’, rendered through 
Jesus’s dying, and resurrection (Badiou, 23).37 But what is dead, has died, 
therefore, Badiou claims, “It has happened. Or, as Rimbaud said, it has passed. 
God is finished” (23). Only a dead God can be used by metaphysics against the 
living God of religion; that is, the abstract power of the infinite One rationalizes 
the dead God as illogical (25). Or, the literalization of God’s death only 
emphasizes the pathological insistence of God’s return: “It is also given in the 
exasperation of the public make-believe rituals and body markings, which have 
only ever been meager performances for the precariousness of the living God” 
(27). Badiou’s plan to promote ‘contemporary atheism’ involves ‘finishing up 
with promises’ (29) so to speak, finishing these incessant and insistent cycles of 
the metaphysical and religious Gods’ immortality which, no matter how 
precarious Badiou claims they are, resist destruction. By cutting what sutures 
the infinite to the One of metaphysical God, as in Nietzsche’s rendering, the 
dead God stronghold evaporates, Badiou claims; by declaring the death of the 
living God of religion, once and for all, the religious God collapses, Badiou 
asserts; and by allowing the poetry-God to signal the fact that we have lost 
nothing, and nothing will return, we can arise to the responsibility of acting in 
the world, “in a mediation, in the clearing of God’s death… ‘here’” (32), and so 
traverse the fantasy of the dead God. Badiou performs how much easier it is to 
say God is dead than to make God lie there, dead.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Badiou highlights that the living God is of a tradition that goes back to Isaac and Jacob; I 
would like to qualify that the expression of their relation to the living God is defined by Pascal, 
and not in the Judean bible. Granted, the emphasis here for Badiou is not who said what, but 
the fact that the expression was only possible because someone said it.	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At the most, Badiou can only obscure the power of the resurrection 
narrative, which is sustained by the dead God promoted by scholars such as 
American radical theologist, John Caputo. A postmodern scholar who 
participated in the movement of the Death of God in the sixties, Caputo 
exemplifies the anti-thesis of Badiou’s strategy. Caputo asserts that incarnation, 
visible and remembered as God’s suffering on the cross (67) was the supreme 
example of God’s devotion to man. If Nietzsche humanized God as Jesus, the 
Death of God movement took advantage of the deifying of man in Jesus, by 
bringing God closer to mankind which, in turn, made possible the elevation of 
mankind to God. The movement followed Nietzsche’s critique of idol worship 
and priesthood in dealing specifically with the incommensurability of religious 
teachings and contemporary issues of women’s and gay liberation movements, 
while at the same time arguing against Nietzsche’s sense of the dissolution of 
God. Caputo notes that even the postmodern practice of the movement 
represented by Mark Taylor as “deconstruction as ‘a hermeneutic of the death of 
God” (67), never strays far from referencing the presence of the suffering, that is, 
living, God. Caputo’s radical theology, enacted as a dynamic dialogue between 
transcendence and immanence, is God-centered and, I cannot help but point 
out, a fantasy sustained by the desire of resurrection, which withstands every 
effort of Badiou’s fantasy of human finitude to take down. 
What Caputo’s article relies on, which Badiou’s two works, The Century, 
and “God is Dead”, do not, is the God-is-Dead narrative promoted in the 
Biblical record. Caputo’s narrative is supported by centuries of religious 
practice, and two hundred years of philosophy; it is exactly the narrative Hegel 
references in his Phenomenology of Spirit as the “hard saying God is dead” 
(455) and is the one which Nietzsche’s attack on metaphysics embodied in the 
historical Jesus. If Badiou’s works referencing God is dead do not engage the 
biblical narrative directly, his Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism does, 
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and also serves to see how the Death of God narrative reflects the twentieth-
century condition of a ‘passion for the real’. In St. Paul, Badiou’s ostensible 
project is to reconfigure Paul’s message of universalism as valuable for our 
contemporary national and racial factions, intolerances, and divisions; 
confronting the promises in Nietzsche’s representation of a real death, Badiou 
addresses the real of death as Paul’s resurrection: “Resurrection is not, in Paul’s 
own eyes, of the order of fact, falsifiable or demonstrable. It is pure event, 
opening of an epoch, transformation of the relations between the possible and 
the impossible… [it] testifies to the possible victory over death” (45). Badiou 
highlights the fabulous quality of that ‘event’: “the event that he takes to identify 
the real is not real (because the Resurrection is fable)…” (58). Paul’s fidelity to 
the event is his retroactive work to signify the death of Jesus through the truth-
Event of the resurrection. In Badiou’s revision, the resurrection establishes 
equality in the universalist message through the truth procedure of love (92). 
For Badiou, ‘event’ is a very specific concept of social/political change 
developed in his seminal opus, Being and Event (1988). Adapting Lacan’s 
concept of trauma, Event is the fantasy, or the product of a radical new 
beginning, as a result of the subject’s encounter with the real, which is the 
evental site. The event is distinguished from the crisis as the symbolic 
dimension of the real: it is the naming of the crisis. Caputo’s ‘event’ is based on 
a collage of influences; for example, God is the event, “harboured in his name“ 
(50),38 while the ‘event’ is provocation as the “unforseeable ‘to come’”, in 
Derridean terms. It is also the promise evident in Žižek’s “fragile absolute” 
(48)—which, I suppose Caputo to mean reflects those moments of love that 
‘unplug’ the subject from the dominant discourse of war and difference (Fragile 
Absolute 119). If God is the event, then the death of God is the event of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Chesterton, and through him, Žižek, argues that the mortification of God on the cross is in the 
cry, “Father, why have you forsaken me?” God has forsaken himself. Žižek’s spin on this event 
is that it signals the moment atheism enters Christianity, admitting a non-existent God. 	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cross, of the father’s sacrifice for the son (63), or, “the seperability in principle 
of the event from the name, like a spirit leaving a lifeless body behind” (70). 
What strongly distinguishes Badiou’s event from Caputo’s event is the subject’s 
position to the ‘real’; for Badiou, the real of the event is only visible in the 
fantasy of the resurrection that leads to the truth-procedure of love; for Caputo, 
the real of the event is the literal crucifixion which makes God’s love visible. 
The asymmetry in their views of ‘event’ highlights a fundamental difference 
between the theologian and the atheist; yet for all their difference, they share a 
similar response to Nietzsche’s narrative.	  
Since the one with the new message is always seen as a fanatic (Anti-
Christ, 87),39 then Nietzsche’s madman in the Gay Science has a radically new 
message: “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall 
we, murderers of all murderers, console ourselves? That which was the holiest 
and mightiest of all that the world has yet possessed has bled to death under our 
knives. Who will wipe this blood off us? With what water could we purify 
ourselves?” (95) Note that Nietzsche is complicit in the murder, problematizing 
the preconceived notions of who Jesus’s murders are, and so also radically 
unmaking the object of murder. Who is God in Nietzsche’s representation but 
the material man who has become an illusion or fable, of Hegel’s Absolute, an 
abstraction inherited from the priests, especially St. Paul. Nietzsche’s literal 
rendering of Hegel’s dying God is intended to erase divine status from a 
historical man whose message has been perverted: “This ‘messenger of glad 
tidings’ dies as he lived and as he taught—not in order to ‘save mankind’, but in 
order to show how one ought to live” (50). Nietzsche aimed to secularize and 
so reclaim Jesus as a political activist for modern mankind, whose ‘free spirit’ 
distinguished him as an example, in a true way that was ruined by his 
deification by St. Paul.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  St. Simon, the self-proclaimed messiah, is one of the fantatics (Nietzsche 87).	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If Nietzsche sees Jesus as the master whose true message of a ‘free spirit’ 
is lost in the lies presented by the priests like St. Paul, Badiou re-signifies Jesus 
as merely the name by which St. Paul can announce the new law: “[Paul] 
‘shifted the centre of gravity of that [Christ’s] entire existence beyond this 
existence” (61), as a promise of new life ‘’for all”. Paul’s militant politics of 
inclusivity, Badiou argues, is entirely missed by Nietzsche (61) whose prejudice 
against St. Paul reflected the real object of his loathing, which was universalism 
(62). While Badiou may be indebted to Nietzsche’s atheist secular project to 
unravel metaphysics, he explicitly erases the visceral quality of Nietzsche’s 
murder: “Hence, the desperate and bloody affirmation of an artificial and 
mortified religion, whose subjectively burrowed real principle is, from end to 
end, that God is dead. The dramatization of this hidden evidence is given 
simultaneously in the ceaseless reproduction of his death, under the type of 
death of those presumably guilty of His death” (27). I want to highlight Badiou’s 
interrelated but incommensurable dramas; there is the drama of the Easter event 
and the drama of the continued persecution of the Jewish people; one is 
imaginary, the other is actual. The narrative of the death of God, Badiou argues, 
reflects the power of ideology to sustain its ‘life’ through the continual cycle of 
resurrection that perpetually affirms the guilt of the Jews. Badiou attempts to 
undermine the cultural ritual by personifying religion as a victim of death so 
that Nietzsche’s dead Jesus has burrowed into a dead inhuman. That strategy 
raises the question, what is killed? Badiou wants to kill religion, you might say, 
but can only do so by giving ‘religion’ life, which means that the Nietzschean 
representation of the death of the imaginary Jesus and the very real persecution 
of Jews goes underground. Of course, the aporia I have highlighted in Badiou’s 
abstraction is offset somewhat by the fact that all of these ‘deaths’ he reviews 
are fundamentally symbolic; they are just fantasies of the real that was missed. 
Even so, sustaining the hegemonic narrative in this way obscures the motivating 
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factors of the narrative and so misses the opportunities for countering 
hegemonic influence. 
Caputo is less coy about the constellation of ‘guilt’ in the narrative: “the 
death of God is a grand recit all its own that is complicitous with Hegel’s story 
about the Jews. That is a supersessionist story of the transition from the 
alienated Old Law of the Pharisees to the benign New Law of love and the gift, 
from the dead letter of literalism to the living Spirit, from the legalism of slaves 
to the religion of the children and friends of God, from an eye-for-an-eye 
economy to the gift, etc.. The hint of Marcion is never far from this story, 
however much it is resisted and revised” (80). Caputo sweeps through the 
history of centuries of empire and Christo-centric supremacy to point out that 
supersucessionism,40 integral to the  use of the term, ‘Judeo-Christian’ and 
emanating from Marcion’s Gnostic philosophy on the superiority of the 
Christian God, is a narrative which, through ‘a certain close reading of Saint 
Paul on the Jews” (80),41 is alive and kicking in the God is Dead slogan as anti-
Semitism. Caputo’s reference to Marcion seems to support Blumenberg’s thesis 
that the trauma of modernism originates in Marcion’s cut, except that the 
historical event that serves the Death of God, for both Caputo and Badiou, 
precedes Marcion.  
Caputo’s analysis makes visible what Badiou reflects only elusively: at 
the heart of the grand récit of the Death of God, there is an anti-Semitism 
originating in the Christian competition with the Judean faith, leading to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Caputo argues supercessionism is ubiquitous: “supercessionism … even shows up in 
completely secular, atheistic neo-Marxists like Žižek and Badiou when they start singing the 
praises of love and grace in Saint Paul over the law, which is dead” (81). What I want to 
emphasize in Caputo’s observation is that the Christian field engaged by Badiou in his strategy 
to sustain a secular vision of the God is Dead narrative in the face of ongoing political activity, 
is perpetually pulled back by the resurrection promise. 	  41	  The ‘certain’ quality of the reading means assuming anti-Judean sentiments were intended by 
St. Paul; the fact is, what St. Paul has to say is directed against the contingent of Jewish followers 
with whom he had been in conflict over the matter of his proselytizing the gentiles to Jesus’ 
message.  	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Christian accusation that the Judeans killed Jesus. In comparison to Nietzsche’s 
creative literal rendering of the death of God by his own murderous actions in 
company with others (did Neitzsche identify his anti-Christian position as 
equivalent to the anti-Semitic subject?), Caputo’s and Badiou’s literalizations 
stage a paradox of elision. Caputo’s theology eliminates the humanness of the 
crucifixion, the historical Jesus, by embodying the death and resurrection in 
divine suffering and compassion. While this might bring God close to the 
human, it obscures the anti-Semitic refrain that is at the core of the ‘slogan’. 
Badiou, for his part, in one text, entirely ignores the historical event of Jesus’s 
crucifixion by focusing on Paul’s role in shifting the centre from Jesus to the 
resurrection of Christ; and in another text, makes religion the living thing to be 
killed; as with Caputo, the anti-Semitic core, the complex network of accusation 
and guilt integral to Nietzsche’s project, as something he wanted to expose as 
bad faith, is maintained in hiding by Badiou.  
While Badiou identifies God as dying, dead, or even ‘embalmed’, and 
points to the fact the ‘truth statement of which God is the application is only 
active insofar as to be barred, burrowed or unconscious’ (27), both he and 
Caputo reject Nietzsche’s God is Dead murder fantasy. Their adoption of “God 
is Dead”, rather, is taken whole, as a ‘slogan’ of the event whose syntax 
eliminates both agent and victim: there is a proper name, God, whose predicate 
is another noun, ‘death’, which has no cause. Who or what is God? What 
caused God’s death? Was God murdered or did God commit suicide, or did he 
die of a heart attack? The fact anyone in the West might smile knowingly at this 
last question, exemplifies the assumptions promoted by both the theologian and 
atheist in their unqualified use of the slogan. That is, “God is Dead” is a Christo-
centric narrative operating in such a Christian field, and by field I mean the 
intersection of many discourses in secularism, that Nietzsche’s murder can be 
euphemistically interpreted as supersuccessionism and presumably, any 
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undefined crimes. Anti-Semitism returns in the passion for the real of “God-is-
Dead” currency; its unconscious repression is exactly what Freud attempted to 
uncover as trauma in Moses and Monotheism. It is a Christo-centric concept 
that underpins secularism.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Marcion’s Gnosticism complements Freud’s research which is why I would not 
argue against Blumenberg’s choice of Marcion as standing for the principle that 
has led to centuries of Christian persecution against the Jewish people, executed 
in extremely traumatic terms in the twentieth century. On the other hand, while 
anti-Semitism may be the effect of the trauma, it need not be considered the 
only effect, an issue raised by the fact that anti-Semitism substantiates Asad’s 
and Anidjar’s theory of secularism’s Christo-centrism, but does not address the 
apparently non-Christian aspects of secular politics, such as laws promoting 
women’s rights, gay rights, animal rights, and intellectual freedom, to name a 
few. In light of Badiou’s and Caputo’s work on the Death of God narrative, I do, 
however, contest seeing Marcion’s Gnosticism as the original cut of our 
contemporary trauma; rather, the death of God points to a cut that inspired the 
delayed return (Nachträglichkeit) of Marcion’s metaphysical, metaphorical, cut. 
That is, if anti-Semitism can be understood as a symptom of a historical trauma, 
then what was the original cut? Caputo claims the cut was the death of Jesus, 
while Badiou asserts it was the resurrection of Christ. Now, since the crucifixion 
is a physical event, something tangible and of death itself, as opposed to the 
purely conceptual resurrection, and since the Nachträglichkeit of Marcion’s cut 
indicated that the anti-Semitic narrative was rooted in the killing of Jesus, then 
the crucifixion would seem to be the originating trauma. What troubles that 
conclusion are two factors; the crucifixion would not exist as it does today 
within the Death of God narratives, without the resurrection; moreover, 
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according to Badiou, with whom I agree, the resurrection is a fantasy. In short, 
this search for the ‘original’ crisis in contemporary iterations of secularism has 
arrived at the impasse of a fantasy. 
This dead end is not the end, though; in considering what has been 
reviewed, a course for further work is highlighted by what is common to all 
elements reviewed. Marcion saw himself as fulfilling what he thought was St. 
Paul’s message through a dualism that resolved the place of the Judeans in the 
future of God’s eschatological plan; Nietzsche rejected Paul as a liar obscuring 
the truth of Jesus’ message of true spirit. The death of God grand recit, has no 
currency without the fact of Jesus’ resurrection that recreated the terms of death; 
as Badiou notes in St. Paul, the earliest witness with the most reliable 
provenance of the resurrection, is St. Paul’s testimony. Since St. Paul is the 
common factor throughout, I propose that the trauma of secularism, which I 
have traced through this chapter, is legible in his letters. What evidence of 
trauma can be found in those letters shall be the focus of the chapters ahead, 
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The impasse with which the last chapter ended reflects a failure that this project 
accepts in advance; the original trauma that is being worked through in 
secularism can never be found and it cannot be found because it is of the ‘real,’ 
that which is inexplicable. All that we can hold of the real is that which Lacan 
identifies as the ‘unassimilable’ element of the encounter with the real that 
marks the trauma within the fantasy (Seminar XI. 55), what Žižek redefines as 
Schelling’s ‘indivisible remainder’ evident in the objet a (Remainder 56). It “is 
not a kind of external kernel which idealization/symbolization is unable to 
‘swallow’, to internalize, but the ‘irrationality’, the unaccountable ‘madness’, of 
the very founding gesture of idealization/symbolization” (52).42 What is at issue 
in my project is the diffuse abstract unknown territory of the real only as it has 
taken shape through the indivisible remainder in our symbolic order in the item 
of the objet a. That trace, in Derridean terms, and the dialogic nature of that 
indivisible remainder in culture across the centuries, is what determines my 
hermeneutic. 
In preparation for analyzing St. Paul’s letters, several methodological 
concerns need to be addressed. For one, our access to an ancient time is riddled 
by centuries of interference, in philological and material terms; for another, the 
language of an ancient text is void of modernisms, leaving the first-century text 
opaque in some notable respects. These are historical categories of trouble that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This quote, according to Žižek, defines the ‘real’, yet four pages later, he qualifies the 
‘remainder’ of the ‘real’ as the objet petit a: “… the subordination of the real under the ideal 
pole (of darkness under light, of female under male…) never comes out without a remainder 
which, of course, is the Lacanian objet petit a” (56). 
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contribute to distancing us from understanding and reflect a problem of 
interpretation exacerbated by the already stated impasse: the fact that the 
original trauma that is being worked through in secularism can never be found. 
The task of this chapter is to define the limitations of the methods I will use, 
psychoanalytic, historical, and philosophical, in order to identify what of the 
mystery of trauma we can touch.   
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first starts with a review of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and its limitations as a science of the linguistic sign, 
leading into addressing why Freud’s narrative of Moses is so over-determined by 
crime and guilt, and concludes with a consideration of Moses’ ‘call’ through 
Althusser’s interpellation. The second section focuses on Badiou’s philosophical 
engagement with Paul’s letters, and especially his attention to Paul’s language. 
Badiou’s claim that Paul was a poet is the detail that signals the third section 
focusing on the historical scholarship on Paul and the historical methods used 
to understand Paul’s text, Sitz im Leben. I conclude the chapter with a thought 
experiment that circumscribes how psychoanalysis may be used to treat Paul’s 
letters as a case study that introduces us to the terms central to the trauma we 
are working through today. 
 
 
AT THE LIMIT OF ANALYSIS: CRIMES AND THE REAL 
The work Žižek does, in company with Badiou and Joan Copjec (Read My 
Desire,) in analyzing culture and politics through Lacanian paradigms runs 
parallel to, and for the most part independent of, work by contemporary 
humanities and sociology scholars who tend to rely on Freud for a more 
memory based approach to cultural analysis. A revitalization of Freud’s theory 
of trauma in addressing Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) experienced by 
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Viet Nam veterans, and an increase in reported cases of sexual abuse,43 
coincided with a rise in scholarship in Holocaust literature and testimony 
responding to a flurry of publications of memoirs, theoretical works, testimony 
projects, and films on the Holocaust from the 1960s to the 1980s. These 
projects share in problematizing witnesses’ testimonies by exploring the limits 
of memory, truth and justice. The most emblematic of the fraught witness is 
found in Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz  (1999); Agamben’s 
metaphorization of the Muselmann as figuring the ethical demand to bear 
witness despite the impossibility of witnessing will be considered in detail in 
Chapter 6. In cultural terms, Claude Lanzmann’s nine-hour epic documentary 
Shoah (1985) is exemplary in reflecting the new ‘limited’ witness; edited in long 
sequences, the film performs in imaginary real-time, the effort and failure to 
access the full truth of the crimes of the Holocaust through interviews and 
location filming, drawing a perverse parallel between the abandoned 
overgrown sites of the death camps, and the perpetrators resistance to 
remembering the past.44  
Holocaust Studies has attracted scholarship from across a variety of 
disciplines, inspiring competing ideas on methods, and even a kind of 
competition between disciplinary approaches to the trauma;45 no matter their 
methodological differences, however, the majority of scholars in trauma studies 
share the same motivation that led Lanzmann to create his documentary: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Tali Kal, Worlds of Hurt, 1996. 44	  The issue of failed or incomplete memory coming out of the Yale University project 
documenting survivor’s testimonies by Langer and Laub (Holocaust Testimony: The Ruins of 
Memory, 1991), or the dilemma of expressing the inexplicable as explored in Sara Horowitz’ 
Voicing the Void (1997). On Memory, see Caruth’s Trauma: Explorations in Memory (1995). 
Scholarship dealing with limitations of first person testimony and second generation witnessing 
are collected in Testimony: Crisis of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (1991) 
edited by Shoshanna Felman and Dori Laub. 
45 Where the psychoanalyst, Laub, distinguishes himself for listening in a way the historian does 
not (“Bearing Witness” 1992, 224), the historian, LaCapra, suggests ‘historiography’ is one “way 
to come to terms with the wounds and scars of the past” (Writing history, Writing Trauma 42).	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seeking justice on behalf of the victims to identify and condemn the perpetrator. 
Dori Laub claims: “The perpetrators, in their attempt to rationalize the 
unprecedented scope of the destructiveness, brutally imposed upon their 
victims a delusional ideology whose grandiose coercive pressure totally 
excluded and eliminated the possibility of an inviolate, unencumbered, and 
thus sane, point of reference in the witness” (“Truth and Testimony” 66). Based 
on the understanding that the perpetrator has an unambiguous role in trauma 
studies as the cause of trauma, La Capra uses the figure to emphasize a serious 
concern with trauma as a method in historical research: “As a consequence one 
encounters the dubious ideas that everyone (including perpetrators or 
collaborators) is a victim, that all history is trauma, or that we all share a 
pathological public sphere or ‘wound culture’” (64). As I will explain shortly, 
what is dubious is not the idea that everyone suffers trauma, but that trauma is 
the privilege of the victim of a crime, and explains why LaCapra footnotes this 
statement with a reference to Ruth Leys Trauma: A Genealogy (2000) amongst a 
few other texts, as a source for more discussion on the “uses and abuses” of the 
concept of trauma. The inclusion of Leys’ text in LaCapra’s reference is an 
indirect reference to her critique of Cathy Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience: 
Trauma, Narrative and History (1996). As I explore Caruth’s work in the 
following pages, I will make a case for the fact that the problem LaCapra 
identifies with the method of trauma, does not reflect a problem with the 
method at all, but rather, reflects a misunderstanding of what trauma is. 
LaCapra’s reference to and anxiety about ‘wound culture’ seems specific 
to Caruth’s Unclaimed Experience, especially since her project aims to envision 
wound as voice in literature through a psychoanalytic hermeneutic of trauma: 
“… trauma seems to be much more than a pathology, or the simple illness of a 
wounded psyche: it is always the story of a wound that cries out, that addresses 
us in the attempt to tell us of a reality or truth that is not otherwise available” 
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(4). In company with the Humanities scholars’ return to Freud’s trauma in their 
research on Holocaust testimonies, Caruth’s project engages in the ethical 
dimension of trauma research, politically motivated to address contemporary 
literary criticism’s concerns with the ‘poststructuralist criticism [which] … lead 
to political and ethical paralysis” (10). Much like the scholarship that 
problematizes prejudices against survivor witnessing, Caruth seems to be 
committed to positioning witness in the ethical role of testifying to the 
impossible trauma of the other. Leys targets Caruth’s humanities project for 
misusing Freud’s psychoanalysis to the extent that it can implicate a scholar for 
sympathizing with the Nazis.  
Leys is a historian of psychoanalysis, and Freud’s contribution in 
particular. In Trauma, she discusses the historical trajectory of medical research 
on trauma from Freud up to the present, highlighting a division in contemporary 
trauma research: there are those who argue it is a psychic condition and so 
oppose the research done by those who study it as a neurological phenomenon. 
Her prejudice against the science of the latter is epitomized by her critique of 
Bessel van der Kolk and his work on PTSD which Caruth’s humanities project 
adapts, in part: this is Leys’ only substantial critique of Caruth’s work, and 
seems over-stated considering that Caruth is not alone in confusing the 
condition of trauma originating from Freud’s already confused approach to 
these two aspects of trauma, a confusion which Lacan avoided by limiting his 
psychoanalytic science to the linguistically determined symbolic. Leys’ 
prejudice against Caruth’s project is signaled by the fact that she misses 
contributions Caruth makes to trauma studies in the humanities, and in the 
process, exposes her own disciplinary limitations. 
As far as Leys’ is concerned, Caruth’s project shamefully misapplies and 
misinterprets Freud’s theory of ‘traumatic neurosis’ in her chapter, “The Wound 
and the Voice”, in which Caruth uses Freud’s study of Tasso’s Gerusalemme 
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Liberata in “Beyond The Pleasure Principle” to introduce the voice as trauma. 
Leys’ critique of Caruth’s analysis is so textually centered that I shall quote fully 
from Caruth’s quote of Freud’s story before reviewing points raised by Leys 
against Caruth:  
Its hero, Tancred, unwittingly kills his beloved Clorinda in a duel while 
she is disguised in the armour of an enemy knight. After her burial he 
makes his way into a strange magic forest, which strikes the Crusader’s 
army with terror. He slashes with his sword at a tall tree; but blood 
streams from the cut and the voice of Clorinda, whose soul is imprisoned 
in the tree, is heard complaining that he has wounded his beloved again. 
(2)  
Caruth proceeds to explore how the trauma of the event is missed by Tancred, 
and recognized only in its return as a haunting voice (4) which, Caruth claims, 
is the wound inviting an ‘encounter with another’ (8). Leys begins: “Freud does 
not cite the story of Tancred as an example of traumatic neurosis but as an 
example of the general tendency in even normal people to repeat unpleasurable 
experiences, and hence as an example of the repetition compulsion, or death 
drive” (293). While Leys is correct to highlight that Freud introduced the 
Tancred story as indicating ‘compulsive repetition’ with no relation to 
‘traumatic neurosis’--“We are much more strongly affected by cases where 
people appear to be passive victims of something which they are powerless to 
influence, and yet which they suffer again and again in an endless repetition of 
the same fate” (“Pleasure Principle” 60)—she overlooks Freud’s assertion that 
the same “compulsive repetition” is evident in the WWI veterans’ nightmares 
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(61) whose inexplicable repetition indicated the condition of “war neurosis”, or 
trauma (“Pleasure Principle” 51).46  
Freud’s reflection on the ‘compulsive repetition’ of the child’s ‘fort-da’ 
case in “Pleasure” (53) is rewritten by Lacan as the child’s trauma of separation, 
or the first stage of oedipalization, and so one of several kinds of trauma 
experienced in a subject’s life. When Lacan claims that trauma returns, ‘as if by 
chance’, he is reiterating that the primary symptom of trauma as “compulsive 
repetition” is never initially obvious (Sem XI 54). While I acknowledge Leys’ 
scholarship on the history of Freud’s research gives her a certain authority, her 
criticism of Caruth’s work reveals a police-like attention to the ‘letter of 
[Freud’s] law’ that does not account for the preliminary quality of Freud’s 
research, and the fact that Lacan reformulated many of Freud’s ideas, in the 
‘spirit of Freud’: “Lacan takes Freud very seriously, but nevertheless contradicts 
him at times after careful consideration” (Fink, The Subject, 149). Caruth’s 
reading of the Tancred story as trauma adapts Lacanian innovations to Freud’s 
formative theories on trauma even as it signals her debt to Freud. Leys pays no 
heed, and so entirely misses Caruth’s contribution to humanities study at a 
formative time in the discipline of literature47. In analyzing a variety of genres in 
her project, from fable, to film to a psychoanalytic text (Moses), Caruth draws 
attention to the indeterminacy of the idea of trauma writing as a genre, not to 
mention seeing trauma as ubiquitous, both in the individual’s life and in social 
structures. Caruth’s approach is in company with the Lacanian-centered 
scholarship by Badiou, Žižek, Zupancic, Copjec, etc., which does not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Sandor Ferenczi completed and published the research he and Freud did together on the 
WWI Veterans in Psycho-analysis and the war neuroses. With introduction by Sigmund Freud. 
London, England: The International Psycho-Analytical Press, 1921. 
47 This formative time refers to the Canon Wars in English departments in the 80s early 90s as 
referenced in the Introduction to this project.	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differentiate between individuals represented in cultural artifacts and political 
phenomena for objects of analysis. 
 Leys’ limited hermeneutic agility, hampering her agenda to discredit one 
non-medical doctor’s use of medical research in her work, is indicated in her 
list of Caruth’s fallacies: “It is not true that Tancred’s killing of Clorinda is 
‘unavailable to consciousness’, until it imposes itself again in the form of a 
murderous repetition. Neither Tasso nor Freud makes the claim that Tancred is 
unconscious or unaware of having killed his beloved the first time. He 
‘unwittingly’ murders Clorinda (Freud uses the term ‘unknowingly’) in the sense 
that he does not intend to kill Clorinda, even if he does intend to kill the enemy 
she pretends to be” (Leys 294). Every time I read this sentence, the absurdity of 
it strikes me like Lacan’s anamorphosis: the statement initially seems to be 
coherent except for some strange interference which, on closer look, implicates 
Leys’, not Caruth, in imprecise diction. The distortion is visible in the verb tense 
‘having killed.” No one, and especially not Caruth, would claim that Tancred 
did not know he had killed Clorinda once he had taken the mask from her 
dead/dying body. That was the point when he was ‘conscious’ of his crime. 
Before that point, the body he dueled with and killed was his enemy.  
Leys entirely misses the nature of trauma; trauma has nothing necessarily 
to do with the physical wound, as Freud emphasized in his early research notes 
on trauma with the WWI veterans48; moreover, Freud notes that the prevalent 
condition of trauma was ‘shock’ or ‘fright’ (51) or in Lacan’s terms, ‘missed’. 
The trauma in Tasso’s story was not the act of killing Clorinda; the trauma was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Regarding “traumatic neuroses”, Freud claims: “The terrible war that has only just ended gave 
rise to a great many such disorders, and did at least put an end to the temptation to attribute 
them to organize impairment of the nervous system brought about by mechanical force” 
(“Beyond the Pleasure Principle” 51). By mechanical force, Freud means physical wounds from 
war; that is, trauma is a psychic, not physical, wound (50). The implication is that there is no 
reason to see psychic trauma being shared with a physical wound, yet there is also no reason to 
see that one cannot exist without the other. 
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the accident of it; the shock of a reality that did not register because it was not 
intended, expected, experienced as such; that is the trauma Freud was talking 
about. It is possible that the reason Freud resisted analyzing Tasso’s story as 
reflecting a psychic condition was because it was a fiction, and not a case 
history; however, the precedent for analyzing a literary text as a case study of 
trauma, was set by Freud himself in Moses. Putting that aside for now, the 
fictional Tancred buries Clorinda, “overwhelmed with grief, self-reproach, and 
guilt…” clearly cognizant of his crime; the killing of her metaphorically a 
second time retroactively signifies the trauma as a shock that could not be 
undone; the shock of being a ‘passive victim’ in Freud’s terms, of that which 
returns differently in the exact same way: in disguise49. I would propose that 
Clorinda’s “disguise” as a tree points to what is ‘inassimilable”, the indivisible 
remainder, of Tancred’s trauma; the trauma is not the question, “Why did 
Tancred kill her?” but “Why was she in disguise?” That question is 
unanswerable for Tancred because Clorinda cannot answer, being  dead. Thus 
we see clearly what is meant by the symptom of repetition that signals trauma; 
even when it recurs, and no matter how many times it returns, the original 
trauma remains inaccessible. 
Leys executes a kind of inverted ‘anamorphosis’ in her analysis of 
Caruth’s text; she has added the term ‘victim’ where it does not exist. Leys 
asserts that Clorinda, the victim of a crime, ‘is not capable of witnessing or 
representing anything of what she has experienced” (295). According to Leys, 
this is a dilemma which Caruth resolves with literary tricks: “Caruth’s highly 
ingenious answer is to suggest that Clorinda’s voice is not exactly her own 
voice but that of Tancred in the sense that hers is the voice of the traumatized 
Tancred’s desecrated second-self” (295). The fact is, there is no trick in reading 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 In Seminar XI, Lacan references Kierkegaard’s article, “Repetition,” with respect to the return 
of trauma, noting that “repetition demands the new” (61). 
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literature as literature. The leap Leys has made to give the dead Clorinda a 
voice, however, is based on a significant misunderstanding of literature. By 
giving Clorinda subjectivity attributed to a living person, Leys mistakes fiction 
for reality and so entirely misses Caruth’s hermeneutic of the wound as 
witnessing through the ‘voice’. Keep in mind that, any fantasy presented to us is 
always limited by the source; the characters in a story are always in relation to 
the protagonist and the protagonist is the focus of the author’s work. That is, the 
act of identifying against the hermeneutic of fantasy authority, to identify with 
Clorinda as Leys has done, is to impose a fantasy on the fantasy. Leys’ 
interpretation speaks only of her own need to find justice, and does not follow 
the strict method Caruth is following. As Caruth emphasizes, the wounded 
speaking tree is not the dead Clorinda; it is the vocal return of Tancred’s trauma. 
This story is not about Clorinda, it is about Tancred; therefore, if Leys wants to 
bring restitution to a ‘literary’ crime, she has identified in Tancred the wrong 
perpetrator of the crime.  
This story was written by Tasso, and so, if any crime could be said to 
have happened, it could only be in relation to Tasso. Even then, reading the 
fantasy of Tasso’s trauma as something real mistakes Tasso’s fantasy as 
confessing to a crime. This of course does not exclude the possibility that 
Tasso’s trauma did not in some way reflect a crime he committed, or one he 
witnessed, but getting at that is beyond my knowledge and I think Leys’ also. 
The fact is, this historical fact is not relevant to contemporary analysis. Rather, 
what is important in psychoanalytic terms is that we have a story in which an 
unanswerable question persists as unknowable, represented simply in the 
disguised return of the accusation in the voice which is Tancred’s ‘psychic 
wound’ made by the ‘rupture’ of reality in Tasso’s fantasy (Lacan Seminar XI 
56). What was the trauma that inspired Tasso’s poignant, misogynistic tale? I do 
not know. 
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All the trouble Leys has in understanding trauma as a psychic wound 
and confusing fiction for the ‘encounter with the real’, is exemplified in her 
project to expose Caruth’s crimes: “[Caruth] converts Tancred into the victim of 
a trauma as well” (294). Leys wants to emphasize that Caruth has exonerated 
the perpetrator by distinguishing him as the victim, a move that only signals 
greater crimes ahead: “But her discussion of Tasso’s epic has even more chilling 
implications. For if, according to her analysis, the murderer Tancred can 
become the victim of the trauma and the voice of Clorinda’s testimony to his 
wound, then Caruth’s logic would turn other perpetrators into victims too—for 
example, it would turn the executioners of the Jews into victims and the ‘cries’ 
of the Jews into testimony to the trauma suffered by the Nazis” (297).50 Equating 
Tancred with the Nazis reiterates Leys’s failure to keep perspective on the 
difference between literature and reality. Leys believes she has found the crime 
in Caruth’s research, but to prove it, she needs to invent the Tancred ‘victim’ as 
a Nazi, at the expense of missing the symbolic significance of the tragedy of 
Tancred’s trauma and trivializing the actual crimes of the Nazis. All that 
happens is that she exposes her misunderstanding of trauma and its fantastic 
manifestations.  
There is no fair correlation between Leys’ obvious relish in levying her 
distasteful and misapplied accusation against Caruth’s work and La Capra’s 
respectful anxiety about ‘wound culture’, but their repeated prejudice against 
the perpetrator in Holocaust trauma narrative overlooks what is visible in 
Caruth’s reflection on Freud’s interpretation of Tancred; in trauma, there is no 
perpetrator. This does not mean the one who suffers trauma is also not a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The root of Leys’ criticism of Caruth’s work is hard to isolate; it may rest entirely with Caruth’s 
notably strange elisions of Freud’s reference to Nazi racial policies, but if that can mean 
anything, Leys leaves things vague and full of innuendo; Caruth’s relation to Paul de Man may 
be added to this list of elusive political issues Leys’ alludes to, except this reference to Tancred 
complicates matters.  
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perpetrator of a crime. Analogously, there is no question that the Holocaust 
involved countless crimes; this does not mean that a trauma was not suffered by 
each and every individual ‘associated’51 with the Holocaust, but it is to say that 
trauma has no perpetrator; the question of the crime and its difference from the 
trauma of the Holocaust is a matter I will deal with in detail in Chapter 6. The 
fact is, because trauma has no perpetrator, there is also no guilt. 
An essential incommensurability between trauma and guilt goes 
unrecognized by scholars who adopt Freud’s research, like LaCapra and Leys, 
and even Blumenberg, uncritically. With respect to Freud’s work on Moses in 
which guilt is so distinctly associated with the murder of Jesus as the return of 
the murder of Moses, Blumenberg can be forgiven his interpretation of Freud’s 
murder as the trauma that was repressed and returned as guilt in anti-Semitism 
because it was Freud’s thesis. While Blumenberg’s explanation of the source of 
guilt being Christian and not Jewish may seem to address Freud’s guilt, it is a 
move based on the assumption that there is a perpetrator of trauma and 
overlooks Freud’s primary objective which was to untangle guilt feelings in the 
neurotic from the repressive strategies of religious institutions. The problem with 
this literal reading of Freud’s case study of Moses, is twofold; for one, the 
murder is only a representation of the actual trauma and therefore, is not to be 
read literally; for another, the Exodus as a case study is on par with Tasso’s story 
of Tancred, both being representations of some historically real but inaccessible 
past trauma. To what extent Tasso’s fantasy is a first or second or umpteenth 
draft of the trauma as compared with the Exodus, this being an issue of degrees, 
is beyond our ability to define. In Lacanian terms, the only cause of trauma is 
the inexplicable of the real, which is invisible and returns in a different guise. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 I use the term to reference anyone who has encountered the Holocaust, from the dead, 
survivors, perpetrators, those who colluded, those who resisted, those who study it, or know 
about it only in vague terms.	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For that reason, any representation we have, any text, film, or article, as a 
product of the encounter with the real, can only articulate the trauma in part.  
 By way of explaining the impossibility of apprehending the actual 
traumatic event, Lacan represented trauma as ‘the encounter with the real’, 
where the real is the chaotic force of the unknown void—the ineffable. That 
which exists beyond the symbolic efforts to represent it, the real will forever 
thwart the subject’s organizing impulse; what remains constant is that, though 
the crisis or trauma eludes the subject, the indivisible remainder that recurs in 
the fantasy points to something having happened. What that original encounter 
was, was missed; it happened elsewhere, “another locality, another space, 
another scene, the between perception and consciousness” Lacan says, quoting 
Freud (Sem XI 56.) Thus, what is apprehended about the original ‘real’ event is 
“only my representation that I recover possession of”, Lacan stresses (57). As 
exemplified in the Tancred story, the only access to that trauma is through the 
compulsive repetition of killing, which can only be understood in the 
metaphorical recreation of the subject’s fantasy response to the original ‘missed’ 
crisis expressed in the objet a of Clorinda’s voice. Through Lacan’s rendering of 
Freud’s trauma, we see the condition is erased of its pathological nature, 
naturalized as part of the formative and ongoing lived experience of the 
oedipalized subject, beginning with the subject’s first trauma of oedipalization. 
Caruth’s project to ‘listen’ for his trauma, took cues from Freud’s 
understanding that, what matters is not whether the analysand is telling the truth 
or not, what matters is what the she/he is saying. For the reason that the trauma 
was missed, the interpretive project of uncovering the trauma is far more 
complicated than simply digging, in archaeological terms, for what has been 
repressed, disavowed, forgotten in memory; in fact, the trauma was so 
unexpected, such a shock, that the original crisis cannot even manifest at the 
level of memory. That is, trauma is only accessible retroactively, and only in 
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repetition, and partially. These fundamental principles of trauma explain why 
there is no perpetrator, but also, why there is no such thing as memory in 
trauma studies. For example, in Badiou’s consideration of the ethical response 
to the event, the subject’s passive relation to the ‘event’, it happens to you, we 
recognize that the event is unrelated to memory: “Never forget what you have 
encountered. But we can say this only if we understand that not-forgetting is not 
memory (oh! The unbearable journalistic ethics of memory!) Not-forgetting 
consists of thinking and practicing the arrangement of my multiple being 
according to the immortal which it holds, and which the piercing through 
(transpercement] of an encounter has imposed as subject” (Ethics 52). In this 
tangle of not-forgetting, we recognize memory is not an issue; thus, we see how 
Lanzmann’s Shoah remains true to his journalistic integrity to offer no false 
memories; in that respect, Lanzmann is ‘directly seized by fidelity’ to the truth 
of the trauma of the Holocaust. There is nothing to remember, there is only the 
ethical response to the ‘event’, as bearing witness to its disappearance; or giving 
voice to the one who cannot speak (Agamben Remnants 146). Unfortunate for 
Holocaust studies, trauma analysis as a method is indifferent to the perpetrator 
and blind to memory; the prevalence of guilt by survivors, I believe, explains 
why melancholia has come to serve a distinctive function in the research to 
complement trauma, and go where trauma fails.52 
Caruth bears witness to Freud’s Moses and Monotheism as a Lacanian 
‘fantasy’ that reflects a historical trauma: “Through the notion of trauma, I will 
argue, we can understand that a rethinking of reference is aimed not at 
eliminating history but at resituating it in our understanding, that is, at precisely 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 LaCapra draws on Freud’s melancholia in significant ways to make up for what trauma 
analysis cannot accomplish in understanding Holocaust testimony; that is, melancholia 
addresses the guilt inherent in survivors testimonies. The guilt of surviving; the guilt of not 
saving his/her family member from death, etc.. The dominant affect of grief in Holocaust 
testimony may account for the condition of melancholia, but accounting for the perpetrators 
crimes and the justice those crimes demand, remains elusive in the psychoanalytic approach.  
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permitting history to arise where ‘immediate understanding’ may not” (11). In 
letting history ‘arise’, Caruth’s hermeneutic relies on the metonymic value of 
Freud’s ‘leaving’, reflected in the Biblical Exodus, repeated in Freud’s reflection 
on the child’s for-da game, which, in Freud’s personal terms, is reiterated in 
being compelled to leave Austria. In this repetitive pattern of ‘leaving’, Caruth 
lets the trauma of Freud’s historical period arise as the ‘Exodus’. By re-focusing 
the trauma onto the circumstance that would inspire the foundational narrative 
of the Judean faith, Caruth makes a brilliant move to explain how Freud’s crisis 
was recreated as a fantasy of deliverance from persecution in his Moses. What 
Caruth’s Exodus focus lacks, however, is the primacy of ethics reflected in the 
guilt lodged in Freud’s murder narrative, and reflected in his reference to the 
ethical foundation of the Judean history of the faith, the one god of Moses’ God, 
as an ethical God (Moses, 63), who demanded ‘living in maat’ (truth, justice) 
(61-62).  
If Caruth does not address the ethical issue in Freud’s Moses, she does 
raise it in her chapter on the ethics of memory through Lacan’s ingenious 
interpretation of Freud’s analysis of the father’s waking from his dream to his 
son saying, “Can’t you see I’m burning?” The father’s guilt for not having saved 
his son from death by fever returns in this nightmare that wakes him to the 
reality of his son’s body being consumed in actual flames. “The dream itself is 
the site of the trauma” (100), Caruth asserts following Lacan, and the 
awakening, is the ethical response to trauma, or what Lacan defines “as an 
ethical relation to the real” (102). Reflected in the imaginary touch and voice of 
the dead son, the rupture caused by the real of a trauma can be seen through 
Badiou’s terms as not about memory but about ‘not-forgetting’; it is the trauma 
of the demand. In this case, according to Caruth’s use of Lacan, the demand is 
that of survival, a demand that deeply echoes the humanities research of 
Holocaust survivor testimonies done by Caruth’s colleagues. The father is 
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caught by the voice of his ‘dead son’. If Caruth identifies the voice of the wound 
as the trauma, what she misses is Lacan’s principle of the ethical practice as 
reflecting the subject’s relation to his desire. Guilt rises up when the subject 
gives ground on its desire; which is to say that, ethical action means to follow 
through on one’s desire. A subject’s desire as the ethical demand, as Mladen 
Dolar points out in his A Voice: And Nothing More (95), reflects the subject’s 
relation to ideological interpellation.  
 
INTERPELLATION 
For Lacan, the tuché is the rupture of the subject’s symbolic order with the real, 
which the subject subsequently seals over, or heals, through fantasy. Lacan 
defines fantasy with the formula: S<>a: i.e., the subject’s relation to the objet a, 
the indivisible remainder. The child’s fort-da game is an example of a fantasy 
response to the trauma of the mother’s departure, enacted in the child’s 
relationship to the objet a, the spool and thread. The voice and the gaze are 
manifestations of an objet a both of which differ from the child’s game object in 
that they belong “to the register of what Lacan calls the real” (Fink 92). That is, 
as ‘unspecular’, immaterial objects, the voice and gaze “resist imaginization 
and symbolization”, leading to their repetitive echoes; or, as expressed through 
Dolar’s interpretation of Lacan’s idea of cause, the voice is the cause of that 
which “doesn’t work”53, the inassimilable, par excellence, existing at the border 
between the real and the symbolic. The politics of the voice, “the same 
operation as in the realm of ethics” (121), is where we find Althusser’s 
interpellation, which, as a particular call, “sustains social injunctions and 
symbolic mandates” (122). Of this ethical realm, Dolar highlights the 
“precarious shifting line, in the interpellating voice” which is the demand to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 In Voice, Dolar quotes from Lacan’s Seminar XI (22) with the phrase, “There is only a cause in 
something that doesn’t work” (10). 
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comply with that which is never explicitly stated; what the subject is saying yes 
to, is never fully grasped. This is why, in practice, ethics seems like such an 
unstable concept, in Badiou’s terms “contingent”. You could say that this 
‘shifting line’ of the voice indicates the contingency of the symbolic limit of 
what is ‘inassimilable’ of the real; it defines the quandary of the subject’s desire 
and subjection in Althusser’s interpellation. 
Responses to Althusser’s revision of Marx’s ‘ideology’ through 
psychoanalysis in “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses: Notes Towards 
an Investigation” (1970), have been polarized between supporters and critics; 
the critics tend to hear incoherence in his idea of interpellation, or, as with 
Eagleton’s critique, an unbelievable subject who is too ‘static’ (144). This vision 
of Althusser’s subject as non-dynamic would suggest the absence of the 
dialectic of the unconscious within the oedipalized subject in Althusser’s work, 
except the oedipalized subject is present throughout his project, but notably 
subordinate to the imaginary of the ego: “…the human subject is de-centered, 
constituted by a structure which has no centre, either, except in the imaginary 
misrecognition of the ‘ego’, i.e., in the ideological formations in which it 
‘recognizes’ itself” (“Freud and Lacan” 62). Althusser’s emphasis on the 
imaginary of the ego in interpellation points to a distortion equivalent to Dolar’s 
‘shifting lines’, or that margin between meaning and chaos, or madness and 
sanity; I would suggest that, in light of Althusser’s psychosis at the end of his 
life, a marginal psychotic incoherence may account for the critics’ assessment 
of his theory as being riddled with inconsistencies or confusion. 
 The first diagnosed schizophrenic, Daniel Paul Schreber, claimed in his 
Memoirs (1903),54 that he was chosen by God to be messiah and also to be 
God’s wife. In Lacan’s terms, Schreber exemplified the psychotic’s condition as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Feud’s diagnosis published in 1911 was based on reading Schreber’s memoir; Freud claimed 
Schreber’s condition was repressed homosexuality.	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being caught in the imaginary, or ‘hallucination’, without the symbolic rudder 
of the Name of the Father (NOF). Since the ‘hallucination is located in the real’ 
(Seminar III 136), and since the NOF is foreclosed, Lacan argued, the psychotic 
cannot organize his experience through the symbolic order as ‘fantasy’, in the 
sense of symbolic formations associated with poetic revelatory texts like those 
by St. John of the Cross;55 without the stabilizing factor of the master signifier, 
the psychotic, lost in a sea of signifiers, “is spoken by the unconscious”. Lacan’s 
preference for the Saint’s poetry over the psychotic’s testimony explains his 
conviction that the symbolic “offers a framework for treating psychosis” 
although “concrete guidelines for treating psychosis… cannot be found in his 
work”, Stijn Vanheule observes (The Subject of Psychosis 80). That is, Lacan 
aimed to theorize the psychotic’s condition, but, especially as is evident in his 
last project on the psychosis of the poet James Joyce, recognized that psychosis 
was not an example of a failed Oedipal subject, but reflected an approach other 
than the NOF to resolve the maladjustment integral to human subjectivity.56 
 Althusser’s concise approach cannot be compared to Schreber’s 
hallucinatory wanderings, but critics seem to identify problems with the 
symbolic elements of Althusser’s theory that I would say point to that ‘shifting 
line’ of meaning. According to Althusser, “ideology hails or interpellates 
concrete individuals as concrete subjects”, which explains how the subject is 
not even aware of the fact that the apparent freedom to consent is actually an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 Speaking about St. John of the Cross, Lacan claims: “I would say that even the briefest 
testimony of an authentic religious experience you can see a world of difference” (Seminar III 
77). 56	  In The Subject of Psychosis: A Lacanian Perspective, Vanheul’s analysis draws out the very 
nuanced approach Lacan took to psychosis, emphasizing his contributions to Freud’s work such 
as introducing the term ‘foreclosure’ to replace Freud’s concept of rejecting the oedipal (34) to 
account for the passive nature of not accepting the NOF. He traces Lacan’s contribution to 
concepts such as hallucination and delusion, and discusses Lacan’s final observations about the 
synthome in relation to the psychotic, James Joyce, which troubled old standards of mental 
health. That is, the synthome does not alert an analyst to a problem, but signals the subject’s 
effort to find fulfillment in life.	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illusion; thus, “ideology has no outside (for itself)” (32). That point is contested 
in Stuart Hall’s persuasive critique of Althusser’s ideology in “Signification, 
Representation, Ideology”. Hall claims Althusser’s ideology ignores the 
autonomy of the individual (99), so that any political action for freedom or 
equality would be swallowed up by the repressive ideologies. What is clear is 
that there is a kind of paranoid insistence in Althusser’s idea of the subject 
living ‘without free will’; yet, Hall’s optimistic vision of the ideological struggle 
(111) and the freedom of civil institutions to ensure human rights, overlooks the 
fundamental fragility of this freedom and weakness of the struggle. In Canada, 
for example, the Charter of Rights which gave citizens the right to demonstrate 
peacefully at the G-20 Toronto Summit in 2010, and that gave citizens not 
participating in demonstrations the freedom to walk the streets, were erased by 
police measures that claimed the citizens were “not in Canada” that weekend 
(Toronto Star June 6, 2012); they had no rights with which to protect themselves 
from unlawful arrest. Efforts to make the police accountable for taking away 
these rights have been thwarted generally, but not entirely, as witnessed in Mr. 
Adam Nobody’s charges against a Toronto police officer of assault. Yes, Hall is 
correct to trouble Althusser’s ideology as oppressive and maybe even paranoid. 
Yes, one can resist the call of ideology (of the Nazi race policies), as Freud did 
on leaving Austria for England; but Freud’s escape did not silence the voice 
interpellating him or other Jews as inferior. Mahmood articulates the reality of 
ideology, which Michael Jackson’s vanity ironically expressed: we cannot 
change our skin colour just as we cannot change our culture. Yet, while there is 
no outside ideology there is, as Žižek argues in The Sublime Object of Ideology, 
a way through its symptom to the ‘kernel’ of the real hiding in it that supports 
Hall’s criticism against Althusser for its categorical claims about ideology’s 
dominance: Freud’s escape reflects that the interpellation of ideology can be 
contested on ethical grounds. 
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Critics find fault with Althusser’s interpellation as the ‘hail’ on the street 
as being absurdly irresponsible and unrealistic: “Assuming that the theoretical 
scene I have imagined takes place in the street, the hailed individual will turn 
around. By the mere one-hundred-and-eighty degree conversion, he becomes a 
subject” (32). Perhaps it was the term ‘conversion’ that inspired Terry Eagleton 
(Ideology, an Introduction, New and Updated Edition, 1991) to point out the 
ludicrousness of this scenario; what self-respecting adult, standing on a street 
corner, would ‘convert’ in answer to the call of a stranger (145)? And how does 
this ‘conversion,’ a 180 degree turn on the street, signal any kind of assent or an 
ideological affiliation? We can see that Eagleton’s trouble with Althusser’s 
consent, or ‘conversion’, is that it is simply irrational. I would say that what is 
irrational, or absurd, in the event is not in the caricature of the call on the street, 
but because it reflects what is ‘real’ of its demand made by those who are 
closest to us. 
According to Lacan, the subject does not choose to consent to the 
Oedipal event that leads to the subject’s Spaltung. Lacan associates that lack of 
choice in the subject’s relation with her/his mortality; ‘death’ is introduced by 
the ‘signifier’ which kills the thing “… because the signifier as such, whose first 
purpose is to bar the subject, has brought into [the subject] the meaning of 
death,”57 and barely veils a representation of the biblical narrative of original sin 
based on Paul’s sin and the law (VII, 83).58 That is, the only relationship we 
have to our mortality is through the signifier, through the symbolic; we do not 
consciously know and understand what we are consenting to when we accept 
the NOF, those of us who have done so. In this respect, a grown adult may 
consent to ideological interpellation in the same way the infant responds to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 From Lacan’s “Position of the Unconscious” (Écrits  719). 58	  That is, the procedure described in Lacan’s Oedipal event of the subject’s acceptance of the 
master signifier, the NOF, is fundamentally a secularization of the biblical narrative of the fall of 
Adam and Eve, the event of the first prohibition leading to mortality.	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NOF: in a compromised position to our desire. The subject’s consent is 
predetermined by the community in which she/he finds herself/himself. 
Interestingly, Badiou explains the same passive acceptance experienced by the 
infant’s Oedipal event with the adult’s encounter with the Event: “We might 
say, more simply: the ‘some-one’ was not in a position to know that he was 
capable of this co-belonging to a situation and to the hazardous course of a 
truth, this becoming-subject” (Ethics 46). What is crucial in this ‘becoming-
subject’ is this: not only does it reiterate the process found in Oedipalization or 
the interpellation of a subject to any ideological order: the truth of the Event is 
not initially known. In Badiou’s terms, the Event is the trauma that happens to 
you (51), and as a subject you are responsible to answer the call made of you 
by the event. Lacan articulates the contingency of this ‘Event’ and its ethical 
implications for the subject in the case of Antigone. Her desire to bury her 
brother as per the laws of the gods is rejected by Creon who upholds the law of 
the state that deems her brother ineligible for burial because he was a criminal. 
Creon offers Antigone a deal: her brother will be buried if she sacrifices her life. 
In following her desire to honour the law that “comes to us from heaven”, 
wherein heaven is Lacan’s euphemism for the real, Antigone commits suicide.59 
Her act is a pure ethical act because she has not conceded an inch of her 
desire. When Lacan says that the unconscious is ethical, he means to say that 
the unconscious puts in the subject’s path the ‘real’ of heaven’s law as the 
subject’s desire which is the ethical injunction, indicative of Freud’s Whatever it 
was, I must go there, and articulated by Žižek as “the desire of the Other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Lacan uses Sophocle’s Antigone as an example of this singularity. Antigone is faced with two 
issues: the civil law carried out by Creon which stated that her brother as traitor could not be 
buried and her desire to bury her brother because the law of the god’s demanded it. Creon 
would only agree to her brother’s burial on condition that she die for it. By following through on 
her desire, Antigone’s suicide can be seen as ethical: ”the laws that come to us from heaven 
[are] the same laws as Antigone’s… the laws of heaven in question are the laws of desire” (325); 
this is to say that while the laws of desire remain ambiguous, particular to the individual, and in 
some cases ambivalent to social mores.	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beyond fantasy” (Sublime Object of Ideology 132).60 Moreover, the 
interpellation of the event is as unnerving as Dolar’s question suggests: “Is 
ethics about hearing voices?” (83). The implication that the subject’s call brings 
on a kind of ‘madness’, as in hearing voices, can serve to rethink what the 
critics claim is impossible in Althusser’s interpellation by recognizing its radical 
quality. 
Even so, Althusser’s representation of Moses’ experience on Mount Sinai 
is somewhat misleading. Introducing this event as the ideological interpellation 
misrepresents the ethical nature of Moses’ call: “And Moses, interpellated—
called by his Name, having recognized that it ‘really’ was he who was called by 
God, recognizes that he is a subject, a subject of God, a subject subjected to 
God, a subject through the Subject and subjected to the Subject. The proof: he 
obeys him, and makes his people obey God’s Commandments” (Ideology 35). 
The symbolic organization of interpellation imposed by the Absolute Subject 
(God) in the biblical narrative is less like the infant’s Oedipal event than 
Antigone’s privileging of divine laws over human laws. If the laws of Moses 
made the Israelites antagonistic towards the ideology of the Roman rulers, so 
also Antigone’s desire to follow divine law made her an enemy of Creon’s state. 
In both cases, the ethical message of the subject’s desire is in conflict with 
ideology’s interpellation. Thus, what Dolar defines as the ‘shifting line’ of the 
call is actually not just ambiguous, but a dangerous struggle between 
interpellations: not only are there the calls of ideology, but there are the calls of 
the laws of desire that put the subject in conflict with ideology. This dynamic 
offers a new way of looking at Freud’s narrative of Moses which can address 
what is missed by Caruth’s focus on the ‘event’ of the Exodus as the trauma 
critical to Freud’s Moses: the significance of seeing Freud’s idea of guilt in 
ethical terms.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Lacan’s	  reference	  to	  Freud’	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 To one extent or another, scholars on Freud’s interpretation of Moses 
have been guided by the ethical issues raised by his focus on anti-Semitism in 
Moses.61 The hatred which Christians had for Jews for having supposedly 
murdered Jesus twenty centuries ago was, for Freud, compulsive and irrational 
behaviour that indicated an unconscious effect of a trauma. Ernst Sellin’s thesis 
that Moses was murdered (Moses, 74) was the basis for Freud’s Egyptian priest, 
the first Moses, while Eduard Meyer’s research of the Midianite who worshiped 
the volcanic god, Yahweh, served Freud with the details of the second Moses. 
In “Freud, Sellin and the Death of Moses”, Robert Paul notes that Freud ignores 
the scriptural proof Sellin offers for his thesis, which is a complicated analysis 
that links two brief Biblical references to the prophet of the Exodus (Hosea 
12:14-15 and Numbers 25:1-3) to Isaiah 52 and 53, the retelling of the murder 
of the chosen one, or messiah (825). Notable is the fact that, in the Christian 
tradition, Isaiah’s suffering servant has been considered prophetic proof of Jesus. 
Robert Paul argues that Freud ignored Sellin’s biblical interpretation because it 
would detract from his argument that Moses was an African, not a Jew (834). I 
would like to add something to his argument. While Freud does not use all of 
Sellin’s research, he alludes to the association between Moses and Jesus as the 
Isaiah 53 messiah in the following statement: “If Moses was the first Messiah, 
Christ became his substitute. Then Paul could with a certain right say to the 
peoples: ‘See, the Messiah has truly come. He was indeed murdered before 
your eyes’” (114). In the seven letters attributed to Paul, the word murder to 
describe Jesus’ death is never used. Of course, Freud attributes this anti-Semitic 
statement to the Saint based on certain conditions; so long as Moses was a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  In Moses the Egyptian, Jan Assmann argues that Freud’s focus on anti-Semitism revealed that 
the root of this Jewish hatred is not inspired by Judaism or Christianity, but the universalist 
revolution of Aknhenaten’s monotheism (167). Barbara Johnson’s more literary approach, in 
Moses and Multiculturalism, traces Moses as a multicultural trope in literature, film, philosophy 
and religious texts. In this multiplicity, she argues, Freud’s radical thesis that Moses was not a 
Jew, but an African (57), introduces the instability of ethnic identity.	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messiah, then the condition that Paul could have said this about Jesus, would 
have been justified. As it stands, Moses is considered a prophet, not a messiah; 
this raises questions about Jesus also being a messiah, and makes Paul’s 
statements impossible, proven by the fact that Paul never said these things. In 
this logic, anti-Semitic hatred is illogical; therefore, Jews are free not to convert 
to Christianity because anti-Semitism is delusional. Based on this logic, not only 
would Sellin’s research detract from Freud’s focus on the hybridity of Judaism, 
as Robert Paul argues, it would entrench, rather than dissolve, the anti-Semitic 
grounds of Nazi persecution. 
Freud asserts that anti-Semitic hate is fueled by the illusion of ‘Jewish 
election’: “I venture to assert that the jealousy which the Jews evoked in other 
peoples by maintaining that they were the first-born, favourite child of God the 
father has not yet been overcome by those others, just as if the latter had given 
credence to the assumption” (116). It is this assumption that Freud addresses by 
secularizing the terms of election; the Israelites were not chosen by God, but by 
an Egyptian priest. Through this secularization, hatred should dissolve, but it 
does not; all it can do is expose the ironic tragedy of the inversion of Jewish 
election in the way the Jewish citizens of Germany and Europe were being 
singled out, interpellated as undesirable, and ‘chosen’ for incarceration (death) 
by the Nazis. What is expressed in this tragedy is this double energy of the 
‘charge’ of trauma, which Santner defines as both ‘charged with a crime” and 
also charged as in “filled with a symbolic mandate” (Psychotheology 31), 
highlighting the indeterminacy of the ethical demand Freud was confronting—
or, in Badiou’s terms, the truth of the event.62 What was the Event except the 
impossible one masterminded by the Nazis? In Lacanian terms, the guilt Freud 
identified reflected the unconscious tangle of desires of his Jewish identity and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 It seems to me that to see the Holocaust as a trauma means that it could only be understood 
as a Badiouian Event. The denial of fidelity to the truth of this event is evidence of evil. 
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his life as a man of science. On the one hand, answering the call of his ethical 
distinction meant giving up on his desire to be a good, secular atheist Jew; on 
the other hand, denying his racial/cultural distinction meant legitimizing the 
Nazi’s condemning of Jews to death. As Hall can well appreciate, there was no 
outside this network of ideological binds for Freud. In trying to write himself 
through this irrational guilt, he recognized it predated his generation by 
centuries, a conviction that was animated in his reflection that Jesus identified 
the return of an anterior trauma originating in Moses.  
It is only because of the second Moses, Freud argues, that the Israelites 
could retroactively organize being ‘chosen’ around the fantasy of deliverance as 
redemption for the people elected by God. By the same logic, it is because the 
Jews did not disappear into Christianity that Jesus’s death came to be organized 
as a fantasy of murder by the descendants of the Israelites. This logic of a latent 
return is implied in Freud’s work, haunting ironic statements like this: “We have 
been delivered from all guilt since one of us laid down his life to expiate our 
guilt” (174). The fact which Freud’s Moses references but never explicitly states 
is that Jews pay for Jesus’ murder with their life; or, literally, are murdered. This 
unstated fact explains how Freud’s use of ‘murder’ in Moses is over-determined; 
it is articulated in anti-Semitic ideology, in the death of the father of the Primal 
Horde, and in Sellin’s interpretation of Biblical texts, but is never used about the 
Nazis. That is, Freud does not use Sellin’s research because there is a necessary 
unreality to the trauma he traces evident in in the fictional quality of the 
murders. There is no evidence to prove that either Jesus or Moses was 
murdered; the ‘murder’ trope in fact only serves ideological practices. That is, 
Jesus’s death, what the NT defines as a sacrifice ordained by God, has been 
written as a crime of murder to serve the ideology driving the anti-Semitic 
agenda to murder Jews. In Sellin’s exegesis, Moses’ murder authorizes the 
Christo-centric messianic narrative. By keeping Moses’ murder posited, and not 
 	  
  85	  
part of an argument as fact, Freud could concentrate on tracing the pattern of 
latency in the return of the repressed, and thus side-step the dilemma raised by 
Sellin’s Moses thesis: if Moses was murdered, then Jesus was the messiah, thus 
affirming the ground of anti-Semitic hate. Freud’s representation of the 
catastrophe that led to a double Moses in the Hebrew period in the wilderness 
must be seen for what it is, a fantasy, in the Lacanian sense. Moses’ function in 
the fantasy, from the perspective of the analyst, is in being the indivisible 
remainder, the objet a, of an ancient encounter which returns in Jesus. Based on 
this analytic position, I argue that what connects Jesus and Moses is not a 
murder, but the real that signaled the encounter with the ethical God who 
exacted a demand, or a call, which, as Dolar observes, remains indeterminate 
and so all the more difficult to navigate, and all the more necessary to heed, 
since it returns again and again. 
It is this difficulty that is developed in Eric Santner’s reading of 
Rosenzweig’s work through Freud’s principle of trauma in On The 
Pyschotheology of Everyday Life. Santner observes that trauma in Freud’s terms 
is “an excess of demand” which causes a ‘breakdown of this very operation of 
translation, leaving the mind flooded by excitation” (32). Santner’s idea that 
translation fails to reflect the trauma echoes Dolar’s concept of the ‘call’ as 
indeterminate; they similarly indicate an affinity with the Lacanian argument 
that the symbolic has no power in the real. Santner goes on to qualify a 
difference between the juridical source of Freud’s trauma, indicative in the 
inscription of the law (105) wherein the super-ego inspires pathological 
behavior, and Rosenzweig’s idea of revelation, which introduces an 
interpellation that unbinds the subject from the law. Opening up to the 
potential in human agency, revelation initiates the “messianic task”, as “the 
interruptive bringing to light of the law’s traumatic ‘foundation’ in excess of 
validity over meaning” (115). I want to draw attention to the fact that Moses’ 
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encounter with the divine on Mount Sinai from which he received the Ten 
Commandments, what Althusser identified as interpellation, is in Rosenzweig’s 
terms, an example of revelation. Moreover, Santner’s understanding of 
Rosenzweig’s concept of revelation as unbinding from the law echoes Pauline 
teachings on the revelation of the Christ. While it is possible to already 
understand that Althusser’s interpellation represented by Moses and 
Rosenzweig’s idea of ‘revelation’ are equivalent as the ethical impulse of a 
subject’s unconscious desire, Althusser’s interpellation of ideology differs from 
the ethically grounded ‘call’ of Rosenzweig’s revelation which is more in line 
with Antigone’s ‘call’ or Badiou’s Truth Event. The significance of the difference 
between the call of ideology and the call of the Event will be explored in the 
Pauline chapters. In those chapters I will also problematize what Santner 
identifies as an opposition between law and revelation, or Moses and Paul in 
Rosenzweig’s thinking.  
Though Moses and Jesus are the central figures around which Freud 
builds his argument against anti-Semitism, Paul stands out as a historical figure 
used by Freud to describe the ethical constellation of crime and guilt. According 
to Jacob Taubes in The Political Theology of Paul, Paul was a Jewish political 
figure with revolutionary aims whose contemporary equal was Freud: “Freud, 
who is involved in the basic experience of guilt, is the direct descendent of 
Paul” (89). That concluding thought is based on his provocative thesis that 
“Christianity has its origin not properly in Jesus but in Paul” (40), and Paul’s real 
message, improperly understood by the German Liberal Protestants’ vision of 
Jesus as abstract ‘”pure love” (61) through Marcion, is actually a message of 
redemption in the tradition of Moses. Taubes highlights that Freud, like Paul, 
wanted to lead the way to redemption: “Freud, so to speak, enters into the role 
of Paul, of the Paul who supposedly brings redemption only phantasmatically, 
while Freud realizes it through his new method of healing, which is not only an 
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individual method, but also a theory of culture” (95). Taubes’ inspired 
paralleling of Freud with Paul, is the last flourish of the unconscious 
associations that this project has been tracing, and signals my turn now to Paul. 	  	  	  
PAUL AND THE TRUTH EVENT 
Of the four major philosophical works on Paul63 published in the last several 
decades, Badiou’s St. Paul: The Foundation of Universalism stands out for my 
project on two counts; his vision of Paul’s significance for contemporary 
society; and his vision of Paul’s role in the formation of early Christianity. With 
respect to the former, his interest in Paul as a kind of Marxist militant through a 
Lacanian lens is like Žižek’s; with respect to the latter, he recognizes Paul as a 
first-century historical figure much as Taubes’ and Agamben’s project have 
promoted him. But with respect to his interest in excising the Christian-ness 
from Paul, Badiou establishes the trajectory of my project.  
For Badiou, what is important about Paul is not the Jesus he promoted, 
but the event, or truth-Event, he identified as the resurrection: “Christ is a 
coming; he is what interrupts the previous regime of discourses. Christ is, in 
himself and for himself, what happens to us” (48). It would seem that Christ, the 
trauma, happened to Paul, and Paul preached that it was for others too; the 
hope that “all” would be saved meant that, according to Badiou, he had to 
liberate his ‘good news’, his Gospel, from the restrictive Jewish community of 
which he was a part (13). As “poet-thinker of the event, as well as one who 
practices and states the invariant traits of what can be called the militant figure” 
(2), Paul’s significance for Badiou is his politics of the universal: “The driving 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Taubes, The Political Theology of Paul; Žižek, The Puppet and the Dwarf; and The Fragile 
Absolute: Or Why Christianity is Worth Fighting For; Agamben, The Time That Remains; Badiou, 
St. Paul: The Foundation of Universalism. 
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force behind Paul’s universalist conviction: that ‘ethnic’ or cultural difference, 
of which the opposition between Greek and Jew is in time, and in the empire as 
a whole, the prototype is no longer significant with regard to the real, or to the 
new object that sets out a new discourse… As Paul declares, defying the 
evidence: There is no distinction between Jew and Greek (Rom 10:12)” (57). As 
such, Paul is for Badiou a ‘guide’ to a universalism that can cut through social, 
political, and class differences, which have been destabilizing contemporary 
society. By following Paul’s message, we can emulate “an indifference that 
tolerates difference” (89-99).  
In the historical record, Badiou asserts, there is technically no Jesus, but 
there is a Paul, whose letters, “are, quite simply, the oldest Christian texts to be 
handed down to us” (18). In order to read Paul’s truth-Event in those letters, his 
historical context is necessary, even though that context is not fully accessible 
(18). While Badiou acknowledges the historian’s point that Paul’s experience on 
the Road to Damascus, called a ‘conversion’ (17), was a fable proposed by 
Luke-Acts, a gospel most likely written at or after Paul’s death, he also relies on 
this fable to contemporize Paul as a participant in the Spanish War: “The fascist 
Paul goes on a mission to see Supporters of France. On the road to Barcelona, 
travelling through southwestern France, he has an illumination. He joins the 
camp of the antifascist fighters” (38). This is a politically charged representation 
of Paul, revealing Badiou’s prejudices and limitations. The politics of Paul is not 
only represented as a left Marxist figure convert from fascism, and thus 
reflecting the ‘all’ of the universal in paralleling Paul as both Judean and 
Christian; this convert from fascist to resistance fighter in the Spanish war is 
echoed in the WWII French resistance fighters such as Maurice Blanchot, who 
was such a convert. While Badiou’s project at the symbolic level seems to 
function with precision, exchanging elements from Paul of the past to the Paul 
in the present, its symbolization unwittingly adapts a central conceit in the Acts 
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narrative: that Paul was a convert to Christianity. In the historical sense, this 
conceit points to several problems, not least of which is an apparent homology 
between leftist politics and Christianity. I will get at one other problem later. 
With respect to Badiou’s representation of Paul in contemporary politics, 
another homology appears between the Spanish War and WWII through the 
struggle against fascism. Thus, in Badiou’s work, the trauma of two 20th-century 
wars is represented as analogous to Paul’s first century politics. With respect to 
Paul’s imaginary value for Badiou, it could be said that Paul is Badiou’s 
indivisible remainder of a left political trauma.  
In adapting the truth procedure of Paul’s message to the contemporary 
project, Badiou must de-historicize Jesus: “What the particular individual 
named Jesus said and did is only the contingent material seized upon by the 
event in view of an entirely different destiny. In this sense, Jesus is neither a 
master nor an example. He is the name for what happens to us universally” 
(60). If Jesus is only a name for the ‘real’, then technically, there is no Jesus in 
Christianity. This is an exciting move; it promises a political truth procedure of 
the universal beyond religious reach; that is, by executing the Lacanian move to 
identify the fantasy as a false real, Badiou’s truth procedure can rid the core of 
Christian ideology from the content of Paul’s message and so liberate the 
universal for ‘all’. The only trouble is that erasing Jesus ‘the man’ does not erase 
the ideological web of Christian thinking from discourse, and Badiou’s own 
writing is implicated in this trouble. For example, Badiou’s use of Luke-Acts 
perpetuates the assumption that Paul was Christian. The fact is that the concept 
we have for Christianity did not exist in the first-century, which has also led 
scholars to trouble what Luke-Acts identifies as a ‘conversion.’64 To identify 
followers of Jesus as Christian is problematic on two counts; when we call 
someone Christian, we are not calling them messiahs, in the literal sense, but 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Alan Segal addresses this issue in Paul: The Convert (1992). 
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members of a faith. The term meant to identify a member of the particular 
religion. When applied to followers of Jesus who did not live by our definition 
of Christian faith, it is a misleading definition. Moreover, a significant occlusion 
of Paul’s message in Badiou’s universal highlights the extent to which Badiou’s 
universalism may not need its historical Jesus, but continues to serve its 
Christianity.  
When Badiou quotes Paul in Romans 10:12 as the term of universalism, 
he excises the Christ condition, evident in this quotation: “because if you 
confess with your lips that Jesus is Lord and believe in your heart that God 
raised him from the dead, you will be saved. For one believes the heart and so 
is justified and one confesses with the mouth and so is saved. The scripture 
says, ‘No one who believes in him will be put to shame.’ For there is no 
distinction between Jew and Greek: the same Lord is Lord of all and is generous 
to all who call on him. For, Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord shall 
be saved” (Romans 10:9-13.)  The universal promise promoted by Badiou 
excludes the fact that, according to Paul, only certain people will be saved; 
only the Jew and the Greek (all) who call on the Lord (not all) and confess to the 
Lord, will be saved by the Lord who is Jesus. Even if there is no ‘man’ Jesus but 
only a name that inspires faith in eternal life, anyone who is not inspired is 
excluded from salvation. Though Badiou has identified the indivisible 
remainder as just a name, Jesus, Badiou has not erased the symbolic content of 
the fable of the resurrection from its root in the crucifixion, which signals an 
exception to the salvation. Agamben has critiqued Badiou’s universalism for 
ignoring the exceptionalism inherent in Paul’s message, what he calls the 
Apelles’ cut (Time That Remains, 50); Caputo reiterates Agamben’s critique of 
Badiou’s unconscious prejudice in his introduction to St. Paul Among the 
Philosophers: “By adapting Paul’s figure of a passage from death to new life, the 
figure of rebirth and a certain resurrection, Badiou is signing on to part of the 
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content of the Pauline event” (8). By not addressing the way in which the 
indivisible remainder has become bound to the fable of the God that will not 
die, Badiou’s militant figure is still determined by a Christian paradigm “not far 
removed from radical theology or death of God theology” (9). Caputo’s critique 
may be seen as pre-determined by his Jesus/crucifixion prejudice; that is, 
Caputo’s commitment to his politics would explain a resistance to Badiou’s 
strategy to replace Jesus with Paul. Having said that, Badiou may believe that 
de-linking the absolute remainder of Jesus from the historical Paul is the task 
that de-religifies Paul’s message; on this point, however, the philosophers’ 
critique indicates where Badiou is blind. I propose that one more step is 
required to ‘liberate’ Paul’s message from Christianity, and that involves 
delinking the name of Jesus from the Christ; that is a task the philosopher can 
do only with the aid of the historian’s method. 
St. Paul Among the Philosophers is an interesting collection of articles 
not just because it invites historians’ to respond to philosophers’ interpretations 
of Paul, like Badiou’s, but also because it exposes some striking disciplinary 
limitations for both the historian and the philosopher. The historian is interested 
in accessing the past ‘as it was’; in that respect, Paul is a fascinating subject 
because he left behind a small but detailed library of his thought, which 
reflected on a critical moment in western history. According to Fredriksen, 
Badiou’s article is in company with Origen and Augustine in misrepresenting 
Paul as a “coherent universalist” which, she argues, indicates that Paul is used 
as a kind of cypher for the philosophers’ contemporary politics.65 The trouble 
the historian Fredriksen has with this variety in interpretation is how selective it 
is: “Our three different readers drop different things. But what all three drop is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Interestingly, this point suggests that Paul was seen by philosophers as the indivisible 
remainder of the first century. The question of course is: is the trauma that Paul stands for of the 
first-century event of Jesus’ crucifixion, or some other trauma? That is a question I will continue 
asking throughout this project.	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Paul’s apocalyptic” (70). In short, these philosophers can only read Paul as 
‘theology’s project’ (72), which is problematized by the fact that their 
hermeneutic, “this is what Paul means,” is a historian’s claim, and so “such 
assertions can only be anachronistic; and an anachronistic historical claim can 
only be false, whatever ideological merit it might otherwise display” (72).  
Badiou has grounds to contest Fredricksen’s critique since his work on Paul may 
be called an anti-theological one, and as a philosopher, he is not bound to the 
historian’s credo to avoid anachronisms. Fredricksen’s critique reveals more 
about her than it says about Badiou. 
According to Fredriksen, “Badiou de-eschatologizes Paul by 
concentrating so resolutely on the resurrection as a contextless ‘event’…. The 
significance of Christ’s resurrection for Paul is that it indicates what time it is on 
God’s clock. It’s the end of history, and the hour of the establishment of God’s 
kingdom. The form of this world is passing away (1 Cor 2:31)” (71). For the 
historian, the apocalyptic energy of Paul’s time is central to his Gospel, 
explaining the interest and attraction to his message by the Greeks; especially 
with the new material at the historian’s disposal now because of archaeology,66 
the historian is able to understand how much Paul was responding to 
apocalyptic anxiety. While Fredriksen is correct to take issue with the elision of 
apocalypticism in Origen and Augustine which, as Blumenberg has affirmed, 
initiated the conditions which have led to the formation of contemporary 
secularism, and by association, the trauma of my project, and she correctly 
understands that Badiou ‘de-contextualizes’ Paul’s thinking especially from the 
religious content of Jesus, she entirely misses the eschatological foundation of 
Badiou’s work. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 See John Joseph Collins’ Apocalypticism in the Dead Sea Scrolls (1997) and also James H. 
Charlesworth’s edited collection, Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Vol 1 and 2 (1983). 
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  Badiou is a philosopher of our time and in our time Messianic discourse 
persists everywhere. In culture, we are witness to the resistant trope of the end-
days in works such as Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, Cameron’s popular 
The Terminator, and Hoban’s experimental Riddley Walker, to name a few. In 
political terms, we are inundated with apocalyptic anxiety evidenced by events 
such as the Russian Revolution, the Holocaust, and Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
not to mention the self-fulfilling prophetic acts at places such as Waco and 
Jonestown, or as expressed in anticipated events like the Mayan calendar 
ending December 21, 2012, and the May 5,, 2011 deadline as advertised by the 
American evangelist. Philosophy engages in this anxiety, from Rosenzweig’s 
redemption (1921) to Benjamin’s ‘weak messianic force’ (1939), to Derrida’s 
messianic with messianism (1989) and recently Žižek on 9/11 (2003). The 
philosophers who have chosen to think and write about Paul, do so because of 
shared apocalyptic thinking which perhaps explains, in part, Agamben’s 
assertion that, “there is a kind of secret link… between Paul’s letters and our 
epoch.”67 In light of Agamben’s claim, it is tempting to suppose that Paul is not 
only Badiou’s indivisible remainder, but is so also for Agamben, Taubes, and 
Žižek. While Taubes and Agamben are more explicit on the apocalyptic and 
messianic content of his letters, Badiou’s Marxist reading of Paul implicitly 
references an eschatological vision of the revolution; that is, ‘Christ is ‘a 
coming’. 
On the issue of Paul’s putative universalism, E. P. Sanders’s contribution 
to St. Paul Amongst the Philosophers, not only raises issue with the conditions 
for salvation in Christianity, but also, highlights Paul’s contradictions internal to 
his thought. Sanders quotes two texts by Paul, one that is a conditional 
universal and the other a universal beyond conditions. Regarding Paul’s 
assertion of universalism, “For as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Quoted by Santner in “Miracles Happen” from Agamben’s book cover (128). 
 	  
  94	  
Christ” (1 Cor 15:22), Sanders concludes with the point raised by the 
philosophers already: “Paul appears as a Christological exclusivist: someone 
who holds the view that only those who put their faith in Jesus as the Christ will 
be saved, while the others will be destroyed” (84.) In contrast to this 
exclusivism, Sanders notes, Paul claims in Romans 11:25-34 that the Jewish 
people will be saved along with the Christ believers, but mysteriously. This 
contradiction Sanders identifies is one of many explored by historians in Paul’s 
thinking, which historians are trying to resolve by considering Paul’s education, 
and his social and cultural environment (87) living as a Jew amongst Greeks, in 
Asia Minor. What is interesting about Sanders’ observation is that, on the one 
hand, there seems to be an impulse to a universalism in Paul, but on the other 
hand, there is nothing on the record that reflects how Paul thought this 
universalism would come about. 
Sanders’ contends that in order to read Paul we need to know what his 
words meant, to what extent he was educated in the Jewish faith and its 
scripture, and what he knew of Greek philosophy. This means that painstaking 
research needs to be done on Paul’s idiomatic expressions, such as ‘law of 
Moses’ and “law of Christ’, work vs. faith, and most notable, the ‘evangelion’.68 
Steve Mason, Josephus historian, contests the assumption that the Christian 
“gospel’, or Announcement, or in Greek terms, the ‘evangelion’, was, as Helmut 
Koester claimed, “the common gospel of the entire enterprise of the Christian 
mission”; and the term originated with Jesus, as Gerhard Friedrich insisted, 
(Josephus, Judea and Christian Origins, 284). This traditional view of the origin 
of the term had been assumed based on its titular use in ‘The Gospels’ of the 
New Testament, itself only a product of mid-second century “by the time of 
Marcion and Justin” (284), which was encouraged by the earliest composed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Sanders introduces a new word into scholarship to express Paul’s Greek term for one who is 
made righteous: “righteoused’.  
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gospel of Mark’s ‘fascinating’ title “The Origin of the Announcement of Jesus 
Christ” (296). Mason asserts that the use of the term became absorbed into 
Christian Orthodoxy as belonging to Jesus, but in fact originated with Paul, 
proven by the fact that his letters pre-date the Gospels by several decades.69  
 In the epistolary review, Mason highlights that Paul’s defensiveness of his 
authority as an apostle with his ‘evangelion’ is not simply, as some scholars 
have assumed, aimed to justify his place amongst the apostles who knew Jesus 
as a living man; rather, his defence reflects efforts to justify the importance of 
his mission which “was well underway before he made his first brief visit to 
Jerusalem (Gal 1:15-24)” (Mason 290). Paul claimed that he received the 
Announcement from a non-human source (Gal 1:12); he is distinguished for 
having a mission consecrated by the Christ to save the Gentiles from the 
upcoming apocalypse: “Gentiles who embraced Paul’s Announcement faced 
the social-political predicament, before the promised evacuation, of not having 
a place in the world, and the obvious place to turn was Jesus’ own long-
established Judean culture, which was in any case receiving considerable 
interest from people of other nations” (Mason 291).70 Paul’s gospel, which he 
repeatedly identified with the possessive article, (Gal 1:11), which was 
“proprietary and special to him” (292), was his mission to convert the Gentiles: 
“Consider also Rom 15:15-20. Just as in Galatians, The Announcement is 
something that Paul alone has been charged with disseminating, by Christ, 
among his Gentile ‘assemblies’ (another distinctive term of his mission.)” (293). 
Badiou’s assertion that Paul tried to drag his gospel out of the constricted Jewish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Paul’s Thessalonians, his first letter, dates to around 40 CE (Mason Early Christian Reader 37); 
1 Corinthians dates to the 40s CE but may have been written as late as 53-55 CE (P. 45); 2 
Corinthians sometime after 1 Cor; Galatians, sometime in the 50s (“Late in his career” P 108); 
and Romans 54-57, before his death in 58 CE (Early Christian Reader 125). 
70 Historical records attest to considerable interest in the Judean faith during the time of Paul; 
i.e. Josephus (War 2.559; Ant. 20.17-96; Ag. Ap 2.282-86) and Tacitus (Hist 5.4) (291); current 
scholarship on the point can be found in Shaye Cohen’s The Beginnings of Jewishness (1999).  	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community is fallacious: the fact is, the evangelion was intended only for the 
Gentiles, and the reason it attracted so much negative attention from Judean 
apostles was because it promoted exempting the Gentile convert from 
circumcision, a standard rite for new proselytes to the Judean faith.71 Thus, it 
was either rejected outright by the Judean Jesus followers, or suffered by few. 
Mason argues that, based on the unpopularity of his mission to the circumcised 
followers of Jesus, Paul’s discomfort in speaking about his ‘evangelion’ in his 
“Letter to the Romans”, would indicate that the community at Rome was 
primarily composed of circumcised Judean followers of Jesus (294).72  
 In light of the fact that Paul’s ‘evangelion’ was meant only for the 
Gentiles, Badiou’s use of Paul’s message for universal ends points to 
assumptions that miss the extreme nature of both Paul’s mission, and his 
militancy. For the Jew and the Greek to reflect equality, the assumption is that 
they existed together in a unified assembly signaled in their ‘conversion’ to 
Christianity. As the historical record shows, Paul’s putative ‘unity’ was aimed 
primarily at Gentile audiences; and its outcome only led to disunity amongst 
followers of Jesus, where division erupted between those who did and those 
who did not accept the uncircumcised Gentile convert, in many cases leaving 
the Gentile converts to exist in communities isolated from the Judean Jesus 
followers. The other assumption at the foundation of this vision of unification is 
that they were all Christians, which, by association, leads to the primary 
assumption that Paul was Christian. To say Paul was a Christian is to miss the 
flux of political dynamics in the events in the first century CE of the Roman 
Empire, and especially Paul’s partial contribution to this flux, which, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Paul preached his evangelion to Judeans first, and then to Gentiles; the majority of Judeans 
gave him a hard time finding his ideas to be heretical.  
72 Mason provides a more comprehensive analysis of the composition of the audience of Letters 
to the Romans in “’For I am not Ashamed of the Gospel’ (Rom 1:16): The Gospel and the First 
Readers of Romans” (Josephus, Judea and Christian Origins 303-328).	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anachronistically, was given prime place of honour because it was attributed to 
Jesus. 
The historian and the philosopher have very different hermeneutic 
practices. The historian tends to read literally; sometimes, this reading leads to 
some specious interpretations, but on the other hand, recognizing the idiomatic 
nature of language, it sloughs off the embedded anachronisms that obscure 
historically specific discourse. The historian’s project is a technical one, even 
corrective, which means that most operations are heuristic and any conclusion 
is qualified as indefinite. In that respect, you could say the historian is interested 
in Jesus and Paul, the men; for Badiou, the philosopher, the human agent in 
ancient times is subordinate to the truth procedure of his speech; or, as the 
historian quipped, Badiou reads like a theologian because he relies on the truth 
of Paul’s message. More than that, Badiou is a Lacanian thinker, interested in 
unveiling what is embedded in a subject’s speech. That is why Badiou can read 
Jesus not literally as the man in history, but as the empty signifier, the indivisible 
remainder, behind which is nothing but the reeling void of the real of Paul’s 
revelation. I take selective advantage of these disciplinary methods in this 
project. I am not interested in Jesus the man or the Christ, but in de-linking Jesus 
from the Christ; I am not interested in Paul the Saint, but the poet Badiou sees in 
Paul. Paul is a poet because he uses rhetorical tropes of repetition, parallelisms, 
and especially because his political message is conveyed in metaphor and 
metonymy; but in order to read Paul as a poet, understanding the language of 
his historical context requires use of the historian’s methods and categories. 
 
CATEGORIES AND METHODS 
The revitalization of Roman Antiquities period scholarship has been influenced 
by radical changes to the discipline in the past century, including discoveries 
such the Nag Hammadi library in Egypt (1945) and the Dead Sea Scrolls (1947). 
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This pseudepigraphical and apocryphal material offered unprecedented access 
to late Second Temple period and early Christian thinking, which called into 
question the Orthodox Christian view that dominated Pauline scholarship. A 
New Perspective on Paul was initiated, aimed at dismantling assumptions about 
his work and addressing confusions about his theology that date to Marcion. As 
with contemporary historians of the Biblical period, scholars of this New 
Perspective on Paul were influenced by advances in historical method 
introduced by the new soft sciences such as archaeology, which defined criteria 
for interpretation and found more effective ways to determine provenance and 
reliable artifactual witnesses.73  
New Perspective historians are self-reflexive, and address “problems of 
bias, perspective, context, construction, particularity, otherness and diversity”, 
(Mason 329), when interpreting texts. That is to say, the historian, in trying to 
access the past ‘for what it was’, is committed to dispelling the centuries of 
assumptions that have obscured the past from a ‘true’ view. As well as 
dispelling terms of contemporary prejudices limiting analysis, historians are also 
focused on defining the limitations of good scholarship. Barclay’s article on 
‘mirror-reading’, an effective method in Biblical Studies research, which I note 
reflects a method used in psychoanalysis, identifies the limitations of the 
method when analyzing Paul’s letters. The case study Barclay focuses on is the 
scholarship on Paul’s “Letter to the Galatians”. This epistle was written to his 
Gentile converts in Galatia who, on the advice of circumcised apostles, decided 
to circumcise; in the letter, Paul is angry and somewhat hysterical in trying to 
convince them that the Gospel absolves them of the ‘cut of the flesh’. Using the 
mirror-method, wherein the language in the text is decoded to define the 
audience the writer is addressing, this letter offers scholars a window into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Provenance was a big issue in archaeology, reflecting the new anxiety with fakes raised by 
various archaeological hoaxes, the earliest and most famous being Heinrich Schliemann’s 
putative discovery of Troy. 
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seeing who Paul’s opponents were based on what he had to say against them. 
To offer one example of the trouble historians face with this method, Barclay 
claims that, “Because Paul constantly pits the cross against the law and 
circumcision (3.1, 13; 5:11; 6:12, 14-15), many scholars have concluded that 
the opponents, who taught the law and circumcision, must have played down 
the message of the cross” (81). In other words, the opponents were considered 
anti-Christian based on an assumption that “law” was Judean and “cross” was 
Christian in Paul’s thought. Barclay concludes that the anti-Christian 
assumption of Paul’s opponents is improbable. The multitude of contradictory 
proposals by historians about the semantic values of Paul’s various ‘laws’, some 
of which I shall consider in chapter 4, serves the fundamental trouble in 
determining very much about Paul’s community through his language alone. 
Paul was neither a Jew nor a Christian. That statement is true in that 
these predicates are anachronistic, or, in Fredriksen’s terms, avoid false claims. 
During the time of Paul, not only were there no Christians, there was also no 
such thing as religion; there were those who Paul persecuted as heretics of the 
sect which followed Jesus, and with whom he became associated after his 
revelation. Moreover, Paul’s message introduces the term “Christ”, the Greek 
word for the Hebrew “mesiach”, or messiah, to define the dead Jesus, and, 
because our record of the period prior to the destruction of the Second Temple 
is limited to Paul’s letters, there is no evidence to prove ‘Christ’ was used by 
Paul to define followers of Jesus, much less, that it reflected the ‘religion’ we 
know today as Christianity. In her scholarship on Paul, Colleen Shantz chooses 
to use the word “christian’, in the lower case to signify the movement in its 
early formative period (Paul in Ecstasy 19). For my part, since there was not 
even a formal concept of religion in Paul’s time, and there were only sects of 
the faith of the Israelites, known to us through first-century historian, Josephus, 
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namely, Pharisees, Sadducees, and Essenes, and some Sicarii,74 I favour the 
more period focused and literal expression, ‘Jesus followers’ in this project.  
While my work follows Taubes in seeing Paul as a first-century Jew, I 
agree with the problems highlighted by historians that Paul’s Jewishness, or his 
affiliation with Judaism, is another anachronism; to repeat, there was no Jewish 
religion, as we know religion. Moreover, there was no identity as Jew, in the 
same racial/ethnic terms it is used today. Shaye Cohen points out that our word 
for Jew, denoting the Jewish people, came from the Greek, Ioudaios and Latin 
Iudaeus, which “were generally ethnic geographic terms like ‘Egyptian’, 
‘Syrian’, ‘Cappadocian’, ‘Thracian’, and so forth. Thus instead of ‘Jews’ we 
should, in many cases, speak rather of ‘Judeans’, the residents of Judea 
(geography), who constitute the ethnos, ‘nation’ or ‘people’ of the Judeans 
(ethnicity)” (Beginnings 14.)75 Mason problematizes the ethnicity implied in the 
term Judean, of Judea, by noting the variety of other expressions that existed in 
ancient Judean, derived from the terms, Yehuda and Judaismos: “Yehudaism” is 
attested no earlier than 5th century CE (143); “Judaizing” meant to circumcise 
(146), and “’Judaismus’ came into practice in early Christian writings” (150.)76 
The term for ethne was applied to a group based in a geographic settlement 
which, for the Roman empire, signaled their tax exemption; the ethne was 
applied to individuals associated with the cult practices of that settlement by 
people not associated with the ethne; therefore, Judean referred to a person 
who was a member of the people whose cult practices originated in Judea, and 
that included ex-patriots Philo of Alexandria, and Paul of Tarsus. Thus, to speak 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Josephus, The Wars, 133-147.	  
75 The term “Judean” is used by many contemporary historians; for example, Mason identifies 
Flavius Josephus as a Judean. 
76 Mason reviews the particular uses of “Judaismus/os” in early Christian texts from early second 
century with Ignatius of Antioch to Epiphaneus to fourth century Eusebius in “Jew, Judeans, 
Judaizing, Judaism” (151-155). I find interesting the fact that Judaism is a term that distinguished 
those who practiced circumcision in contrast to the non-circumcised followers of Jesus. Did the 
invention of the name Judaism take root in the formation of Christianity?	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of Paul as Jewish only displaces how he positioned himself in his life, and 
amongst his followers; he was from Tarsus, a Roman citizen, a Judean living in 
Asia minor, and self-identified as a Pharisee. I will in my project identify the 
first-century community of Jewish people in Judea and in Asia Minor as Judean. 
According to Luke-Acts, Paul had a revelation ‘on the road to Damascus” 
which led to his conversion. The fact is that scholars do not hold much faith in 
the facts of Luke-Acts about Paul, since it was written only at the end of Paul’s 
career as an Apostle, if not after his death around 67 CE. What Paul tells us 
about himself in his letters is very little, but he repeatedly attests to at least one 
divine encounter77. That divine encounter testimony points to one more 
category, which I add as a headline rather than as content for discussion here, 
and that is ‘religious ecstasy’. Colleen Shantz’s title alone, Paul in Ecstasy: The 
Neurobiology of the Apostle’s life and Thought, indicates the interdisciplinary 
nature of the scholarship on religious ecstasy which, she notes, has not been 
explored much with respect to Paul in historical research (Shantz 12). That 
category of religious ecstasy contextualizes the psychoanalytic nature of my 
project as a whole, while, in specific terms, it is the focus of chapter 5.  
My interest in exploring Paul’s religious ecstasy requires attention to his 
writing, which is why I limit my analysis to a consideration of only letters 
commonly attributed to Paul: i.e., Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, 1 and 
2 Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans. Any references to Luke-Acts will be 
made because a scholar’s argument requires it, but I will refrain from engaging 
critically in the reference. These letters written by Paul during his ministry 
spreading the Gospel to the Gentiles, starting in the late 40s and ending with his 
last letter to the Romans sometime during the early sixties, reflect one period of 
Paul’s life and did not reflect a theological project, nor were they read as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77 Morray-Jones argues that there is too little evidence in the letters to determine how many 
experiences Paul had; though he does point out that the event of his first encounter is different 
from his ascension to the third heaven 2 Corinthians 12:2.  
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scripture. They were written by a man on a political mission to save people 
from the apocalypse. In that respect, Badiou misrepresents the political activist 
Paul as a Saint. If Paul was not a Christian, he was not a Saint, either; in saying 
this, I do not aim to de-sanctify Paul, or show any disrespect to believers, but 
simply want to refocus this modern lens on the past when Christianity did not 
exist; what did exist in the first century was a man whose ecstatic experience I 
call a trauma was documented in his letters. 
 
THOUGHT EXPERIMENT 
Badiou contends that, “Death is a construction of the evental site insofar as it 
brings it about that resurrection (which cannot be inferred from it) will have 
been addressed to men, to their subjective situation” (St. Paul 70). In other 
words, the crucifixion of Jesus only serves to highlight the truth-Event of the 
resurrection. Žižek contributes an eschatological emphasis to Badiou’s ‘truth-
Event’: “The naming of the truth-Event is ‘empty’ precisely insofar as it refers to 
the fullness yet to come” (82). If Christ is ‘a coming’ as an event that happened, 
in Badiou’s terms, and in Žižek’s terms, what happened is a promise of his 
return to affirm the resurrection to come, to this I add that the return will finally 
confirm or deny his crucifixion. Until that day, the historical Jesus persists only 
as symbolic energy in the dynamic exchange between the crucifixion and the 
resurrection.  
As a thought experiment, I would like to signal a rethinking of Badiou’s 
truth event of the resurrection. His implicit identification of Paul as a Christian 
perpetuates the false assumption that Paul’s ‘truth-Event’ was also Christian. In 
order to follow through on Badiou’s promise to free Paul’s message from 
Christian-ness, I would like cut the desire/drive cycle of the 
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resurrection/crucifixion by de-linking Jesus from the Christ.78 That delinking 
begins with Paul’s “gospel’ which came through the inhuman source: it was a 
revelation very much like Althusser’s interpellation, or the call. The 
‘interpellation’, or ‘call’, happened to him. In the historian’s circle, this ‘call’ is 
the ecstatic experience. 
In terms of Freud’s method of analysis (it does not matter if it is true or 
false, what matters is what the subject is saying), when we hear Paul excitedly 
proclaiming his ‘interpellation’, or call: “the gospel is not… of human origin… 
but through a revelation of Jesus Christ” (Gal 1:11-12), the question raised is not 
whether or not Paul’s authority as an apostle came from an inhuman source, 
because we know, through Althusser’s somewhat awkward representation, how 
the inhuman can speak to people, on a spectrum from the psychotic episodes of 
the nervous energy of Schreber’s two Gods, to the quiet insistent inner voice 
Dolar inherits from Freud, and everything in between; nor is it strange to think 
of the dead speaking to us in dream, because the father’s dream of his son 
attests to that being a reality, too; no, what is inexplicable is Paul’s relation to 
the dead Jesus who came to him as resurrected. If the logic of the Christian 
symbolic of the indivisible remainder is that resurrection is only possible for the 
dead, what must be added to this logic is that, without Christ’s resurrection, 
there would be no Jesus crucifixion. Paul’s letters are our only access to the 
‘real’ void, which the name covers over. I accept that that ‘real’ trauma will not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 This delinking strategy is carried out by a small group of biblical studies scholars through a 
philological investigation of the meaning of messiah in first-century Judea. The modern 
discovery of the Dead Sea Scrolls and other archaeological finds of the twentieth century have 
troubled the definition of the signifier Christos to designate Jesus as messiah. Novenson 
considers the semantic exchange between ‘Christ’ and mesiach in Christ among the Messiahs: 
Christ Language in Paul and Messiah Language in Ancient Judaism (2012), by outlining the 
scholarship that has gone a long way to de-linking the orthodox Christian principle of Jesus 
Christ as messiah from the Judean concept of the messiah/christos used by Paul. My research 
contributes to Novenson’s project from a psychoanalytic perspective. 
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be found, but that a re-vision of the indivisible remainder that Paul, the first 
century Judean Pharisee, had in mind, is possible in a limited way. 
I take one more step in this thought experiment. In purely logical terms, 
we recognize that the following statement is true: the dead Jesus was able to 
speak to Paul because he was resurrected. What is not logical is how Paul, who 
never knew Jesus as the historical preaching and healing man, could know this 
resurrected figure was Jesus. Unlike now, back then there was no currency of 
the image via TV or photography by which to identify someone. There is no 
reason to believe Paul had any means of recognizing Jesus by sight or voice. 
Subtracting the illogical from the logical, then, the most we can say about what 
Paul wrote is: there was a revelation about resurrection because of death.  
In the chapters ahead, I will be driven by the following questions. With 
the un-binding of Jesus from Christ, what is visible in Paul’s Christ? In delinking 
these forces of Christianity, can Paul’s experience continue to be identified as 
conversion? In erasing our anachronistic Christian-ness from Paul’s experience, 
does our inherited trauma look different from those already proposed?  
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CHAPTER 3: MESSIANIC ROADS AND HIGHWAYS: FROM PAUL’S 




The process of delinking Jesus from the Christ, the signifier from its predicate, 
involves identifying the point of articulation of messianic redemption with the 
Christian figure. What that means is not as simple as it sounds. For one, the 
Christian messiah has had a monopoly on the messianic expectation of western 
culture for twenty centuries, and notably invisible through the secular 
paradigms, as Löwith has argued, which is to say that its original moment has 
been obscured by centuries of assumptions. For another, while Judaism “has 
always maintained a concept of redemption as an event which takes place 
publicly, on the stage of history and within the community” (The Messianic Idea 
in Judaism 1), as Scholem argues, there has been an effort in rabbinic Judaism to 
suppress apocalyptic thinking raised by the first-century gnostic thinking of 
Merkabah literature, and early Jewish mystical practices that anticipated the 
‘end days’, which explained a general reticence to speak about the messiah in 
Jewish culture (70). As James Dan explains in his study of the divide between 
the political messiah and the mystical messiah: “It was Scholem in his detailed 
study of the subject who proved that Jewish messianism is a constant 
component of Jewish belief, always present, even if for long periods it is 
subdued and does not express itself strongly in historical occurrences” (James 
Dan 121.) Scholem’s historical review of the messiah in Jewish history 
coincides with a scholarly re-visitation of the idea of the messiah in the first 
century based on discoveries of first-century artifacts such as the Dead Sea 
Scrolls. As expressed so clearly in Neusner’s edited collection title, Judaisms 
and Their Messiahs at the Turn of the Christian Era, research by Jewish scholars 
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of both secular and sectarian backgrounds have problematized the Christian 
paradigm of a singular redeemer sent by God. The essential conflict between 
the coherent Christian messiah and the multiplicity of and resistances to the 
Jewish notion of the messiah contextualize Benjamin’s decidedly ambiguous 
messianism. 
 My investigation in the pages ahead exploits the ambiguity of Benjamin’s 
messianic for the reason that it has inspired a debate traced by contemporary 
concerns with Jewish identity and Marxist politics. In The Time That Remains, 
Giorgio Agamben proposes that Benjamin’s ‘weak messianic power’ in his 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History”, is a ‘quote without quotation marks’ of 
Paul’s idea of strength in weakness in 2 Corinthians 12:9-10. Brian Britt is 
adamantly opposed to this theory. As I will show in the pages ahead, not only is 
it a delicate business to distinguish what first-century messianic traces are 
defining Benjamin’s thoughts on redemption, it is difficult to isolate the juncture 
at which a Christian messiah is not a Jewish messiah in the first century. By way 
of exposing the different assumptions driving Agamben and Britt each about 
Benjamin’s messianic, I review scholarship on Paul’s idea of the Christ in 
conjunction with a consideration of the first-century messiahs in literature 
contemporary to Paul, and conclude with an attempt to address the 




PART ONE - THE ‘CITING WITHOUT CITATION’ 
In their introduction to a special messiah issue of the Journal of Cultural 
Research (Vol 13, Issues 3-4, 2009), Arthur Bradley and Paul Fletcher suggest 
that, “we might trace the evolution of modern thought through the figure of the 
messianic itself” (183). They point to how Heidegger’s work on Paul’s letters in 
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Phenomenology of Religion led to his idea of ‘ontological messianism’ which, 
they say, can be traced through work by contemporary philosophers, especially 
in the expression, “messianic now” (184), a distinctly Pauline reference. What is 
clear about this messianic figure of the ‘now’ in modern thought by religious 
and atheist scholars alike, such as Derrida, Levinas, Benjamin, Žižek, etc., is its 
dialogue, ranging from covert to overt, with the Christian foundation. Assuming 
a Christian privileging in the Pauline messiah seems to be at the root of Brian 
Britt’s critique of Agamben’s theory that argues for a link between Benjamin’s 
“Theses on the Philosophy of History” (1939) and Paul’s 2 Corinthians. In, “The 
Schmittian Messiah in Agamben’s The Time That Remains”, Britt faults 
Agamben’s ‘theory’ for misrepresenting Benjamin as upholding a Schmittian 
fascism that enforces a Christian messiah, the politics of which, he stresses, 
Benjamin spent his life resisting. To emphasize his point, Britt declares, “Not all 
messianic roads lead to and from Paul” (279). What does Britt mean by 
disconnecting Paul from a plurality of messianic roads? In relation to the 
supposed connection in Benjamin’s work with Paul’s letters, Britt implies that 
Paul’s messiah is Christian and so, by way of destabilizing the Christian 
monopoly on the contemporary messiah, he gestures to the messianic ideas 
preceding Paul.  
Most scholarship agrees that when Paul identified Jesus as Christos, he 
was translating into Greek from the Hebrew ‘mesiach, meaning the anointed 
one79. The fact that ‘anointed’ distinguished one group of believers from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 In “The Jewish Messiahs, The Pauline Christ, and the Gentile Question” (Journal of Biblical 
Literature 128 (2009): 357-373), Matthew V. Novenson reviews the possibility that when Paul 
was identifying Jesus as Christos he was not identifying him as a ‘messiah’, though he affirms 
that a connection between the Greek Christos and the Hebrew ‘mesiach’ exists. In his book-
length project, Christ among the Messiahs, he brings more evidence to current scholarship that 
troubles the orthodox understanding of Paul’s term ‘Christos’. He argues that in Paul’s time, the 
concept of ‘messiah’ was a fluid one referencing biblical literature about the ‘anointed one’ who 
would be a political leader. As an example of the trouble in apprehending semantic values in 
the obscure historical period of the first-century, Novenson points out that ‘anointing’ people 
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larger group of believers, has ideological implications whose irony is not often 
acknowledged and does bear considering in detail, but which needs to be 
postponed until after I have completed separating Jesus from Christ. The 
meaning of messiah that we have today is a retroactive rendering of the original 
concept of ‘anointed’; in the OT, mesiach identified a public figure like a King, 
such as David, or a priest, such as Aaron; implicit in the anointing was divine 
approval. In Paul’s time, ‘mesiach’ came to denote explicitly a figure chosen by 
God to save or redeem the people. To complicate this etymological shift, there 
were many different ideas of messiah. By focusing on considering what first-
century scholarship can say about Paul’s idea of mesiach, I aim to contest Britt’s 
argument of Agamben’s thesis. 
In The Time that Remains, Agamben’s project to reintroduce the term 
‘messiah’ into discourse on Paul, argues against Badiou’s theory that Paul’s 
message was intended to be universal: “an indifference that tolerates difference” 
(89-99), Badiou claims, aimed to dissolve the politics of ethnic difference since, 
“[t]he production of equality and the casting off, in thought, of differences are 
the material signs of the universals” (109). For Agamben, this way of reading 
Paul misses the point of Paul’s ‘evangelion’, or good news. According to 
Agamben, the good news of the gospel is actually that Jesus Christ, the messiah, 
signaled a new relation to the law which involved a break, a cut in the law, 
leading to differences and distinctions that can never be transcended as a 
universal concept: “The messianic cut of Apelles clearly never adds up to a 
universal” (52) which leads Agamben to conclude: “You see, it makes no sense 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was a practice that stopped in the second century BCE, but as a practice of sanctification, it 
continued as a practice in places (51). Therefore, the term was not understood to be literal but 
figurative. Borrowing Loren Stuckenbruch’s idea that use of the term in that time was ‘creatively 
biblical”, Novenson concludes: “It follows that all such [messiah] texts should be taken into 
consideration as evidence of this interpretive practice and, second, that no one messiah text has 
a claim to represent ‘the messianic idea’ in its pristine form over against other messiah texts that 
do so less adequately” (62-63).  
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to speak of universalism with regard to Paul, at least when the universal is 
thought of as a principle above cuts” (53). It is on the principle of the 
distinctions, and the Schmittian concept of the sovereign’s power to define the 
exception, that Brian Britt critiques Agamben for imposing a Schmittian concept 
of the messiah on Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History; and 
specifically Agamben’s work to prove a correspondence between Benjamin’s 
‘weak messianic power’ and Paul’s phrase “but [the Lord] said to me, “My grace 
is sufficient for you, for power is made perfect in weakness” (2 Corinthians 
12:9), which Agamben defines as a ‘citing without citation”.  
In criticizing this thesis, Britt emphasizes that his “primary concern is not 
Agamben’s reading of Paul but of his reading of Walter Benjamin as a Pauline 
thinker through the lenses of Carl Schmitt’s political theology” (263). Britt is 
convinced that Benjamin is merely a tool for Agamben, a tool for scholarly 
legitimacy, which makes Benjamin out to be a Schmittian (267). Thus, in the 
effort to delink Benjamin from Schmitt, Britt’s task is to prove that what 
Agamben sees as a Pauline citation in ‘weak messianic power’ is no more than 
“a loose associative allusion, not a citation” (270). This delinking is centered on 
the fact that Agamben ignores the Sitz im Leben of Paul’s messiah within the 
context of the historical concept of messiah which Benjamin was drawing on: 
“Agamben’s claim to discovering a one-to-one correspondence between Paul’s 
text and Benjamin’s oversimplifies the broad, complex strands of biblical 
tradition” (282). In my review of Britt’s critique below, I want to qualify that, 
even if Agamben claims a one-to-one correspondence, which he does not, but 
rather uses Benjamin’s metonymic ‘citing without citation” expression, I am not 
out to prove a one-to-one correspondence, but a correspondence that is 
stronger than Britt’s diminutive ‘allusion.” Secondly, while Britt has grounds for 
complaint that Agamben does not do his biblical homework, Britt’s effort to 
show the absent homework only emphasizes that Britt’s argument 
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overcomplicates the connection Agamben claims to have found while at the 
same time proving plausible the idea of seeing a hidden citation of Paul in 
Benjamin’s work.  
 As far as Britt is concerned, being able to see a connection between 
Benjamin’s ‘weak messianic force’, and the schwachen and Kraft in Paul’s 2 
Corinthians 12;9, is weakened by the missing ‘messiah’ in Luther’s translation of 
“my strength is made perfect in weakness” (denn mein Kraft ist in den 
Schwachen machtig) (2 Corinthians 12:10) (268).  Agamben is apparently aware 
that there is no ‘messiah’ in the Pauline text, but is obviously unaware of the 
trouble Britt claims this engenders. Britt’s observation seems the most damning 
critique of Agamben’s discovery: How could there be an actual ‘citing without 
citation marks’ if the Pauline line involving ‘weakness’ has no messiah? In 
defense of Agamben’s intuitive reading, the ‘weak’ in Paul’s lines, which the 
Lord claims Paul must accept, is made bearable by “the power of Christ” which 
dwells in him; that is, a messiah appears in the passage though not as weak, but 
as the voice of the Lord (my grace is sufficient for you), which is the power of 
Christ that allows Paul to claim, “whenever I am weak, then I am strong” (2 
Corinthians 12:10). Having said that, Britt’s observation that the messiah is not 
weak in Paul’s 2 Corinthians as it is in Benjamin’s text is a keen observation, 
which explains why linking weakness to the messiah becomes the thread that 
he follows in his analysis.  
 Having identified the missing messiah, Britt proceeds to offer alternative 
sources for Benjamin’s Schwachen (268): The Suffering Servant in Second Isaiah 
points to ‘my chosen one’, or messiah (42:1-4) but no ‘weak’; we read ‘God has 
been my strength’ but again, no ‘weak’ (49:1-6); the suffering of the ‘servant’, 
ugly and ‘despised’, is not defined as ‘weak’ (52:13-53:12). When Deutero-
Isaiah was written, the suffering servant was not a messianic figure, but was a 
prophet or the nation as a whole, reflecting an eschatological interpretation 
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sometime during the critical period of the Babylonian exile. The messianic 
significance in Isaiah was a retroactive interpretation of the Biblical text in 
response to political troubles which some date from the rule of Antiochus IV 
and the Maccabean Revolt. As the Judean desire for independence from first 
Greek, and then Roman rule in Judea, gained traction, an eschatological 
expectation of redemption began to take shape through a divine intercessor in a 
movement known as apocalypticism. Paul, the Pharisee from Tarsus, versed in 
the law and Biblical scripture, was a participant in this apocalyptic thinking, 
which helps explain his use of Deutero-Isaiah’s suffering servant as messianic. 
The complexity of interpretation which Britt brings forward about the suffering 
servant to fill in what is absent from Agamben’s research does not, ultimately, 
prove the insignificance of Agamben’s discovery; the small pool of literature 
used for messianic projects, which together reflect various and even competing 
ideas of redemption and salvation as they have come to be associated with the 
messiah in the first-century CE, contextualizes Paul as a Judean author writing 
within an amorphous messianic tradition. 
On the matter of combining ‘weak’ and ‘strong’, Britt suggests looking at 
Joel 4:10: “... if not explicitly messianic, [it] is clearly apocalyptic: “Let the weak 
say, “I am strong!” (“Der Schwache spreche: Ich bin Stark!”) (269). Scholars 
date Joel to about 400 to 350 BCE; its hybrid prophetic and apocalyptic 
structure mentions no messiah. While apocalypticism came to be associated 
with an eschatological anticipation of a future redemption, not all apocalyptic 
texts had a messiah (Collins 11). What remains confusing for me is why Britt 
would think it feasible that Benjamin circumvented Paul’s letters to fuse Joel 
and Isaiah in a messianic expectation, when the precedent for placing ‘weak’ in 
some kind of indirect relation to the messiah is found in Paul’s letter. In short, 
the only messianic way to Joel or Isaiah is through Paul. Though Britt is correct 
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to assert that not all messianic roads lead to Paul, Britt’s historical review 
overlooks the convergence of ideas within Paul’s letters. 
 Britt’s effort to detach Agamben’s thesis of Paul from Benjamin with each 
biblical reference only re-attaches Paul to his context, and that is especially 
obvious in Britt’s admission when reviewing the significance of Erlösung 
(redemption) and Erlöser (redeemer) in Benjamin’s theses. As Britt observes, 
references in “Thesis 6” to the redeemer parallel those to the redeemer in Isaiah 
(9, 11, and 40-55), which is “a text that precedes and influences Paul on the 
idea of a weak Messiah” (270). If Britt can here affirm Paul’s use of Isaiah for 
messianic purposes, then why ask the reader to see Benjamin use Isaiah as the 
preferred messianic source in ’weak messianic power’, overlooking Paul’s use 
of Isaiah for the ‘weakness’ of the suffering servant? While this is a contradiction 
within Britt’s article that signals problematic assumptions about Christianity and 
Paul, it also points to a problem with Agamben’s thesis that Britt’s critique 
circles but cannot clearly articulate. It is true that Agamben’s theory does not 
appear to be substantiated by the historical record, and Britt's cursory review of 
the historical record shows no substantial support for Agamben; it is also true 
that if Benjamin invented combining the messiah with weak, then Paul’s 
reflection is only passably more direct than Isaiah, thus an ‘allusion’. Thus, 
Britt’s identification of the ‘absent messiah’ appears to weaken Agamben’s 
thesis; a deeper investigation into the historical record, however, and 
specifically the biblical scholarship on Isaiah and other pre-Christian texts 
introduced by Britt’s brief review, will show that, far from making “Agamben’s 
case for a primarily Pauline influence even more dubious” (279), this literature 
will offer proof that Benjamin could have had Paul in mind when writing ‘weak 
messianic power’.   
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When Britt claims “not all messianic roads lead to and from Paul” (279), the 
pivotal factor in this statement is Paul; he is not the historical figure, but the 
letter writer who represents Jesus Christ. Yet, for Britt, the problem with the 
Pauline messiah, a.k.a. Jesus Christ, is not its Christian-ness, per se, but its 
Schmittian-ness: “Agamben’s messianic genealogy from Paul to Schmitt and 
Benjamin really amounts to the imposition of Schmitt on Paul and Benjamin” 
(278). In Britt’s assessment, even Paul’s messiah needs defending against 
Schmittianism. Britt’s protectionism of two dead people’s ideas implies that their 
works cannot speak for them. In order to save both Benjamin and Paul from 
Schmitt’s fascism, Britt focuses on messianism, which “emerged ... from a large 
number of biblical and postbiblical texts and became part of the culturally 
pervasive biblical tradition theorized by Benjamin” (278). Indicative of Britt’s 
animus against Paul’s Christian messiah, which I assume is a means of rectifying 
centuries of prejudice for Christianity by here speaking against it, Britt 
substitutes Jesus with Jewish messiahs: “Although It can be argued that 
messianic texts in Isaiah 9, 11, or 53 do not reflect a coherent or full-fledged 
doctrine of the messiah, Michael Fishbane shows how early rabbinic 
understandings of the Messiah have strong biblical roots...” (278). Following 
Britt’s gesture to include a literary period for analysis, I concentrate on the 
suffering servant in Deutero-Isaiah in this section, to draw into focus a period 
that remains obscured by limited textual evidence. When the messianic ideas 
emerged and, more importantly, how they spread, can only be supposed, based 
on the limited library at hand. In this analysis, I want to highlight that, while 
Britt is mainly correct to see that not all messianic roads lead to Paul, his 
assumption that Paul promoted the Christian messiah over other messiahs 
overlooks Paul’s pre-Christian context. With respect to messianism after Paul, I 
will not have the space to engage in depth with that assertion, but rather, at the 
end of this section will point to some of the scholarship that outlines how 
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Judaism has engaged in a dialogue with the dominant Christian messiah over 
the centuries which problematizes the second part of Britt’s assertion. 
 For Britt, the issue of the difference between Benjamin’s messiah and 
Agamben’s Pauline messiah, comes down to a scholarly struggle between the 
Jewish and the Christian messiahs. That is evident in Britt’s introduction of Israel 
Knohl’s scholarship on the messiah in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Knohl’s thesis is 
simple; the “Self-Glorification Hymn” (4Q491b), a first-person text by someone 
who claims to be a messiah, is the messiah who, preceding Jesus, “influenced 
the emergence of Christianity” (52); this messiah supposedly preceded Jesus and 
thus, for contemporary readers, displaces Jesus from his primacy. Moreover, 
Knohl asserts, “in my opinion, there is evidence that the speaker in the hymn 
was a leader of the Qumran sect who saw himself as the Messiah and was so 
regarded by his community” (20). Unfortunately, Knohl’s research collapses on 
too many outstanding failures of the example, based on a thesis that is purely 
speculative.80 For the thesis to stand, the messianic claimant would have to 
have been a resident of the site where the scrolls were found, that is Qumran; 
he would have to have existed before Jesus; and especially, he would have to 
have existed at all. No matter how possible the assertion, there is simply no 
concrete evidence for either proposition. 
Knohl’s emphasis of the uniqueness of the scroll—no other messianic 
voice exists in the Qumran material—is less proof of an actual messiah, than it 
is a sign of an anomaly; anomaly or not, this figure is equal to Jesus, in Knohl’s 
review, because the suffering servant passage from Isaiah 53 used by Paul to 
define Jesus’ vicarious suffering, is found in the Self-Glorification hymn scroll:  
“My glory is in[comparable] and besides me no one is exalted, nor comes 
to me, for I reside […], in the heavens, and there is no […]… I am counted 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 “The possibility that the figure in question was a messianic leader was briefly considered, 
among other possibility, in E. Puech, “La croyance des Esseniens en la vie future: Immortalité, 
résurrection, et éternelle?” Ebib 22 (Paris, 1993): 392-395” (Knohl 110).  
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among the gods and my dwelling is in the holy congregation; [my] desire 
is not according to the flesh, [but] all that is precious to me is in [the] glory 
[of] […] the holy [dwel]ling. [W]ho has been considered despicable on 
my account? And who is comparable to me in my glory?... who bea[rs all] 
sorrows like me? And who [suffe]rs evil like me?” (4Q491 Frag 1; 6-8 
Martínez p 981).  
 
According to Knohl, the last lines echo Isaiah 53:3, “he was despised, we held 
him of no account; Yet it was our sickness that he was bearing; our suffering 
that he endured” (Isaiah 53:4). Then he proposes that this messiah figure 
preceded Jesus because, when he identified himself as ‘beloved of kings”, 
Knohl singles out a friend of King Herod who is named in Josephus’ Jewish 
Antiquities 15:372-79 as Manaheim (55). Knohl’s hypothesis (51), already weak 
because it relies on a single document, is further weakened by a fundamental 
literalism that does not grasp the figurative nature of 4Q471b, (it is not the 
actual voice of the messiah in heaven), or its performative quality (it is alluding 
to Biblical scripture.)  
As Knohl outlines in his Appendix A, scholarship has proposed some 
feasible authors for the messianic hymn, one of which is the author of the 
Hodayot scrolls, who some argued was the Teacher of Righteousness, a leader 
mentioned in the CD who may have been a leader of the community81. Collins 
argues against seeing a connection between the messianic hymn and the 
Teacher’s hymns (the Hodayot) because the language cannot be compared 
(Apocalypticism 146). Eshel notes: “The resemblance between the Teacher of 
Righteousness and the Eschatological High Priest could have led some scribes 
to incorporate the Hymn of Self-Glorification, which was composed in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 So much of the Scrolls remain a mystery, so that claiming a connection between the Teacher 
of Righteousness and the author of the Hodayot Scrolls remains in the area of speculation. 
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name of the Eschatological High Priest, into the Hodayot Scroll” (Eshel, 
“4Q471b: A Self-Glorification Hymn,” 202). At the most, the messiah hymn 
points to a redaction of the Teacher’s hymns, but does not affirm that the 
Teacher was a messiah, much less affirm it is the words of an actual person who 
was a messiah; rather, the most that can be said about the scroll is that it reflects 
a messianic expectation by the author and probably those who read the hymn. 
Hengel remains agnostic about interpreting 4Q471b as messianic at all; the 
elevated status of the figure suggests seeing him as the arch-angel Michael, 
though when the figure compares himself to human rulers, the angelic reading 
crumbles; with respect to the Hodayot scrolls, he argues against scholars who 
have claimed the author reflected a messianic figure like the suffering servant 
since, if he suffers, he does not suffer vicariously82.  
I would make the same argument against the messianic scroll author: his 
suffering is meant to glorify himself; when he claims to ‘bear all sorrows’ like no 
one else, he is only boasting about his capacity to suffer, and makes no 
reference to the fact that he is suffering on behalf of others. Knohl has identified 
a link to Isaiah 53 in the DSS messianic scroll, but any concrete evidence that 
could substantiate the suffering servant in Isaiah as the messiah expected in the 
DSS writers/readers remains obscure to scholars. To this research I would add 
one more point against Knohl’s assertion of a messiah which predated and 
influenced Jesus’ mission: there is no evidence that 4Q491 (and its variants) 
predated Jesus and Paul since the Qumran library was in operation until Rome 
destroyed it, a few years before 70 CE, the destruction of the Second Temple. To 
add fuel to a burning fire of speculation, I would suggest that rather than being 
a source which influenced Christianity, this messianic scroll could have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Martin Hengel and Daniel P. Bailey, “The Effective History of Isaiah 53 in the Pre-Christian 
Period”. The Suffering Servant: Isaiah 53 in Jewish and Christian Sources. Edited by Bernd 
Janowski and Peter Stuhlmacher. Grand Rapids, MI/ Cambridge, UK: Eerdmans, 2004. 118. 
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influenced either by Jesus himself83 or Paul’s mission in the twenty years he was 
preaching before his death in 67 CE.  
The variety of messiahs represented in the wealth of material found off 
the shores of the Dead Sea affirms Britt’s assertion that there were many 
messianic expectations in Paul’s time. The more eschatological scrolls can be 
said to fit into a body of literature of this period identified as apocalyptic. As 
Joel shows, not all apocalyptic literature points to a messianic figure; and, as 
4Q471b highlights, not all putative messianic texts are apocalyptic. 
Technically, as Saperstein notes, the messiah is an anachronistic concept (8); it 
is a term that has been applied to OT figures in response to a Judean 
phenomenon of a real anxiety about the future in the face of political struggle 
against the ruling forces. The figure has evolved over time, incorporating key 
tropes; namely the chosen one as the ‘anointed’ of mesiach; sacrifice, as 
exemplified in the suffering servant; and exultation, variously represented as 
resurrection and or simply ascension to heaven or, as in the self-glorification 
hymn, superiority.84  
The messiah as the “the anointed one”, originally in the OT signaling a 
figure chosen by God, like king David, or a priest selected for office, over time 
came to be associated with a saviour / redeemer figure85. Exactly when the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 The central paradigm of this project is that Jesus is not the author of his messianic status; it 
was conferred post-mortem, and the record suggests that it was done so by Paul.	  84	  For a useful reference with some commentary of the use of the Hebrew ‘mesiach’ in OT texts 
and in pseudepipgraphical material, see Gerben S. Oemega’s The Anointed and his People: 
Messianic Expectations from the Maccabees to Bar Kokhba (1998).	  
85 Seeing Jesus as the messianic fulfillment of a long-standing Jewish tradition in the OT was 
central to approaches taken by biblical scholars such as Sigumund Mowinkel in his He That 
Cometh (1956). As a result of the widespread access to the Dead Sea Scrolls, some scholars 
have raised questions about this research because the rare use of ‘mesiach’ in the documents 
suggest that messianism was not central to the Judean cult or its eschatological hopes. 
Therefore, there is no direct correlation between the messianism of Jesus Christ and Judean cult 
practices of the time. James H. Charlesworth’s edited collection of articles, The Messiah: 
Developments in Earliest Judaism and Christianity (1992) is indicative of this critical scholarship. 
In his article,  “From Messianology to Christology: Problems and Prospects”, Charlesworth 
points out that Jesus was not identified by Paul, or most of the other early texts, as having 
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suffering servant came to be associated with the saviour messiah remains 
obscured by our limited understanding of Second Temple idiomatic 
expressions. Hengel traces the anointing of the suffering servant from Isaiah 53 
through various texts of the pre-Christian period. Determining what is meant by 
anointed, or who is anointed, in Isaiah remains difficult; anointing can be 
literally blessing someone with oil; or in more figurative terms, being called or 
chosen by God. Sometimes the Suffering Servant was the priest or prophet who 
was anointed; sometimes the anointed Servant was seen as the collective of the 
nation of Israel: “Under certain circumstances the two possibilities [individual 
or collective] could be viewed simultaneously as different aspects of the text, 
because a messianic figure is always at the same time a representative of the 
whole” (81). Thus, the mesiach of the pre-Christian period remained 
ambiguous. Moreover, the “Son of God” motif “can be applied collectively to 
Israel, to the Messiah, and to the individual godly, pious, or wise person” (82). 
Thus, when reading apocalyptic literatures that reference a mesiach, an 
anointed figure, and especially the enigmatic “Son of God”86, we know we are 
encountering a non-standard idea used creatively by a diverse faction of 
politically motivated Judean apocalypticists. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
messianic attributes (ie. son of David) (8), thus leading to questions about whether Jesus was in 
fact a saviour figure before his crucifixion, and raising questions about when his messianic 
status was determined after his death. If the DSS are any proof of messianic thinking of the time, 
Charlesworth argues, then “statistically we must admit that messianology was not a major 
concern of the community” of Qumran (25). N. A. Dahl takes a semantic approach to the 
relation between the Hebrew ‘mesiach’ and the Greek “Christos’, highlighting the selective use 
of ‘Christ’ which suggests the existence of conflicting agendas within the Christian movements 
(398). That is, texts that represent Jesus a messiah of the crucifixion rarely use “Christ’ to define 
Jesus; whereas texts that distinguish Jesus as resurrected use Christ often (primarily Paul). J M 
Roberts provides a brief review of the etymological/social development of the Hebrew ‘mesiach’ 
in “The Old Testament’s Contributions to Messianic Expectations”. In light of Freud’s theory of 
the Egyptian origin of Moses teachings, Roberts makes a very interesting point that Egyptian 
royal protocol may be the foundation for “much of the mythological dimension in the later 
messianic expectations” (43). I believe there is enough tension in this idea to warrant an 
expanded study.  
86 For more reflection on the role of the Son of God in Pauline letters see Shantz, Segal, Tabor, 
Morray-Jones, or chapter 5. 
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The scrolls found at Qumran exemplify this diversity. In The Apocalyptic 
Imagination (1998), Collins claims “there is little evidence for the anointing of 
prophets in the Hebrew Bible,” yet, “prophets are ‘anointed ones’” in the 
Qumran scrolls, CD (Damascus Document)87 2:12, 6:1, and IQM (War Scroll) 
11:7 (166). In some texts, the priestly messiah is identified as the Interpreter of 
the Law (1Q28 a 2.11-20), or prophet in the Star of Jacob (4Q175 and 4Q 
Testimonium). Then there are scrolls that reference a royal messiah, such as the 
King David reference in the ‘root of Jesse” from Isaiah 11 (4Qp161 11-21; 
1Q28b 2.22-5.20). In the War Scroll we read that the messiah is God (1QM 
11.11), but we also see a fusion of the King and priest as the Warrior-Priest 
(1QM 15.4-6). In the CD88 we read of two messiahs, one priest and one King 
(CD VII.19),89 and we also read of a prophet and the anointed of Aaron and 
Israel in 4QTestimony. A highly unorthodox editorializing in Isaiah 51:5 of the 
Great Isaiah Scroll (Isa), wherein the first person pronoun of God’s voice in the 
MT text was changed to third person denoting the anointed servant, suggests the 
primary importance of Isaiah amongst the community at some point in their 
association. Regarding the tendency by scholars who assume that the scrolls 
represent one group of people at the site known as Qumran, Schiffman 
“cautions against seeing the material found in the cases as a monolithic corpus, 
the elements of which may be harmonized with one another at will” 
(“Messianic Figures and Ideas in the Qumran Scrolls” 129). Those scholars who 
contest the long-standing theory that the residents were Essenes offer the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
87 The name Damascus Document applied to texts found at Qumran is meant to recognize that 
it is a copy of a scroll found in a Geneza in Egypt in the first half of the twentieth century.	  
88 Florentino García Martínez and Eibert J. C. Tigchelaar, editors. “The Damascus Document.” 
The Dead Sea Scrolls: Study Edition, Volumes 1. Leiden: Brill; Michigan: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing Company, 2000. 561. All subsequent Dead Sea Scrolls excerpts cited are from this 
translation. 
89 “And a star is the Interpreter of the Law, who will come to Damascus, as is written: Num 
24:13 [sic] ‘A star moves out of Jacob, and a scepter arises out of Israel.’ The scepter is the 
prince of the whole congregation and when he rises he will destroy all the sons of Seth” (CD 
VII.19). 
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caution.90 In summary, the most that can be said about the writers and readers 
of the Scrolls, as different as they probably were, is that they maintained an 
eschatological expectation of defeating evil with divine support, and that 
conviction probably reflected many factions in Judea. Collins contends that the 
Qumran documents overall do not necessarily show that a messianic 
expectation was central to the community from the beginning, but they do 
show that in Judea “a messianic expectation eventually arose” (83); and that this 
expectation was closely connected with the political energy of apocalypticism.	  
Even when it was first written, Isaiah reflected an eschatological 
expectation of the redemption of Israel (Gignilliat 65) and Israel’s role amongst 
the nations: “the servant is given a unique, dual role—that of restorer of the 
remnant of Israel and as light to the nations” (Isaiah 49.1-6, Gignilliat 80). That 
was adapted in various ways by the pre-Christian texts, as either priest/prophet 
or Davidic messiah, or a combination thereof; in the Christian tradition, the 
messianic suffering servant took on a decidedly singular identity as Jesus. While 
most scholars claim that Paul’s use of Isaiah in his letters affirms Jesus as a 
suffering messiah, not all scholars see that Paul’s use of Isaiah reflects only 
Jesus;91 some have argued that Paul cites Isaiah to identify himself as the 
suffering servant. Donaldson, for example, claims that Paul cites Isaiah 49 not 
for Christ’s suffering, but for his own suffering.92 Contributing to this argument, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 The long standing belief that the community at Qumran were Essenes, comes from the earliest 
archaeological finds on the Dead Sea Shores where the scrolls were found at a site that had 
buildings that suggested a community lived there, evidence which seemed to affirm Josephus’ 
claim that the Essenes lived on the shore. Steve Mason critiques this thesis in his “What 
Josephus says about the Essenes in the Judean War”. Stephen G. Wilson and Michel Desjardins, 
eds., Text and Artifact in the Religions of Mediterranean Antiquity: Essays in Honour of Peter 
Richardson (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2000), 434-467.	  
91 As well as the scholars outlined forthwith, James Tabor is a name I add to the list of those who 
believe that Paul self-identifies as a suffering servant (Things Unutterable 41). 
92 Terence Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles 254.	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Lane argues that Paul’s call in Gal 1:15 and 2 Corinthians “indicates that he has 
been called to prophetic office”, where the ‘call’ signifies ‘anointing’.93   
Paul relies on Isaiah frequently to make his point which, in the letters to 
the gentiles (Thessalonians, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians), was meant to 
justify his responsibility to the Gospel. An echo to Isaiah 49:1-3 can be heard in 
Paul’s Gal 1:15: “But when God, who had set me apart before I was born, and 
called me through his grace“. The suffering which Paul endures for his mission 
(2 Cor 11: 23-33) and which, because of proximity, identified metaphorically as 
‘the thorn in his side” (2 Cor 12:7), which points to his suffering on behalf of the 
mission as demanded by God, could suggest the vicarious nature of his 
suffering; he endured persecution on various fronts94 in order to spread the 
‘good news’ to the gentiles, a mission grounded in Isaianic language: “he has 
sent me to preach good news to the poor, to bring up the broken hearted, to 
proclaim liberty to the captives and release the prisoners....” (Isaiah 61:1.) In 
light of Jesus’ messianic status, Paul’s self-identification as the Isaiah messiah is 
provocative, but perhaps explained by the fact that Paul identifies himself as 
Christ: “It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me” (Gal 2:20.) There 
is an implicit theological significance to these layers of identification, which 
shall be further developed, in the next chapter95.  
Gignilliat concedes to arguments for seeing Paul’s self-identification as 
the suffering servant (Paul and Isaiah’s Servants, 58), but raises objections both 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 William L. Lane. “Covenant: The Key to Paul’s Conflict with Corinth” 7. 
94 As a Jesus follower, Paul was persecuted by the very Pharisees he once associated with; but as 
a Jesus follower with a mission for the Gentiles, he was also attacked, as 2 Corinthians and 
Galatians suggest, by fellow Judean Jesus followers.  
95 Paul’s thinking tends to be circular; he claims he has died in Christ and now, it is not him 
who lives, but Christ who lives in him. The future he promotes for the followers of Jesus is that, 
if they believe in Jesus Christ, then they will also be like Paul, who is like Jesus: they will die in 
Christ and, reborn, will have Christ live in them. If we take this ‘christos’ concept through Paul’s 
thought to its logical conclusion, Paul’s letters suggest that, not only are believers in Jesus saved 
at the end of time, but they become Christos, or, in other terms, messiahs before that end time. 
That is not as revolutionary an idea as it sounds for us today, considering that, in Isaiah’s terms, 
all of Israel was anointed: messiah. 	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in principle and in application. In principle, Christ is the messiah and Paul is 
the apostle; one is divine and one is human. In application, Gignilliat asserts, 
Donaldson’s idea of Paul’s identification with Isaiah is contradicted by Paul’s 
use of Isaiah 53 in 2 Cor 5:14-21 to identify Jesus as the Christ: “he died for all, 
so that those who live might live no longer for themselves, but for him who died 
and was raised for them”. As far as Gignilliat is concerned, Paul cannot be the 
Servant: “The typological significance of the Servant is a weight too great to be 
placed on the shoulders of Paul. Someone greater than Paul is needed to carry 
this significance and it has been argued that this person is Jesus Christ” (109). I 
find this an interesting statement perhaps most because of his assertion that ‘it 
has been argued’ that Jesus is the servant. If there is an actual argument, 
Gignilliat does not provide details. The fact is, Gignilliat’s claim is riddled with 
assumptions, the primary being that there is only one messiah and that is Jesus 
because he is more than human; the ability to suffer on behalf of others is so 
‘great’ that Paul’s mere mortal existence could not sustain the demand; 
moreover, it assumes that the suffering servant, as identified by Isaiah in the 
Babylonian exile, was a messiah, predicted as being chosen by God. This of 
course means that Paul’s encounter with God (2 Cor 9) could not make him 
equal to the servant’s call, and that Paul’s use of the suffering servant could only 
point to the divine resurrected Jesus because his part in the mission of messianic 
redemption is inferior. Gignilliat accounts for Paul’s apparent self-identification 
by defining him as “the servant of the Servant” (142). That argument solves a 
contradiction he claims is evident in Paul’s letters while it tidily avoids 
addressing the supposed arguments questioning Jesus’ legitimacy; this 
avoidance shall be taken up shortly.  
Gignilliat’s main argument that affirms Paul’s use of Isaiah to define 
Jesus’s messiah-ship is found in Romans 15:12: “The root of Jesse shall come, 
the one who rises to rule the Gentiles/ in him the Gentiles shall hope”. The ‘root 
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of Jesse’ identifies the Davidic rule of the messianic expectation apparent in 
several Dead Sea Scrolls and is proof, Novenson argues, that Paul had meant 
the “messiah” when he identified the risen Jesus as the Christ (christos).96 I 
would like to qualify Novenson’s affirmation that Paul does mean ‘messiah’ 
when he says Christos, by pointing out what he later affirms in his book-length 
project, Christ Among the Messiahs, which is that Paul’s ‘messiah’ was a fluid 
concept, very much like Hengel’s idea. This fact can explain to some extent, 
what scholars of Paul’s letters read as contradiction or incoherence.  
Scholars tend to address incoherence in Paul’s letters as reflecting his 
audience or, seeing as the letters were written over a period of two decades, the 
changes in his thinking over time. Thessalonians was his first letter; Romans was 
his last and was written just before his departure for what would be his third 
and last meeting in Jerusalem before his arrest and subsequent martyrdom in 67 
CE. Paul had been operating independently of Jerusalem which seemed to be 
the hub of the movement; he met with Cephas and Jesus’ brother James three 
years after his ‘call’ experience (Galatians 1:18-19) and did not return to 
Jerusalem until fourteen years later (Galaltians 2:1) when he was given the 
green light to spread the gospel to the gentiles. Unlike his letters to the gentile 
communities that he started, the Letter to the Romans has always been 
recognized as different because of the scripture cited; there are at least twenty-
four references to Isaiah. Walters notes that, when one reads these passages in 
their groupings, the priorities indicate “Paul uses these scriptures along with his 
own hermeneutical methods to defend his gospel”.97 Supporting this theory, 
Hays suggests that the Christological significance of Isaiah 53, the sacrificing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 Novenson, “The Jewish Messiahs, The Pauline Christ, and the Gentile Question” 358. 
97 J. Edward Walters, “How Beautiful are my Feet: The Structure and Function of Second Isaiah 
References in Paul’s Letter to the Romans” 39. 
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suffering servant, in Paul is rather undeveloped98 in comparison to Paul’s use of 
Isaiah to promote his gospel: “Paul was not so much interested in proving that 
Jesus “was” the Servant. Rather, Paul was seeking to show that Isaiah revealed 
the prophetic promise of God’s redemption of the world, embracing Gentiles as 
well as Jews” (48). Hays’ and Walters’ observations encourage seeing that Paul’s 
citation of Isaiah in all his letters was rhetorical and that he saw his gospel as 
being on a par with Jesus’s message; Paul wanted to show that his gospel 
promoting equality amongst the Judeans and the Gentiles was anticipated in 
Isaiah.  
These observations are made more interesting when considered with 
Mason’s observation that the otherwise profuse use of ‘evangelion’ in his letters 
to his Gentile missions is restricted in Romans (320). According to Mason, this 
resistance to discussing his ‘evangelion’, points to the fact that the audience at 
Rome was composed primarily of Judean Jesus followers who were likely 
resisting Paul’s mission to the gentiles. In that light, the profuse use of Isaiah in 
this letter, written and delivered to an audience that knew Isaiah, suggests 
Paul’s agenda was to emphasize Israel’s responsibility as ‘a light’ for the gentile 
nations, and indirectly support his role in the project. This move contrasts his 
tendency to self-aggrandize in the letters to the Gentiles. Since the audience in 
Rome was probably mostly Judean, they would have known the Isaianic 
references, unlike the Gentile audiences in Thessalonia, Galatia, Corinth, 
Philippa, which probably would have not. The inconsistencies are explained by 
Paul’s creative rhetorical adaptation of Isaiah to justify his mission to the 
different audiences. That is, Paul’s use of Isaiah to substantiate his ‘exulted’ 
status as having a mission from God would have been key to his gentile 
audience, secondary or dependent on Jesus’ messianic status, and since his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98 Richard B. Hays, The Conversion of the Imagination: Paul as Interpreter of Israel’s Scripture, 
49.	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mission was not widely accepted by the Judean Jesus followers, Paul’s focus 
with the Letter to the Romans was to highlight that Jesus’ exulted status 
reinforced the legitimacy of his call to spread the Gospel to the Gentiles. While 
this would suggest Paul’s use of Isaiah was primarily rhetorical, reflecting an 
indifference to the content he was using, the argument against that indifference 
centres on his conviction that his mission to the Gentiles was blessed by God. 
With respect to his mission, at least, Paul seems to have seen his role in 
God’s mission as equal to Jesus’, and not as Gigilliant argues, subordinate to 
Jesus’ role as the resurrected. This is affirmed in his self-identifying with the 
resurrected Christ, and also being the suffering servant. Paul’s use of Isaiah 
would attest to what Hengel identified as fluidity in the concept of ‘messiah’, 
wherein his identification with being the prophet, the suffering servant, and the 
light to the Gentiles as an Israelite, was in a historical sense not indecent or far-
fetched. This variety of meaning is attested in the double messiah motif in the 
Damascus Document which, in turn, helps to interpret Paul’s use of Isaiah; If 
Paul used Isaiah to identify Jesus as the royal Davidic messiah in Romans, then 
we can see Paul, representing himself as working with Jesus for God’s plan to 
spread the word to the nations, identifying as the priestly messiah complement. 
In this respect, the silence, which Mason notes in Paul’s use of the gospel in 
Letter to the Romans, is echoed in his not self-identifying with Isaiah’s suffering 
servant. This tension evident in Romans points to a number of possible reasons 
of which I would propose two: for one, Paul downplayed his gospel in Roman 
because of a sense inferiority amongst the other apostles (1 Corinthians 15:8-
11), and the criticism he experienced by some or many Judean Jesus followers 
because of his gospel; for another, the fact that Jesus stands out as the dominant 
messianic figure in Romans (Isaiah 11:10), in comparison to the pre-Christian 
messianic multiplicity which Paul relied on while writing his other letters during 
his two decades of apostleship, may indicate a limiting of the messiah idea to a 
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singular figure near the end of Paul’s missionary years possibly indicating 
pressure around him demanding justification for his heretical gospel. 
Whether Paul initiated this limitation, or whether it was part of the 
movement around him, or even postdated him, all that the evidence allows us 
to say today is that the concept of the singular messiah is cemented by the time 
of Acts 8:32-35, wherein Paul’s Conversion (Acts 9) follows Philip’s 
identification of Jesus with Isaiah scripture: “Like a sheep he was led to 
slaughter…”. The fiction of Acts is that, almost perfectly inverting the reality that 
Paul introduced the Isaiah language for the messianic significance of the Jesus 
movement, Philip introduces Jesus as the messiah promised in Isaiah. In this 
reification, the plurality of Paul’s messianic Isaiah has been reduced to a single 
figure, Jesus. From this point on, there is no messianic accomplice or 
competition as found in the pre-Christian tradition as I have argued is evident in 
Paul’s letters; there is no issue that Jesus is the messiah, because he has fulfilled 
the promise anticipated by the suffering servant of Isaiah 53. There is no 
argument. Gignilliat’s resistance to seeing Paul as a suffering servant seems to 
break down on the issue of his inability to wear the mantel of ‘messiah’. It could 
be that Paul’s concept of ‘anointing’ was not directly associated with a 
‘redeeming saviour’ figure we have come to know in Jesus, the saviour sent by 
God. We understand he saw himself as an actor in God’s plan for mankind 
who, suffering on behalf of others (suffering servant), fulfills his part in God’s 
plan. This is to say that Paul did not identify with the Jesus we know in the 
Christian faith, a resurrected God, because that figure did not exist for him: in 
this respect, Gignilliat makes an argument where there is none. Paul saw 
himself as part of the nation of Israel, chosen by God to fulfill the plan to 
redeem all of mankind, and in that way, he was fulfilling God’s plan by 
fulfilling his ‘call’; thus, he suffers persecution (on behalf of others) making him 
both ‘anointed’ and also the ‘suffering servant’. I want to emphasize that, Paul’s 
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distinguishing of Jesus from all mankind is part of the narrative of his fantasy 
which is skewed by his rhetoric in support of his gospel. Understanding what 
this fantasy signifies must wait till the end of Chapter 5. All that can be said now 
is that it is problematic to identify the Christian messiah as a Pauline concept, 
since the messiah was not God made incarnate in Jesus, but was a responsibility 
shared by all Israel, both the individual and the community. Against this 
plurality, the new tradition of a singular and particular messiah, which Britt 
targets as Paul’s, is both true and not true, and so, misleading.   
While I have made a case against seeing Paul as the author of the single 
messiah of Jesus Christ, since his use of the term ‘Christos’ was so fluid that he 
included himself as one on occasion, in Isaianic terms, his place in the 
continuum of influence in early Christian teachings suggests that he is the 
‘author’ in the strictest sense,99 in equating the suffering servant with the 
Christos in Christian thinking. By implication, then, he may be seen as 
indirectly responsible for reactions to the singular Jesus Christ found in rabbinic 
material. That is, if we close the gaps of transmission, we see Paul’s hand 
reaching into rabbinic teachings. Adna’s review of the use of Isaiah 52:13-53:12 
in Targum of Isaiah, a rabbinic text dating to between 70 and 130 CE, highlights 
the singular messianic figure: “Targum of Isaiah has drawn all the three figures 
(prophet, messiah of Aaron and messiah of King David) into one… the picture 
of the Mesiach in Targum Isaiah 53 presents an analogy to that of the New 
Testament, though it must immediately be added that the New Testament 
description of the messiah-ship of Jesus Christ places the accent on very 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 I had always found fault with Foucault’s article about the death of the author because the idea 
of the author’s irrelevance erased the author’s political context. In this specific incident of Paul’s 
use of Isaiah as part of the narrative developed around the historical Jesus, I become sensitive to 
the salient element of Foucault’s argument: no author writes in isolation but borrows and 
represents the climate of thinking around her/him. Paul was not thinking alone, and for this 
reason, the Isaianic concept was probably reflecting sentiments of his contemporaries at least 
about the idea of a political messiah being identified as a ‘suffering servant’. 
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different terms.”100 What Adna calls an ‘accent’ can be redefined as evidence of 
a dialogue; this is the dialogue that Britt does not take into account in his 
sweeping and dismissive claim that “not all messianic roads lead from Paul.” 
While Britt’s claim is logically true since, the odds for at least one messianic 
path not connected to Paul exists, the documents in rabbinic Judaism and 
Christianity in the period post-Paul reflects a focus on the Christian messiah, 
either in support or against. The Judean “triumphant’ messiah speaks against the 
Christian messiah as the ‘cursed’ crucified Jesus, a trope which is reiterated in 
the living example of the messiah leader of the last Judean rebellion (132-135 
CE) who was, tradition claims, identified as the messiah Bar Kokhba by R. 
Akiva; notably, the letters written by the rebellion leader, Bar Kosiba, and 
archaeological coins found by contemporary archaeologists101 affirm Bar 
Kosiba’s dual role as both priest and warrior-King messiah. The failure of the 
rebellion in 135/136 CE made it possible for Justin Martyr to have and record a 
conversation with a Judean named Trypho just after the last Judean rebellion 
(132-135/6) in his Dialogue with Trypho,102 in which the exultation of Jesus “our 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Jostein Adna, “The Servant of Isaiah 53 as Triumphant and Interceding Messiah: The 
Reception of Isaiah 52:13-53:12 in the Targum of Isaiah with Special Attention to the Concept 
of the Messiah”. 224. 
101 For information about the full collection of the letters, including those found by Yagil Yadine, 
see The Documents from the Bar Kokhba Period in the Cave of Letters. Jerusalem: Israel 
Exploration Society, 1963. For detailed discussion on the coinage, see Leo Mildenberg. The 
Coinage of the Bar Kokhba War. Frankfurt am Main and Salzburg: Verlag Sauerländer, 1984. 102	  The significance of Isaiah’s suffering servant only becomes concretized after Paul’s mission, 
exemplified in Justin’s work which never contained a direct quote, according to Werline 
(“Transformation of Pauline Arguments in Justin Martyr’s Dialogue with Trypho, 80). In order to 
prove to the Jewish refugee from the Bar Kokhba War that Jesus was indeed the messiah, Justin 
cites OT prophecies to prove that Jesus Christ was the messiah anticipated and that his mission 
was to speak to the Gentiles. As Bates notes, “The significance of Isaiah is that he, like all of the 
other Hebrew prophets, was a faithful vehicle of the divine logos. The prophecies which the 
logos spoke through Isaiah announce that the ‘true Israel’ is the Christ and those who follow 
him” (540.) The scholarly review of Isaiah in Justin emphasizes a key issue of absence. Bingham 
notes, “The cross, though not explicit in Isaiah 53, is inherently there by means of the theme of 
shameful, innocent suffering” (251) evident in Dialogue 36.6; 49.2; 85.1; 110.2. It is a strange 
argument to say that Christ’s suffering on the cross is ‘implicit’ in Isaiah when, as the record 
shows, it was not written about Jesus; and as the review of Paul’s work shows, Isaiah was used 
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suffering and crucified messiah” (111.2) seems a cruel jibe at the failed Judean 
messiah. The rabbinic community had a vested interest in knowing what the 
Christians were up to in order to at least re-assure the faithful that the messiah 
had not come, or as Scholem’s research suggests, to suppress the havoc caused 
by messianic fever.  
Rabbinic efforts to control messianic expectation after the last Judean 
rebellion did not erase messianic hope in Jewish communities in the diaspora; a 
confluence of political and spiritual conditions, Scholem argued, led to the 
eruption of messianic fervour inspired by the Polish messiah, Sabbatai Zevi 
(1626-1676) who, notably, justified his conversion to Islam to save his life by 
using Pauline principles of breaking with the law.103 In nineteenth-century 
France, self-proclaimed messiahs modeling their projects after Paul’s mission, 
inspired Marx’s vision that communism fulfills history, and the nation becomes 
the means of redemption in his communist project (Talmon 285). In much more 
reactionary terms, Nietzsche’s raging anti-Pauline polemic in The Anti-Christ 
reiterates another aspect of the Christian monopoly on the messiah. This 
literature was the culture that Benjamin inherited. 
Clearly, any messianic road that Paul was on was not a pre-determined 
road, very much as Britt asserts, but as far as what came after Paul, the historical 
record shows that the dominant messiah dates to the first-century concept. True, 
not all roads lead from Paul, but the main highway of messianic hope, off 
which other messianic roads branched, points to Paul as a source; he authored 
the scriptural concept of the Christian messiah, and also, shared the same 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
rhetorically to support his mission to the Gentiles as integral to the tradition of the faith in 
Israel’s role as a suffering servant to be a light to the nations. 103	  Scholem asserts that the ideology justifying Sabbatai’s apostasy utilized Pauline ‘faith’ to 
accommodate the paradox of following a messiah who was a convert to Islam: “Both 
Christianity and the Sabbatian movement took as their point of departure the ancient Jewish 
paradox of the Suffering Servant which, however, they stressed with such radicalism that they 
practically stood it on its head”  (“Sabbatai Zevi, The Mystical Messiah” 1992, 321).	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messianism that runs through the apocalyptic energy of mystical practices of his 
time. For that reason, to say that not all messianic roads lead from Paul 
overlooks the fact that a Judean culture dominates his Christian legacy. 
Moreover, though he is associated with the singular Christian messiah by 
rabbinic Judaism, his relation to Jesus seems to have inspired a pattern of co-
dependence between the messiah and his handler: Bar Kokhba was identified 
by R. Akiva,104 Sabbatai Zevi would have had no audience without John of 
Cusa. A double messiah returns in Nietzsche’s reactionary de-coupling of the 
inimical Paul from the ‘real’ suffering Jesus, indirectly reiterating the early 
Christian move to save the faith from the radical idea that Paul, too, was a 
‘suffering servant’ or messiah. This series of cuts and sutures of a doubled 
messiah may in fact point to the repression of the first-century messianic 
message found in the priest and King messiah in Qumran Scrolls and the 
coupling expressed in Paul’s message of Jesus, which may be said to reflect 
generally the historical and philosophical ground of Benjamin’s ‘weak 
messianic force’. 
Britt uses Knohl to highlight evidence of a Judean messiah before Jesus 
and Paul. The fact is, Britt has targeted Paul’s messiah because it is a Christian 
figure, which, in western discourse at least, has shut out the variety of messiahs 
around the idea of the suffering servant and has monopolized messianic 
thinking since its inception. While Britt is correct to contest the monopolistic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Current scholarship argues that there is no substantial proof that Rabbi Akiva named Bar 
Kosiba the messiah. In “Bar Kokhba and the Rabbis”, Schäfer argues that, based on the few 
documents in which the story of the revolt is mentioned, we can only understand that R. Akiva 
was attributed to having identified Bar Kosiba as the messianic hope in the star of Num 24:17 
(4); the reason why this story was important to the rabbinic community is a mystery (21); 
Novenseon iterates Schäfer’s conclusion, arguing that ‘the tradition that has in fact come down 
to us bears several telltale marks of inauthenticity” (“Why Does R. Akiba Claim Bar Kokhba as 
Messiah?” 556); Adele Reinhartz emphasizes that Bar Kokhba probably was considered a 
messiah during his military campaign because the famous R. Akiva is used in rabbinic literature 
to authorize his distinction, which is immediately refuted by Ben Torta who calls the leader the 
“Bar Kosiba”, the Hebrew word for liar (“Rabbinic Perceptions of Simeon Bar Kosiba” 181). 
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hold Christianity has on the concept of the messianic, he has conflated Paul 
with Christianity, duped by the early Christianity propaganda that there was 
only one messiah, and it was Jesus. What Britt would have overlooked in 
reading Paul’s text within this tradition is that, when he claimed, “for whenever 
I am weak, then I am strong” (2 Corinthians 12:10) he was reflecting on the fact 
that his being anointed, in the Isaian sense of the ‘mesiach’, was the source of 
strength. That is, the messiah Britt does not see is Paul himself. Therefore, Paul’s 
fusing of human weakness with the strength of Christ arguably shows the 
combination Benjamin uses in ‘weak messianic power’, thus providing some 
proof that Agamben’s thesis is in the realm of possibility. 
On the whole, I concede to Britt’s essential argument that any strong 
evidence for seeing Benjamin’s use of ‘weak’ as a conscious reflection on Paul’s 
‘weak’ in 2 Corinthians 12:9-10, would require more proof than Agamben 
provides, from the typological clue to the references to other Pauline texts in his 
concluding ‘Threshold’, as well as Scholem’s implied observation that Benjamin 
identified with Paul (143 – 145). The fact is, an in-depth consideration of 
Benjamin’s relation to Pauline literature, Luther’s Bible, other literary influences, 
and perhaps the most impossible of all, some real access to Benjamin’s 
conscious intentions, would be the only way to prove or disprove Agamben’s 
thesis, definitively. In other words, a proper analysis of this situation would 
involve the work which Agamben’s project does not supply. Perhaps the only 
failure of Agamben’s thesis is in framing the connection between Paul’s text and 
Benjamin’s intentions for which there seems so little reliable evidence. Having 
said that, I am interested in what Agamben hears because, as I have shown, 
there is something to hear. 
 
 
WEAK MESSIANIC FORCE 
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In the previous pages, I wanted to problematize the terms Britt used in his 
reflexive rescue mission against Agamben’s Schmittianizing of Benjamin. That 
reaction, I have argued, is based on assuming that a Pauline reference in 
Benjamin’s text signals pro-Christian ideology central to Schmitt’s work on 
political theology. Britt’s defense of Benjamin against Schmittianization 
conditions his Christo-centric reading of Paul. As Britt notes, Benjamin was 
concerned that Marx’s ‘classless society’ and the new man had become internal 
to the state of exception as a ‘contrived discontinuity”: Britt quotes Benjamin: 
“A genuinely messianic face must be returned to the concept of the classless 
society, and that is in the interest of the revolutionary politics of the proletariat 
itself/themselves” (f.n. 28, 274). Benjamin’s messiah is a political one, Britt 
argues; therefore, Agamben’s conflation of Paul’s ‘weak’ with the Schmittian 
exception undermines the very real confrontation Benjamin had with Schmitt 
and fascism: “The Schmittian reading of Benjamin—my main concern here—
distorts or inverts a body of work that challenges the distinction between sacred 
and profane and resists messianic fulfillment” (280). Britt’s logic here involves 
dismissing the exception as a Schmittian theory in service of a Christian 
ideology of weakness, ignoring the fact that the exception is not just a fascist 
theory but reflects real political examples of persecution and discrimination by 
the Sovereign. Britt’s logic also assumes that Agamben’s thesis sees Benjamin’s 
text as unified with Paul’s Christian principle. Granted, Britt’s assumption may 
be seen as encouraged by Agamben who suggests in the “Threshold” that 
Benjamin identified with Paul,105 and thus implies that there is a semantic 
correspondence between Corinthians and Benjamin’s text. The fact is, the 
correspondence is not one of homology but of dissonance; in Paul, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 Agamben quotes Scholem’s identification of the “Angel Satan” and Paul’s thorn in the flesh” 
in 2 Corinthians 12:7, in Benjamin’s Agesilaus Santander which leads Agamben to conclude 
that “Scholem is implying an identification with Paul on the part of Benjamin” (Time that 
Remains 145). 
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messianic is the power that gives strength to the weak; in Benjamin, the power 
of the messianic is ‘weak’.  
Apart from these references to Benjamin’s possible intentions, it is hard 
to know what exactly Agamben thinks about this supposed Pauline ‘citation’ as 
his application of his theory to Benjamin’s “Theses” is indirect and incomplete. 
Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” was a political tract 
responding to fascism by meditating on the tension between the history shaped 
by enlightenment progress, which is written by the rulers, and the view of things 
from the perspective of the historical materialist devoted to the Marxist 
revolution to emancipate the oppressed. This tension is established at the start 
with the Puppet, otherwise identified as “historical materialism”, which is 
playing a game of chess. Invisible under the table at which the Puppet plays is a 
dwarf which is directing the Puppet who “is to win all the time”. The Puppet is 
assured mastery so long as it uses “the services of theology”, which “is wizened, 
and has to keep out of sight”. In the concluding pages of The Time that 
Remains, Agamben claims that his identification of Paul’s Corinthian reference 
in Benjamin’s “Theses” means we know the identity of “the hunchback 
theologian”. Agamben never explicitly identifies who or what the ‘hunchback’ 
is, but the implication is that it is Paul’s theology (141-145). Therefore, 
Benjamin’s historical materialism is determined by Paul’s theology. The 
singularity of this proposition goes against the general consensus in scholarship 
reflected in Britt’s critique, that Benjamin’s work is fraught with ambivalence 
and tends to reflect Jewish, not Christian, religious concepts.106 My task in this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 In his article “Benjamin’s Ambivalence” (Telos, 11:1 No. 35, 1978), John Fekete claims “his 
work embodies ambivalence and tension rather than coherence and identity” (192). McBride 
cites the scholarship criticizing Benjamin’s effort to bring together Jewish mystical thinking and 
Marxist ideas in “Marooned in the Realm of the Profane: Walter Benjamin’s Synthesis of 
Kabbalah and Communism” (Journal of the American Academy of Religion, Vol 57, No. 2 
(Summer 1989), pp. 241-266.)  
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concluding section is to read what Benjamin’s text is saying about ‘weak’, and 
determine to what extent it reflects a Pauline reference. 
The nature of the relationship between the dwarf and the puppet is 
pivotal for introducing Benjamin’s project, Ian Balfour argues in “Reversal, 
Quotation”. Writing some two decades before Žižek’s identification of the 
inversion of the power relation between the dwarf and historical materialism, 
Balfour points out that the story of the dwarf and the puppet is a strange story 
used even more strangely to introduce the structure of his project as changing 
the old power-dynamic to the new: “the puppet is now figuratively pulling the 
strings of the dwarf, a reversal of the lines of power drawn in the first part of the 
thesis” (626). And the puppet is doing so by enlisting “the service of theology... 
which... is small and ugly and has to keep out of sight.” In Agamben’s terms, 
this ‘theology’ in Benjamin’s “Theses” belongs to Paul. It seems clear that in the 
dynamic between the dwarf and the puppet, Benjamin is referencing Schmitt’s 
criticism that secularism was determined by the hidden infrastructure of religion 
for critical ends. Throughout the “Theses”, Benjamin calls out of hiding those 
religious terms, which have been buried in politics in the name of secularism, 
including the Marxian expectation of redemption in the ‘messiah’. Thus, in the 
field of historical materialism on which Benjamin’s philosophy is built, the 
‘services of theology’ by secular historical materialism, terms like messiah, 
messianic, the Antichrist are called out of hiding and are reorganized for new 
political ends. Balfour’s interpretation that Benjamin saw two kinds of 
“historical materialisms”, the one that exists, and the one that ‘might become’ 
(627), is clearly signaled in the “Theses” by a new messianic expectation.  
The power dynamic between the Puppet and dwarf establishes a motif of 
weak and strong throughout the “Theses” in binaries such as the working class 
and rulers, winners and losers, Fascists and their opponents, angels and 
progress. For example, there is the ‘single catastrophe’ witnessed by Angelus 
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Novus, and the wreckage it causes (IX). From the human perspective, that 
wreckage may be the product of war and conflict in history; from the angelic, 
eternal perspective, however, the mess is the product of a single catastrophe 
which has caused damage the Angel is compelled to heal, but cannot because 
it is being propelled backwards into the future by the winds of the storm of 
progress from “Paradise”. The power of the angel to heal is diminished by the 
human factor of progress. In another example of the binary, Social Democracy 
disguises Protestant progress in the salvation of technology (XI), reinforcing the 
Protestant work ethic that oppresses the workers with conformism. The working 
class, like Angelus Novus, is weakened by enlightenment progress. In another 
example, Benjamin observes that Social Democracy’s “cutting of the sinews of 
its greatest strength” (XII) involves the misapplication of ‘redeemer’ to workers, 
which weakens their will to change by making them forget their “hatred and 
spirit of sacrifice”. What becomes apparent in Benjamin’s vision of history is 
that, the disenfranchised worker, the economic exception, is targeted by 
fascistic propaganda, weakening his will for emancipation. Unspoken, but 
implied, in this history is the figure of the Jewish exception in Nazi-ruled 
Germany. In Benjamin’s literalizing of the weakness of the exception by the 
Sovereign’s “cutting of the sinews of strength”, it is hard not to notice that 
Benjamin seems to have an ‘ear’ to a weakness that shows some relation to 
Paul’s concept of ‘weakness’.  
I suggest that what Agamben hears as Paul’s ideas in Bejamin may 
simply be Paul’s legacy in Christian thought. Though the fusion of messiah and 
weakness is documented in Paul’s letters, the association of weakness with 
messiah in the Christian tradition is attributed to Jesus’ teachings in the Gospels. 
Take for example, the words of Jesus quoted in the Gospel of Matthew, “Blessed 
are the meek; for they shall inherit the earth” (Matthew 5:5). Paul never knew 
the human Jesus and Paul does not pretend to quote Jesus, but somehow Paul’s 
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idea of ‘weakness’ permeates Jesus’ teachings on the figure of the 
disenfranchised, or the exception. While tradition would argue that the ‘weak’ 
originated with Jesus, the historical record I have referenced suggests that it 
originated with Paul, though the message of the exception may have been 
common currency in Paul’s time. Setting aside the problem with origins, the 
idea that the Christian is empowered by ‘weakness’ in persecution, suffering, 
poverty or meekness, inspired Nietzsche’s rants against the Christian priesthood 
(i.e. Paul), and informed nineteenth-century European social movements, 
including Marx’s communism. Sublimated in Marxist politics is the Christian 
culture of Jesus’ teaching which can be understood as a sublimation of Paul’s 
personal experience with the Christ, which itself probably reflected a 
sublimation of an earlier cultural idea. In this trace of sublimation, it is the link 
between Marx’s project and Benjamin’s “Theses” that explains what Agamben 
is hearing, to an extent. 
Benjamin’s principle of the universal in the messianic repeats another 
Pauline concept: that of the ‘all’. Benjamin’s ‘weak Messianic power’ is 
inherited by the ‘we’ of our generation: “Our coming was expected on earth. 
Like every generation that preceded us, we have been endowed with a weak 
Messianic power, a power to which the past has a claim. This past cannot be 
settled cheaply” (390). If we take seriously the idea of inheritance, and that the 
inheritance belongs to the ‘all’ of us as ‘we’, then we ‘all’ inherit and so we all 
have an equal obligation, from Benjamin to Schmitt, Charlie Chaplin to 
Goebbels. This obligation does not belong to our generation only, but connects 
us deep into the past and into the future generations about a shared 
understanding of ‘end-time’ or fulfillment of humanity. Whether this was 
conscious or not, Benjamin’s ‘we’ echoes Paul’s intended inclusiveness in the 
‘pan’ or ‘all’ in Christ: there is no distinction between the Jew and the Gentile in 
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God’s eyes.107 On that point, we see the connection between the ‘exception’ in 
Paul’s time, and the exception in Schmitt’s theology. That is, where the ‘all’ of 
Paul’s teaching is conditional on the Christ, Benjamin iterates the ‘condition’ of 
the all but in political terms: though we are all equally obliged to be responsible 
citizens, we do not share that responsibility equally. Fascism registered a 
messianic expectation of redemption, but in sinister terms had divested it of 
justice, turning it into propaganda for its mandate to serve some of the citizens, 
while excluding other citizens, and eventually, erasing these ‘others’ from the 
law as non-citizens. By reiterating the ‘all’ in the divide between those with 
power, and those without, Benjamin stresses that the ‘messianic force’ is 
weakened in its political manifestations. The Gentile who, two thousand years 
ago, was excluded until Paul’s project of ‘inclusion’ through the Isaiah promise 
of “a light to the nations” drew them into the fold is, in Benjamin’s Germany, 
eliminating all remnants of the Israelite nation. Whether or not Benjamin’s text 
was referencing the Gentile/Jew divide central to Paul’s message does not 
change the fact that his text is a poignantly ironic reflection on the return of 
first-century politics in twentieth-century Germany. The actions of the Nazis, 
and by association, Schmitt’s theory of the exception, show that what is weak in 
messianic power is that, because it is directed to the ‘all’, it is blind. It does not 
choose its human subject; it does not determine how its ‘power’ manifests; it 
cannot stop fascists from using its promises for their political agenda. Perhaps its 
weakness is what protects us from utter annihilation. 
Anson Rabinbach108 highlights how Benjamin resists political action 
centering on language as the effective means of political action because 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  This ‘all’ was one of the few positive things Britt had to say about Agamben’s analysis of 
Paul’s letters (Britt 55) as the ‘pan’ evident in 1 Corinthians and Romans, and was equal to the 
quality of Taubes’ work.	  108	  “Between Enlightenment and Apocalypse: Benjamin, Bloch and Modern German. Jewish 
Messianism”, New German Critique, #34 (Winter 1985): 78-124. Web. Accessed 23/03/2013.	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“language is the medium of redemption” (121). In seeing language as having 
messianic power, Benjamin adapts Jewish mystical thought, which sees that 
language is connected to its divine essence. In “On Language as Such and on 
the Language of Man”, Benjamin outlines how language, profaned because of 
the mortal factor of the fall, retains its sacred power in a corrupted state as 
magic: “The Fall makes the birth of the human word, in which name no longer 
lives in tact, and which has stepped out of name language, the language of 
knowledge, from what we may call its own immanent magic, in order to 
become expressly, as it were, externally magic” (“On Language” 327). While 
the power of the divine ‘im-mediate’ language deteriorates with the fall, 
becomes weaker through the mediation of semantics and the Babel 
phenomenon of linguistic confusion (329), that weakness remains connected to 
its source of power. This is an important point because it explains ambivalence 
in Benjamin’s concept of ‘weak’. When Rabinbach claims that “Benjamin 
invests language with a Messianic power precisely at the moment of its fall, its 
disintegration into propaganda” (108), we can hear the paradoxical fact that, 
though Social Democracy’s cut in Thesis XII has weakened the messianic 
power, the historical materialist whose activism is performed through language 
has access to language’s divine strength, if weakened by the quality of post-fall 
language. Whereas Lacan identifies the ‘failure’ of language to mean because 
the signifier of the sign is arbitrary as it is linked to the incomprehensible 
demand of the Other through the unconscious, Benjamin insists that profane 
language remains linked to its inhuman divine essence. Lacan sees a 
disconnection between language and meaning, while Benjamin sees continuity 
in man’s profanization of the divine source of strength even as it is tenuous. The 
link to power, that point of articulation, is what is weak, and ambiguously so 
our of necessity. 
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The new historical materialist is the one who perceives “a constellation 
saturated with tensions” which crystalizes “as a monad” by which he 
“recognizes the sign of a messianic arrest of happening” that signals the 
revolution (396). Not only does Benjamin reinterpret messianic power as the 
inhuman abstract idea of ‘messianic time’ (Jetztzeit), erasing it of the Christian 
figure of redemption, he expresses its power in terms of the potential reflected 
in the image of “ ‘now time’ shot through with splinters of messianic time” 
(397). Benjamin’s “splinters” conceptually reinterpret the cosmic event of the 
broken vessels in Lurianic Kabbalah for a modern secular society. In this Jewish 
mystical tradition, the breaking of the vessels was a catastrophe wherein six of 
the ten sefirot, emanations of God’s light, shattered, leading to the dispersal of 
God’s light in the universe. In Kabbalistic thought, the responsibility of mankind 
is to gather the shards, an ethical project known as tikkun (the restoration, the 
healing). In Benjamin’s terms, the world is full of the shards of this first event, 
the trauma of which exists in the world as the opportunity for redemption.109 
The fractured state of divine emanations may be seen as reflecting a ‘weakness’, 
but that state of weakness does not detract from each part having strength; the 
shards have enabled the dissemination of God’s light for all humanity, through 
human time, giving each generation “a revolutionary chance to fight for the 
oppressed” (390). Structurally, the positive force of messianic change counters 
the enervating force of fascistic messianism.  
Benjamin’s fusing of the Kabbalistic idea of redemption with the Marxist 
project for emancipation was unorthodox, as McBride points out, and has been 
the source of conflicted interpretations (242): “Some saw him as a Jewish 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109I think this is a valuable way of thinking about trauma, which in no way is meant to make any 
kind of judgment of an individual’s experience of trauma. Lacan implies the same idea in his 
concept of the value of the synthome. The synthome is that psychic knot of pathological 
behaviour which is recognized as giving the subject a reason to live. More on the synthome can 
be found in Livres XXII: Le Sinthome. Editions de Seuil, 2005. 
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theologian and not really a Communist; some believing him a Communist but 
not really a theologian” (243). The fusing of Christian and Jewish concepts, has 
led to many criticisms about Benjamin’s Marxist project, such as a criticism of 
‘tacking’ Jewish mysticism onto historical materialism (Habermas, 1979:51), 
and judging the combining of apocalypticism and Marxism as inharmonious 
(Terry Eagleton 1981:81). The divide between scholars on Benjamin along 
ideological lines explains the conflict between Agamben and Britt, somewhat. 
Agamben hears a Pauline notion of the weak in Benjamin’s promotion of the 
Marxist politics of the final emancipation of the oppressed. What Agamben 
does not hear, according to Britt, is the stream of Jewish mystical thinking that 
determines everything about Benjamin’s ‘messianic’. This means that 
Agamben’s thesis needs to be modified to accommodate the radical fusion at 
the core of Benjamin’s project. At the same time, what is radical in Benjamin’s 
work demands a modification of Britt’s perfunctory resistance to Agamben’s 
thesis. There is a Pauline reference in ‘weak messianic force’, in part, and that 
part is not limited to the Marxist source, a fact probably not even consciously 
known by Benjamin, himself. 
Britt saw only a Schmittian mandate serving a Christian agenda buried in 
Agamben’s thesis, and that was supported by Agamben’s project, if only 
because he sustained a Christian-based perspective, even though he introduced 
his project as being aimed to redress the stranglehold Christianity had on the 
‘messiah’ (1), and to follow Taubes’ effort to reclaim Paul as a Jewish thinker by 
focusing on Paul’s Judeo-Greek language in The Time (5). The fact is, Britt can 
argue against Agamben’s thesis because it does not account for Benjamin’s 
Jewish mysticism, and Agamben would have to agree. This agreement describes 
a blindness both share about Paul. The Kabbalah is a mystical tradition that 
originates in the middle ages, but has roots in first-century mystical literature of 
the Merkabah. Paul was a first-century Jew whose sensibility, as I will show in 
 	  
  141	  
Chapter 5, reflected knowledge of Merkabah thought and it served his 
understanding of the Christ. The fact is, the twentieth-century cultural map from 
which Benjamin drew for his messianic power is traced with Pauline thinking 
via both the Christian and Jewish traditions. It is not an understatement to say 
that Benjamin’s messiah reflects an affinity with Paul’s 2 Corinthians.  
What is striking about Benjamin’s project of emancipation is that it is 
neither strictly Christian, nor strictly Jewish, but rather aims to fuse the Pauline 
principle of the weak in Marx’s project with Jewish mystical thought, creating 
terms for a universalism in which all messiahs exist in messianic time. If Paul 
stresses that his weakness is made strong in the transcendent, Benjamin 
redefines the terms of weakness as the inhuman principle which serves the 
emancipation of the exception. In Benjamin, it is not the subject which is 
strengthened, as it was with Paul, but the divine source as the interference in 
“the sign of a messianic arrest of happening” (Thesis XVII, 396). Britt’s issues 
with Agamben’s interpretation of Benjamin’s messiah reflect a sensitivity to 
tensions central to Benjamin’s text which Agamben does not fully account for in 
his association of Paul’s 2 Corinthians 12:9-10 with Benjamin’s “Theses”. That 
is, the Pauline agenda Agamben heard, whether it was the conscious or 
unconscious effect of an agenda critical of the Christian project of redemption, 
was reinvented by Benjamin as a ‘weakness’ of articulation: in the relation 
between mankind’s search for power over others, and in the relation between 
mankind and the divine.  
 
CONCLUSION 
The extent to which I disagree with Britt’s claim that Agamben has misheard a 
Pauline concept of messiah in Benjamin’s “weak messianic thought” is the 
extent to which I detect a symptom of a first-century trauma in the twentieth 
century. If Agamben believes he hears Benjamin consciously ‘citing’ Paul’s text, 
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I have shown that there are reasons for his theory. In fact, what Agamben 
identified as a ‘citation’ requires more knowledge of Benjamin than we have 
which is why I would use the term ‘affinity’ to describe the relation between 
Paul’s ‘weakness’ and Benjamin’s ‘weak’. Benjamin’s work reflects an affinity to 
Paul’s thought through Marxist politics and Jewish mysticism. The social 
injustice exacted by Nazi fascism, which targeted the Jewish population of 
Europe as being excluded from the right to live, led Benjamin to reach for the 
messianic, seeking the same outcome Paul sought: salvation. Benjamin had a 
vested interest in reversing the fascistic legal power to decide the exception. 
The crisis was so severe that it seemed that changing that power dynamic was 
only possible through the radical intervention of messianic time: eternal time 
was a check-mate to the injustice of sovereign power to define the exception. 
The messianic broke the laws of time.  
Benjamin’s reliance on the messianic to resolve the exception repeats 
what Agamben defines as Paul’s use of the messiah in his contemporary 
political conflict: “The distinction between Jews and non-Jews, those who are 
within the law and those who are outside, no longer holds in the messianic” 
(Time that Remains 106). In this resistance to ‘distinction’, the Gentile’s 
exceptionalism is undone by the messianic. For both Paul and Benjamin, the 
messiah resolves the exception. This fact brings me to the thesis driving this 
project: it seems that the return of the messianic in contemporary society is a 
reconfiguration of the trauma of the exception. This leads to the question: what 
is the relation between the secular exception and the first-century exception? 
Since law determines the exception, being able to address that question requires 
an understanding of Paul’s relation to the law. 
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With respect to Paul and the law, the philosophers and the historians are 
essentially opposed. Whereas the philosophers such as Badiou and Žižek hear 
coherence, historians such as Heikki Räisänen and J. P. Sanders hear 
contradiction.110 Superficially, this difference is signaled by the fact that the 
philosophers seem only to be interested in Paul’s law of love, whereas 
historians, attending to the letter of the law, pay attention to all of Paul’s sayings 
about the law, which are many and seem contradictory. What is fundamental to 
these contrary perspectives on Paul’s law is a methodological divide. 
Meditating on Paul’s power of weakness, Badiou recognizes an ethics, 
which is “profoundly coherent” (53) and reflects a unique approach to 
universalism: “love inaugurates the universality of the true” (97). Žižek similarly 
focuses on Paul’s law of love, but in terms closer to Agamben, as the means of 
suspending the exception of the law, the homo sacer, and so accommodating 
difference. The philosophers’ interest in Paul is political; in addressing the 
critical events of twentieth-century genocides, they have revitalized Paul’s 
message of love as a solution. In the process, however, they have disappeared 
the very material reality on which historians’ rely for understanding Paul’s laws. 
The historians’ interest in Paul and the law stems from their attention to his 
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110 N. T. Wright argues against Räisänen’s theses about Paul’s theology in The Climax of the 
Covenant: Christ and the Law in Pauline Theology, arguing that seeing contradictions is based 
on a simplistic reading of the logic of Paul’s argument where, on many occasions he is 
intertwining logic with unverified assertions (13). In fact, in terms similar to Badiou’s assertion 
about Paul’s thinking, Wright argues that what we hear as contradiction reflects “the theological 
‘deep structure’ of Paul’s thought” (16.) Wright’s analyses of specific passages on Paul and the 
Law (CH. 2 Gal 3:10-14 and Chapter 1- Romans 8:1-11) are insightful and sophisticated, and 
especially useful because he acknowledges the limits of his analysis.  
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who wanted to convert to the Judean faith; he spoke about the Mosaic laws and 
the law of love with respect to Jesus and his resurrection; he also spoke 
enigmatically about the law of Christ.  
The opposition identified in Santner’s review of Rosenzweig’s work as 
noted in Chapter Two has been the founding principle of historians’ 
understanding of Paul’s idea of the law. This simple opposition has proven 
problematic in analyzing Paul’s theology because, in tracing and cross-
referencing all of his laws in his letters, the difference between the negation of 
the law of circumcision and the promotion of the law of love collapses in 
contradiction. That is, if the Mosaic laws are being thrown out, then why is 
Moses’ law of love retained? Or what does Paul mean when he says there is no 
difference between circumcision and uncircumcision (Gal 5:6)? Räisänen notes, 
“we find two conflicting lines of Paul’s theology of the law. Paul asserts both 
the abolition of the law and also its permanently normative character”,111 
leading him to suggest it “is not literally a law” (81). J. P. Sanders observes that 
Paul’s idea of sin and the Law is confusing, in that Paul does not explain how 
the law can be abrogated if “it is not the law that changes, but the person”.112 
This confusion is exacerbated by the fact that when it comes to understanding 
what Paul meant by the law of Christ (Gal 6:2 and 1 Cor 9:20), historians are 
unanimously flummoxed, especially because it seems to displace the law of 
Moses and yet, as is clear even in this introduction, it does not. With this 
imperative to understand the multiplicity of Paul’s laws and their meanings, 
vaguely demarcated along the lines of negative and positive laws, some 
historians have suggested that Paul’s theology is no theology, but simply reflects 
his changing thoughts about Jesus over time. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111 Räisänen, Paul and the Law, 69. 
112 Sanders, E.P.. Paul, The Law, and the Jewish People, 104.	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Considering scholars of both disciplines are reading the same material, 
the dissonance in their research begs questions; however, the shear weight in 
kilos of the scholarship by historians on Paul in comparison to contemporary 
philosophers’ small production simply complicates navigating the difference. Of 
all questions to pose, asking how Badiou, a philosopher who is so precise and 
thoughtful, could be so wrong about Paul, helped to focus on the relationship 
between material evidence and method. Both disciplines are looking at the 
same body of literature, and both share the same assumptions about Christ and 
sin, and both are self-conscious of the limits of disciplinary method, but only 
one has the advantage of psychoanalysis. It is by bringing to bear the 
philosophers’ psychoanalytic understanding to the historians’ research that I 
will offer a solution to the dilemma of the Law of Christ which potentially 
resolves the quandaries outlined by the historians, while at the same time, 
affirms the coherence Badiou hears in Paul, and most importantly, brings us to 
the exception of the law as it relates to the Christ event. 
  
 
LETTER OF LOVE  
In his Seminar on ethics, Lacan argues that sin is bound to desire which the law 
excludes as prohibition, and quotes from Paul’s Romans 7:7 to explain the 
relationship between sin and the law (Seminar VII 83). The fact is, sin does not 
make the law, but the law makes sin.113 In the logic of this bind between law 
and sin, the command, “love thy neighbour,” logically, is bound to its 
transgression, hatred. This explains the paradoxical truth that “one knows 
nothing of love without hate” (Encore 91). This principle is fundamental to 
Freud’s Civilization and Discontents; in that long essay, Freud argues that, as a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  In Lacanian terms, sinning, going against the law, becomes a desire for death; the relation 
between sin and law therefore defines the cycle of desire and death.	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human emotion of inclusiveness, love promotes partisanship and a hierarchy of 
inclusion; therefore, love is at the root of discontent and war. Some are closer in 
love than others; some are farther; those who are loved are, because others are 
not. And amongst those who are loved, the concentric circles of inclusion point 
to the fact that some are closer to the inner circle than others; and those on the 
outer circumference are always in danger of shifting into the circle that poses a 
threat. Žižek’s recognition of the perversion of this dynamic in Stalin’s party 
politics contextualizes the very trouble Lacan adapted from Freud with respect 
to Paul’s love for the neighbour: “everytime Freud stops short in horror at the 
consequences of the commandment to love one’s neighbour, we see evoked 
the presence of that fundamental evil which dwells within this neighbour” 
(Seminar VII 186). Lacan’s rewriting of Freud highlights that the evil in the 
neighbour is the same evil in the self which one distances oneself from: “To 
love him, to love him as myself, is necessarily to move towards some cruelty” 
(198). Freud’s Civilization aimed to address the psychological ground of anti-
Semitism as the absence of love; in similar terms, but with far more positive 
expectations, Badiou and Žižek address the same issue in reclaiming Paul’s law 
of love for contemporary politics. 
Badiou’s focus on the modern Paul as a Spanish War fighter seems 
intended to de-center the impact of the ‘passion for the real’ of the Holocaust, 
born of the race laws which reflect the absence of moral laws, and especially 
that of love; this intention is emphasized by the fact that Badiou references anti-
Semitism at the end of the book as an example of the absence of universalism, 
ironically asserting that the ‘the same as the same’114 intended by the Nazis who 
created a camp in which all inhabitants were equally doomed to death ‘is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Badiou’s phrase here echoes that found in Sarah Kofman’s consideration of the Nazi death 
camps: “…as Empedocles taught, the affinity of the same for the same is governed by hatred, 
while love consists in the union of the heterogeneous, the lack of relation, the infinite 
separation” (Smothered Words 28.) 
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fraudulent” (109): “… the death camp produces exorbitant differences at every 
instant, that it turns the slightest fragment of reality into an absolute difference 
between life and death, and this incessant differentiation of the minute is a 
torture” (109). Badiou’s rendering of Nazi politics as promoting false equality 
emphasizes his deep critique of the principle of fascist politics, aka Schmittian 
politics, which harnessed a campaign against the exception. The Third Reich’s 
project excluded the European Jew from all terms of equality, especially that 
promoted by Paul’s message: “The address to the other of the “as oneself”, (love 
the other as oneself), was what the Nazis wanted to abolish” (Badiou 110). 
French resistance fighter, Antelme, says as much in his memoirs of the death 
camps.115 As far as Badiou is concerned, the love Paul preached against 
difference is the antidote to any future acts of genocide. 
Ferocious anti-Semitism, according to Žižek in his Puppet and Dwarf, is 
caused by the Christian mystic who ‘has come too close to the pagan mystical 
experience” which means bypassing, “the Jewish experience of Law” (119). 
That is, Christianity for Žižek is a product of Jewish and pagan cultures: “When 
Christianity loses the mediation of the Jewish law, it loses the specific Christian 
dimension of love…” This exclusion of the Jewish law appears equivalent to 
Badiou’s idea that Nazism erased the laws, including the law of love; yet 
Žižek’s idea that pagan mysticism can be seen as the basis of Nazi anti-
Semitism116 is an awkward and ideologically problematic proposition. For one, 
while scholarship used the term pagan to define cultural/mystical practices 
expressing a belief in multiple deities which differed from the Judean belief in a 
singular divine figure, it is hard to understand fully how paganism explains Nazi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 “Though shalt not be: upon that ludicrous wish an enormous machine has been built. They 
have burned men, and tons of ashes exist, they can weigh out the neutral substance by the ton. 
Thou shall not be: but, in the man’s stead who shall soon be ashes, they cannot decide he not 
be.” Robert Antelme in The Human Race (74).	  
116 In the Fragile Absolute, Žižek equates anti-Semitism with fundamentalism (120). 
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hatred towards Jews, though Freud does identify those who practice anti-
Semitism as descended from “badly christened” people who were “barbarically 
polytheistic” (Moses and Monotheism 117). While we may see that, in attending 
the Führer’s rallies, Hitler’s followers engaged together, unconsciously, in a 
suspension of the social order through the ecstatic joy of the Führer’s speeches 
which may be equated to the unplugging historians recognize as pagan 
possession practiced in Paul’s time;117 the most we can say about anti-Semitism 
is that it evolved from a combination of first and second-century factors, the two 
primary being the Judean proclivity to ‘unplug’ from the social order so as to 
keep its rituals from corruption,118 and Christianity’s effort to assert its divinely 
sanctioned supersession of Judaism. Even so, the fact that many second-century 
Christians were of pagan background does not mean their anxiety against the 
Judeans reflected the racial hatred fueling the twentieth-century events whose 
history reflects a particular trajectory of persecution, expulsion, and forced 
conversions that led Spinoza to adapt Paul’s law of love for political purposes. 
Obviously, anti-Semitism preceded the Spanish and Portuguese Inquisition, but 
that only signals an anterior date of origin being sometime after Paul’s century, 
which remains obscure.119 What I want to emphasize is that Žižek characterizes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Possession cults reflected pagan practices which, Eileen Shantz notes, served the community: 
“possession tends to relieve the social pressure that is present in the group and thereby 
facilitates the survival of the status quo” (161). In Shantz’s understanding, Paul’s use of 
glossolalia was a means of harnessing this activity for his congregation not to encourage 
possession, but to bind the community together in the spirit of the cult of Christ (163). 
118 The term ‘unplug’ comes from Eric Santner’s On the Psychotheology of Everyday life: 
“Freud’s error was to equate [divine violence] with a specifically Jewish cultivation of the 
superego. Rosenzweig, for his part, makes a compelling case that it must rather be understood 
as a conversion or unplugging from the ‘normal’ ways of succumbing to superego pressure, of 
remaining addicted to the repetition of compulsions—the “Egyptomaniacal” labors—that sustain 
idolatrous attachments” (115).	  
119 Justin Martyr’s writing points to a reaction by early Christians to formative rabbinic Judaism, 
but the power dynamic between the cults does not translate into the persecution central to the 
anti-Semitism we know today; persecution, as a power dynamic between the strong and weak, 
can only have taken root once Christianity had affirmed its place of supreme power globally, 
pointing to a period beyond my research. 
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contemporary anti-Semitism as originating in a primitive mysticism (pagan), 
distinguished from Christianity and Judaism together, which on one level 
absolves Christianity of responsibility for anti-Semitism. 
The political significance of the law of love in Badiou’s and Žižek’s work 
is inherited from Spinoza who, in the effort to address anti-Semitic policies by 
European states, adapted Paul’s notion of equality between the Greek and Jew 
as arguing that all nations are equally loved by God.120 Spinoza’s philosophy 
aimed for a universalism by separating the influence of religion on the state. 
Badiou continues Spinoza’s project and refines it by taking Paul’s message of 
love literally, reducing all laws to the abstract law which stands for love: “Law 
returns us to life’s articulation for everyone, path of faith, law beyond law. This 
is what Paul calls love” (88). In even more abstract terms, the transcendent 
figure of God, who both dispenses equality, but also commands love (laws), is 
replaced by Badiou’s concept of truth: “The militant real of that love is the 
universal address of what constitutes [the truth]” (92). These abstractions do not 
erase the particularities of religious elements as much as Badiou expects; that is, 
sublimated in the formal role of truth in the event are the Christ/God predicates 
of immanence and transcendence; truth is accessible to mankind, and is also 
beyond mankind; therefore, the procedure of love (in truth), or the love for the 
truth that there is no distinction between the Jew and Greek (i.e. from God’s 
perspective), establishes the universal. What Badiou does not include in Paul’s 
message is that love is conditional on the truth of Christ, which is the event of 
the resurrection. What is implied about the Moslem woman who sees no truth 
in this event; is she excluded from love? This is essentially Freud’s point in 
Moses and Monotheism about Jews in Christian Europe. In that sense, if love is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120 “Paul concludes that, since God is the God of all nations—that is, he is equally gracious to 
all… God sent his Christ to free all men… So that no longer would they act righteously from the 
law’s command but from the unwavering resolution of the heart. Thus, Paul’s teaching 
coincides with ours” (Political-Theological Treatise 44).	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the traversing of the fantasy of the particularities of difference, that which 
obscures the universal ‘truth’ of equality, then Badiou can be seen to have 
found a way to better Spinoza’s project only by cementing the Christian 
principles, wherein love traverses the Christian legacy of anti-Semitism making 
it viable only for Christians. Interestingly, Badiou’s acknowledgement of 
Christian culpability in anti-Semitic practice contrasts Žižek’s effort to distance 
Christianity from anti-Semitism.  
In contrast to Badiou’s limited inclusive love, Žižek argues that love 
initiates what he calls a Radical universality which, linked to the Remainder by 
‘an umbilical chord’ has a specific logic of inclusion by exclusion: ‘it is those 
who are excluded, with no proper place, within the global order, who directly 
embody true universality, who represent the Whole in contrast to all others who 
stand only for their particular interests” (109). That is, Paul suspends the law 
which emancipates the exception through the law of love. Contemporizing 
Paul, Žižek argues that this negation of the rule of the law means that “Paul’s 
gesture [breaking from Judean law] is thus his break with any form of 
communitarianism: his universe is no longer that of the multitude of groups that 
want to ‘find their voice’, and assert their particular identity, their ‘way of life’, 
but that of a fighting collective grounded in the reference to an unconditional 
universalism” (130). Clearly, Žižek sees only problems raised by partisan 
alliances in ‘communitarianism’, and so, contrary to Paul’s actual idea of 
equality as conditional on Christ, appears to be in agreement with Badiou’s 
universalism as being beyond ‘difference’, and thus, like Badiou, sustains, rather 
than destabilizes, the Christ condition. 
If both see Christian love as universal, it is noteworthy that neither 
address anti-Semitism effectively. Badiou suggests love can traverse the fantasy 
that leads to anti-Semitism; unfortunately, his idea is caught in a paradox. Love 
cannot undo the exclusion of the law of love central to anti-Semitism because 
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exclusion, exception, is central to any partisan community, Christianity being 
the unconsciously dominant example; there will always be those who are 
excluded from love, and those excluded are necessary for defining those we 
love. Žižek sees this, and thus agrees with Lacan and Freud on the reason for a 
fundamental conflict amongst peoples, which accounts for the exception 
enforced by anti-Semitism; Žižek’s pagan references, unfortunately, render anti-
Semitism awkwardly as a product of a non-Christian source, which protects the 
Jesus fantasy from negative associations. It is striking how his prejudices 
describe that hierarchy of Freud’s love; the proper place of pagans and Jews 
remains outside the sacred circle of Christ believers; they are both fighting 
neighbours to each other, but together are Christianity’s unwanted Other.  
Scholars have noted that Žižek is essentially a Christo-phile121; his 
Christo-centrism has been served by Lacan’s thinking, the Christian foundation 
of Name of the Father (NOF) (Pound 14) and the exchange of God for the 
unconscious (Labbe 17), and is exemplified in Žižek’s apparent self-
identification with the apostle Paul.122 With respect to his project to engage 
critically with Christianity, Pound argues, “Žižek remains locked into the very 
system he is critical of” (19). I would agree; the pagan reference is a case in 
point, and is affirmed by his concluding statement in Puppet: “That is the 
ultimate gesture that awaits Christianity: in order to save its treasure, it has to 
sacrifice itself—like Christ, who had to die so that Christianity could emerge” 
(171). It strikes me that Hegel has already described this sacrifice of the treasure 
for secularism as the messianic Aufhebung (Agamben 106). Considering that I 
have identified secularism as the site of our contemporary trauma, I would have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See Marcus Pound’s Žižek: A (very) Critical Introduction and Erin Labbie’s Lacan’s 
Medievalism. 
122 Pound quotes Žižek: “Deep down I am very conservative; I just play with the subversive 
stuff” (16). Žižek in an interview with Robert Boynton “Enjoy Your Žižek: An Excitable 
Slovenian Philosopher Examines the Obscene Practices of Everyday Life, Including His Own,” 
Linguafranca (March 2001): www.lacan.com.	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to argue that any effort to preserve a treasure in Christianity misreads the 
compulsive nature of that preservation.123 Žižek’s subversive and chaotic play, 
entirely enamoured of the Christian fantasy of death and resurrection, draws out 
all the contradictions that the Christian fantasy aims to cover over (Pound 56), 
pointing in the direction of this project’s trauma. 
Echoing Paul’s own question in Gal 43:19 (What of the law?) Žižek 
rightly questions how love functions for a subject ruled by law, (NOF) if the 
relation between law and sin represents the psychoanalytic cycle of the death 
drive and desire (“the sting of death is sin, and the power of sin is the law “ (1 
Cor 15:56) (116); that is, how can one suspend the law of the NOF if we are 
limited to our human mortal sinning reality? The event that led to the exception 
in Christianity, the product of the crucifixion and resurrection as the trauma of 
the cut (88), which happened as a moment of eternity in temporal reality, is 
translated, by Žižek, as ‘love’ (89) played out in conversion: “...the ‘good news’ 
of Christianity, however, is that, in a genuine Conversion, one can ‘re-create’ 
oneself, that is, repeat this act, and thus change (undo the effects of) eternity 
itself” (89). Thus, the ‘dying into the law” in Paul’s gospel signals rebirth not 
based on a redemption or fulfilling of a past trauma, but in launching a radically 
new direction (Fragile Absolute 92). 
Paul’s revolutionary message, in Žižek’s focus, is centered on the “love 
beyond law” (110). In psychoanalytic terms, “love is feminine, it involves the 
paradox of the non-All” (Puppet 116). In “Love Letter”, Lacan roots the feminine 
and masculine logic in sexual difference; with a play on Paul’s “the letter of the 
law kills”, as literally letters of the symbolic system that oedipalizes the subject, 
he parallels man’s relation to the Phallus as the ‘all’ function (all men are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 Ward Blanton does not argue as I do that this return signals a trauma, but he does call 
attention to the fact that repetition is central to Žižek’s final words in Puppet, in “Disturbing 
Politics: Neo-Paulinism and the Scrambling of Religious and Secular Identities”.  Dialog: A 
Journal of Theology. Vol 46, No. 1 (Spring 2007), 1. 
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caught by the phallus of the NOF) with masculine logic; while woman’s special 
relation to the Phallus through the not-all designation as the barred A (Other), 
signifying how she is Other to herself (Lacan, Seminar XX, 81), denotes the 
feminine logic. As Žižek highlights in Puppet, “the ‘non-All’ means that not all 
of woman is caught in the phallic function: there is a part of her that resists 
symbolic castration, inclusion in the symbolic order” (67); thus, as the 
exception, she suspends the all of masculine logic. The fact that she is both 
excepted from and included in, the “all” function of the phallus means that she 
exists in a relation to both the masculine and the feminine logic, which means 
that she is able to swing both ways, so to speak: “One can also situate oneself 
on the side of the not-whole [like women]. There are men who are just as good 
as women… Those are the ones we call mystics” (Seminar XX 76). That is, the 
male mystic, like Paul, is privileged like the woman. In Žižek’s terms, then, 
Paul’s law of love is taken up in the Aufhebung, or the messianic suspension of 
the masculine law “all”. What is signaled by this suspension is its ethical 
contribution to politics; that is, feminine logic “takes place in the intersection of 
ethics and politics, in the uncanny domain in which ethics is ‘politicized’ in its 
innermost nature, an affair of radically contingent decisions, a gesture that can 
no longer be accounted for in terms of fidelity to some pre-existing Cause, since 
it defines the very terms of this Cause” (FA 145-146).124 Therefore, Christianity is 
determined by a feminine logic that promotes ethical action. This logic can be 
traced through Marx’s project against oppression of the masses, as well as 
Agamben’s project on the remnant in the Muselmann whose inability to speak 
for himself imposes the ethical imperative for the witness to speak on his125 
behalf.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 The idea of fidelity to the truth event in regards to ethics is outlined in more detail in 
Badiou’s Ethics: An Essay On the Understanding of Evil. 
125 Muselmann was a term used for the male inmate in Auschwitz; therefore, Muselmann 
remains a masculine signifier in my work. 	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Žižek’s Christo-centric analysis of Paul’s suspension of the Judean law 
through the feminine logic of love as an unplugging for ethical purposes reflects 
a centerpiece of scholarly interest in the exception, which is not strictly 
Christian. In fact, Žižek admits adopting ‘unplugging’ from Santner’s use of it in 
Psychotheology of Everyday Life to describe the Jewish diaspora communities 
within European society: they lived as exceptions to society, self-sufficient and 
independent of the dominant culture around them (Puppet 118-119).126 For his 
part, Santner credits the idea of ‘unplugging’ to the modernist philosopher, 
Franz Rosenzweig whose project on the ‘new thinking’ in The Star of 
Redemption  (1921), aimed to reinvest religious experience in philosophy as an 
“awakening or exodus—a deanimation of undeadness—[.] granted with and 
{…}, indeed, coterminous with the event of revelation” (On the Psychotheology 
65).127 In short, the ‘unplugging’ that relieves the subject of the law is revelation. 
Paul’s revelation of the Christ and Moses’s Mount Sinai encounter are both 
examples of such unplugging. While they are traumas in the psychoanalytic 
sense, they are not, as was inferred in chapter two, the same as Althusser’s 
definition of interpellation as the Oedipal event. The difference is explained by 
Santner’s redefinition of Rosenzweig’s unplugging from the law as “an 
interpellation beyond (ideological) interpellation” (The Neighbor, 132). Here we 
understand that Santner has differentiated Moses’ ‘revelation’ from Althusser’s 
ideological interpellation associated with the Oedipal trauma. That is, Moses’ 
experience on Mount Sinai was the unplugging from the law (ideology or the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  126	  I would add that this behaviour by the Jewish people is not limited to the diaspora period; it 
also existed in the period of the Roman occupation of Judea prior to the destruction of the 
Second Temple that ended the Jewish uprising in 70 CE. Žižek reconfigures Santner’s idea to 
codify the Christian concept of love as an unplugging or a ‘suspension’ of the Judean law by 
which the ‘work of love’ forms an “alternative community” in which difference is accounted for 
through distance (Fragile Absolute 120).	  
127 Santner adds his own interpretation of ‘deanimation and undeadness’, which leads into 
territory my work does not go but which I find problematic with respect to Paul, in that the 
result of death is not a movement to undeadness, but, he emphatically stresses, new life as 
expressive of ‘eternal life’. 
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Oedipal event), otherwise defined as the symbolic code of socialization;128 his 
revelation introduced new laws to the existing social code. By the same logic, 
Paul experienced an unplugging from the law (ideology) through his revelation 
of Christ. According to the philosophers, Paul’s revelation became symbolically 
integrated into Christianity as a revision of the Mosaic law of love to address the 
politics of the exception.   
What is striking is that the exception and the suspension of the law are 
related in secularism through the messianic. Santner traces a confluence of 
shared interest amongst Jewish German philosophers in the ‘unplugging’, and 
its effect as messianic change which need not be a radical break but does reflect 
an awakening that, according to Bloom, is “the freedom yet that can be our 
time” (Psychotheology 64). Stéphane Mosès’ identification of Benjamin’s vision 
of the revolution and messianic time offers an equivalent to the messianic 
product of unplugging through the term ‘unknotting’: “If, for Benjamin, the idea 
of happiness reflects that of Redemption, it may be said to be precisely as the 
term (Er-lösung) must be understood as the ‘unknotting’ of the paradoxes of the 
present”.129 In short, in this language of the suspension of the law of time, of 
society, of class distinctions, etc., the messianic is the by-product of the 
revelation, or the objet a informing the fantasy of change. According to Santner, 
Paul is the source for the German Jewish scholars on the messianic fantasy 
(132); while the messianic is not represented by the German Jewish 
philosophers as necessarily Christian, the messianic idea does perpetuate the 
Christian exception found in Pauline thought. 
The same Pauline influence can be heard in Rosenzweig’s use of the law 
of love in relation to the Neighbour; being able to live in the secular world as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 The psychoanalytic equivalent to this ‘symbolic code of association’ is the Oedipal event, or 
NOF. I want to emphasize that we have no reason to believe they experienced the initial 
socializing trauma with the same cultural significance (Oedipal) that we have given it.	  	  
129 The Angel of History: Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Scholem 126.	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the exception, as the one excluded from social love, is manageable because of 
the divine command to love your neighbor. Regarding Rosenzweig’s work, 
Santner notes that: “the central paradox is that it is really secular thought that is 
most deeply invested in fantasies of exception, in other words, of being 
‘excepted’ from the lot—and love—of finite human existence and that 
monotheism is actually a form of therapy that allows for a genuine return to the 
midst of life with our neighbour” (133). I emphasize two things suggested by 
Santner’s observation about Rosenzweig’s work: for one, in the secular world, 
fantasies of exception proliferate in many different guises, from the diasporic 
Jew, to the homo sacer, to the feminine exception, to Jesus Christ or a messianic 
change; and for another, love from a transcendent source sustains these 
fantasies. From Rosenzweig’s perspective, we see that the source of love is 
inhuman, from elsewhere, and in a fundamental respect, does not address the 
universal ‘all’ of mankind, but the exception. Rosenzweig’s understanding of 
love’s exclusivity troubles Badiou’s assertion that love is the universal principle 
that can traverse the fantasy of difference, and affirms Žižek’s thesis of the 
Christian exception. In light of Žižek’s focus on the exception as a Christian 
paradigm, Santner’s correlation of the exception with secularism can be seen as 
evidence supporting Anidjar’s assertion that secularism is Christian.  
Badiou argues that “Christianity is a religion of love” (St. Paul, 89). Žižek 
iterates Badiou’s claim and adds that Judaism is a religion of love, as well, 
exemplified in such texts as the Song of Songs (Puppet 124),130 but in a 
fundamental way is different from Christianity. According to Žižek, love in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  I note that Žižek misses an opportunity to reference Moses’ Leviticus 19:17-18 as the original 
source of the command to love, and so perhaps does not develop fully the differences between 
Christian and Jewish love. That is, as one of the many laws in the Books Of Moses, Paul’s 
interpretation of the law of love as the only law that represented all laws was a new idea 
inspired by his apocalypse which eventually came to define the Christian faith. I would suggest 
that what is difficult to navigate about the law of love is less about love and who should be 
given it and how, but rather, what is meant by that commend if it encompasses all the laws at 
once. 	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Judaism is ideologically driven as “an imaginary reconciliation of God and 
humanity” (124). What distinguishes Christianity from Judaism, Žižek contends, 
is that, on facing God’s impotence in Christ’s sacrifice (126), the Christian is 
“thrown back into [himself], compelled to assume the risk of freely determining 
the coordinates of [his] desire” (129). While for the Jewish people, anxiety is 
inspired by the law, and the command to love, for Christians, anxiety is inspired 
by the freedom to choose how and who to love. Žižek’s comparative review of 
Judaism and Christianity may ostensibly highlight ideological differences, but in 
fact emphasizes that love in both religions is the same. Love is the objet a; it is 
the “mask” (103) covering over the traumatic rupture/gap (80), as the remainder 
or the unsayable of the real, “of an Infinite Law”. Following Žižek’s salient point 
that love is this remainder, and combining that observation with the fact that the 
exception is also an objet a of the Other, then love is synonymous with the 
exception. That relation between these objets a seems to reflect the Christian 
ideology of Pauline thought. While we can trace Paul’s influence on the 
philosophers with respect to love and the Neighbour/Other, his influence on the 
various modern versions of the exception is not quite so clear. What does Paul 




If we were to read the philosophers as experts on Paul’s theology, we would 
suppose that Paul’s message centered on love. The fact is, love is mentioned in 
detail only twice in his seven letters: in 1 Corinthians 13:1-12; and Romans 
12:9-10 and 13:8-10; and briefly in Galatians 5:14 and 5:22. The audience of 1 
Corinthians was composed of Gentiles converting to the faith whose 
background in Judean scripture was minimal, and whose moral code troubled 
Paul. “It is actually reported that there is sexual immorality among you” (5:1), 
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Paul writes, and “I wrote you in my letter not to associate with sexually immoral 
persons… drive out the wicked person from among you” (5:9-13)131. In response 
to this immorality, Paul’s reference to love is a highly accessible and poetic 
rendering of all that is morally good without being scripturally heavy: “Love is 
patient, love is kind; love is not envious or boastful or arrogant or rude,” (1 
Corinthians 13:4-5). In contrast, Paul’s letters to the Galatians and the Romans 
offers a more succinct and practical understanding of that law: all 
commandments, Paul asserts, “are summed up in this word, ‘Love your 
neighbour as yourself’. Love does no wrong to a neighbour, therefore, love is 
the fulfilling of the law” (Rom 13:8-10). The difference in audiences of the 
Galatians and Romans letters would suggest the similarity in message is 
problematic, until we recognize that at both locations, Paul is arguing against 
the rite of circumcision. In point of fact, there is a connection between Paul’s 
law of love and his abrogating of the law of circumcision, and it centres on the 
Gentile who was the ‘exception’ to the Judean cult and which he was trying to 
bring into the cult.  
Paul’s abrogating of the ritual law relies on the opposition between the 
letter and the spirit of law: the letter of the law which demands circumcision, 
practicing kashrut, and keeping the Sabbath and the Holidays, has been made 
immaterial by the spirit of the law in Christ so that circumcision has become “a 
matter of the heart—it is spiritual and not literal” (Rom: 2:29). Without 
accounting for the material reality of the letter of the law, the philosophers’ use 
of Paul’s ‘spirit’ in the law of love misses the actual ‘cut’ Paul was addressing. In 
fact, Badiou’s universalizing of Paul’s message erases access to the trauma Paul 
reflected on: “Theorem 7: The Subject’s process of a truth is one and the same 
thing as the love of that truth. And the militant real of that love is the universal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  Issues of incest could support Žižek’s notion of carnivalesque paganism amongst the Gentile 
converts to the movement of Jesus followers.	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address of what constitutes it. The materiality of universalism is the militant 
dimension of every truth” (92). Badiou’s patient concise statements are 
absorbing; nothing compares to the grace with which he represents the meta-
ethical self. Even so, his approach renders Paul’s political message flat and 
without context; the “materiality of universalism” is an antiseptic representation 
of the radical and heretical nature of Paul’s gospel because Paul’s message 
meant that devout believers would not have to suffer a painful and potentially 
dangerous operation. The actual militant real of Paul’s message of love for the 
equal rights of all to God’s salvation, meant erasing the Judean cult’s painful 
laws of inclusion (circumcision) in order to be more inclusive (circumcision of 
the heart). The change of the law was meant to fulfill the role of the Israelites as 
a light to nations, which is obscured by Badiou’s Marxist revolutionary leader of 
the Spanish Civil War. Paralleling Paul and Badiou’s version of Paul we see that 
the resistance fighters led by Paul are Greeks, which means that Paul’s ‘bad 
guys’ are bad because they are Judean; the anti-Semitic undertone, obviously 
unintentional, shows how Badiou’s project reflects our broken dialogue with 
the first century and so obscures the political import of Paul’s concept of the 
exception.  
Similar to Badiou’s depoliticization of Paul’s message, Žižek invokes the 
immaterial reality of Paul’s message of the resurrection and thus contradicts the 
material reality Paul was addressing. Žižek goes so far as to grant Paul 
anachronistic status as a postmodernist inventing, ‘theoretical inhumanism’, in 
his quoting of Paul’s 2 Corinthians 5:16-17: “From now on, therefore, we regard 
no one from a human point of view; even though we once knew Christ from a 
human point of view, we know him no longer in that way. So if anyone is in 
Christ, there is a new creation: everything old has passed away; see, everything 
has become new!” (Fragile Absolute 118). Does Žižek realize Paul’s use of ‘we’ 
here, reflects a covering over of his historical lack, since he never knew Jesus? 
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There is profound rhetorical messaging in Paul which Žižek overlooks, entirely 
misreading the principles of Paul’s faith, and his inferior status in the Jesus 
community. Amongst Judean followers of Jesus, Paul is at a disadvantage 
because he is preaching a message many of them think is heretical; amongst 
Gentile followers, he is at a disadvantage in comparison to other apostles who 
are preaching what Jesus taught them in person, and preaching the true Judean 
faith because he never knew Jesus. The only novelty Žižek acknowledges Paul 
introduced into the Judean cult was a modification on the integral ‘inhumanism’ 
of God, which thereby signified the resurrection as an affirmation of God’s plan 
to bring all nations to worship the God of the Israelites. By way of fulfilling that 
project for the nations (the Gentiles), Paul initiated a program that changed the 
Judean ritual laws of conversion, which inspired a backlash amongst Judean 
followers of Jesus. In 1 Corinthians, you can hear his shrill justification: “I think 
I am not the least inferior of these super-apostles” (11:5); or the faux humility in 
the following: “Then he appeared to more than five hundred brothers... Last of 
all, as to one untimely born, he appeared also to me” (15:27). In this respect, 
Paul’s promotion of spirit over flesh, iterated in the fact that the knowledge of 
Christ in the spirit trumps the inferior human-centered knowledge of a man 
crucified in the flesh, can be heard as a defense against his ignorance of Jesus, 
the man, and the superiority of the divine ‘inhuman’ source of his gospel. 
Žižek’s theory about a ‘theoretical inhumanism’ misses the necessity in Paul’s 
fantasy of divine authority. Without the inhuman source of Paul’s gospel, Paul’s 
mission would be theory without practice. 
While the philosophers have rewritten the historical inheritance out of 
Paul, in another respect, they have shown an unconscious integrity to his 
message. For Badiou, as I highlighted in this introduction, Paul’s thinking is 
‘profoundly coherent’. Žižek’s idea that ‘unplugging’ reflects the feminine logic 
of conversion may initially sound abstract and innocuous, but on reflection, it 
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represents the very real legal issue of Paul’s Gospel; the conversion of the 
Gentiles which did not require a cut of the flesh as per the ritual laws, but rather 
a cut of the spiritual kind, was literally feminine; women proselytes were not 
required to circumcise to convert to the Judean faith.132 In effect, the sublation 
of the ‘flesh’ for the spirit, the law for faith, points to a unifying principle behind 
Paul’s law of love, which the philosophers grasp intuitively. The fact that 
contemporary revisions of Paul’s love are directed at addressing the exception, 
but fails to address the hate central to anti-Semitism, affirms my earlier 
suggestion that love is no more than a by-product of the trauma, and therefore 
misapplied as a solution to the fantasy of difference. By shifting the focus from 
the spirit of the law of love as the philosophers have seen it, to Paul’s 
understanding of the letter of the law by historians, and their attention to the 
issues raised by Paul’s Gospel, I approach the unconscious trauma, which the 
historians have made audible as incoherence. 
 
THE NEGATIVE LAW 
In Biblical Studies, Paul’s law is of interest because it reflects the earliest 
evidence of Christian theology; unfortunately, Paul’s contradictions about the 
law lead to much confusion. If Paul’s gospel is centered on the fact that, 
because of Christ, the law of circumcision has been abrogated, historians note 
that Paul contradicts himself when he claims that there is no difference between 
circumcision and uncircumcision (Galatians 5:6). Räisänen argues that it is not 
useful to search for a coherent theology in Paul’s texts, but rather, to accept his 
work as essentially fraught with contradictions. What scholars agree on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 In My Own Private German: Daniel Paul Schreber’s Secret History of Modernity, Santner’s 
book length work on the first diagnosed schizophrenic, Daniel Paul Schreber, who believed he 
had endured a sex change in order to serve God as his wife, Santner describes Germany’s 
prejudice against Jews for being effeminate; he goes on to parallel that social reputation with the 
rabbis justification of circumcision as a necessary feminization of the male Jews; circumcision 
makes the Jew ready and receptive to God.   
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generally is that Paul’s negative view of the law mainly targets the ritual laws 
(circumcision, kashrut, Sabbath/holidays) and his positive comments reflect on 
the moral law.133 Having said that, Paul’s ‘Law of Christ’ (Galatians 6:2 and also 
1 Corinthians 9:20-21), remains the greatest puzzle.134 It is at this point that I 
will begin to address this puzzle, starting with considering the historians’ 
perspective on Paul’s negative law. 
In Galatians, we read of Paul’s conviction that the believers of Christ not 
only do not need to circumcise, they should not if they are followers of his 
‘evangelion’. Not only does he rebuke them for ‘deserting’ his gospel (Galatians 
1:6), he reasserts his authority as one to spread the ‘gospel’ (Galatians 1:11-
2:10); and says negative things against Peter, the apostle to the Hebrews, by 
reinforcing his reproof of the Galatians (4:8-20) and then concludes 
paradoxically: “For neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is anything” (6:15). 
Why is Paul so upset if, as he admits here, to circumcise makes the followers 
like Saint Peter and so remain followers of Christ? His great disappointment is 
repeated in the letter and it is not just because, as Paul admits, these new 
circumcised converts to Christ are now bound, or ‘enslaved’ to follow ‘all the 
laws’. What is at issue for Paul is that their act contradicted his gospel: “For if 
justification comes through the law, then Christ died for nothing” (2:21). It is 
unclear why, on the one hand, Paul can admit that there is no difference 
between circumcision and no circumcision; and then turn around and 
essentially contradict himself by asserting that if the Galatian circumcises and 
becomes justified by the law (of circumcision), that means that Christ died in 
vain. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 The question as to whether laws were distinguishable in Paul’s time shall be raised in the last 
movement of this chapter, taking into account the scholarship that troubles an anachronistic 
understanding of Paul’s ‘law.’	  
134 Todd Wilson’s article (Currents in Biblical Research 2006) is the most recent review of the 
scholarship on the topic, and shall be considered later in this chapter. 
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Paul’s proselytizing to the Gentiles addressed the ritual laws that would 
allow a convert to live with the Judean faith. In this period in Asia Minor, the 
cultural exchange between Judeans and Greeks was leading to changes in 
perspectives in both groups. Many Gentiles were attracted to the simplicity of 
the Judean faith, especially the concept of a single human-focused godhead. 
Many ‘god-fearers’ as they were called would congregate at synagogue during 
prayer; and many male god-fearers remained on the outside of the ritual of 
prayer because they could not bring themselves to circumcise. Women had an 
easier time of it, if they were not tied down to family obligations and were 
financially independent, such as rich old widows.135 The diasporic Judean 
community was trying to adapt to the influx of interest, and Paul’s abrogating of 
the ritual laws was an example of that adaptation.  
 In abrogating circumcision or loosening the kosher laws, Paul did not 
give up his Judean faith, but remained a devout believer in the law he was 
raised with. Sanders correctly problematizes Paul’s struggle with his faith while 
having to abrogate the ritual laws for the Gentiles: “He certainly knew that 
circumcision, Sabbath observance, and dietary restrictions were commanded in 
Scripture; and it was certainly with full intent that he said that they are not 
binding on those in Christ” (103). Some critical shift has occurred for Paul on 
the matter of these ritual laws so important to the integrity of the Judean 
community, and that shift reflected the greater community in Asia Minor. 
Several movements amongst Judean factions, Räisänen points out, questioned 
the ritual laws in response to the growing interest by Gentiles of the Judean 
faith136, especially because of the hardship faced by male proselytes in 
accepting mutilation as a requisite for conversion. Raisanen’s review of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Helen of Adiabene was one of the most famous of these rich widowed Gentile converts to 
the Judean faith. 
136 For an analysis of the changing dynamic in the Judean faith because of Gentiles’ desire to 
convert to the faith, see Shaye Cohen’s The Beginnings of Jewishness (1999). 
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Hellenistic Judean literature, texts such as Testaments of the Patriarchs, the 
Letter of Aristeas, Pseudo-Phocylides, the Sibylline Oracle, and work by Philo, 
shows that a variety of communities were questioning the commandments, the 
moral and ritual laws (34). For example, Philo saw a stronger ethical value in 
the moral law than in the ritual stipulations, evident in his ‘lavish allegorizing’ 
of the ritual laws; as Räisänen explains: “Yet [Philo] shrinks from the conclusion 
that the external rites could be left unobserved. His well-known critique of 
some Alexandrian ‘allegorizers’ shows indisputably, where he draws the 
boundary line—as well as the fact that he himself is extremely close to stepping 
over the line (Mgr Abr 89 ff) (35)”.  
The ‘allegorizers’ were Judeans named after their favouring an 
interpretive reflection of the law; they tended to reject the physical rituals as 
requisites for Gentile conversion, according to Peder Borgen, arguing that 
anyone who followed the ethical moral laws was essentially circumcised.137 In 
Räisänen’s review of the first-century literature, he notes the distinction between 
proselytizing in Asia Minor and proselytizing in Palestine; in the former region, 
ritual laws were minimized and interested Gentiles were welcome at 
synagogues as ‘god-fearers’ which, Räisänen asserts, might be read in 
psychological terms as a ‘self-criticism’ of the Judean faith (40). Perhaps 
because in Palestine the Temple and its rituals were so central to cult practice, 
Judeans were not as accommodating of the Gentiles; proselytes who refused to 
circumcise, were considered outsiders, and barred from entering past the outer 
court of the Temple (41). Within the context of Asia Minor and the positive and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 In “Observations on the theme ‘Paul and Philo’”, Borgen argues that what Paul had to say 
about circumcision in Galatians reflected thinking by philosophers and scholars of his time, 
with a slight difference. Philo promoted that the moral law grounded the rites, which meant that 
circumcision applied to both the body and to the heart/mind (90). This concept of circumcision, 
Borgen argues, is adapted by Paul and then transformed; for Paul, the crucifixion of Jesus 
represented the spiritual circumcision experienced/endured by the new convert to Christ, and 
that was enough to fulfill the conversion ritual (91).
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at least partially accommodating response to the Gentiles interested in the 
Judean faith, Paul’s mission does not stand out as completely alien. 
A few questions are raised. If Paul’s mission existed within a changing 
community of Judean believers, why was he targeted by his fellow Jesus 
followers in Corinth and Galatia and possibly even Rome? Furthermore, why 
would Paul claim that a Gentile’s circumcision meant that Christ died in vain, 
and also claim in 1 Corinthians 7:19 in what Sanders regards, “as one of the 
most amazing sentences that he ever wrote: “Neither circumcision nor 
uncircumcision counts for anything, but keeping the commandments of God” 
(103)? It is a paradox which Räisänen reiterates in his introduction: “...where 
Hellenistic Jews clung to the whole Torah with a new accentuation, Paul’s 
solution amounted to ‘the whole Torah and yet not the whole Torah” (41). That 
is, historians seem to agree that Paul’s law remains obscure to us. 
 
POSITIVE LAW 
On Paul’s positive reflections of the law, questions abound. If the law has been 
abrogated, then why is the Christian called to fulfill the law (Snodgrass 104)? 
How was it possible that the law was required for sin to be counted, when sin 
was counted anyway? (Sanders 1983 25-26). And, more significantly, what does 
it mean that believers die to the law through the death of Christ (Schreiner 57); 
or, how does one reconcile the fact that the Christian is free from the law 
because of Christ and yet Jesus Christ comes to fulfill the law; that is, if the law 
is fulfilled, does that mean there is no law anymore (Schreiner 47)? Considering 
the breadth of questions raised above, it is no wonder that both Sanders and 
Räisänen in their conclusions share a reticence in saying anything definitive 
about Paul’s law except that it seems focused on the Christ event (Sanders 1983 
114; Räisänen 1983 200). Räisänen ironically adds that depth psychology 
theory may be the only method left unused for understanding Paul’s meanings; 
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“the actual driving forces have been concealed under the pretext of some more 
or less plausible rational reasons” (201). Räisänen seems quite prepared to 
accept what Badiou intuits as coherence, despite no proof. Without irony I 
contend that the ‘rational reasons’ do exist to quash the negative issues raised 
by the historians. 
 Both Sanders and Räisänen weigh in on the confusion inspired by 
Romans 5. A first reading of Romans 5:12-14 explains how confounding it is: 
“Therefore, just as sin came into the world through one man, and death came 
through sin, and so death spread to all because all have sinned—sin was indeed 
in the world before the law, but sin is not reckoned when there is no law. Yet 
death exercised dominion from Adam to Moses, even over those whose sins 
were not like the transgression of Adam who is the type of the one who was to 
come” (5:12-13). Sanders’ trouble with Paul’s passage derives from a 
combination of two factors; Paul seems to see sin as a universal thing, as 
Sanders translated, ‘during the period from Adam to Moses, sin led to death 
even without the law” (35); and paradoxically, “Paul then inconsistently says 
that law is required for sin to be counted, but that it was counted anyway” (36). 
How can a sin be counted and then not counted; and how can sin be universal 
if sin can happen without the law? Sanders recognizes that Paul argues as if he 
has an argument (36), but if it is based on something real, Sanders is not privy to 
it. Caught in the poetic web Paul is weaving, Sanders misses the causal logic 
that Paul is emphasizing in describing sin as beginning with Adam and 
progressing until Moses’ reception of the commandments. 
 In Paul and the Law, Räisänen attempts to resolve the confusion raised 
by Sanders by pointing out that before the law ‘sin is not counted.’ As he 
understands it, those living between Adam and Moses (the interim period) 
sinned but were not considered transgressors (“their deeds were not registered 
in the heavenly books”); by this, Räisänen is able to find Romans 
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comprehensible through referencing Romans 2:12-16: “those who have sinned 
‘without the law’, will perish without the law” (v. 12) in “the last judgment” (v. 
16).138 Then he claims that Paul’s distinguishing of God’s punishment of sinners 
between Adam and Moses and the last judgment is a ‘technical trifle.” (146): 
“Until the law sin had been punished because it was sin; since the law, the very 
punishments are imposed because of transgression.” Like Sanders, Räisänen’s 
analysis of Paul is dependent on two things: that the law, which Paul is 
referencing, is that given to Moses on Mount Sinai; and that the sin Paul uses is 
always the same generic idea of sin. 
 The assumption of the Mosaic law and omission of the definition of sin 
in Räisänen’s criticism, lead him to claim that Romans 5:13 contradicts Romans 
7:8 (“apart from the law, sin lies dead”) (147). The contradiction is legible to 
Räisänen because, according to 7:7, sin was ‘dead’ before the coming of the 
law, which means that the death of sin pre-existed the law. Räisänen proceeds 
to propose an idea, which, in the logic of his assumptions, seems valid: “5:13 is 
an artificial expedient which disturbs the argument of chapter 5... It is an 
infelicitous attempt to introduce secondarily the problem of the law into a train 
of thought with which they originally had nothing to do and into which they do 
not logically fit” (147). In other words, Räisänen’s logic is that, since ‘the law 
does not bring about sin’, the relation of sin to death is a causal one from sin to 
death; therefore, the death of sin is a non sequitur. The sin of Adam’s fall 
(Romans 5) is clear for Räisänen, while the sin of the law (Romans 7), which is 
peculiar to Paul, is the mystery. Räisänen acknowledges that Paul intended 
something (“not totally unconscious of the tension”), which he considered was 
Paul’s effort to integrate ‘by way of two incidental remarks’, the law and Adam 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	  Räisänen footnotes a contradiction in Paul cited by Turcke (145) between verses 13 and 14, 
as if to cite a confirmation of his point that what we read as incomprehensible is not our fault, 
but Paul’s fault, but does not elaborate on his point. 	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(147). While Räisänen’s critique of Paul’s text as incoherent appears valid I will 
show, it is not only unfair,139 but wrong. 
 Snodgrass humbly admits that the connection between the law and sin in 
Romans 5.20 is not obvious for a modern historian; and in seeing a dialectic 
procedure in Paul’s arguments, he claims that the full meaning of Romans 5.2 is 
evident in Romans 7:7-13: “The most that we should say is that God permits the 
connection between sin and law in order that the true nature of sin may be 
displayed” (104). In his conclusion, he claims that Paul’s meaning is clear in 7, 
where the tyranny of the law prevented mankind from serving God as it should: 
“Sin works through the flesh and uses the law to cause death.” Interestingly, the 
law in Snodgrass’ conclusion has assumed the somewhat aggressive 
characteristics noted elsewhere in Paul’s description of sin (Romans 7:8-12), 
which, as I will show later, actually does reflect the law Paul intended to talk 
about. Despite the fact Snodgrass reflects a coherent interpretation of Paul’s 
thought and does so without arrogance, he remains bound to the same 
assumption blinding Sanders and Räisänen: that Paul’s law is the Mosaic Laws. 
Like Räisänen, Snodgrass also supposes the Law of Christ is a rebuttal of the 
Law of Moses. 
Sanders’ contribution to the issue of Law of Christ vs. Law of Moses in 
Paul, the Law and the Jewish People shows Paul’s signature ambivalence. What 
does Paul mean in differentiating between the ‘whole law’ (“everyman who lets 
himself be circumcised is obliged to follow the whole (holos) law,” Galatians 
5:3) and “entire law” (“For the all [pas] of the law is summed up in a single 
commandment, “You Shall love your neighbour”, Galatians 5:14)? Sanders asks. 
In assuming that the first citation reflects the Mosaic law, and the second 
citation reflects the Christian law, Sanders suspects there is some kind of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Snodgrass makes the point that both Räisänen and Sanders are harsher critics than Paul 
deserves. (96). 
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opposition wherein those following a Christian life are not under the Mosaic 
(holos) law (Galatians 5:17) (96). This proposition, he claims, contests Hubner’s 
‘ingenious’ claim that for Paul ‘whole’ was synonymous with ‘all’, and 
therefore, no opposition should be heard here. Sanders understands Paul’s law 
is referencing the Torah given to Moses on Mount Sinai; therefore, Sanders 
contends, when Paul is quoting ‘all the law” (Galatians 5:14), it is hard to 
believe that “a person of his antecedents could use this quotation to mean a law 
that has nothing to do with the law of Moses...” (Paul, The Law 96). Sanders in 
the end concedes to Hubner’s argument that to understand the difference 
between the ‘entire law’ as the Law of Moses in contrast to ‘all the law’ in the 
Law of Christ, is futile (97); therefore, we cannot verify a dialectical correlation 
between the Law of Christ and the Law of Moses.  
In “The Law of Christ and the Law of Moses,” Wilson reviews the lack of 
consensus amongst scholars about how the two laws are connected (Barclay 
1998:131-135; Hong 1993: 176-83; Longenecker 1998:86), and, for that 
matter, what the Law of Christ means that recurs in research as an anomaly. 
Sanders saw incoherence in Paul’s use of law, generally140; and Barclay argued 
an intentional ambiguity in Paul’s use of the term, ‘law of Christ’ (128); Dunn 
claimed there was no connection between the Law of Christ and the Law of 
Moses, the Torah (131); and Schreiner advises that, such a little-used phrase as 
‘Law of Christ’ is best interpreted in the immediate context of Galatians (1993 
159). Despite these efforts to explain away the anomaly of Law of Christ in 
Paul’s epistles, Wilson acknowledges the persistent recognition by scholars that 
Paul is disturbingly consistent in its use (137).141  And to that extent, Stoike 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Wilson claims: “It should be kept in mind that while Sanders denies that Paul knew a 
distinction between ‘the whole law’ (5:14) and the Law of Christ (6:2), he ends up having to 
admit that he does not find Paul entirely coherent on the issue” (137). 
141 Wilson references Louis J. Martyn’s argument in Galatians: A New Translation with 
Introduction and Commentary (New York: Doubleday,1997: 555), that the sheer repetition of a 
term affirms its definition: “Nartyn himself has recently underscored this point with some vigor. 
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argues that the apparent coherence could be explained by the fact that Paul 
“seized [it] from the vocabulary of his opponents” (139.)  
Stoike’s suggestion that there might be a shared and undocumented 
idiomatic origin to Paul’s law of Christ, which implies support of Badiou’s 
assertion of apparent coherence, independently and uncomfortable alluded to 
by Räisänen, here signals my eureka moment. I realized that, while the 
historians toggle between two laws, the Mosaic law and the ritual laws, the 
philosophers appear to be referencing a law that, for the most part, is absent 
from the historians’ research; on the binary between death and sin, the 
philosophers account for natural law. The historians have notably addressed the 
relevance of this law to Paul in very tentative terms. For example, Sanders 
references Dodd’s identification of natural law being the ground for Gentile 
knowledge of law (Romans 2:14-15), but discards the idea quickly: “the 
explanation on the basis of natural law in Romans 2 is striking because it is not 
otherwise employed” (82). The fact is, Dodd had identified an even more 
cogent reference to natural law in Romans 1:19-21,142 but his focus remained 
on explaining the Gentile figure who returns in Romans 2 as a lesson to the 
Judean. In this Gentile focus, Dodd ignores addressing natural law as relevant to 
Pauline thought, especially since he has no reason to believe Paul had access to 
the Stoic idea of natural law (Dodd The Parables of the Kingdom 132). Though 
Dodd recognizes a connection between natural law and the law of Christ, he 
does not develop it further, nor does he see a link to the Law of Moses (141).  
Reflecting on the universalism implicit in Paul’s idea of the laws, 
Westerholm considers the significance of Philo’s natural law “which is binding 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The appearance of nomos in Gal 6:2 is the thirty-first in the epistle and in each previous 
instance it is a reference to the Law of Moses” (Martyn 555), 135. 
142 “(Rom 1:19-20) For what can be known about God is plain to them, for God has shown it to 
them. Ever since the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though 
they are, have been understood and seen through the things he has made...”  
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on all people, finds perfect expression in the ‘laws’ of the Jews (cf. On the 
Creation of the World 3; On the Life of Moses 2.52),143 but then retracts that 
idea by noting that there is no evidence in Paul’s texts that Mosaic law 
“combines demands binding on all mankind and other precepts required only 
of Israel” (153.) In “Paul and Natural Law”, Westerholm again reaches beyond 
Mosaic law with respect to Paul’s idea of sin: “Like Genesis, Paul believes that 
even before the law was given, there was sin--and, thus, moral responsibility—
in the world (Romans 5:13.) It was not the prohibitions of murder, adultery, or 
theft, that made these activities wrong, though the prohibitions did serve to turn 
what was already sin into the more flagrant wrong of ‘violation’ (Rom 4:15)”.144 
Westerholm’s recognition that sin existed before the law introduces seeing 
Paul’s use of sin in more nuanced terms; yet, while Westerholm circles the first 
prohibition more closely than the other scholars, he still cannot see past the 
prominence of Mosaic law in scholarship, and so does not see the larger frame 
for Paul’s idiomatic expression. As I will show in the next section, the way to 
that larger frame is through Philo’s natural law.  
  
PHILO’S NATURAL LAW 
Seeing a Philo connection in Paul’s mission has already been considered in this 
paper through Räisänen’s review of the cultic rituals in Hellenistic Asia Minor; it 
is also evident in scholarship on his letters.145 In a brief review of Hindy 
Najman’s two papers arguing for the revolutionary contribution Philo makes to 
philosophy and the Judean faith by integrating the Greek idea of ‘natural law’ 
into the Mosaic law, I aim to apply a precedent for seeing Paul’s thought as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143 See Stephen Westerholm’s “Sinai as Viewed from Damascus: Paul’s Re-evaluation of the 
Mosaic Law” (152).	  
144 See Westerholm’s “St. Paul and the Knowledge of the Natural Law” 442. 
145 For more information see Gregory E. Sterling’s “’Wisdom Among the Perfect’: Creation 
Traditions in the Alexandrian Judaism and Corinthian Christianity ” in Novum Testamentum. 
Vol 27, Fasc 4 (Oct 1995). 355-384. 
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influenced by Philo’s Judean philosophy146, and for proposing that the 
abrogated law in his texts is connected to Stoic philosophy’s idea of natural 
law. As will become clear in the final review, the ritual laws reflect a secondary 
abrogation only applicable to the Gentile, which explains why they are applied 
irregularly by Paul; this secondary abrogation, however, is only an offshoot of 
the first significant abrogation relevant for all.  
In “The Law of Nature and the Authority of Mosaic Law” (1999), Najman 
introduces Philo’s philosophy within the context of Philo’s period as a Judean 
philosopher working in a diasporic community which resented Judeans’ 
exclusivity; this tension led the Judean philosopher to contend with how Greek 
philosophy saw wisdom and ethics as superior concepts in comparison to 
sectarian cult practices reflected in Judean thought: this tension compelled 
Philo to find ‘natural law’ in the Mosaic law. Najman stresses that ‘natural law’ 
was at the cutting edge of Greek philosophical thought during Philo’s time, 
particularly Stoicism, which was only just beginning to distinguish the law of 
nature as a relevant determining factor of life for humans, in contrast to the gods 
(1999 57).  
 In ancient Greek culture, the unwritten law was superior to the mundane 
civic or written law; that value judgment is evident in Sophocles’ Antigone. 
Antigone refuses to let her brother’s body go unburied, as is commanded by the 
King because he deemed Antigone’s brother a traitor; rather, the unwritten law 
which is the law of the Gods, demands her brother’s burial. In order to fulfill the 
superior command, Antigone sacrifices her life so her brother may be buried. 
Antigone’s story is the central paradigm of Lacan’s concept of ethics in his 
Seminar VII, wherein the law of the state is subordinate to law of the gods. 
Clearly, Lacan’s concept of ethics reflects the Christian principle of the power of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Research on the connection between Paul and Philo is limited; Craig Keene discusses how 
early Christianity and Philo borrowed from another source in The Gospel of John: A 
Commentary, 343-347.	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the spirit of God over the flesh of mankind, which comes via Paul from Philo. In 
adapting the latest Greek philosophy on natural law to the Mosaic law, Philo 
took advantage of the Greek elevation of the unwritten status over the written to 
explain the putative absence from Moses’ texts of ‘natural law’ as the proof of its 
authority over the Torah: “Philo would have to show that the Greek concept of 
‘nature’ was central to the authority of Mosaic law, despite the general absence 
from scripture of that concept, for which no Hebrew word existed” (1999 59). 
Najman makes a case for seeing the revolutionary impact of Philo’s creative 
move in understanding the Law of Moses through Greek philosophy. 
Philo argued that the putative presence of the natural law was evident as 
unwritten in Mosaic Law because, paradoxically, since nature cannot be 
adequately represented in language, then it cannot be written there; and since 
God created the universe, God is the author of the unwritten natural law (2003 
57). Philo claims that Moses’ books begin from the beginning because that 
beginning has embedded within it the essential natural law, which is God’s law 
there unwritten. Najman quotes Philo’s Moses 2.48: “...in relating the history of 
early times, and going for its beginning right to the creation of the universe, he 
wished to show two most essential things: first that the Father and Maker of the 
world was in the truest sense also its Lawgiver; secondly that he who would 
observe the laws gladly welcomes conformity with nature and lives in 
accordance with the ordering of the universe, so that his deeds are attuned to 
harmony with his words and his words with his deeds” (2003-59). Naijman 
argues that the paradox of Philo’s claim that the written Law of Moses can 
contain in it the unwritten law of nature is possible because there is a culture in 
the Judean faith of interpretation; the Law of Moses, itself, is not simply the 
word alone, but is full of the meaning of that word revealed over time (2003 
62). In the Judean tradition, it was believed that prophecy, or direct revelation 
from God, ended in the early Second Temple period. This sense of completion 
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of God’s revelation led Judeans to meditate on the texts, and uncover patterns 
and so new understandings about God and the universe. That is, thinkers like 
Philo understood that the principle of revelation continued through methods of 
interpreting the texts of the Prophets. Philo’s method of reading Moses’ books 
for hidden truths about God was echoed in the contemporary interpretations of 
Ezekial which developed as the mystical practices documented in Merkabah 
literature. 
The fact that the written text has authority over the unwritten was 
inconceivable to the Greeks; but, in turn, Philo’s move to insert a Hellenistic 
concept of the unwritten to ‘authorize a sacred, written text” (1999 68), was 
revolutionary. This move, Naijman argues, explains how Philo began to 
recognize the authority of the Law of Moses as ‘based on the universality of its 
content” (1999 69); and the universality of that content is centered on the 
mortality we inherited from Adam and Eve, whose punishment for sinning by 
eating the prohibited fruit made our life contingent on death.147 Clearly, Paul 
and the philosophers recognized that the first prohibition brought our mortality; 
thus, what is universal in Paul’s message is not the vague concept of God for 
all, but the real fact of human existence: what the Gentile and Jew share 
because of their original father is mortality. They are both equal in the single 
unequivocally definitive characteristic of life: death.  
In Paul’s terms, Christ’s resurrection signaled that the law of Christ, 
reflecting eternal life, pointed to the abrogation of natural law; this logic means 
that the Mosaic Law did not change. Thus, the historians’ suspicion that there is 
no dialectic relation between the Mosaic Law and the Law of Christ is correct. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 The following quote by Brian Rosner explains how a discussion with the philosophers would 
have introduced Paul to the principle of human mortality as the basis of universalism in his idea 
of sin: “Paul conceives of the law as a letter that kills, as a book that brings a curse, as decrees 
that stand against us, and as commandments to be obeyed. In every case, according to Paul, this 
is not how the law relates to Christians” (“Paul and the Law”, JSNT, 418.) 
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Christ’s law as I have outlined it explains Sanders’ observation that the law does 
not change, but the person does and also certifies Räisänen’s suspicion of some 
‘rational reason’ motivating Paul’s meaning. Most importantly, the law of Christ 
explains away scholars’ confusion about the unsuccessful or partial abrogation 
of the identity laws; once the natural law was abrogated, the ritual practices 
were a relic of mortality, a relic which in one letter Paul admits shame in not 
being able to undo (Philippians 3:2-7). Paul knew, however, that circumcision 
could not be made to disappear, which is why in Romans 2:29, he kept it 
allegorically in the spiritual sense of a cut within the heart. In that respect, 
circumcision explains how the Judean, for Paul, becomes synonymous with the 
believer; even the Gentile can become a Judean in his heart. It also explains 
why Paul’s conviction in his ‘gospel’, was centered on the fact that the Gentile 
convert should not circumcise; to circumcise would mean the convert had 
missed the significance of Christ’s resurrection. Considering the putative source 
of Paul’s theology, his grief in failing to ensure the Galatians follow the Law of 
Christ would have been severe. It would have seemed a sacrilege to his God, 
and a great personal failure of his call and role as apostle. 	  
Philo’s translation of the Law of Moses into Hellenistic terms can be seen 
to have influenced Paul’s conviction of the equality amongst Jew and Gentile, 
and also explains how Paul’s very Judean messiah became animated with Greek 
ideas of the inhuman. The ‘unwritten’ quality of the natural law in Philo is 
echoed in Paul’s letters as the unwritten authority of the break with the law (1 
Corinthians 2:7 secret and hidden) central to his mission--his gospel is ‘not of 
human origin” (Galatians 1:11)--which explains how Paul wielded authority in 
the Gentile community he was converting. The unwritten source of his 
authority, which inspired the trust of his audience, clearly disturbed the Judean 
followers of Jesus and goes far in explaining why some followers of Jesus were 
compelled, for ethical reasons, to undermine his mission in Galatia. This 
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reaction by Paul’s critics suggests that there was a conservative stream amongst 
the Jesus followers who, promoting the ritual laws, probably did not see Jesus as 
having changed much in the faith. That is, even if Jesus appeared to 500 
people, as Paul says, he may have only appeared as an ascended figure, 
reflecting a Judean tradition of the ascension of prophets such as Moses, Ezekiel 
and Enoch. That is, there may have been Judeans among the followers who did 
not see Jesus as someone who broke the natural laws. You might say, Paul’s 
critics describe the argument to which Gignilliat vaguely gestured. 
When Paul claims, “Apart from the law, sin lies dead” (Rom 7:8), 
historians tend to search for a theological significance and are confused, while 
the Lacanian philosophers I have referenced (Badiou and Žižek), read ‘sin’ in 
psychoanalytic terms as reflecting the psychic dimension of the subject’s 
relation to social law imposed by the NOF. For psychoanalysts, the subject’s 
language is the material of the trauma; its metaphorical value contains evidence 
of the crisis. Paul’s law of Christ is traced with the crisis: the cycle of sin tied to 
the law, expressed in the dynamic relation between desire and the death drive 
of the oedipalized subject, was arrested, according to Paul, by the messiah’s 
resurrection. In this light, and contra the historians, Paul’s theology is not non-
existent or confused, but simple and elegant. Moreover, the message of Christ 
was intended for all because, advancing the universal principle of death in 
Philo’s terms, Jew and Gentile, man and woman, adult and child were equally 
eligible for this second or eternal life. In this respect, Badiou’s claim that Paul in 
“assigning to the universal a specific connection of the law and the subject” (7) 
displacing differences of ethnicity, gender, and age, and so provoking, “a 
cultural revolution upon which we still depend” (15) to define the terms of the 
universal, is somewhat misleading. For one, Badiou does not take into account 
that Paul’s universal is conditional on the truth of Jesus crucifixion/resurrection. 
For another, Paul’s ‘universal’ may be seen to have dismantled a real ‘universal’ 
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that was identified by Philo with the Stoics. Before the condition of Christ came 
into focus, all mankind, from Adam onwards, shared the same human destiny of 
death; Christ’s resurrection broke that universal. This abrogation of natural law, 
however, was true only for those who believe in the resurrected Jesus, the 
Christ, thus signaling what Agamben identifies as the Apelles cut. The impact of 
the cut of the law, or the suspension of the ‘exception’, would have been 
negligible had it not been for Paul’s use of the Greek concept of the immaterial 
through faith. Faith does not demand physical evidence, nor does it seek out 
written proof; it is based on the impalpable reality of the ‘exception’ of mortality 
that responded to the apocalyptic anxiety of his times: the future redemption 
was at hand as the bliss of eternal life in Eden because of Christ. 
 
READING PAUL’S SIN 
I shall take a circuitous route to Paul’s trauma evident in this hermeneutic of the 
law of Christ, by first rereading the historians on Paul’s use of law through a 
literary focus. The historian’s interest in rhetoric periodically rises up as relevant 
to scholarship on Paul, evident in Räisänen’s observation that the literary 
devices, dialectic and paradox, indicative of Paul’s texts, were moves the 
‘Semitic mind’ delighted in (4). Wright has approached Paul’s text as narrative, 
exploring the “story in Pauline theology” in Romans 8:1-11, which has resolved 
seeing contradictions in his work.148 These incidences of historians’ doing 
literary analysis pale in comparison to the philosophers’ approach. When 
Badiou asserts that Paul is a poet he means to call attention to the fact that his 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
148 N. T. Wright aims to address apparent contradictions by focusing on reading Paul’s ideas not 
as fixed concepts, but as elements of a narrative: “To require of Paul that he should always say 
exactly the same thing about Torah all the time would be like criticizing the story of Jack and 
the Beanstalk on the grounds that it was internally inconsistent, because Jack was sometimes 
going up the beanstalk and sometimes coming down” (The Climax of the Covenant, 215). 
Wright’s sensitivity to the spatial/temporal structure of implied narratives serves my analysis of 
Romans 7 ahead.	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expression is not only ‘fantastic’ but also, highly condensed. Whereas the 
historians have been selective in their research on the matter of Jesus 
resurrection,149 because the limitations of historical method reflect on issues of 
veracity, the philosophers, Badiou, Žižek, as well as Caputo, who each 
acknowledge the significance of the crucifixion in psychoanalytic and 
philosophical terms, are concerned less with the truth of the resurrection than 
with its impact on society in political terms. Following the philosophers’ 
attention to Paul’s creative use of language to represent reality, I shall forthwith 
draw out rhetorical and narrative elements in Paul’s work with respect to the 
poetic impulse in expressing the inexpressible of how Christ’s resurrection has 
changed the Christians’ relation to sin, and therefore changed the law. That is, I 
shall set aside the historian’s focus on events as factual, to get at the psychic 
foundation of his use of language. 
I shall focus on rhetorical repetition in the narrative, and compressed 
poetic language in Paul’s use of ‘law’ in interpreting Romans 7:7-13: “I would 
not have known what it is to covet had the law not said, ‘You shall not covet.’ 
But sin, seeing an opportunity in the commandment, produced in me all kinds 
of covetousness. Apart from the law sin lies dead: I was once alive apart from 
the law, when the commandment came, sin revived and I died, and the very 
commandment that promised life proved to be death to me.” This passage, the 
very one used by Lacan to explain that sin is created by law in Seminar VII (86), 
is constructed on repetitions in such a way that calls attention to definitions. 
Law is essentially repeated in the term ‘commandment’, but on further analysis, 
this repetition only stands for a multiplicity of laws in the passage since the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Archaeological finds in Israel over the last several decades have uncovered nails from the 
Roman occupation of Israel which supplement the most important archaeological proof of the 
practice of crucifixion: in 1968, archaeologists found in a bone box (an ossuary) at a burial site 
outside of Jerusalem, a heel bone with a nail through it. Israeli, Yael, and Mevorach, David, 
Cradle of Christianity, The Israel Museum, Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel, 2000, 
English/Hebrew  The Israel Museum, Publisher: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 2005.  
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commandment of covetousness is one law within the context of the Mosaic 
laws as a whole. Yet, to read the law associated with the first ‘apart’ as either 
‘covetousness’ or all the Mosaic laws does not illuminate what Paul means by 
“sin lies dead”. I would suggest Paul is referencing yet another law in this short 
sentence. Reading with a logic of parallelism helps to decode how ‘death’ is a 
term for another law. For example, if law makes sin, then the law that prohibits 
covetousness creates covetousness. Similarly, the law of mortality, creates the 
sin we have inherited from Adam and Eve.150 Born to die, humans live in a 
constant state of sinning. When Paul says that, “apart from the law sin lies dead’ 
we see a break in the dynamic between law and sin as defined by Lacan, 
wherein sin no longer has power over mankind. That is, when the law of 
mortality is gone, sin no longer is created—it lies dead. Thus, the law from 
which one is ‘set apart’ is the law of mortality. Christ has initiated this 
tremendous event: the law of Christ, as the law of eternal life, has replaced the 
law of nature.  
Paul shifts his focus in the second ‘apart’ to reflect the narrative of his 
own death and resurrection in Christ in a mirror-like inversion of the first 
‘apart’. Whereas the person with Christ’s law is ‘set apart from’ the law of 
mortality in the first ‘apart’, we read in the second ‘apart’ that Paul’s life before 
revelation meant he lived ‘apart from’ Christ’s law; that is, he lived bound to his 
mortal destiny, to original sin, and followed the ‘commandments that promised 
life’ (the Mosaic laws) which encouraged him to persecute the Jesus followers. 
When he claims, “sin revived and I died,” he is providing a précis of how his 
zealotry against the Jesus followers led to his encounter with Christ which was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150 W. D. Davies’s analysis of Romans 7 In Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, is very similar to mine, 
sans a recognition that Jesus’ contribution to a new religion involves a break with natural law, 
or the law of mortality. Davies argues that the sin, which Paul is referencing here in Romans, 
can only be the one associated with death, which is the one we inherit from Adam because of 
original sin. Davies references 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch as examples of this idea in Paul’s time (32-
33). 
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the death necessary for new life. In other words, the Judean faith promised a life 
bound to the law of death, which led him to his death; in his death, this 
promise was fulfilled as the resurrection through Christ.151 Through his 
encounter with Christ, an inversion has occurred in the idea of natural law, 
which he is trying to replicate in this complicated shifting of positions in this 
short narrative; the relation of life with death (sin) was transformed into life 
without death (sin). 
 It is unnerving to read a text whose coordinates suddenly shift; one law 
is suddenly another law, and the flag for that shift is internal to the text. Why 
does Paul reference several laws in one and the same verse? Schreiner notes, 
footnoting a long list of scholars in agreement, that ‘there is no evidence in 
Judaism for such divisions of the law” (63). Sanders qualifies in a footnote that, 
“Paul never explicitly distinguishes between the ritual and the moral law; yet 
one can observe that he never cites a ritual law which is valid for Christians, 
while he does so cite moral laws” (f.t. 22 117). That is to say, Sanders stresses, 
Paul knows what law he intends for each use of the word. Considering 
Najman’s analysis of Philo’s work, is it possible that there was some sense of 
the distinction of the laws by his immediate colleagues, but it was perhaps not 
common currency amongst the whole community? Would that explain Paul’s 
obscurantism? In the case of Galatians, was Paul avoiding being specific in his 
rhetoric of exegesis on the law because he was dealing with Gentile followers, 
whose backgrounds in philosophy was varied and unequal, and who had no 
formal exposure to biblical scripture? Or, in the case of Romans, was Paul 
protecting the truth of his message for fear that he would be persecuted for his 
radical ideas? These are just some of the questions raised by Paul’s technique 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  “For through the law I died to the law, so that I might live to God. I have been crucified with 
Christ; and it is no longer I who live, but it is Christ who lives in me... for if justification comes 
through the law, then Christ died for nothing” (Gal 2:19-21). 	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with the ‘law’. Paul’s apparent jumbling of all laws at once seems to mobilize 
indeterminacy on two fronts. On the one hand, we can see in this strategy to 
obfuscate meaning a reaction to those who had trouble with his message; on 
the other hand, there is a playfulness in the repetition of nomos (law) that may 
be seen as a poetic approach to the theological aspect of his message: all laws 
are manifestations of the one law that came from the first sin: natural law. 
Considering the Letter to the Romans as a whole, in relation to the 
passage I reviewed, we can read how Paul was addressing a group of Judean 
followers of Jesus most of whom not only knew the Holy Scriptures, at least 
orally, but might also have been versed in contemporary Judean philosophy and 
Philo’s Hellenizing of Judean faith in the Book of Moses. That would explain 
why Rom 1:18-32 would not, as Sanders and Dodd suggest, reference a Gentile 
community as distinguished from the Judean people, but rather, actually point 
to all of humanity in the early chapters of the book of Genesis; from Adam and 
Eve until Noah, including the relation between humans and Giants, the 
destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the flood, we see sinning by 
everyone. This, however, does not explain Paul’s perverse pleasure in troubling 
his meaning of law by way of expressing the inexpressible of it, coupled by his 
apparent self-promotion that repeats constantly. The self-centered nature of his 
writing would lead me to disagree with those scholars who claim that Romans 
7:25 reflects mankind’s relation to sin and the law generally; rather, I would 
argue that Paul means to situate his autobiography covertly in a universally 
shared experience. Paul is the central figure who, suffering sin, was saved (Rom 
7: 24 “Wretched man that I am! Who will rescue me from this body of death?”) 
by Jesus Christ. Moreover, when he claims he has died in Christ, when we read 
his self-identification with the death and resurrection of Christ, we can hear that 
faith in Christ not only frees a person from death but transforms that person by 
being ‘anointed’, or turns them into a messiah, in the Isaianic sense. This 
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transformation appears to be of the figurative order. In Chapter Five, I will make 
a case for seeing this change as literal.  
 There is much work yet to be done to trace the implication of my theory 
of the Law of Christ as the abrogation of natural law on the full body of Paul’s 
letters. For example, when Räisänen and Sanders claim that the statements in 
Romans 5:13 are confusing or trite, it is because they have not distinguished 
between different kinds of sin, as Paul has. When Paul claims, ‘sin was in the 
world before the law’, he is not identifying generic sin outlined by the Mosaic 
laws, but the sin committed by Adam and Eve before their fall which 
condemned mankind to mortality; original sin existed before the first law of 
death. Moreover, when Paul claims that “sin is not reckoned when there is no 
law”, he has shifted time and place; the law which has governed man from 
Adam to Moses until Paul’s ‘now’, has been undone by the Law of Christ.152 
Christ’s resurrection was the sign that God had forgiven mankind his [sic] sins; 
with the abrogation of this law, there is no more sin to count. Since we know 
the relation between sin and law is contingent on death, Snodgrass’ reading of 
Rom 7:7-13 as “sin works through the flesh and uses the law to cause death” 
inverts the causal logic. Sin does not use the law; rather, in psychoanalytic 
terms, because the first sin created death, law uses sin to maintain awareness of 
our mortality. Overall you can see how important Paul’s concept of Christ’s law 
was. His conviction that Christ must be revered for freeing mankind from the 
bind of sin and death, signified a revolutionary change for himself. His role in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	  In research continuing a Marcion dilemma, Jerome Hall notes the trouble with understanding 
Paul’s demonic angels in Gal 3:19 which, according to Hall, Hubner tried to resolve by 
separating Gal 3:19 “into two parts—the first being ascribed to demonic angels, the second 
obviously to God” (375). Where Marcion reached for a gnostic solution, contemporary scholars 
have remained stumped. I argue that the demon, which gave mankind natural law clearly does 
not signify God, but Satan in the guise of the serpent who tempts Adam and Eve to eat of the 
fruit. The demon is the temptation that causes the law of mortality.	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that change, as having died and come back to life in Christ, points to the fact 
that he saw himself not only as a messenger, but as living proof of Christ. 
  
CONCLUSION 
What Paul identified as a cut in the fundamental law of life, repeating terms of 
exception for all mankind in the future of eternal existence, manifested as a 
crisis within the Judean faith because the satellite entity which came to be 
known as Christianity, gathering legitimacy around a supersessionist narrative, 
grew exponentially on the momentum of the invisible power of ‘faith’; a cut in 
the Judean faith was the result. Tradition has blamed Paul for this cut; according 
to Paul, however, the responsibility of this cut was the Christ apparition of 
God’s grace. Christian tradition continues to affirm that Paul encountered a 
divine being; it is an idea grounded in the OT tradition of visions and visitations 
by the divine ‘Other’. What is different about Paul’s representation of his divine 
encounter as based on the OT and those of the mystical tradition is centered on 
the trope of death. Whereas Jesus can be seen as equivalent to the prophets 
who ascended to heaven in their death, Jesus was different, according to Paul. 
That difference and its impossibility was reflected in Paul’s own resurrection. At 
the end of chapter two I argued that Paul’s encounter involved death and new 
life; I here qualify that statement to mean that, what Paul meant by death in 
relation to a resurrection, was his own. He was the one who died and, because 
of the ‘risen Christ’, he was resurrected. As a suffering servant, he was equal to 
Jesus in God’s greater plan. 
Now I shall further qualify what I mean by Paul’s death and resurrection 
in psychoanalytic terms; the Law of Christ can be read as a traversal of the 
fantasy of oedipalization, or mortality. Looking behind this traversal of the 
fantasy of death, a traversal which stands as the Christian fantasy whose 
fulfillment has been deferred to Jesus’ return, we see a momentary suspension of 
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the law of life. The same interruption of time or destiny in terms such as the 
“now time” in Benjamin’s “Theses”, and Santner’s unplugging along with 
Rosenzweig’s “interpellation beyond interpellation” all reflect a messianic 
fantasy, if not in actual terms as Paul and Rosenzweig have represented it, then 
in aspiring terms as Benjamin and Derrida have reflected on it.153 What is 
significant for me about the interruption reflected in this unplugging, leaving 
aside the messianic obsession for the moment, is that it is an experience, which 
psychoanalysts would define as equal, in part, to the psychotic’s foreclosure of 
the NOF. This means two things for my purposes. Paul’s encounter with the 
real, in other words, his trauma, is the psychotic escape from the symbolic of 
the law (Judean faith, mortal destiny, oedipalization) into the roiling terrorizing 
atmosphere of the chaotic real; and that escape echoes what Rosenzweig 
registered as the call, or the ‘interpellation beyond interpellation” whose 
mask,154 is love.155 In all these cases, to one extent or another, ‘love’ marks the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  Santner traces a confluence of shared interest amongst Jewish German philosophers in the 
shift involved in ‘unplugging’, stressing that it need not be a radical break but does reflect a 
messianic awakening that, according to Bloom, is “the freedom yet that can be our time” 
(Psycho 64). Stéphane Mosès identification of Benjamin’s vision of the revolution and messianic 
time offers an equivalent to unplugging as unknotting: “If, for Benjamin, the idea of happiness 
reflects that of Redemption, it may be said to be precisely as the term (Er-lösung) must be 
understood as the ‘unknotting’ of the paradoxes of the present”.153 According to Santner in his 
concluding thoughts in “Miracles Happen”, “Saint Paul was the first great German-Jewish 
thinker, equal in stature to Rosenzweig, Freud and Benjamin”; furthermore, he suggests, Paul 
may be thought of as such because he was the source for these great German Jewish scholars 
(132), and that influence is reflected in the suspension of the law (of time, of society, of class 
systems, etc.), and especially in the concept of “fantasies of exception” in secular thought (133). 
154 I chose to use Žižek’s concept of the imaginary aspect of love, for two reasons; it reflects the 
role of love to protect what is being hidden; it also reverberates between psychoanalytic and 
mystical texts on the issue of the feminine principle. Žižek’s adaptation modifies the essential 
issue Lacan raises about the ‘mask’ or ‘veil’ in “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic 
of Desire”: “Such is woman concealed behind her veil: it is the absence of the penis that makes 
her the phallus, the object of desire. Evoke this absence in a more precise way by having her 
wear a cute fake one under her fancy dress: the effect is 100 percent guaranteed, for men who 
don’t beat around the bush, that is” (Écrits 699). 
155 Rosenzweig introduces “Revelation” with the idea of love: “For love is not attribute, but 
event, and there is no place in it for an attribute… God’s love is always wholly in the moment 
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same thing, messiah as ‘anointing’, and in each case, differently. What is this 
anointing? That question is addressed through the question that determines the 
next chapter: what did Paul mean by conversion? 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and at the point where it loves; and it is only in the infinity of time, step by step, that it reaches 
one point after the next and permeates the totality with soul” (Star of Redemption 177). 
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During the American Comparative Literature Association’s Annual Conference 
on the topic of Catastrophe, Collapse and Change in 2012, I attended a panel 
on conversion. There were a few presentations looking at the controversial 
conversion of T. S. Eliot; there was a presentation on ‘coming out’ and the 
confession as an expression of conversion; and there was one comparison of St. 
John of the Cross’s Spiritual Canticle with a Hindi prayer that seemed 
incongruous at first, since its focus was on ecstatic experience. Besides this 
incongruity, I was struck by the absence of a self-conscious understanding of 
the Christo-centric vision of conversion in the papers presented, articulated by 
one panelist who perceptively asked, “Does conversion exist in other forms?” 
The fact that no one could address the question beyond Christo-centric terms, 
including me, struck me as indicative of a problem in scholarship; eventually, I 
came to the conclusion that this problem could be traced to the fact that Paul’s 
influence on Christian conversion remained buried in the scholarship presented 
at this panel, especially in the paper comparing the Hindi prayer with The 
Spiritual Canticle.156 
What was incongruous about this paper was the fact that neither the 
Christian poem nor the Hindi prayer were in any explicit way about conversion, 
an absence which was exacerbated by the fact the presenter unself-consciously 
engaged in a Christo-centric reading of the Hindi prayer. Implicit in this 
comparison though not consciously addressed, was that ecstasy was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Gloria Maité Hernéndez. “Figures, Comparisons and Resemblances: The Comparative Act of 
Mystical Writing”. ACLA Conference, Brown University, Providence, R.I., March 31, 2012. 
Conference Presentation. 
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synonymous with conversion. According to Colleen Colleen Shantz, conflating 
conversion and ecstasy in Pauline scholarship is a central blind spot. In Paul’s 
Ecstasy: The Neurobiology of the Apostles Life and Thought, she applies a 
neurobiological method to interpreting Paul’s ecstatic events as separate from 
his conversion experience. Shantz’s scientific approach to ecstatic experience 
shall complement the psychoanalytic approach to Paul’s text in the pages 
ahead. Through a textual analysis of Paul’s ecstatic experiences, I will follow 
Shantz’s project in distinguishing between the event of ecstasy and the event of 
conversion and move beyond her research to give reasons for why Paul could 
not be considered a convert.  
The failure to imagine beyond the Christian paradigm to which the panel 
participants had equally and independently, ‘as if by accident’, bound their 
scholarship, highlighted an aporia raised by the question “does conversion exist 
in other forms?” Can we, for example, see a correlation between conversion 
and ‘interpellation’? In this chapter, I indirectly take up this question by 
following through on an observation made by the editors of Taubes’ The 
Political Theology of Paul: “Taubes differentiates between conversion and 
calling: Whereas the conversion of Paul constitutes the model of a Christian 
conversion, his being called puts him in line with Jewish prophets”.157 Once I 
have addressed the scholarly assumptions about conversion and Paul, and 
subsequently defined the difference between conversion and the ‘call’ or 
interpellation, I will provide proof for Taubes’ understanding of Paul and also 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157 Wolf-Daniel Hartwich, Aleida Assmann and Jan Assmann in “Afterword”, 118. 
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In her project on Paul’s ‘ecstatic experience’, Colleen Shantz highlights the fact 
that ‘conversion’, as used in Pauline scholarship, is ‘notoriously imprecise” (46). 
By imprecise she does not mean to raise issues of the anachronistic use of 
Henry James’ idea of the psychological/sociological term to define a person’s 
move from one religion to another; rather, she highlights that scholarship 
collapses or conflates Paul’s ecstatic experience with his putative conversion, 
relying primarily on Luke’s representation of Paul’s “Damascus road 
experience” (47), an experience which cannot be verified in Paul’s letters. The 
event of ‘conversion/call’, Shantz asserts, is “safely opaque—and therefore a 
kind of tabula rasa on which the central Pauline tenets might be written” (55); it 
allows scholars like Kim to maintain that Paul’s “first vision of Jesus was an 
‘objective external event’“(57); that is say, Jesus was not a revelation of God, 
but the literal visitation of the dead man, unique and incomparable. This idea of 
Jesus’ unique status maintains the conflation between ecstasy and conversion, 
which, for my purposes, marks the spot for my investigation into the 
unconscious persistence of Paul’s testimony in secularism.  
While Shantz targets Kim’s focus on the unique quality of Jesus as a mark 
of scholarly blindness, she cites Segal’s research in Paul: The Convert as 
showing Paul’s experience as not unique, but of the tradition in the Judean 
faith, which would develop into Merkabah mysticism (57). It is true that Shantz 
will go on to problematize Segal’s literary methods to understand Paul’s 
experience, but the fact that she does not question Segal’s thesis that Paul was a 
convert also reflects scholarly blindness. Granted, Shantz’s project is not to 
debate what conversion is, “but the way in which the assertion of a conversion 
experience allows one to lump all sorts of ecstatic experience into a single 
event…” (56). With respect, I would say that Shantz misses an opportunity to 
uncover the fact that ecstasy is made invisible by the ideology determining 
conversion. That ideology motivates Segal in Paul: The Convert, in which he 
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professes that, while his task is to reread Paul as a Judean (xv), in order to put 
back the Judean content determining Paul’s letters, his motivating thesis is to 
prove that Paul converted to Christianity: “I maintain that Paul is indeed a 
convert in the modern sense” (21). Despite the confidence here, he admits in 
his Appendix that to call Paul’s experience a conversion ‘may not be useful’ 
(285), long after asserting, “Conversion is an appropriate term for discussing 
Paul’s religious experience, although he did not himself use the term” (72) and 
then affirming, “[v]iewing Paul as a convert is a productive model” (117). This 
repeated justification signals an unconscious doubt. Segal is fully cognizant of 
the anachronistic move in using the modern term, ‘conversion’, to define an 
ancient event which is known only based on some letters; considering my 
project could be seen to be arguing to do the same thing, applying a modern 
idea of trauma to a historical event barely accessible to us now, then I for one 
should have no problem with Segal’s method, and I do not. I am compelled to 
push at Segal’s thesis, however, because a deterministic anachronism is 
debilitating Segal’s ‘productive model’ and that is Christian ideology. 
According to Segal, Paul’s experience is reflected in modern 
psychological ideas of conversion: “Forces of dissonance are always unleashed 
in a conversion because the convert sees a great distinction between his 
previous life and the present one” (265). If we owe our modern idea of 
conversion to the anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists, it is always 
forgotten that these modern scientists owe their idea to the Paul who was 
Christianized through the early period of the Jesus movement158. Moreover, I 
would assert that the vague language used by these modern science disciplines 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Shantz is conscious of resisting seeing the first-century followers of Jesus as already defined 
under the rubric of Christianity; recall, the term “the Christ’ had only just been introduced by 
Paul in the 50s CE. Shantz resolves the anachronistic impulse to name this community 
Christianity by erasing the capital ‘C’ and so calls them, ‘christian’. In the same spirit of resisting 
anachronisms, I prefer to name the community as being followers of Jesus. 
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about conversion reflects an unconscious effect; almost any circumstance in our 
modern times that is not religious, experiences like migration, a psychological 
breakdown, marriage, divorce, or political participation signal the same 
psychological shift reflected in this definition of conversion. What I want to 
highlight is the fact that a religious condition of change would apply equally to 
almost any secular activity, which emphasizes the ubiquity of Pauline thought 
in contemporary culture, and its ambiguous legacy.   
In first-century terms, ‘convert’ or ‘proselyte’ were terms used to define 
gentiles who were not the God-fearers (in Asia Minor, at least) but who, through 
circumcision, accepted a new life following Judean precepts; conversion 
reflected a movement from a life without the true God to a life with the true 
God. Segal recognizes this quality of conversion in Paul’s society as being a 
pagan turning (epistrophe) to the true God; he reflects on the putative 
conversion expressed by Josephus in his time studying with Bannus, the Essene 
(82), noting the liberal ideas Judeans had at the time about non-Gentiles 
entering the community, Philo’s near allegorizing being an example (90) and 
that the messianic element of apocalypticism attracted people to spiritual 
communities (111), the case of the Jesus movement being the most widely 
known in modern society. In this review, Segal does not highlight an important 
qualifying issue: our modern idea of conversion is inherited from the first-
century conversion of turning to an affiliation, culled from Acts 15:3, 
“conversion of the gentiles” using the Greek epistrophe, for ‘turn’ or a ‘turn in 
direction’. Interestingly, the use of ‘turn’ in Acts to signal conversion, can be 
seen to have a connection to Paul’s use of ‘apostrophe’, or “turn away”, in 
Romans 11:26, in his quotation from Isaiah, “turn godlessness away from 
Jacob”. Paul’s ‘godless’ can be seen in two ways; it reflects the Gentile who 
lives without God until his turn to God; or, in Paul’s later career as an apostle, it 
may also have reflected his own increasing trouble with those Judeans who, 
 	  
  191	  
preaching God, behaved as if essentially godless. It could be argued that this 
double entendre in his diction, which reflects what I have before described as 
his conviction in his mission to the Gentiles, combined with his defense of that 
mission against those who critiqued it, has, interestingly, come to define 
Christian conversion; that is, the change from a godless to god-centered life as 
indicated in Paul’s gospel, has become christianized as the change from a non-
Jesus to a Jesus-centered life. 
Segal admits a lack of conversion language in the letters (19), but 
repeatedly refers to Paul’s experience as a conversion to Christianity (12). 
Segal’s use of this term is applied to Paul because of the anachronistic use in 
Luke’s Acts: “Luke describes Paul explicitly as a new prophet, but he also 
portrays Paul’s experience as a radical conversion” (11). Written after Paul’s 
mission, or at his death, Acts reflects something striking about the first decades 
of the Jesus moment which I have noted before with respect to the significance 
of the suffering servant: the term ‘conversion’, from the Greek epostrophe (to 
turn, to turn about), perhaps adapted from Paul’s quotation of Isaiah in Romans, 
has become a part of the community’s discourse, in Foucault’s sense of 
discourse in Archaeology of Knowledge. This discourse in Luke, as Shantz 
highlights, had political importance: “It has long been noted that Luke’s 
characterization of Paul… owes a great deal to the evangelist’s own redactional 
purposes… In the final tally, the accounts from Acts agree with Paul’s own only 
in (1) the notion of some apprehension of the divine and (2) the association of 
this apprehension with a change in Paul’s social identity” (48-49). Shantz insists 
Luke is historically unreliable because of its politics: “In the end, the only 
significant historical information provided by the Lukan accounts is the fact that 
some sectors of early christianity told a story of Paul’s dramatic conversion as a 
means of validating his role and to address concerns about the nature of the 
movement” (49). The ‘nature of the movement’ in Shantz’s terms, here, means 
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that the Jesus followers were beginning to distinguish themselves in opposition 
to the Judean cult. Their identity as a separate and distinct cult, which we 
inherit in the named religion, ‘christianity’159, is visible in its formative state in 
Acts, following Paul, and not necessarily including Paul. 
Segal admits Paul does not use language of conversion such as 
epistrophe or apostrophe to describe his experience; Segal also claims that his 
project is meant to envision Paul as a Judean. The fact that Segal contradicts his 
own intention to take a Judeo-centric approach to his experiences, and instead 
adapts early Christian language to describe Paul’s experiences, highlights a 
series of adumbrated assumptions motivating his use of ‘conversion’. Seeing 
Paul as a convert implies that Paul’s message was about a new unique event 
centered on Jesus’ Crucifixion/Resurrection which was separate from the Judean 
faith; it implies that, the event launched the rupture between Judaism and 
Christianity, which meant that Paul turned away from his Judean faith, which 
means that he stopped seeing himself as a Judean or believing in his laws, and 
so become a Christian. In short, according to Segal, Paul turned to a new faith 
which preceded its formation as a community, not to mention its naming. 
Segal’s assumption that Christianity existed for Paul to convert to, implies that 
Jesus not only preceded the formation of the church, and that Paul was equal to 
a gentile and needed to ‘turn to God’, but in distinctly secessionist terms 
represented in Milton’s fantasy in Paradise Lost, Christianity pre-existed the 
Judean cult as part of God’s great plan of salvation, envisioned before 
mankind’s cataclysmic fall. In short, we see in Segal’s thinking the very opacity 
Shantz highlights in Kim’s conviction that Jesus was an objective unique event; 
we see the ideology of Christo-centricism. 
As Segal has noted, Paul’s representation of his experiences of visiting 
the third heaven, encountering the Doxa/Kavod of God in Christ, were not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 This is Shantz’s term for the early period of Christianity.  
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unique, but reflected the tradition of mysticism that goes as far back as Moses’s 
experience on Mount Sinai encountering the Glory of God; terms like metanoia, 
meaning change of heart or repentance (2 Cor 7:9), or metamorphoas, as in 
transformation (2 Cor 3:18), are used by Paul about himself, or his community, 
as caused by the divine message, communication, or ‘apocalypse’, the 
revelation. There is little reason to see, as Segal suggests, that Paul rejected his 
faith, or believed in his Christ as opposed to the Judean cult, as in epistrophe. 
Stendahl argues that Paul did not experience a conversion, but a ‘call’ (10); this 
accords with historians (Donaldson and Campbell) who contend that Paul was 
not rejecting his Judean faith for another ‘faith’ in being an apostle of the 
gospel.160 Terrence Donaldson argues in Paul and the Gentiles (1997), that 
Paul’s call was not just about preaching his gospel to the gentiles, but involved 
the impact of the Christ on himself and his contemporary society (260). The fact 
that his message was not one of opposition is upheld in my analysis of the Law 
of Christ as a supplement to, not a dismantling of, the Law of Moses. The fact 
that this message was for all, emphasizes that any opposition we hear in his 
letters does not reflect his position to the Judean faith, but to those Judeans who 
opposed his gospel. Though Paul believed in the turn promoted by his gospel, 
his experience did not signal that he identified with that gospel; rather, his 
experience reflected a transformation in ways he considered equal to Moses’ 
impact on the wandering Israelites.  
Paul’s identification with the prophet Moses (2 Corinthians 3:12-19) 
sheds light on how he understood his transformation. Moses was called (from 
his birth) as was Paul (set aside by God); and that his task was to lead the 
chosen people to the promised land; on receiving the commandments, his face 
was radiant (Exodus  (29-34), requiring that he veil himself except before God; 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160 See Terence Donaldson’s “The Gospel that I Proclaim Among the Gentiles (Galatians 2.2): 
Universalistic or Israel-Centered?” 93.	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Paul identifies himself and his followers with the Mosaic unveiling, “seeing the 
glory of the Lord as though reflected in a mirror,… being transformed into the 
same image from one degree of glory to another” (2 Corinthians 3:18). Taubes 
asserts that Paul did not see himself as a prophet, like Moses, but an apostle 
‘outbidding Moses’ (39). In response to Taubes, I suggest that Paul had no 
interest in upstaging Moses since the Law of Christ did not reflect a rejection of 
Moses’ laws of Mount Sinai; rather, Paul was called to signal the resolution of a 
theological dilemma much like Moses confronted his dilemma of the Israelite’s 
enslavement. Moses was leading the chosen people; Paul was speaking to the 
new members of the ‘chosen’ community not just about God, but about the 
future day of judgment when they would rise, saved in Christ. The apostolic 
nature of his message for Gentiles, therefore, signaled what is unique about his 
prophetic call; it involved inclusion of the outsiders into the transformation for 
all believers, indicated in terms like metamorphoas or metanoia, expressed in 
his personal experience of new life. This change, integral to the Law of Christ, 
was a substantive transformation, which Paul promoted as available to both the 
converted pagan and the Judean as salvation.  
While Segal is sensitive to Paul’s language as relevant to the movement, 
he continually erases Paul’s authority from his own text: “The language of 
transformation was evidently used by two evangelists to describe Jesus 
transfiguration. It is quite possible that the transfiguration itself was supposed to 
be a model of transformation for the believers as well as a sign of Jesus’ own 
identity as God’s principle angelic manifestation” (Segal 111). In Segal’s project 
on Paul, Paul’s own transformation, identified often in the text as ‘dying in 
Christ’ or ‘suffering the thorn’, is entirely displaced by the transfiguration of 
Jesus and references to transformation by evangelists, iterating the erasure of 
Paul’s messianism in Acts, previously noted in Chapter 3, but also highlighting 
the opacity in Pauline scholarship. It remains the bane of historical scholarship 
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that a Christian ideology occludes seeing Paul as the author of his own 
experience, as opposed to being the midwife of a religion whose name was not 
even directly attributed to him when it came to be named. In Freud’s terms, 
what is important is not whether the experience happened or not, but that the 
person believes it did; that is, what is important is not whether or not Jesus 
came to him, but that Paul was convinced that he had experienced a 
substantive transformation in being given new life, because of the Christ, which 
empowered him to save people from the impending chaos of the end times. 
Even though Segal writes over Paul’s experience with an anachronistic Christo-
centric pen, Segal stays true to the fact that Paul experienced a change. That is 
an important detail because, as I will show in the following pages, the change 
in Paul was not the conversion promoted in Acts, but the idea introduced by 




Shantz understood that conversion became a cypher for Paul’s experiences 
because enlightenment rationalism could not adequately accommodate ecstasy. 
The science of ecstasy, Shantz argues, can be traced through anthropological 
research on shaman practices, pejoratively defined as primitive religion, and 
then, in psychoanalytic terms, as schizoid abnormality, until it become 
assimilated in science as Altered States of Consciousness (ASC). The 
cognicentric thinking of enlightenment valuing of the “objective truth stripped 
of personal involvement” (26) determining this scientific research is echoed in 
what Shantz defines as the ‘misregard’ of Pauline scholarship. Scholarly biases 
against Paul’s experiences were reflected in identifying them as insane 
hallucinations, as Corley highlights was the norm in nineteenth century thinking 
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about Paul (55),161 or as pagan magic, an issue which led theologians to avoid 
his ecstatic language, fearing contamination of the divine doctrine. When 
addressed by scholarship, Shantz argues, Paul’s experiences have been framed 
by the cognicentrically determined literary traditions, which have obscured the 
experiential significance of his encounter(s) of Christ (59). In the effort to resolve 
the impasse in scholarship on Paul’s thinking by analyzing his ecstatic 
experiences as ASC events, Shantz is not only in unchartered territory, her 
injection of religious content into the cognicentric fields of secular research is 
subversive and I applaud it, even as I resist it. While I too value Paul’s ecstatic 
event as significant, and admittedly am restrained by applying the very 
cognicentrism she critiques, my aim is to disrupt the hold Christianity has over 
scholarship by showing that Paul’s event did not exist as we have come to 
know it through the highly formulated terms of contemporary Christianity.  
Paul’s references to his ecstatic experiences are few. In Galatians he tells 
the story of his ‘call’ (1:15); and in 2 Corinthians, he offers an account of 
ascension in the third person, ‘a person who in Christ was caught up to the third 
heaven” (12:2). Scholars tend to agree that Paul here is speaking about himself, 
and most find ways to explain the anomaly of his self-erasure by referencing 
contemporary spiritual traditions. Segal, for example, references rabbinic 
prohibitions: “Rabbinic rules also forbid public discussion of mystic 
phenomena. A first-century date for this rule would explain why Paul could not 
divulge his experience in his own name at that place. It also suggests why 
Jewish mystics consistently picked pseudepigraphical literary conventions to 
discuss their religious experience, unlocking the mystery behind the entire 
phenomenon of pseudepigraphical writing” (Segal 58). Segal’s claim that Paul’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  161	  It has been noted by Bruce Corley that a trend in the nineteenth century saw Paul’s ecstatic 
experience as reflecting mental or cognitive disorder: “Nineteenth-century explanations, in fact, 
commonly delved into mythic projections of guilt, hallucinations and apparitions, epileptic 
seizures, or the power of thunderstorm” (“Interpreting Paul’s Conversion—Then and Now”, 14).	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experiences are a part of a larger tradition of ascent literature (of Moses and 
Enoch, etc.,) in the Dead Sea Scrolls (59), explains the significance of the 
‘unutterable’ as a code in the tradition of Talmudic literature (60), an idea very 
much shared by Tabor’s thesis that Paul’s inability to say whether he was raised 
in body or in spirit reflected a censoring of secret knowledge (Unutterable 121).  
Segal, Tabor162, and also Morray-Jones163 contextualize Paul’s experience 
in the tradition of Judean mystical practices otherwise known as merkabah 
mysticism or hekhalot literature, which, as far as Shantz is concerned, 
misrecognizes Paul’s experience. Shantz argues that for Segal’s thesis of 
rabbinic influence to work, certain assumptions must be made. For one, Paul’s 
training had to have been limited to the Pharisaic community, and the rabbinic 
rules on mystical traditions had to have been securely in place in Paul’s time 
(61), neither of which is indicated by the breadth of thinking in Paul’s letters; for 
another, in order to see Paul’s silence as following an esoteric prohibition (62), 
Shantz argues, one would have to suppose that prohibition applied also to his 
references to it amongst the gentile community he was addressing: Why would 
this prohibition apply if the audience did not understand to begin with? Her 
point is that Paul’s refusal to share what he heard is not about a conscious effort 
for secrecy, but about an inability to express himself.  
As opposed to left-brain cognition, which is linguistic and narrative-
driven (101), ecstatic experience centres on right-brain activity which is neither 
spatial nor linguistic; in ecstatic experience, the subject looses track of where 
the body exists in relation to time and space (96), a condition evident in “the 
phenomenon of ‘phantom limbs’… also associated with the persistence (and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162 See James Tabor’s Unutterable: Paul’s Ascent to Paradise in its Greco-Roman, Judaic, and 
Early Christian Contexts. New York, London: University Press of America, 1986. 
163 C. R. A. Morray-Jones wrote two articles on the issue of the relation between ascent literature 
and Paul: “Paradise Revisited (2 Cor 12:1-12): The Jewish Mystical Background of Paul’s 
Apostolate”: Part 1: The Jewish Sources” (HTR, 86:2 (1993): 177-217) and Part 2: Paul’s 
Heavenly Ascent and its Significance” (HTR, 86:3 (1993): 265-92).	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plasticity) of somatic neural imprinting, even in the absence of actual bodily 
parts” (97.) Since ecstatic experience is beyond verbal cognition, it is often re-
created to conform to literary conventions. Interestingly, the neurological 
definition of right-brain cognition in the experience of ecstasy complements 
Lacan’s concept of the subject’s experience of the real; that which is ineffable, 
whose encounter is the trauma, is missed by the subject which leads to the 
imperative to make sense of it afterwards through the symbolic. This central 
principle behind fantasy formation in Lacan’s theory explains the difference 
between the mystic and the psychotic. If the mystic can retroactively give shape 
to her experience through fantasy, the psychic, who is fundamentally limited 
symbolically, shows incoherence in her/his representation of the crisis; Daniel 
Paul Schreber’s testimony is a prime example of this confusion, according to 
Lacan (Seminar III 78). Bearing in mind that Paul’s representation of his 
experience as limited by his semantic frame is a given, then what is 
inassimilable of his experience, what cannot be digested by the symbolic, 
stands out. For this reason, I argue, Segal’s and Tabor’s analysis of the merkabah 
tradition in Paul’s work remains valuable not just to affirm the shared 
experienced reflected in the tradition, but also to identify his innovations. 
To contextualize Judean conversion in Paul’s time, Segal notes parallels 
between Paul’s ascension to paradise and elements of the conversion depicted 
in Joseph and Aseneth, (81, 91, 92, 180). JandA is a Greek Syrian novel, 
otherwise defined as a Hellenistic romance, set in ancient Egypt, which 
develops a conversion narrative around Aseneth, Joseph’s Egyptian wife, from 
the biblical pericope in Genesis 41-37-45. The novel tells of her love for Joseph, 
his rejection of her for being an idolater, her week of fasting and repentance 
after which she is visited by a heavenly figure (angelos) who signals her 
conversion, leading to her acceptance by Joseph as his bride; the second shorter 
half tells of political intrigue of the Pharaoh’s failed assassination plot against 
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Aseneth, both aided and hindered by Joseph’s brothers. This Greek novel is an 
interesting selection for Segal because, though drawing connections between 
Aseneth’s conversion and Paul’s story have been noted in scholarship for 
decades (Chesnutt 58-59), there is no obvious reason that it could be proof of 
Paul’s conversion since its Christian origin is disputed.  
The earliest text we have is in Syrian and dates to the 5th century CE. 
Burchard and Philonenko have done the most to categorize the extant 
manuscripts between four rescensions (A, B, C, D), wherein Burchard favours 
B164 and Philonenko favours D as original.165 Most scholars agree it was 
originally written in Koine Greek and dates from between 110 BCE to 115 CE.166 
Amongst the majority, there are a few dissenting voices; Ross Shepard Kraemer, 
favouring Philonenko’s translation (D), asserts the romance cannot be dated 
before the 4th century.167 Gideon Bohak argues for an Egyptian Judean author, 
dating to the Onaid period, around middle second century BCE.168 Some 
scholars have focused on its generic identity, as a Hellenistic romance 
(Philonenko, Kee) drawing connections to pagan initiation practices (Kee)169, or 
roman novels of transformation such as Apuleius’ Golden Ass (Burchard), but 
most focus on its authority. As with the dating game, there is only disagreement 
amongst scholars about the author’s cultic affiliation. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164 Burchard offers a thoughtful review of his original thesis that B was the first version of the 
novel in “The Text of Joseph and Aseneth Reconsidered”, and concludes ambiguously that he is 
not sure of his original conviction, but that B represents a family of texts distinct from A and D, 
which share an ancestor, and are distinct from B (94-95).  
165 Marc Philonenko’s translation of D, (Joseph et Aséneth: Introduction Texte Critique 
Traducion et Notes. Lieden, E. J. Brill, 1968) is used by Kraemer in her work.  
166 Randall Chesnutt, From Death to Life, 36-37; Howard Clark Kee, “The Socio-Cultural Setting 
of Joseph and Aseneth,” New Testament Studies 29 (1983): 394-413.	  
167 Kraemer. When Aseneth Met Joseph: A Late Antiquity Tale Of the Biblical Patriarch and his 
Egyptian Wife, Reconsidered. New York: Oxford U Press, 1998. 
168 See Bohak’s ‘Joseph and Aseneth’ and the Jewish Temple in Heliolpolis. Atlanta, Georgia: 
Scholars Press, 1996. 
169 Kee’s “The Socio-Cultural Setting of Joseph and Aseneth” primarily argues for seeing an Isis 
cult practice in the story of Aseneth, drawing parallels to contemporary romances, particular 
Apuleius’ Golden Ass. 
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The variety of theories about JandA’s author is due primarily to the 
absence of religious particularities in the text. Battifol’s theory that the novel 
was a ‘neglected apocryphon’ of Christian origin because Christian 
communities preserved it,170 was a theory that held until the discovery of the 
Dead Sea Scrolls. Scholars, noting similarities in the practices of Aseneth to the 
Essenes who supposedly wrote the sectarian scrolls, argued for seeing the 
romance as Judean. The majority of scholars today argue for a Judean authority, 
seeing it either as a propagandic work to entice Gentiles to convert to the 
Judean faith (Burchard)171 or as a guide for Judeans accepting converts into the 
fold (Chesnutt).172 In this majority, there are a few who adamantly disagree. 
Kraemer, for example, supports Battifol’s theory,173 addressing the text’s putative 
Judean allusions as indicative of a Judean Christian author; she remains 
convinced there is no reason to see it as a strictly Judean conversion story, 
especially with its late dating.174 Rivka Nir also argues for a Christian origin, not 
because it was used by Christians, but because it does not reflect the historical 
record of ritual practices of the Judean cult of the time, pointing to the bad logic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 See P. Batiffol’s “Le Livre de la Prière de Aseneth” in Studia patristica: Etudes d’ancienne 
littérature chrétienne. Vol ½. Paris: Leroux, 1889-90, 1-115. 
171 Christophe Burchard. “The Text of Joseph and Aseneth Reconsidered,” Journal for the Study 
of the Pseudephigrapha 14.2 (2005): 83-96. 
172 Chesnutt, From Death to Life: Conversion in Joseph and Aseneth, 1995.	  
173 Arguing against Kraemer and Battifol’s interpretation of this text as Christian, Collins rightly 
points out that many Judean texts, such as Josephus’ opus, were preserved through the centuries 
by the Church which means that, though Aseneth was preserved by the Church, it cannot 
automatically be considered Christian (“Joseph and Aseneth: Jewish or Christian?” 98). 174	  Contra the early pro-Christian origin scholars, Aptowitzer put forward the thesis that the 
story, which appears in medieval rabbinic literature, dates to the first century. Kraemer reviews 
the rabbinic literature of Aptowitzer’s research, and claims that his thesis does not hold because 
of a textual detail. In rabbinic literature, Aseneth’s mother was the raped Judean Dinah thus 
explaining the rabbinic interest in returning to the fold a lost Judean, much like Moses. In the 
Syriac tradition, there is no mention of Aseneth’s mother: “It may be quite significant that the 
earliest attestation of the Dinah legend appears to be the Syriac tale printed [much later] by 
Oppenheim, which Aptowitzer assumed to reflect earlier rabbinic traditions but which could 
quite conceivably itself be formulated in response to the Syriac Aseneth and form the basis of 
the material found in later midrashic sources” (318). While Kraemer’s point does seem to 
undermine Aptowitzer’s thesis, it is not proof that it was originally a Christian story.	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in Chesnutt’s assertion that the absence of Christian ritual in the text makes it 
Jewish.175 Confusion about whether the text is of Christian or Judean origin spills 
over into historians’ work to determine what it can say about conversion of the 
time. From Lieu’s perspective, the text remains ambiguous about the issue of 
women conversion in the Roman Antiquities period,176 arguing rather that it 
reflects a concern about conversion generally by the religious authority, which 
was composed of men; the feminine gender of the story’s convert reflects a 
double ambivalence to the outsider seeking admittance. As it stands, gender 
and religious ambiguity in JandA make it a useful text to compare to Paul’s 
letters, by isolating the difference between the transformation involved in 
conversion and that experienced in the ecstatic event. 
 
DOXA 
The doxa of God represented by Paul as Jesus Christ may be in Shantz’ 
project, a representation of Paul’s psychic event equal to other psychic events 
experienced by Shamans or the cults of Paul’s time, yet she sustains a sense of 
Paul’s distinction, and the distinction of his gospel, as originating from the 
Christian concept of Christ as the risen Jesus.177 In comparing Paul’s letters and 
the Greek novel, Joseph and Aseneth, I aim to dismantle this ideological 
prejudice that underpins Shantz’s analysis, in order to affirm the equality of 
ecstatic experience(s) and the non-partisan nature of Paul’s doxa. In preparation 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 See Rivka Nir’s Joseph and Aseneth: A Christian Book, 8. 
176 Lieu argues: “The social context of [women’s convert stories] prominence has been much 
debated, but their role seems best understood not as evidence of a predominantly female 
readership nor of women’s prominence in society but as a projection of male concerns” (“The 
Attraction of Women” 17).	  
177 “Something more than conscious reasoning is at work in Paul’s shift in identity, and attention 
to the nature of religious experience helps to name what that ‘something’ is. Paul’s experience 
of union with Christ during the peak of neurological tuning, as well as his repeated perception 
that the divine spirit inhabited or possessed him, created in Paul a knowledge of resources 
beyond his own. […] The compelling and embodied knowing of ecstatic experience is 
necessary (though by no means sufficient) to account for Paul’s christianity” (Shantz 208). 
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for making a comparison between the works, certain inequalities between the 
novel and Paul’s letters need to be addressed. While it is true that the texts seem 
generically incommensurable, since one is a first-person testimony and the 
other is a third person fiction, and also ideologically, since one is about an 
actual Judean man and the other is about a fictional pagan woman, two things 
encourage fruitful analysis; in psychoanalytic terms, the differences in the two 
texts are inconsequential considering that neither text, Paul’s letters or the 
Greek novel, is anything more than a fantasy of the traumatic event. Moreover, 
since, as Shantz pointed out, any representation must rely on tradition for a 
semantic frame, then the fact that both Paul and the author of JandA are roughly 
of the same historical period signifies that they share some of the same tradition. 
Finally, Aseneth’s motivations remain ambiguous with respect to her/the text’s 
religious affiliation, which makes possible interrogating Paul’s own experiences 
as similarly ambiguous: if Aseneth’s pagan origin gives us a means of seeing her 
change as the epistrophe of the Gentile convert, then on the matter of her 
transformation, as metanoia or metamorpho, what does she share with Paul? It 
is this shared element that I argue is reflected in the presence of doxa in both 
works, not just as the vision of God, but as the signifier of what Stendahl terms 
“call”, or what I call, “interpellation beyond interpellation”. 
In the Septuagint (LXX), doxa reflects the mundane definition of ‘opinion’ 
or ‘what one thinks’, and Paul uses it that way often; but in certain 
circumstances, Paul uses the term for its root significance which Shantz defines 
thus: “doxa is nearly a technical term that combines first its root sense of 
appearance or manifestation and second the superlative connotation connected 
with its use for the splendor of God” (122). Shantz highlights how Paul’s doxa 
reflects the presence of God, the Christ as the image of God, “apprehended as 
radiance or light” (127). It is a term that signifies the source as God, but in Paul, 
that source is always related to the Christ. In 2 Cor 3-5, Shantz highlights that 
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doxa is reflected in Moses’ face, visible as ‘light and radiance’ (123). This idea is 
then transformed in Paul to incorporate the followers of the Christ, as the source 
of this light, as noted above (2 Cor 3:18). I want to clarify that, I use ’christ’ for 
its definition of the ‘anointed one’, or the ‘messiah’, and not as a synonym for 
Jesus; in that respect, Shantz’s sophisticated reading of Paul’s use of doxa to 
define christ leads me to see doxa in a causal relation to the ‘anointed one’.  
Though the term doxa is not used in JandA in the sequence of chapters 
devoted to Aseneth’s encounter with the heavenly figure (chapters 14-17), 
detailing her conversion, images of light permeate the narrative, exemplified in 
the description of the heavenly figure, identified as angelos: “…there was a man 
in every respect similar to Joseph, by the robe and the crown and the royal staff, 
except that his face was burning like lightening, and his eyes like sunshine, and 
the hairs of his head like a flame of fire of a burning torch, and hands and feet 
like iron shining forth from a fire, and sparks shot forth from his hand and feet” 
(14: 9-11, Burchard translation, 225).178 Who this angelos is, is not immediately 
clear; Ross Shepard Kraemer notes, he does not identify himself with a name 
(124);179 however, he is represented in the radiant light indicative of the 
traditional literature describing the double of God, Son of God, the heavenly 
figure, logos of God (127), or the doxa in Ezekiel’s vision of ‘the appearance of 
the likeness of the glory of God’ (34), which links this figure to merkabah 
mysticism.180 JandA draws from the same traditions that informed Paul’s visions. 
Moreover, the fact that Aseneth’s visitor remains un-named shows a parallel to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 The following is a somewhat different translation by D. Cook from The Apocryphal Old 
Testament, edited by H. F. D. Spark: “8. And she looked up and saw a man like Joseph in every 
respect, with a robe and a crown and a royal staff. 9. But his face was like lightning, and his 
eyes were like the light of the sun, [11] and the hairs of his head like flames [12] of fire, and his 
hands and feet like iron from the fire” (www.markgoodacre.org). 
179 Kraemer identifies the figure as archangel Michael, adapted from both Philonenko and 
Burchard’s translations, but notes that the figure in Aseneth remains unnamed. 	  
180 Schäfer most famously counters Scholem’s thesis and is supported by Halperin (Chariots).    
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the ‘unutterable’, that indivisible remainder of the objet a, of Paul’s ascension 
narrative. 
According to Segal, the human-like figure associated with God’s Kavod 
found in Ezekiel 1:26 LXX, represents, God’s Glory: “That the Glory of God 
refers to the manlike figure... is manifest from the rest of Ezekiel where Kavod 
YHWH or the God of Israel is described as sitting on the throne or otherwise 
personified” (52). This Kavod, Segal argues, is evident in the representation of 
Christ in Paul’s 2 Corinthians 3:18-4:6: “For Paul, as for the earliest Jewish 
mystics, to be privileged to see the Kavod, or Glory (doxa) of God is a prologue 
to transformation into his image (eikon)” (60). In Segal’s terms, the Christ in 
Paul’s text is an image which only represents and is not an actual risen dead 
man. Morray-Jones also recognizes the metaphorical significance of the Kavod 
in Paul’s reference to the ‘man in Christ’ formula: “In the apocalyptic-merkabah 
tradition of ascent into heaven, the vision of the Kabod (whom Paul identifies 
with Christ) involves a transformation of the visionary into an angelic supra-
angelic likeness of this glory or divine image, and that this seems to be the 
background of Paul’s concept of ‘glorification’ (for example Romans 8:29 and 2 
Corinthians 3:18)” (Morray-Jones, 273.)181 While Segal sees ‘the kavod’ was not 
the living preaching Jesus raised from death, Morray-Jones takes his analysis of 
this metaphorical figure one step further to say that what Paul thought he saw as 
the Christ, the “merkabah vision of the enthroned and glorified Messiah” could 
be understood simply as inspiration for his ‘gospel to the nations’ (292). These 
assertions substantiate my reading of Shantz’s doxa, not as the ‘christ’ of Jesus, 
but as the literal ‘anointed one’, which recurs in JandA in surprising ways.   
As previously noted, Aseneth’s visitor who looks like Joseph, the one she 
loves, is not the human Joseph. While this imaginary figure of God, which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Segal offers almost the exact same idea of kavod in the Jewish mystical tradition: “For Paul, 
as for the earliest Jewish mystics, to be privileged to see Kavod or Glory (doxa) of God is a 
prologue to transformation into his image (eikon)” (60).	  
 	  
  205	  
stands as proof of God’s presence, reflects a strictly Judean tradition of the ‘son 
of God’, a Christian reading of JandA is defended by the contemporary tradition 
that saw Joseph representing Jesus Christ; Burchard highlights that a Syrian 
manuscript of the The Book of Joseph, coupled with J and A, and believed to be 
written by St. Ephrem, tells the story of Joseph as Jesus (9). Kraemer notes, this 
association of Jesus with Joseph is attested by Origen and Augustine (253); 
moreover, she adds, that the connection between the novel’s inhuman and 
human Joseph with Jesus Christ, is encouraged by the human Joseph’s 
identification as “son of God” several times in JandA (6:3; 18.11; 21.4). Notable 
is the fact that this identification signals a heavenly aspect of the human Joseph 
in JandA which is attested in Judean mystical texts and merkabah literature; 
thus, far from affirming its Christian origins as Kraemer suggests, this detail 
actually positions JandA within a tradition shared by both Jesus followers and 
Judeans, if not also other contemporary cultic groups, and so explains how the 
Roman novel eludes sectarian distinction.  
 
BAPTISM (mortality) 
As reviewed, Paul’s Gospel defines conversion, or apostrophe (epistrophe) a 
turn, as a turning away from pagan life to turning to the one God; in this sense, 
Paul did not convert, but Aseneth did. If not being able to see or identify the 
moment of conversion in Paul has distracted scholars because when that 
conversion happened, or what it looked like, is not explicit to Paul’s testimony, 
the same trouble exists for scholars in studying JandA as a conversion text. 
There are no standard rituals of conversion in the novel to help identify the faith 
driving its construction. If Kee argues that this text cannot be a Judean one since 
circumcision is not mentioned (399), Collins correctly points out that 
“Circumcision is irrelevant since Aseneth is a woman” (“Joseph and Aseneth: 
Jewish or Christian?” 106). I will come back to this point of circumcision and 
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gender, after considering the place of the right of baptism in the novel and in 
Paul’s works; that is, if Christianity demands baptism in its rite of conversion, 
the absence of an explicit baptism in JandA makes it impossible to call it 
categorically a Christian work; but the fact that Paul’s text is equally ambiguous, 
highlights the similarity of their ecstatic experience.   
There are two incidences of baptism or ‘purity cleansing’ in JandA. The 
first incident is when the heavenly figure says to her, ‘wash your face and your 
hands with living water’ (15:13); and so she “washed her hands and her face 
with living water” (15:17). In the second incident, before seeing Joseph, she 
asked for a bowl of pure water, what Burchard claims would have been 
considered a bath in a Hellenized environment (note m 232) but when she saw 
her face in the water ‘like the sun’, “she was amazed at the sight and rejoiced 
with great joy, and did not wash her face” (18:10). In seeing herself as brilliant 
of light, full of kavod/glory/doxa, so to speak, of the heavenly visitation, she is 
witness to her transformation, and so any baptism/ritual cleansing here appears 
to be redundant, almost making it of neither faith. 
Collins cautiously navigates the Scylla and Charybdis of the argument for 
and against seeing JandA as having Christian origins, before promoting a Judean 
author because “there is no explicit Christian reference although Joseph often 
appears explicitly as a type of Christ in other writings” (100). Despite this 
putative Christian allusion in JandA, Collins asserts, the absence of baptism 
“which was the ritual of conversion from the beginning,” (106) means the novel 
cannot be considered a Christian text. This claim is over-stated, Chesnutt 
argues; first-century historical scholarship highlights the fact that immersion in 
either Judean or early Jesus follower movements (Taylor and Crehan) “arose 
shortly before 70 CE or even later” (Chesnutt 157); moreover, scholars 
(Finkelstein) have no way of determining when baptism became the official and 
widespread Christian rite of conversion, since John the Baptist’s influence on 
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this rite was likely retroactively determined by a religious authority aiming to 
formalize a tradition around conversion. Moreover, in Judean communities 
within Palestine and in the diaspora, the absence of ‘immersion’ for Judean 
proselytes is questionable, since there are witnesses to this rite in Josephus, 
Philo, and the literature of Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha (160).  
Whether or not Paul actually practiced or preached baptism as a 
Christian rite of conversion is unclear for the same reasons noted above. Dunn 
makes the point that the ‘concertina’ of the term ‘baptism’ in Paul’s theology, a 
stand-in for spirit, justification, faith, etc., is based on the assumption that 
baptism was a central ritual in the early movement, beginning with John the 
Baptist (The Theology of Paul the Apostle 450), which means that Paul’s few 
references to the Greek verb ‘baptism’ (to plunge, to submerse, etc.) are read as 
reflecting that ritual (445). The problem arises with Paul’s use of the term, 
which is done infrequently, and figuratively, as seen in this example: “Are you 
unaware that all we who were baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized unto his 
death? So then we were buried with him through baptism into death, in order 
that as Christ was raised from the dead… so we also should walk in newness of 
life?” (Romans 6:3-4). Dunn highlights the ambiguity of what Paul means by 
‘baptized into [Christ’s] death”, since immersion in death could only be read 
metaphorically (452), and from the Judean perspective, the expression can be 
seen to have simply spiritualized the ritual of purity (454). Segal’s point that 
Paul’s “dying in the law’, as a conversion experience, “closely associated with 
baptism” (Galatians 2:19-20) (134) substantiates Dunn’s reading of ‘baptism’ in 
metaphorical as opposed to literal terms. Furthermore, Shantz’s idea that dying 
in Christ, identified above as a baptism, which reflects the ecstatic experience of 
right-brain cognition in which the mind is unable to perceive spatial reality 
(141), provides scientific support for Dunn’s non-literal interpretation of the 
term.  
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The metaphorical nature of Paul’s idea of baptism, as considered by 
Dunn, Segal and Shantz, can be seen echoed in Aseneth’s ritual cleansing 
experience, especially in her radiant reflection in the second though incomplete 
ritual bath. There is a tradition of the mirror in the first-century period, Segal 
notes, adapted from Moses’ experience of God, by Paul and his contemporaries: 
“Philo believed that people do not see God directly but through a mirror (On 
Flight 213)” (90). The pure water in Aseneth’s story becomes a mirror in which 
the doxa of God is reflected back in her face as her converted self. This 
reflection does not signify magic practice, Burchard notes, but a mystical 
transformation: “She comes close to being an angelic figure” (232), echoing 
Moses and Paul’s experiences with God’s doxa, and paralleled by 1 Corinthians 
3:18. I would add there are parallels to the glory Paul claims can be found in 
the human face as defined in 2 Corinthians 3:16 to 4:6. While light imagery 
centered on the ‘face’ is found in both Paul’s letters and JandA, the absence of 
the Pauline term doxa in JandA, suggests that the latter does not derive from the 
former, but that both works draw on the same tradition in merkabah literature of 
Moses’ experience. Since Paul’s letters became a part of the Christian tradition, 
it would seem that Aseneth’s conversion story lends support to the thesis that 
the novel was written for a Judean audience.  
In the effort to determine the origin of JandA, scholars centre on features 
of the text that contextualize the reasons for the author’s writing. Philonenko, 
Aptowitzer and to an extent Burchard, reflect the scholarly consensus that 
JandA was meant as propaganda to enlist Gentile converts to the Judean faith.182 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 See Philonenko, Joseph at Aseneth, 106-107 and Aptowitzer, “Asenath”, 305-306. Burchard, 
notes: “Few doubted that JandA is preoccupied with conversion from the pagan idols to the 
God of the Hebrew”, “The Text of Joseph and Aseneth Reconsidered”, Journal for the Study of 
the Pseudepigrapha 14.2 (2005), 89. He notes exceptions to this consensus: namely, J.C. 
O’Neill, “What is Joseph and Aseneth about?”, Henoch 16 (1994), (189-98); Catherine Hezser, 
“Joseph and Aseneth in the Context of Ancient Greek Erotic Novels”, Frankfurter Judaistische 
Beiträge 24 (1997), pp. 1-40. 
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In contrast, Chesnutt emphasizes that the novel does not target a Gentile 
audience, but addresses the Judean community, and proof of that audience is 
evident in the fact that the Biblical origin of the story is not explained in the 
romance (37).183 Rather, Chesnutt argues, the novel aims to address tensions 
within the Judean community about admitting new converts and promoting 
inclusion (32), further indicating Judean-centered concerns: “Thus, the detailed 
description of Aseneth’s self-castigation, asceticism and prayer—though 
certainly recounted from Aseneth’s viewpoint in the sense that she is alone and 
is the only one whose thoughts, words, and actions are described—seems 
designed to respond to intramural Jewish questions about the relative status of 
the convert and the propriety of marriage to a convert” (38). Chesnutt’s thesis is 
supplemented by Lieu’s observation that Aseneth’s significance as a woman is 
not a gender issue, but symbolic in the community of the threat of the ‘other’, to 
use a term of contemporary Imperialist criticism. Of course, read as a Christian 
text, the gender of the convert would be irrelevant, making it a politically apt 
story for representing conversion to Christian communities (Collins 103).  
Lieu’s thesis of Aseneth’s symbolic significance can be seen in a more 
metaphysical sense through Kraemer’s interpretation that Aseneth as the female 
lover and divine bride, as witnessed in the Song of Songs (30), stood for the 
community as a whole. A corresponding but opposite interpretation is suggested 
by Daniel Boyarin. The hermeneutic tradition of the ‘daughters of Zion” from 
the Song of Songs which anchors the rabbinate response to Paul’s circular 
argument against circumcision in Galatian, reflects a “paradoxical gender 
assignment” (129) of the adept’s relation to God; in other words, the rabbis 
legitimized circumcision as a necessary feminization by the adept in order that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 This point seems less convincing since the same principle applies to a text created for a 
mixed community of Judean and Gentile followers of Jesus. 	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he may have a vision of God (126),184 which, Boyarin notes, shows a 
complication in the allegorical function of the revelation of the Song of Songs: 
“If the male partner is God, then the female partner must be Israel” (128). 
Clearly, the feminine logic which Žižek claims as central to Christianity, which 
Kraemer highlights as expressed by Aseneth’s representation of the Christianity 
community, is iterated by Boyarin in the Jewish feminization of the male adept; 
it would seem that the feminine logic is not strictly Christian. This feminization 
of the convert as either a Judean or Christian explains why circumcision is a 
non-issue (106) and reinforces how the text remains religiously ambivalent.  
 My point in this review of Aseneth’s religious ambiguity is to emphasize 
her similarity to ambiguities in Paul’s letters. Read through Aseneth, the Jesus 
element of Paul’s christ-factor dissolves into the ambiguous doxa. Read through 
Paul’s letters, Aseneth’s conversion as a pagan turning to the one God, 
highlights the fact that she and Paul are transformed by their experience in the 
same way; seeing how that transformation is neither strictly Christian nor strictly 
Judean is most visible in lining up the two partisan interpretations of JandA. In 
seeing Joseph allegorically as the Christian figure,185 Aseneth comes to stand for 
the convert to Christianity, man or woman, leading to her transformation into a 
‘new life’. In seeing Aseneth as Israel, her ‘call’ signals the call of the 
circumcised adept to ‘new life’. That is, while one reflects conversion and the 
other does not, her ‘call’ is like Paul’s ‘call’, a transformation into eternal life. 
 
 
PARDES (immortality) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 In A Radical Jew: Paul and the Politics of Identity, Boyarin is relying primarily on Elliot 
Wolfson in this idea that the early rabbinic community was directly responding to and 
countering Paul’s assertion against circumcision (127-128). 
185 As an aside, at this point, Kee does not recognize biblical references in JandA; rather, he sees 
its context in Hellenistic romance offering “apologetics for a cult, or more probably for the 
cultural minority who are its devotees” (395).   
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According to some scholars, both the fiction and the testimony of the ecstatic 
experience share motifs consistent with early renderings of what came to be 
known as Merkabah mysticism, a set of Judean texts and traditions around the 
mysteries of God, defining meditation practices involving ascending to heaven, 
or adjuring angels for assistance. Segal, Tabor, Shantz, and others, have 
recognized a parallel between Paul’s ascent to heaven (2 Corinthians 12) and 
one of the core texts of Jewish mysticism, the Tannaitic text of the four rabbis 
who went to paradise. According to Kraemer, allusions to Merkabah mysticism 
are evident in Aseneth’s adjuration of the angel; Chesnutt concedes to some 
connections to the Judean mystical tradition in JandA, such as the chariot with 
Joseph (5.4), and the angel (17.7-8) (207), but overall does not see a “kinship” 
between JandA and Merkhabah literature, and sees no grounds “to justify our 
interpreting Aseneth’s conversion in light of that tradition”. He concludes: “The 
revelation brought by the angel is not about the heavenly order in general but 
about how to obtain eternal life” (215). I would say Chesnutt is correct to find 
no corroboration between Merkabah and conversion; in fact, I aim to show in 
this section that Aseneth’s and Paul’s heavenly experiences are not about 
‘conversion’, but revelation of ‘eternal life’. 
Gershom Scholem claimed that Paul’s ascension story (2 Corinthians 12) 
shows parallels to the ascension narratives in Merkabah literature, depicted in 
the Tannaitic story of “the Four Who Entered Paradise”. The story of the four 
rabbis describes the dangers of heavenly ascent; one rabbi goes to heaven and 
dies there; one rabbi goes and loses his mind; the third goes and returns ‘cutting 
the stalks’, or perverting his adepts; and the fourth, Rabbi Akiva, goes and 
returns unaffected, emblematic of the perfect journey. Scholem identifies a 
parallel in Paul’s ascent story to both the latter Tannaitic story and earlier 
literature of heavenly ascent, namely the Slavic Enoch: “They [i.e. The men] 
carried me up to the third heaven and set me down in the midst of Paradise” 
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(Ch. 8).”186 In light of this tradition, Scholem argues, “Paul’s testimony is a link 
between these older Jewish texts and the Gnosis of the Tannaitic merkabah 
mystics” (18). Peter Schäfer contends Scholem’s thesis is weak, since there is no 
correspondence whatsoever between Paul’s heaven and the Tannaitic story; the 
pardes in the rabbinic tradition, Schäfer argues, does not mean both orchard 
and Paradise (pardes), the latter being Scholem’s only link to Paul’s Pardes 
(Paradise): rather, in the rabbinic story, we find the fusion of two distinct earlier 
traditions not connected to Paul (33).187 In response, Morray-Jones claims that, 
what Schäfer diminutively calls Scholem’s ‘parallelomanic” (34), need not 
disqualify connections identified by Scholem. On showing a corroboration 
between Merkabah literature, the Tannaitic story, and ascent narratives, Morray-
Jones argues for seeing Paul’s ascent story in 2 Corinthians 12 as well within the 
Judean mystical practices of ascent into a celestial Holy of Holies (288); 
however, Morray-Jones asserts that the ascent story must be distinguished from 
Paul’s encounter with God in Galatians 1:15-16 and uses timelines outlined by 
Acts 22:17-22 to argue that the Road to Damascus was the moment of his 
‘conversion’ and preceded his ascension (289). I argue against Morray-Jones’ 
identification of any ‘conversion’ in Paul, and iterate my suspicion of Acts as a 
source, especially for timelines, for reasons previously noted; yet, with regard to 
Morray-Jones conclusion that “The impact of Merkabah mysticism upon human 
history has therefore been considerable, for it was at the very heart of Paul’s 
experience and apostolic claim” (291), I am in full agreement; I do not have the 
time and space in this project to address how Merkabah mysticism, and the 
figure of the ‘throned messiah,’ is the legacy we inherit from Paul, but, in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 See Gershom Scholem’s Jewish Gnosticism. Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition, 
17. 
187 While I defer to Schäfer’s knowledge of rabbinic literature, my first response is to question 
how rabbinic literature which reflects post-70 CE discourse engaging with a missing original 
story, could be used to sever connections between Paul and merkabah mysticism.   
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following pages, I do provide some proof of the fact that we have misread this 
tradition as reflecting Christian conversion. 
Kraemer not only identifies elusive connections to Merkabah literature in 
the adjuration of angels etc., in JandA, she also argues that paradise tropes 
permeating Aseneth’s story encourage interpreting the novel as also ascent 
literature. She parallels Genesis 2.9, the garden of Eden, with the courtyard in 
Aseneth’s home, populated by trees with fruit; a river runs through each place; 
and like the cherubim in Eden in Genesis, young men guard the four gates in 
Aseneth’s palace (117). Kraemer notes that the symbolic association of 
Aseneth’s world with the Biblical paradise is identified in a temporal immediacy 
of the honey: “And the bees of the paradise of delight have made this from the 
dew of the roses of life that are in the paradise of God” (16:8). When the visitor 
feeds her a piece of the comb, he says: “‘Behold, you have eaten of the bread of 
life, and drunk a cup of immortality, and been anointed with ointment of 
incorruptibility’” (16:16). This statement iterates his promise earlier: “You will 
be renewed and formed anew and made alive again, and you will eat blessed 
bread of life, and drink a blessed cup of immortality, and anoint yourself with 
blessed ointment of incorruptibility” (15.5-6)188. While the visitation reflects 
adjuration, the image of honey symbolizing paradise points to the same 
confusion of space as found in Paul’s obscure ideas of being ‘caught up’ in 
heaven. That is to say, the journey to heaven is not a physical, but metaphysical 
one. 
In both the fiction and the testimony, paradise is registered in temporal 
disjunctions, which signals how the ineffable of ecstasy is represented in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Following Kraemer’s analysis, I would add that once Aseneth is renamed the City of Refuge, 
her beatified self becomes almost evocative of a heaven on earth: “and the hair of her head was 
like a vine in the paradise of God prospering in its fruits… and her breasts like the mountains of 
the Most High God” (18:9.) The architectural dimension of Aseneth, the convert, has been 
associated allegorically with the Church; my interest here is only in asserting the paradisal 
language in associated with Aseneth as a result of her conversion.	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symbolic terms. Paul’s resurrection through his death in Christ, were determined 
by God who “had set [him] apart before [he] was born”. Paul’s temporal present 
was predetermined by his temporal past, through the intercession of God’s 
eternity; with this God perspective, Paul’s eternal life is the future for which he 
was destined. Time trouble in JandA is expressed in the intersection between 
temporal and eternal time; we see her fasting and praying for seven days 
wearing black, symbolic of death (Chesnutt 126), after which the visitor arrives 
and claims her future in the book of life has already been secured: “you name 
was written in the book of the living in heaven… and it will not be erased 
forever” (15:4-5). According to Chesnutt, the moment her name was written in 
the book was the moment of Aseneth’s ‘conversion’ (124).  While this is a 
perceptive interpretation of time disjunction in the text, I respectfully disagree; 
the time disjunction for Aseneth is equivalent to Paul’s ‘call’ from before his 
birth. That is, Aseneth’s ‘call’ which places her in the book ‘forever’, signals the 
intercession of eternal time in her temporal world.189 If we take Aseneth’s 
revelation of the moment of transformation from corruptible human to 
incorruptible (“From today you will be renewed and formed anew and made 
alive again” [15.5]), as equal to Paul’s idea of his own dying and being 
resurrected as an eternal version of himself in Christ, then we find equally in 
both works that transformation anticipated by an anterior elsewhere event, 
indicating a future visible only in the present ‘transformation’ which itself is not 
of ‘this time’, but of eternal life. 
While Aseneth’s fiction may be equal to Paul’s testimony on the matter 
of the ineffable of the real, it is also equal to Paul’s testimony with respect to her 
transformation. Based on Kraemer’s reading, Burchard suggests that Aseneth’s 
transformation “is not about conversion, but the salutary elevation of the body 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Much more could be said about the apparent conflict between the future ‘will’ and the 
superlative future in ‘forever’ in “and it will not be erase forever” (15:5), and the issue of 
temporal disjunctions in the story. 
 	  
  215	  
and soul through mystical experiences” (2005 90). Chesnutt sees no grounds for 
mystical practice in Aseneth’s story, and rather sees her conversion as indicative 
of social tensions within the Judean community about proselytes (116). The 
bread, cup and oil, Chesnutt asserts, do not indicate parts of a literal meal of 
conversion, but are merely symbolic of the transformation; “all three of these 
terms denote immunity from the death, decay and destruction which, as we 
have seen, constitute the inevitable lot of those who worship idols rather than 
God” (143). The mystery of the bees and honey,190 Chesnutt argues, is not 
intended to reflect the literal transformation of the new proselytes into eternal 
beings, but is purely symbolic of the revelation about immortality (137). 
Chesnutt’s interpretation that Aseneth’s revelation is not literal seems to 
overstate the obvious (this is only a fiction), while implying that any real 
transformation or conversion had to be free of symbolic order. In that light, one 
could dismiss Paul’s testimony for being the ultimate fiction. For example, 
Paul’s revelation about his own transformation reflects impossible conditions 
like dying and living as someone else: “for through the law I died to the law, so 
that I might live to God; I have been crucified with Christ; it is no longer I who 
live, but Christ who lives in me” (Galatians 2:19-20). Note that Paul’s 
identification with ‘christ’ being in him parallels Aseneth consumption of the 
honey.191 Aseneth’s symbolic death parallels Paul’s death; and Paul’s 
resurrection through the doxa is echoed in Aseneth’s ‘new life’ as anointed. In 
symbolic terms, she becomes “the messiah”, much as Paul understood himself 
to have been ‘anointed’ messiah. Chesnutt’s symbolic/literal dichotomy 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Anathea Portier-Young offers a detailed footnote outlining the various, often conflicting, 
theories about the meaning of this honey in “Sweet Mercy Metropolis: Interpreting Aseneth’s 
Honeycomb”, 141.  
191 Nir claims that the honey is further proof of the novel’s Christian origin; since manna in the 
desert was identified as honey, it prefigured the Eucharist, thus explaining the apparent mystery 
of the honey (40). Since the Eucharist is the embodiment of Christ himself, her thesis is sound; 
but then again, the Judean would have had a cultural relation to honey as manna, thus troubling 
seeing honey as proof of the tale’s Christian origins. The issue remains irresolvable, so far. 
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misrecognizes the fundamental nature of the symbolic in any text, whether 
fiction, non-fiction (testimony) or merkabah literature; the text is inspired by the 
real, even as it fails to reflect the real. While scholarship continues to argue 
about whether or not merkabah literature is a source for either the novel or 
Paul’s testimony, what cannot be disputed is that both “protagonists” have been 
transformed into the same thing; the doxa has anointed them with eternal life of 




The time-trouble found in Antiquities indicates the anxiety with the future 
known as, “apocalyptic thinking”. It is this thinking, Blanton argues, which 
explains why secular atheist philosophers are now turning to Paul. In 
“Disturbing Politics: Neo-Paulinism and the Scrambling for Religious and 
Secular Identities” (2007), Blanton argues that Paul’s reinvention by the secular 
left (8) is symptomatic of the collapse of the dichotomy between religion and 
secularism. This is an interesting interpretation since, in light of secularism’s 
Christian foundation, secularism’s crumbling points to a deconstruction from 
within, something like what happens in Ridley Scott’s Alien; Christianity is 
erupting with all its teeth from secularism through Paul, and this eruption is 
neither birth or rebirth, but an escape from the worn out veil of neutrality. This 
description may be melodramatic, but does iterate the apocalyptic theme 
Blanton highlights. What is most salient of Blanton’s argument is his iteration of 
the place of the universal in contemporary thought with respect to Christianity. 
Contra Agamben’s and Žižek’s interest in Paul’s importance for identifying the 
not-all of political exception and its ethical demand of redefining inclusion, 
Blanton support’s Badiou’s reading of Paul’s universalism, but from a religious 
perspective: “I want to make the perverse claim that we are absolutely correct 
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today to look at Christianity as the exemplar for a thinking of the universal” 
(10). Unlike Badiou, who uses the psychoanalytic method of traversing the 
fantasy of difference through love to approach the universal, Blanton takes a 
decidedly structural approach to the issue through deconstruction; if the 
literature, even in secular-based biblical studies research, affirms “Jesus was 
unique among the Judeans of his day” (10), then liberating universalism extant 
in Christianity involves “desublimat[ing] the valorized ‘universalism’ and the 
‘ungrounded’ political force of ‘Paul’ in these texts” (10). In Blanton’s terms, if 
Jesus were read through the historical materialist, as a political activist vying for 
equality and not a transcendent figure who, as Paul’s legacy has it, defines 
salvation as conditional, then the conditions of universalism would disappear. 
This deconstructionist impulse in Blanton, to cut the conditions that exist and so 
liberate us, inspires my revision of Paul’s ‘apocalypses’; yet, whereas Blanton 
wants to cut at Paul’s political force, I aim to liberate his politics from the Jesus 
fantasy.  
In Koine Greek, ‘apocalypse’ is the word for revelation. Paul uses it 
often, sometimes in aural terms as a message, but also in visual terms as 
manifestation and appearance; Paul’s confusion of sensibilities in the term 
emphasizes what Shantz argues is paradigmatic of ecstatic experiences. Yet, 
while Shantz’s science explains the incomprehensible or ineffable of Paul’s 
ecstasy, it cannot explain how Paul knows what he knows. How does he know 
he is in the third heaven?192 How did he know the Christ was Jesus? How does 
he know there is a Law of Christ? The only indirect answer we have to any of 
these questions is Paul’s proclamation that his gospel, “is not of human origin” 
(Galatians 1:11); ‘called’ by God (Galatians 1:15), he is not relieved of his 
suffering, but is assured divine support: “My grace is sufficient for you, for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Tabor explore through textual analysis of contemporary works, how paradigmatic Paul’s 
experience was of ascent literature (57-97). 
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power is made perfect in weakness” (2 Corinthians 12:9). This quotation, one of 
few direct quotations of the Lord in Paul’s letters, points to Paul’s inhuman 
source for the ‘apocalypses’: what is this source? In Galatians, it seems to be the 
Lord, as God, who revealed “his Son” to Paul (Galatians 1:16), but when Paul 
references Jesus Christ as Lord, then the omniscient God becomes confused 
with a Christian messiah. What Paul means is not clear since he reveals very 
little about his source; more importantly, he does not tell the story of how the 
figure of his revelation introduced himself as the risen Jesus.  
In comparison to Paul’s ‘unutterable’ of his encounter, reflected in 
explicit and implicit ways throughout his letters, Aseneth’s encounter with the 
flaming radiant angelos, the doxa, is significantly symbolic. The angelos is 
quoted as making intelligible comments, and is represented not as Joseph, but 
in the most self-consciously symbolic terms, as ‘like’ Joseph. When the angelos 
calls her name twice, and two times (14:5-8), we read a representation of the 
‘call’ evident in the OT literature tradition, from which its symbolic nature has 
been generated. This same tradition generated Acts 9:4 story of Paul who was 
called by Jesus three times, a fact totally absent from Paul’s letters except 
implicit in 2 Corinthians 2 as not from Jesus but from God, indicative of what is 
inexplicable in the ‘call’ of the real. Everything we read in the novel exists in 
the symbolic register except for the namelessness of the heavenly Joseph; this 
absent name, I argue, is the stain in Lacanian terms, the inexplicable detail 
which points to the ecstatic event.  
Paul lived in a time with an eye on the imminence of the end time, while 
JandA reflects a world decidedly unburdened by this eschatological anxiety. In 
the Apocalypse of the Imagination, Collins highlights the scope of apocalyptic 
thinking in Paul’s Letter to the Thessalonians193 as reflecting the early interest in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  193	  “For the Lord himself will descend from heaven with a cry of command, with the archangel’s 
call, and with the sound of the trumpet of God. And the dead in Christ will rise first; then we 
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the movement and Jesus’ perousia as the longed-for end of suffering (268). This 
anticipation of man’s imminent salvation, coming ‘like a thief in the night’, 
dramatically drops away from Paul’s language in subsequent letters. The 
temporal proximity between the first letter we have from him to the 
Thessalonians, and his ecstatic experiences indicates that there was some 
connection between Paul’s experience and his eschatological expectations. 
Paul was a zealot, and shared with his fellow zealots an eschatological vision of 
the future; in that future, evident in biblical texts such as Isaiah and especially 
Ezekiel’s dry bones (37:12-14) the motif of final judgment was the day of the 
resurrection of the dead. In psychic terms, Paul’s transformation into an eternal 
being may be seen, much as Blanchot’s revelation was after surviving a death 
squad; the deferral of his death, created a new relation to the future that 
manifested in a momentary sense of immortality.   
Though Collins recognizes that the “Son of Man” is “well attested in 
Jewish literature of the Second Temple period, especially in an eschatological 
context” (106), he cannot explain how this figure would appear in JandA which 
is clearly not about apocalyptic anxiety. Kee addresses this issue, arguing that 
apocalypticism of the first century was transformed over time into the personal 
eschatology present in Merkabah mysticism (407).194 This supports the theses 
that the writing of JandA preceded or followed from the first century and its 
apocalyptic anxiety;195 on the issue of the representation of the real of death, 
how Paul’s letters and JandA differ signals an important distinction between 
them. In Paul’s testimony, the significance of his eternal life, though framed by 
the symbolic concepts of spirit versus flesh, and obviously ordered around 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
who are alive, who are left, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds to meet the 
Lord in the air; and so we shall always be with the Lord” (4:15-17). 
194 See my article, “Spivak’s Fantasy of Silence: A Secular Look at Suicide”.	  
195 A recent article by George Brooke argues for an earlier construction of J and A using as proof 
the novel’s parallel to Qumran materials: “Men and Women as Angels in Joseph and Aseneth.”  
 	  
  220	  
rhetorical tropes, operates in a different register from Aseneth’s eternal life. Very 
much along the order of Chesnutt’s assertion that Aseneth’s transformation is 
only imaginary, Aseneth’s story has the same relation to reality as the expression 
that a certain film is ‘to die for’’; it does not mean anyone would be compelled 
to see the film in order to die. In contrast, Paul’s words were meant literally. 
Paul’s promise that eternal life is in Christ had its impact on his audience and 
those who came to his teachings long after his death, because it reflected the 
real of his experience; his conviction that he had become immortal was 
reflected in what he identified as Jesus’ immortal status. His words attracted 
believers as literal, and he accepted martyrdom to prove it. And others 
followed. That literalness adds a psychological dimension to Paul’s symbolic 
revision of the trauma not evident in JandA. 
Aseneth knew and loved the human Joseph; his heavenly double visited 
her and graced her with conversion. Note that the human Joseph is not 
connected to the heavenly one, except indirectly as ‘Son of Man’, signaling the 
heavenly figure’s metaphorical significance for Aseneth; moreover, the primary 
detail that signals what is ineffable of this element of the real of his 
namelessness. In contrast, Paul’s figure was apparently named, though the 
circumstances of that naming are not confessed. According to Acts 9:4, the 
figure revealed himself as Jesus Christ, full of the questions of why his followers 
were being persecuted. This narrative does not exist in Paul’s testimony, 
through it may be evident implicitly, only if we extrapolate in a particular way 
from the cryptic reference in Gal 1:13. On a structural level, comparing 
Aseneth’s coherent narrative to Paul’s testimony reveals clues for seeing that 
Paul’s encounter had no name. For one, Paul never knew Jesus, so could not 
have had the encounter Aseneth did with someone ‘like Joseph’, by seeing 
someone, ‘like’ Jesus. In the literary tradition, doxa is represented generically as 
“Son of Man,” and Shantz’s science explains that the narrative/semantic centre 
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of the brain is inactive during ecstatic events. These anomalies suggest reasons 
for why Paul did not go to Jerusalem until three years after his vision, as he said; 
this ‘delay’ points to a time lapse between the event and its retroactive fantasy 
formation indicative of the cycle of a subject’s trauma known as 
Nachträglichkeit, sometimes translated as ‘deferred action’. So, why did he wait 
to spread the gospel? The single detail of the ineffable in Aseneth’s trauma 
supports seeing that the doxa, which Paul encountered, did not self-identify. 
Paul did not go to Jerusalem immediately because he did not know immediately 
his encounter was with Jesus, if it was Jesus. 
Reading Paul’s testimony against Aseneth’s story raises one more critical 
aporia that contributes to the thesis that Paul’s doxa was not Jesus, and it is 
centered on the matter of love. Aseneth’s apparition arrived in the shape of love 
familiar to her. That detail in Aseneth’s story suggests that Paul’s emphasis on 
the law of love in his teachings reflected the love emanating from his encounter 
with the doxa. Since Paul did not love Jesus, and at the most may have detested 
him as a heretic who inspired heretics that he persecuted, it is inexplicable that 
the love of his encounter came to be associated with this figure. This 
incongruity signals that the trauma of his encounter took three years to 
‘organize’ in a retroactive narrative. In order to determine how Paul’s doxa of 
love came to be dressed in the narrative of Jesus, I first need to review two 
psychoanalytic terms: literalness and inversion.  
According to Lacan, literal thinking is the primary symptom of psychosis; 
without the master signifier, that device for operating the chain of signification 
in the symbolic order, the subject is unable to discern that what rises up from 
the ‘encounter with the real’, the hallucinations of the imaginary order, are not 
real; the psychotic takes things literally. Daniel Paul Schreber, the first 
diagnosed schizophrenic, believed he experienced the ‘end of the world’ in 
hallucinatory events from 1893 to his incarceration in a mental instituation in 
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1895; when he realized the world had not ended, he understood he was chosen 
as the messiah and God’s wife. Logically, he understood that, since he was a 
man, his role as wife meant that he was being changed into a woman by the 
two Gods. Freud interpreted Schreber’s gender reversal as a sign of repressed 
homosexuality justified by delusions of “Redeemer Fantasy”.196 Freud’s 
homosexuality thesis has been generally abandoned by more sophisticated 
theories. For example, in My Own Private Germany,197 Santner interprets 
Schreber’s feminization as reflecting the social issues of contemporary 
Germany; in Schreber’s sexuation, he identifies the association of the feminized 
Jew as the circumcised adept, referencing Boyarin’s understanding of the 
rabbinic interpretation of the mystical significance of the Song of Songs; as 
already noted, the circumcised man must be feminized in order to receive 
God’s revelations (117). The same feminized relation to the divine in JandA and 
in Schreber’s memoirs, is also evident in St. John of the Cross’s recreation of the 
Song of Songs in his Spiritual Canticle: the Christian “I” of St. John’s poem, was 
identified as the ‘bride’ of Christ; the gender assignment evident in Schreber and 
St. Paul is also evident in Paul’s identification of his followers as virgin brides 
for Christ (2 Corinthians 11:3). The parallel between St. John and Schreber may 
have foregrounded Lacan’s comparison of the mystic and the psychotic in 
Seminar III, which explains how it returns through the feminine logic as the 
mediated and partial access to divine truth in Seminar XX. A consensus across 
disciplines, religions, and time about feminization as a privileged position to 
God, is what is expressed literally by Schreber’s putative sex change; the 
‘encounter with the real’, or doxa, as ecstasy, reflects the erotic quality of divine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Freud, “Psychoanalytic Notes on An Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia 
(Dementia Paranoides) (1911), 28. 
197 Santner. My Own Private German: Daniel Paul Schreber’s Secret History of Modernity. 
Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1996. Quotes shall be cited parenthetically in the 
pages ahead. 
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love. Paul’s experience of love for the figure of his revelation has a ground in 
tradition and psychoanalysis; the question is: how did this objet of love come to 
be identified as the one he hated? 
 Reversal signals repression, Freud argued; it was an idea most explicitly 
described in his theory on dream analysis, wherein the manifest content of a 
dream as wish or fear, is always in conflict with the latent, unconscious, 
message of lack in the waking subject’s life.198 The repression of the murder of 
Moses became organized symbolically around the inversion of election; instead 
of escaping slavery, the Israelites were being led to the promised land; instead 
of murdering their follower, they believed they were chosen by God. While it 
goes without saying that this interpretation is particular to Freud, and not widely 
shared, it signals my claim in Chapter 1, that the event of the Exodus for the 
Israelites need not be murder to have psychic impact; in fact, what was 
fundamentally unknowable, became evident in the remainder of the vocal objet 
a of interpellation; in other terms, election as the ‘call’. The significance of the 
objet a and its part of the trauma, identifies Lacan’s articulation of Freud’s 
inversion as evident in the scopic drive.   
The trauma of oedipalization, what Lacan identifies as the “sanctification 
of the organ (circumcision)” (Écrits 697), which, I note, relies heavily on Paul’s 
idea of the relation between the letter, as death, and desire, as life,199 wherein 
the desire for the mother is given up in order to accept the law of the NOF, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Freud’s research explored various examples of inversion from Da Vinci’s painting of St. 
Anne, in “Leonardo Da Vinci and A Memory of His Childhood” (1910), to the literary trope of 
the choice of three caskets in Shakespeare plays, in “The Theme of the Three Caskets” (1913), to 
name a few. 
199 Lacan’s debt to Paul’s dichotomy of law and spirit on the matter of sin in his seminar on 
ethics (Seminar VII,) draws on Freud’s meditation on the matter of love in Civilization, which 
unsurprisingly links to Paul’s law and sin (VII 106). Integral to the cycle of desire and law in the 
subject is the subordination of the subject’s need to the demands of the collective; the 
individual good is antinomic to the social good, thus explaining the dominance of law over the 
subject’s desire.	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reflecting the subject’s sacrifice of autonomy for sociality. The sacrifice divides 
the self between the law, and the unconscious desire which returns as the objet 
a. The objet a is of the imaginary register, and is fundamentally manipulative, in 
that it lures the subject to keep going, despite loss. It is an illusion that the 
subject cannot live without. In that respect, any symbolic fantasy is formulated 
around the imaginary remainder [objet a] of the cut of the real to make possible 
living after the trauma: “This a is presented precisely, in the field of the mirage 
of the narcissistic function of desire, as the object that cannot be swallowed, as 
it were, which remains stuck in the gullet of the signifier. It is at this point of 
lack that the subject has to recognize himself” (Seminar XI 270). In 
psychoanalytic terms, the objet a is the substitute for the desire that the subject 
cannot fulfill except in dying physically, or dying to the symbolic order, this 
latter being a matter of psychosis. I advance the idea that psychosis, or 
foreclosure of the NOF, which is equal to a dying to the symbolic, is integral to 
terms like ‘unplugging’ or the severing of the Gordian knot, or in Paul’s sense, 
dying in Christ. 	  
The objet a manifests in different registers, including the scopic drive, 
what Lacan calls the gaze. The illusion caused by gaze is exemplified by the 
trope of the mirror; this reflective device which grips the subject in the gaze of 
himself through the Other, which obscures as it inserts him and his 
surroundings behind him into the surroundings in front of him, is an optical 
illusion of occlusions and insertions that place the subject in relation to the 
objet a, like a carrot stick leading him on, behind which hides the loss (Seminar 
XI 159). In first-century Judean culture God was accessible only through the 
mirror; Paul knew God was visible only indirectly; Aseneth’s transformation was 
visible after the fact, indirectly in her transformed countenance in the mirror. 
The scopic drive integral to Paul’s experience encourages seeing Jesus as the 
insertion, that carrot-stick of the objet a which attracts the subject to go forward 
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and which does not fit its landscape; that is, Jesus is the inadequate symbolic 
covering over of the real rupture, ecstatic event.   
Prior to the crisis, Paul was busy persecuting the Jesus followers for 
breaking the Judean law, motivated by his zealotry in anticipation of the 
imminent last judgment. In the aftermath of the crisis, he claimed he died and 
was resurrected; the law, which was death, became spirit, which was the new 
life of immortality. What changed Paul, according to Paul, was Jesus’ love. That 
story goes that Jesus came to him, much as it is represented in Acts; however, 
nothing in Paul’s letters support this was actually the case. The manifest content 
of Paul’s message of love, which comes from Leviticus, points not to love, but 
the latent inverse affect of hate.200 Was there guilt for having hated; was there 
shame? That is not knowable to a modern audience, but understanding that the 
source of love is visible in a reading of the latent content through the manifest 
content is knowable. The manifest content reflected in Paul’s eternal life, points 
to the latent anxiety of the final judgment, and the latent wish promised in 
Ezekiel’s resurrection as eternal life. The most striking quality of Paul’s message 
is its effect on his thinking, equal to Schreber’s solipsistic and psychotic 
rendering which, “…set off a cascade of reworkings of the signifier from which 
the growing disaster of the imaginary proceed[ed]”.201 Paul’s inversion spread 
through the chain of signification not in haphazard terms, like Schreber’s, but 
systematically anchored to the NOF, in symbolically inverting only one law, the 
law of mortality. From this inversion, a cascade of inversions was set off; the 
cursed, doomed for death, became blessed with eternal life; sinning man (Paul) 
was made immortal and forgiven; the end was the beginning; hate became love; 
and since love manifested as eternal life, and since mortality as the prohibition 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 To keep things simple, I use the word hate in a binary relation to love, and to stand in for 
Paul’s term about his treatment of the Jesus followers, namely, persecution; persecution includes 
the variety of affect, such as hate, and also disgust, rejection, revulsion, disdain, etc., etc.. 
201 Lacan, “On a Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” (1958) (Écrits 481). 
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for sinning meant that his forgiveness came in the shape of eternal life for all, 
then all were saved, and all were loved, even the most abject, cursed, and 
hated: Jesus. Jesus came to stand as the radical element of his ‘all’. 
 
 
THE SYMPTOM OF SECULARISM 
In his introduction to The Sublime Object of Ideology, Žižek claims that 
ideology’s weakness is centered on its universal claims: “Every ideological 
Universal—for example freedom, equality—is ‘false’ in so far as it necessarily 
includes a specific case which breaks its unity, lays open its falsity” (16). The 
‘case’ that lays bare the falsity of ideology’s universal is the ‘exception’: it is the 
inconsistency that ideological fantasies intend to mask. (142). The 
inconsistencies, which reflect the return of the real as that which has been 
excluded from the symbolic (143), point to the symptom. By going ‘through the 
fantasy’, or inverting the link of causality of the symptom, Žižek argues, we 
expose ideology’s ‘real kernel’, the traumatic source of the universal fantasy. In 
this chapter, I have attempted to go ‘through the fantasy’ of Paul’s ecstatic event 
to expose the ‘real kernel’ being masked by his message to the Gentiles. Now I 
will explore, through the uncanny echoes between Paul’s Christianity and 
Žižek’s notion of ideology, the ‘real’ kernel of secularism. 
  Paul’s trauma of the doxa is distinguished from the trauma of the Oedipal 
event in being a ‘call’ from Lacan’s ‘heaven’ or the real. If oedipalization 
interpellates the subject into social laws, as per Althusser, Paul’s doxa may be 
seen as the ‘call’ that interpellates the subject to a divine law: it is a second 
interpellation. It is the ‘interpellation beyond interpellation’, the ‘real’ ‘call’, 
which caught Paul with the ethical imperative inherited from his culture. God 
had spoken to Moses and Isaiah, and Paul believed he was also graced with the 
same call. In encountering the ‘doxa’, Paul’s faith was affirmed and his 
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responsibility to his faith was articulated as the imperative to draw the Gentile 
to his monotheistic tradition. As Antigone followed the law of the gods against 
the human laws, and acted ethically by answering her desire, so too did Paul. 
Yet, Paul’s doxa did not end with his sacrifice and death as Antigone’s did, and 
it is the putative ‘endlessness’ of the return of his message in the principle of the 
exception of secular politics that recalls Caruth’s concept of trauma as the 
recurring crisis of survival driving history (Unclaimed Experience 64). It would 
seem that Paul’s message seeped into the foundations of western thought, 
especially evident in his influence on philosophy and history. As this evidence 
testifies, the issue with Paul’s return in contemporary thought is not about his 
own history, but about our relation to his history as our own. That is, the 
impulse to return to Paul now indicate an effort to work through his influence 
on secular ideology, perhaps not as the single ‘cause’, but at least a significant 
anterior tuché that identifies the dynamic highlighted by Žižek as the rule of 
ideology: the bind between the exception and the universal.  
 In the Christian tradition, Paul’s experience is known as ‘ecstasy’. His 
ecstatic event was an experience of new life, eternity, immortality, love and a 
call to fulfill God’s plan. Paul organized this ‘call’ from the real through the 
symbolic structure of his ‘good news’ exploiting the power of the ‘real’ of his 
encounter. The fact that Paul’s mission and its importance to believers helped to 
set the stage for a movement that would change the cultish geography of the 
first century does not necessarily make his contribution unique: Moses had a 
similarly great influence on the Israelites, as well as the prophets on the faithful 
in exile. What is unique about Paul’s message was its effect: he passed on to his 
community and to the Gentiles a message that had a wide and devastating 
impact. If Paul’s fantasy had the desired effect of inspiring and introducing 
Gentiles to the ‘call’ to convert in the name of Jesus Christ and participate in the 
Judean cult, it also participated, if it did not in fact initiate, a trauma on the 
 	  
  228	  
social fantasy for the Judean community, exacerbated by the destruction of the 
Second Temple and the diaspora. Understanding Paul’s part in the historical 
conditions of Judea in the Roman Empire requires research beyond my 
jurisdiction. Another question that this project raises but cannot address: was 
Paul’s trauma his own or the return of a trauma that preceded him by centuries 
back to Moses? The fact Paul’s fantasy reflected a tradition around revelation 
and ecstasy in the Judean faith implies his trauma was probably shared by 
others, those contemporary to him and before him; understanding if Paul was 
experiencing a recurring trauma from deep history would involve analysis of 
more extant texts of the first century as well as older biblical material and is 
beyond the scope of this project. All that this analysis can say is that it is 
probable that the effect of Paul’s messiah fantasy returned in secularism: the 
question is how? The complexities of the links between then and now are 
multiple; I have isolated one dialogue between then and now linking 
Christianity with secularism.  
Žižek singles out a rhetorical move in analyzing ideology’s reason for 
being: “The crucial step in the analysis of an ideological edifice is thus to 
detect, behind the dazzling splendor of the element which holds its together, 
(‘God’, ‘Country’, ‘Party’, ‘Class’…) this self-referential, tautological, 
performative operation” (109). Christianity’s tautology is the least noticed and 
no less ironic, naming of the believer as ‘chosen’, which, in translation, is 
‘messiah’. The literalness of this ‘anointing’ persists sublimated in the ‘universal’ 
that Badiou and Blanton uphold: for the atheist, love or for the believer, 
Christianity, will allow us to transcend all exceptions by creating universal 
equality through the ‘chosen’. The inconsistency of the exception, however, 
proves how the universal does not exist, and cannot, no matter how hard 
scholars may try to deconstruct and or reconstruct Christianity. Tellingly, this 
failure is unconsciously articulated in Žižek’s promotion of Christianity to 
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reconcile the exception to the universal. Žižek does not bother to ‘go through 
the fantasy’ of the ‘dazzling splendour’ of Christianity’s equality; rather, he 
digests the symptom of Jesus’s reconciliation whole. Jesus is not the solution, 
but the ‘stain’ of Paul’s revelation; he is what sticks in the craw of Christianity, 
the remainder of the ‘real’ which we inherit as a solution for the universal of 
equality; Paul is the inconsistency that Žižek uses as an argument in favour of 
Christianity. As the agent of Paul’s ‘good news’, Jesus functions as the lure of 
the symbolic order of desire, and rather than giving life, it barely seals and lies 
over the trauma caused by Paul’s call, and so, in the symbolic sense, kills. Jesus, 
as the founding sovereign principle of the all, is the cause of the exception and 
its engine. 
 If Jesus was to be the light on the future as inclusion, his effect was 
sinister because it went into hiding; as the factor that defined the terms of 
exclusion, initiating the exclusiveness of the universality of Christ, Jesus became 
sublimated in the ideological fantasy of secularism as the force of universal 
rights. The contradiction of secular ideology has been poetically articulated by 
Freud’s assertion that the Jew who does not accept Christ is a criminal. This 
explains in real terms Žižek’s aphorism that “what is excluded in the 
Symbolic… returns in the Real” (143): i.e., the Jewish person is the symptom of 
the Christian failure to be a universal force, which initiates the cycle of 
exclusion as the exception in identifying the symptom of that failure as the Jew 
even into secular society. What is shocking is to consider the philosophical 
work that has focused on the exception, from Schmitt’s concept to Santner’s 
observation that the ‘exception’ is an obsession of secularism to Žižek’s and 
Agamben’s struggle with Paul’s message because of the hook of the exception. 
One might say that the fantasy of Christ as history is the trauma, in Caruth’s 
sense, which returns in the real as the exception: it is the “case”, which “lays 
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open [secularism’s] falsity” even as it props up Christianity’s “dazzling 
splendor”. 
Paul’s impulse to include the excluded of the Judean communities in 
Rome’s dominion, returns in our modern politics in the ethical imperative 
driving human rights discourse. It is through human rights that anti-Semitism 
has come to be recognized as a crime, that women have the right to vote, gay 
people the right to marry, the atheist the right to reject God. Human rights 
promises universal equality and does so in the field of justice; but justice 
requires crimes to be possible, which points to the secularism’s culpability in 
manufacturing the exception. Human rights discourse hides the traces of the 
Christian paradigm that secularism attempted to obscure: the consent to the 
exceptional status of Christ.  
Žižek’s notion that ideologies need the exception in order to sustain the 
universal seems to miss the opportunity to go further into the symptom of 
ideological fantasy. The fact is, Paul’s good news is a legacy inherited by 
secularism affirms Anidjar’s assertion that modern, western secularism is 
Christian: where the medieval subject was saved on the condition of believing 
in Christ, now the secular citizen is saved by the state that demands she erase 
her own difference. The cycle of this double demand in secularism describes 
how the symptom of the exception is the engine for secular ideology. While I 
recognize the value of human rights discourse as being motivated by an ethical 
impulse, I would not identify it with the beneficence of Christianity’s 
contribution to the world, as Žižek claims; rather, the pessimistic view that it 
reflects Christianity’s responsibility for correcting its impact on the world is, in 
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Barbara Johnson identifies the responsibility for correction in Lacan’s self-
defined distinction as the true inheritor of Freud’s project. In Christianizing 
Freud’s work in order to critique Christianity with Christian writings, Lacan 
aimed to fulfill Freud’s psychoanalysis as “a reading of the damage Christianity 
had done, and the repressions and delusions on which it is based” (70). I inherit 
Freud’s and Lacan’s ethical obligation, identifying in the impulse for correction 
the aura of a trauma. By aura I mean that a series of traumas are apparent in 
rough outline: there is Paul’s personal trauma of the call; there is the trauma for 
the Gentile in being called to salvation on condition of the Christ; there is the 
trauma of the Judean community in historical terms; then there is the trauma of 
being called to equality on the condition of state authority. This pattern 
encourages me to take up Taubes’ concept of a “messianic logic” to ask the 
following: what of this ancient trauma is returning in the messiah and then also 
the Muselmann?202 That question drives the focus of Chapters 6 and 7.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 In a two-page footnote, Hent de Vries explores the significance of Taubes’ lectures on Paul 
and argues that Taubes’ research exists in a tradition shared with Benjamin, Scholem, Levinas 
and Derrida on the concept of the messianic in philosophy as a “messianic logic”. He goes on 
to consider seeing “messianic logic” as “a model in the psychoanalytic understanding of 
trauma” where the origin of monotheism, as envisioned through Freud, reflects a “certain 
repetitive force” (Philosophy and the Turn to Religion. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns’ Hopkins 
University Press, 1999. 187-188). In the “Afterward” to The Political Theology of Paul, editors 
Wolf-Daniel Hartwich, Aleida Assmann, and Jan Assmann highlight Taubes’ interest in seeing a 
repetition of certain semantic signifiers as expressing ‘messianic logic’ (122); specifically, the 
‘suspension of the law’ and the ‘love command’ (123-131). I would suggest that, in the same 
way that the messiah returns with the same discourse of law and love, the return of the messiah, 
in its different forms, is the return of the same historically specific trauma. 
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Since the exception is the symptom of the ideological fantasy of secularism, and 
since Jesus Christ is the first exception indicative of Paul’s trauma, then the 
symptom of the return of the messiah in secularism is not the return of the real 
of Paul’s Jesus, but the return of the exception in the real: it is what was 
excluded by Christianity and what was excluded was the one who did not 
convert because he was the one who ruined the dream of equality. This thesis 
of a “messianic logic” is complemented by this second part: the Muselmann is 
the exception, as defined by Agamben’s research, and reflects the failed convert 
or, the one yet to be converted by secularism. Thus the messiah and the 
Muselmann, two terms that had at the start of this project been identified as 
disparate objets a in secular fantasies, are now shown to be connected as a 
symptom of a failed equality returning in the real throughout western history. 
This return, which signals the secular subject’s unconscious desire, points to an 
ethical injunction. What that ethical message is shall be the focus of both this 
chapter and the next.  
In the analysis of this chapter, I shall approach the limit of Frye’s claim 
that the Christian Bible more properly belonged to the literary arts over other 
forms of expression, such as philosophy. At this point, I have made some in-
roads into showing how Frye’s claim can be contested; specifically, I have 
reviewed the influence of biblical paradigms in Benjamin’s concept of the 
messianic, from the Puppet’s utilization of theological tropes to the promise of 
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revolution for equality as a Christian principle, implicit in the Pauline notion of 
‘weak’. In other words, we have seen at least one case in which philosophy has 
harvested biblical tropes in the same way literature does. Analyzing other texts 
for a trauma at the core of secular ideology will provide a better understanding 
of how some tendencies evident in Benjamin’s work show the return of a first-
century trauma in the symptom of the exception.  
While I have outlined how the exception determines secular ideology as 
a double demand of conversion that fails even as it serves its cause, what needs 
to be considered now is how this ideological fantasy reflects on the 
symptomatic use of the religious terms, messiah and Muselmann, in the 
twentieth century. The double demand in secularism arises in Benjamin as an 
unstable binding of Marxism and Kabbalistic mysticism. While critics for and 
against Benjamin’s work have focused on his use of Marxist (Christian) and 
Jewish thought, I would argue that this focus misrecognizes what I have 
described as his unconscious exposure of the double demand within secularism 
through the use of the messianic. What is seen obscurely in Benjamin’s work is 
vividly articulated by Freud’s assertion that the Jew who does not convert to 
Christianity is a criminal. In Freud’s representation of the dilemma, the Jew, 
unlike the Christian, is without ethics. What is false about this statement points 
to the hidden contradiction in secularism. Freud’s logic in his assertion implies 
a discomfort with the call to ‘equality’ in Christianity because it described how 
the choice offered him was riddled with an ethical dilemma. Freud’s concern 
was not with equality as a universal ideal, but with the terms by which equality 
would be possible. Those terms were assimilation: in other words, convert or be 
punished. Freud understood that, in order to be a good secular atheist, he had 
to give up on his desire for his Jewish identity. The dilemma reflected his 
unease with the ultimatum: he did not want not to give up on secularism and 
the promises afforded by atheism, and yet he did he want to give ground to his 
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Jewishness.. This unease shall be the focus of the two case studies in this 
chapter. 
In the first case study, I shall attend to two representations of messiahs in 
twentieth-century philosophy for their notable unease; specifically, I shall read 
Rosenzweig’s The Star of Redemption, written in response to WWI, with 
Derrida’s works, primarily Specters of Marx written in response to the collapse 
of the USSR.203 Though reflective of two very different political traumas, their 
engagement with the dichotomy of the exception and the universal through a 
reinvention of the messiah identifies a common ground for comparison with 
respect to the ethical terms of equality, and the double bind of ‘exceptionality’. 
Regarding the Muselmann, I take as my lead Agamben’s work adapting Primo 
Levi’s claim that the figure is the ‘the complete witness” (Survival in Auschwitz 
150). Agamben interprets this significance as conveying the ethical injunction 
to bear witness for the one who cannot (Agamben 161). How this figure’s 
demand plays out in Sarah Kofman’s Smothered Words, her personal meditation 
on Auschwitz as a survivor of the holocaust, because the figure does not exist in 
her work, shall be the focus of unease in the second case study.  	  
   
 
CASE STUDY #1: EXEMPLARITY 
According to Dana Hollander, Derrida’s effort to exist with the paradox of 
Jewish exemplarity and universalism reflects ‘his unease’.204 In Exemplarity and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	  The collapse of the USSR was obviously a trauma for the citizens of the Republic; yet, as an 
event that changed the dynamics of global politics, namely the Cold War, that trauma had an 
effect around the world. Moreover, since the event appeared to reflect the failure of the first 
communist state, its traumatic impact on communists, both card-carrying and sympathizers, was 
felt around the world, including by Derrida.	  
204 See Hollander, “Is Deconstruction a Jewish Science? Reflections on “Jewish Philosophy” in 
Light of Jacques Derrida’s Judeite”, 135. 
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Chosenness, she reframes that unease in the question: “how is the elevation of a 
particular people reconcilable with a universal God?” (2), and aims to answer it 
by reading Derrida’s paradox of particularity and universalism through 
Rosenzweig’s meditation on Jewish election. Her question remains bound to the 
same assumption reflected in Derrida’s and Rosenzweig’s thinking, and which 
is shared by secularists; the assumption is that the universal in our secular world 
is a neutral transcendent benign paradigm. The figure of the exception, Jesus 
Christ, signals the root of this failure of secularism to be neutral, leading us to 
see an unease reflected in Rosenzweig’s and Derrida’s engagements, 
consciously and unconsciously. Despite the fact these scholars are separated 
politically by the horrors of WWII, writing within two distinctly different 
intellectual periods, modernist and postmodernist, and are distinguished from 
each other religiously, wherein Rosenzweig reclaimed his Jewish faith, while 
Derrida remained a devout atheist all his life, even during what scholars have 
identified as his nod to the religious turn,205 their works touch on very similar 
themes. Both, in their very different ways, engage consciously with the idea of 
conversion as a Christian paradigm; alongside this attention to conversion, both 
engage with the ‘messiah’ in conscious and unconscious ways. As I will show, 
their engagement with both concepts reflects a discomfort with secularism.  
 
CONVERSION 
In Circumfessions, Derrida draws an inverted correlation between circumcision 
and conversion, by referencing an image of St. Paul’s Letter to the Galatians 
(29) in the context of defining how Christian terms have ‘circumscribed’ his 
Jewish rites of passage: “… in my family and among the Algerian Jews, one 
scarcely ever said, ‘circumcision’ but baptism’, not Bar Mitzvah but 
‘communion’ with the consequences of softening, dulling, through fearful 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 John D. Caputo. The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion (1997). 
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acculturation, that I’ve always suffered from more or less consciously… (12-20-
76.)” (72-73.)206 What Derrida calls ‘acculturation’, which may be seen as the 
completion of the Portuguese demand for conversion begun four hundred years 
ago, which led his Sephardic family to flee for Algeria, reflects a passivity of the 
unconscious effect of Christian culture on his sense of self, leading to his 
conscious struggle with his Jewish identity. When he declares, “I am the end of 
Judaism” (1981 p 122), he means to emphasize that, as a secular Jew, his 
conversion is complete, to the extent that not even his first cut of the flesh, his 
circumcision, can protect him from corruption: “I am a sort of marrane of 
French Catholic culture… I am one of those marranes who no longer say they 
are Jews even in the secret of their own hearts” (170). French culture has not 
only erased his difference, it has erased the significance of his exemplarity, 
leaving Derrida feeling ‘unrecognizable’ when faced by a young audience 
member’s question: “you are unrecognizable, as you were to that young 
imbecile who asks you, after you talk on the Final Solution, what you had done 
to save the Jews during the war… perhaps you didn’t do enough to save Jews, 
he might be right…” (312). Derrida is unrecognizable to himself as a Jew 
because he does not fight for Jewish rights, but for the secular fight for equality; 
and as an adult with public acclaim, he does not recognize his childhood self, a 
victim of persecution and selection by Occupied France for being a Jew.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 On the matter of circumcision, Circumfessions is linked to “Shibboleth for Paul Celan” in 
many ways, most notably in the following Pauline reference: “Celan elsewhere… calls words 
circumcised, as one speaks of the circumcised heart” (Word Traces 24). Apart from this moment 
of a Christian reference, Derrida’s “Shibboleth for Paul Celan” does not engage in Christian 
markers as he does in Circumfessions. Derrida begins “Shibboleth” with the declaration, “One 
time alone: circumcision takes place but once” (3) and goes on to contextualize how 
Shibboleth, the password used to identify the stranger based on her/his mispronunciation of the 
password, is a cut in the same way language and cultural identity are ‘cuts’, or circumcision. 
“Shibboleth” complements Circumfessions because, if Shibboleth identifies the collapse of 
cultural differences within history from the perspective of language as circumcision, 
Circumfessions explores that collapse through the fusion of Christian and Jewish cultural 
markers. 	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What is described in Derrida’s ‘confession’ is the unconscious effect of 
language/culture in recreating his Jewish distinction as something to justify 
persecution, which led to his need to be saved from persecution through 
secularization. This dynamic is made explicit by Rosenzweig’s decision to 
become Christian. As opposed to what Derrida represents as the threat of 
Christian culture on his Jewish self in a secular life, Rosenzweig’s desire to 
convert to Christianity was a conscious choice against secularism. He believed 
Christianity was the true religion; in making his choice ‘for Christianity’, he 
unconsciously expressed the dominant discourse driving philosophical thinking 
in Hegel and Kant, and cloaked in secularism’s seeming neutrality; the Christian 
faith is the supreme faith. Unlike Derrida’s engagement with the bind of 
language and identity through deconstructionist practices, Rosenzweig 
unearthed the Christian demand to accept Jesus and answered it. At the 11th 
hour, Rosenzweig decided not to convert to Christianity. In a critical night 
reviewing his decision, he realized his destiny was what he called his ‘dark 
drive’, his Jewish faith. This decision led to many changes in his personal life, 
but also, led to the revelations in his opus, Star of Redemption (1921). This 
work can be read as an apology and a justification for Judaism, defining the role 
of Jewish people in history and in the future of mankind, alongside Christianity; 
but on a philosophical level, it is a moving and inspired meditation on the place 
of faith in the individual and in society in a secular world. 
In Star, Rosenzweig claims that what differentiates the Jew from the 
Christian is his/her relationship to the eternal. According to Rosenzweig, the 
Jew by birth has a direct relationship with the eternal, born into his/her 
inheritance of eternal life; the Christian, on the other hand, has a conditional 
relation to the eternal because, born separated from Jesus Christ, he/she needs 
to accept Christ to enter this eternal dimension. Rosenzweig paraphrases 
Goethe’s claim that the true Christian is the pagan who comes to Christianity as 
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a convert: “Christianity demands sacrifice of the self” (298). The Jew, on the 
other hand, has no need to convert: “[Christians] themselves, each for himself, 
had to become Christian. Being-Christian has been removed from them before 
they were born through Christ’s birth, just as on the contrary, the Jew possesses 
in him and carries with him his being-Jewish before his own birth, because his 
becoming-Jewish was removed from him in the olden times and in the 
revelatory history of the people” (419). Through these differences, Judaism and 
Christianity are equally eligible for the promises of the universal God, because 
both are considered true religions, unlike Islam, which, he agues, is not a true 
religion. Anidjar highlights that Islam, for Rosenzweig, was, as the “political 
enemy” (97), distinguished from Judaism. Anidjar cites Shlomo Pines’s 
suggestion that the exclusion of Islam in Rosenzweig’s work reflects a reaction 
to Hegel’s denigration of Judaism with Islam (303).207 Jean Cahan follows Pine’s 
assessment, noting that Islam’s inferiority to the two other monotheistic faiths 
reflects “a remnant of Hegel’s own theo-anthropology, a method of making 
invidious comparisons between different religious cultures and of maintaining 
the superiority of one culture over all the others…” (19).208 Rosenzweig’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 In The Jew, The Arab, Anidjar references Pines’ “Islam according to The Star of Redemption: 
Toward a Study of Franz Rosenzweig’s Sources and Biases” 303) 98.  
208 According to Emil Fackenheim, considering Hegel’s philosophy is centered on Christianity, 
he nonetheless “does greater justice to Judaism than  any other modern philosopher of the first 
rank" (To Mend the World p. 107). That is, he saw Judaism as “an indispensible aspect of the 
total religious Truth”, even though it “is now as such an anachronism” (Encounters Between 
Judaism and Modern Philosophy: A Preface to Future Jewish Thought 95). Fackenheim credits 
Hegel with seeing Judaism as a genuine religion because it is an expression of the relationship 
between God and mankind: “[Judaism] has a role within the total realm of religious truth that is 
unique and indispensible. The Jewish fear of the Lord is not one wisdom beside others. It is the 
beginning of all religious wisdom” (Encounters 90-95.) Interestingly, Rosenzweig seems to 
develop Hegel’s criteria of ‘religious truth’ in his concept of revelation, a factor that excludes 
Islam from being defined as a true religion, as is Judaism and Christianity, because its revelation 
is a book: “For Judaism, older and holier than the written word is the oral teaching, and Jesus 
did not leave a single written word for his followers; Islam is religion of the Book from the first 
moment. The Book sent down from heaven—can there be any greater distortion of the notion of 
God himself ‘descending’, giving himself to man, of surrendering to him? He is enthroned in his 
highest heaven and gives to man—a Book” (180). The ground for Rosenzweig’s disparaging of 
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prejudice against Islam prefigures a prejudice that would recur in Auschwitz, in 
naming the abject inmate, Muselmann, an issue I will return to later in this 
chapter.  
Hollander asserts that Rosenzweig’s acceptance of his relation to his 
election as a Jew, as one living in a constant relation to the eternal, resolved the 
paradox of election and universalism: ”This is the essence of Jewish election: 
their claim to being at once individual (Einzelnes) and universal (‘all’, Alles)—
indeed, being universal by virtue of being absolutely singular” (Hollander 178). 
In that respect, Rosenzweig did not convert because he rejected Christianity, 
but because he had qualified how election fit into the Christian paradigm of the 
universal. He did not need to convert. Implicit in this lack of necessity is that 
the conversion demand in secularism is, clearly, not ‘for all’, which indirectly 
suggests that what remains a constant in Rosenzweig’s work is a conviction of 
the value of universal. Rosenzweig’s revelations served his philosophical and 
religious convictions, which, as I will show, manifested in Star as a dialogue 
with Pauline thinking. 
In the following passage, which precedes the books concluding image of 
the ‘gate’ which opens “into Life” (447), a particular incoherence of the ecstatic 
event encourages reading the Star as a product of an ecstatic experience, similar 
to Paul’s experience of doxa: 
In the innermost sanctuary of divine truth where he would expect that all 
the world and he himself would have to be relegated to the metaphor for 
that which he will behold there, man beholds nothing other than a 
countenance like his own. The Star of Redemption has become 
countenance that looks upon me and from out of which I look. Not God, 
but God’s truth, became the mirror for me. God, who is the Last and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Islam is ironic considering that the laws given to Moses were words engraved on tablets, and 
that this story is known through Moses five books, the Pentateuch.  
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First, opened the doors of the sanctuary for me that is built in the 
innermost centre. He let himself be seen. He led me to the border of life 
where the sight is allowed. For no man who sees Him remains alive. So 
that sanctuary wherein he allowed me to see had to be a piece of the 
supraworld within the world itself, a life beyond life. But what he gave me 
to see in this beyond of life is—nothing different than what I was permitted 
to perceive already in the centre of life; the difference is only that I see it, 
no longer merely hear. For the sight on the height of the redeemed 
supraworld shows me nothing other than what already the word of 
Revelation bade me in the midst of life…” (446)  
 
Note the lost article of ‘countenance’ in the second sentence signaling a 
slippage of spatial differentiation created by a moving subjective position. The 
countenance of the Star that looks on him is pure ‘countenance’, the form by 
which he looks out, reflecting the same bodily confusion apparent in Paul’s 2 
Cor 11. In ambiguous terms, though God is present, the divine countenance is 
invisible, as is the “I”; the passive construction in “God let himself be seen” 
entirely erases the writer’s place as the seeing subject. God, demarcated as 
God’s truth, is witnessed indirectly through the mirror, echoing Paul’s “all of us, 
unveiled faces, seeing the glory of the lord as though reflected in a mirror” (2 
Cor 3:18), and Aseneth’s revelation of herself in the ‘living waters’. The other 
most repeated trope is the shifting between the micro and the macro spatial 
perspectives; the subject has been brought to ‘the innermost centre’, which is 
‘within the world’ even as he is shown from the ‘height of the redeemed 
supraworld’ things. This location signals the border of life, which suggests not 
just space, but the mortal limit of existence. If there is something beyond life, is 
that the eternity in scripture that he not only hears but sees? Clearly, this 
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testimony in which God’s glory is represented as radiating in the Star, reflects 
tropes of the merkabah literary tradition evident in Paul’s letters. 
I would contend that, not only can we hear allusions to Pauline ecstasy 
in the Star, we can even hear a dialogue with Paul’s message, most significantly 
in the work’s structure: The Star begins literally with death and ends ‘into life’ 
(447), which is homologous to Paul’s death and new life in Christ. Death, or the 
fear of it, Rosenzweig begins, is the factor that leads to mankind’s coming to 
consciousness, to reaching out beyond the self into the world, and beyond the 
world, to the abstract concept of creator, God. Clearly, Rosenzweig is repeating 
Philo’s recognition that mortality, or death, is a universal principle. Since the 
Star ends with exiting the gates ‘into life’, the structural conceit encourages 
retroactively determining that the 446 pages of philosophy occurred in pardes, 
or the elsewhere from which revelation comes. When Rosenzweig references 
‘life beyond life,” the source for Santner’s ‘interpellation beyond interpellation”, 
we understand that he has been called, much as Paul had been called; that is, 
we can read in Rosenzweig’s testimony that his call which came from beyond 
life, which until his revelation was only heard, has manifested as a vision of the 
star. The radiant source of God’s truth in Rosenzweig’s revelation, or 
apocalypse, like Paul’s doxa, anoints the subject with itself, which implies the 
subject’s transformation.  
There is no question that the spatial incoherence in Rosenzweig’s 
representation of his encounter is homologous with Paul’s encounter in heaven, 
as well as Aseneth’s encounter with the visitor, which suggests that 
Rosenzweig’s transformation, in keeping with the literary tradition, is of the 
eternal. Moreover, as these historical protagonists experienced that supreme 
conviction of forgiveness, Rosenzweig’s experience is equivalent; Rosenzweig 
has been anointed with the light of redemption. In short, the star, as the objet a 
of the encounter, is an image of redemption that parallels the figure of Jesus in 
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Paul’s experience. In comparison to Paul’s encounter with the resurrected Jesus 
become ‘christ’, Rosenzweig’s objet a is the star which is notably not human, 
and not Jesus; that reconfiguration has significance in seeing a discomfort 
expressed in his reinvention of the ‘mesiach’. 
Integral to Rosenzweig’s thesis of mankind in Star is the conceit that 
God’s redemption is universal; the implication here is that the redemption 
offered by the star has no condition, nor exception, but demands an affirmative 
response. As we see in Rosenzweig’s experience, the doxa is not Jesus Christ. 
Rosenzweig’s version of the eternal divine as inhuman and unconditional 
reflects either an inversion of Paul’s retroactive naming of his doxa as Jesus who 
came to define the terms for exclusion, or simply a different naming; in that 
respect, Rosenzweig’s objet a of the star can be interpreted as a criticism of 
Christianity, if we could see it as conscious an effort as critique suggests. For 
several reasons, I would argue that what we may see as critique is not so 
conscious, the primary reason being that Rosenzweig even-handedly accounts 
for the importance of the Christian faith in bringing ‘pagans’ to God. Moreover, 
Christianity’s equality to the Jewish faith is reflected in his reference to the 
modern paradox of two messiahs: “the eternally irreconcilable expectations of 
the Messiah: the one to come and the one to come again—it cannot lead 
beyond the And of these two final commitments on behalf of the truth. Only 
with God himself does the verification reside, only before him is the truth One” 
(New Thinking 99). The mystery of which messiah sustains the Star of 
Redemption is God’s truth only, a fact which reflects Rosenzweig’s essential 
reticence to interfere with the messianic paradox and take sides in the ongoing 
conflict between two faiths.  
Rosenzweig’s silence on messianic expectation reflects a disinterest or 
disinclination to engage it in his work, which scholars have identified as 
‘wariness’. Bielek-Robson notes that Rosenzweig was conscious that the 
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promise of salvation in messianic thinking had an equal and equally volatile 
energy of destruction, which is why he promoted love as a means of postponing 
that volatility.209 This tendency to avoid suggests that his star was not intended 
as a figurative competition with the Jesus Christ factor. Rather, in identifying his 
own objet a as the figuration of a ‘call’ to eternal life, whose ethical demand led 
to a change in his life, Rosenzweig understood that the call to Christianity as 
conversion was not meant for him. That is, in Rosenzweig’s meditation in the 
Star we can see a kind of correction of secularism’s conflation of Paul’s legacy: 
if, to answer the call to equality was conditional on the conversion to Christ, 
Rosenzweig proved the conditional was limited to some people and not ‘all’ 
people. To rephrase a question raised in the introduction, how did Paul’s 
‘trauma’, the ‘call’ to eternal life, change into the call for equality as a condition 
of Christ? I would answer by suggesting that the sliding of signification in Paul’s 
experience-cum-message signals the trauma that we are living with today. 
Moreover, this sliding makes visible the cut referenced by Blumenberg and 
Žižek in Chapter 1. The ‘cut’ was not a singular event of time and place but a 
process wherein Christianity used Jewish election for its power-grab, articulated 
profoundly by Benjamin’s recognition of the fascist use of messianic discourse 
for its anti-Semitic propaganda.  
The trauma of election that had originated in Judaism through Moses 
returned inversely in Paul’s message of the condition of Christ. The replacement 
of exceptionality of the Jew with the exception of Jesus, where the former 
singled out a group of people, and the latter singled out a man, was not as 
simple as shifting the site of ‘election’ from one place to another, but, 
paradoxically and therefore more traumatically, associating ‘election’ with the 
universal principle. What is striking is that Rosenzweig, in stepping away from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 See Agata Bielek-Robson’s “Tarrying with the Apocalypse: The Wary Messianism of 
Rosenzweig and Levinas” 262.	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secularism, was able to untwist this binary of election and the universal within 
secularism, identifying the universal as his birthright, and so distinguished the 
call to eternal life as distinct from the call to convert to Christ. This wrestling 
with the demands of secularism in Rosenzweig’s work articulates the same 
unease that troubles Derrida; yet, whereas Rosenzweig appears to have resolved 
that conflict by internalizing universal redemption within him by externalizing 
the Christian exception that demands conversion, Derrida embodies a 
consciously ambivalent relation to the same demand(s) through his messiah.   
 
MESSIAH 
In order to contextualize Derrida’s engagement with the messianic, Hollander 
quotes from Rosenzweig’s translation of a poem by Jehuda Halevi “The Joyous 
Message”. In this short piece, we read of the Jewish messianic expectation as 
constantly confronted by the ‘fake messiah’, that which signals the danger of 
messianic expectation for those with hope and those with faith, where the 
faithful are more vulnerable to corruption (Hollander 190.) It is intriguing to see 
evidence of the Bar Kokhba legacy of the false messiah move through the 
medieval philosophers, to Rosenzweig in the modern age and, as Hollander 
understands it, to Derrida’s ‘messianicity’ also: “When Derrida speaks of the 
messianic as an opening to the future-to-come, I think he means an opening to 
something beyond what can be hoped for (beyond, as he repeatedly notes, a 
telos or a regulative ideal), and thus an opening that also risks utter 
disappointment or failure” (190). This beyond hope, as Hollander defines it in 
Derrida’s messianicity in Specters of Marx, manifests as the expectation of 
justice demanded by crimes in the past, lifting a motif from Marx of the past 
haunting the present. Through this haunting, Derrida intends to bring to bear an 
ethical turn to deconstructionism’s contribution to the ‘spirit of Marx’ as “an 
emancipatory promise” (74).  
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Unlike Rosenzweig’s Star, whose structure follows a teleology of the 
Christian logic of resurrection by beginning with death and ending with new 
life, one might say appropriating the Christian narrative for a new universalism, 
Derrida’s structure in Specters of Marx arrests the energy of eschatological 
narrative by beginning where it ends, not with death but with what Derrida 
claims precedes death: “namely with haunting, before life as such, before death 
as such…” (220). Derrida uses a quotation from Shakespeare’s Hamlet, 
specifically a fragment of Hamlet’s dialogue with his dead father, the Ghost, in 
Act 1 to introduce that haunting as the interference of the present with the past 
in relation to an indeterminate future, “The future-to-come announces itself as 
such and in its purity only on the basis of a past end” (45), a future which 
reflects Benjamin’s radical notion of messianic time as the event that is not 
predetermined.210 To signal the unknowable source of the emancipation and its 
universal quality, Derrida erases the human agency and affiliation of 
messianism: “it is perhaps even the formality of a structural messianism: it is a 
messianism without religion, even a messianic (adj.) without messianism 
(noun), an idea of justice” (Specters of Marx 74). In this cycle of the past’s 
relation to the future as an injunction for justice in the present, the messianic is 
“a waiting without horizon” (211), and “without failing the future in the name 
of old frontiers” (213), thus stripped of partisan affiliations, national and 
mystical ideologies, and reduced to its essential form as the ‘desert-like 
messianism’ (33). Hollander notes that, though the abstraction of messianicity 
as ‘desert-like’ is just another metaphor (200), it engages the question of the 
particular and universal in philosophical terms as including both the remains of 
‘desertification’, as well as what has been taken out as “abstracted or 
subtracted” (200). Reading through the psychoanalytic lens, I would argue that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	  “This would be the opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of 
justice, but without horizon of expectation and without prophetic configuration” (Derrida “Faith 
and Knowledge” 56).	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Derrida’s messianicity, as the impossible anticipation of justice, is an objet a 
that points to its traumatic launch, which I argue is also visible in Rosenzweig’s 
star, in personal and in historical terms.  
Derrida’s meditation on the messianic reflects a faith in justice expressed 
as “a universalizable culture of singularities a culture in which the abstract 
possibility of the impossible translation could nevertheless announce itself” 
(Hollander 201).211 This quotation is not mine, but Hollander’s, who uses it to 
end her analysis of exemplarity and Derrida’s unease. I quote from her to 
emphasize that her use repeats, and so is emblematic of the trauma I am 
reviewing in Derrida. Notice the effort to accommodate difference through 
‘singularities’ as a universalizing principle, much as Badiou’s ‘indifference to 
difference’; notice the conditional terms for defining the announcement, or the 
call; notice the disjunction between the original call, which goes unheard, and 
the received translation of it, when it may arrive. The link between the ‘here’ of 
culture and the ‘elsewhere’ of what is to be translated, are based on a factor of 
‘not now’ which inverts Benjamin’s ‘now time’, or at least the Pauline influence 
as the ‘now’ of Jesus’ salvation. This deferral of the messianic as an effect on 
some undefined future, which we hear echoed in Rosenzweig about the 
messianic paradox proper and not about the ‘mystical’ star experience; it is a 
strategy harnessed by the Hasidim, and first-century writers, Josephus and Philo, 
but also Augustine in his effort to establish a ‘this world’ relation to the ‘other’ 
world, the condition which Blumenberg highlighted established the meaning of 
modern secularism. I think it is useful to be sensitive to secularism’s 
etymological foundation, and to question to what extent Derrida is influenced 
by the Christian paradigms, as opposed to Jewish paradigms, or to what extent 
Jewish paradigms have adapted Christian ideas, seeing as secularism feeds off 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
211 “This justice, which I distinguish from right, alone allows the hope, beyond all ‘messianism’, 
of a universalizable culture of singularities, a culture in which the abstract possibility of the 
impossible translation could nevertheless be announced.” (“Faith and Knowledge” 56.) 
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the Christian system that is incredibly resistant to destruction, because it is 
rooted on a teleology disguised as emancipation.  
The fact that Rosenzweig and Derrida were writing in such different 
historical moments of the twentieth-century, wherein one confronted the loss of 
political innocence in WWI, while the other, responding to the end of a 
political promise in national communism, was determined by the extreme 
horrors of man’s nature in WWII, serves to explain the fundamental stylistic 
differences in their work; and in that difference, what stands out is their 
treatment of the semantic significance of ‘anointing’ in their representation of 
the messianic. While Rosenzweig accounted for the doubled paradox of the 
messiah in society, the ‘star’ experience clearly identifies the ‘anointing’ for 
redemption as accessible in the now, and emanates from the eternal within the 
world, as ‘interpellation beyond interpellation’. The ‘star’s’ appearance in the 
purely imaginary register, which signals the objet a of Rosenzweig’s own 
anointing, or messianic call, reflects the antithesis of Jesus Christ; because this 
objet a is an unconscious critique of Jesus Christ and therefore emblematic of 
our trauma, in some very profound ways, it has exposed and fulfilled the doxa 
of Paul’s message buried for so many centuries. In comparison to Rosenzweig’s 
figure, Derrida’s work is apparently void of anointing, yet it persists in a way 
emblematic of our post-WII trauma, and leaves traces through his procedure. 
Considering my historical review in chapter three, Derrida’s deconstruction of 
the ‘messiah’ as something that “belongs properly to no Abrahamic religion” 
(56), seems more a wish for a universal source of an original politics, an 
abstraction based on theoretical extrapolation, as opposed to a reduction based 
on historical evidence; in fact, as Hollander notes, his desert-like’ messianism is 
bound to “a sacred topology of religious texts” (200), and therefore symbolically 
bound, if obscurely, to the semantic ‘anointing’.  
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In psychoanalytic terms, the ‘desert-like messianism” is Derrida’s object 
a, whose attributes are justice and emancipation. What is striking about this 
image is that its aridity is the antithesis of the oil used in ‘anointing’. In the 
imaginary register, desertification is a biblical trope of the narrative of the 
Exodus, and the geographical relation to the sky which defines the sun’s 
supreme place; this topos signals another kind of anointing. The impact of the 
sun in this messianism is light, both in its positive and negative sense; on the 
one hand, one has been illuminated, chosen, by the light; on the other hand, 
one has been ejected into the wilderness, unprotected and doomed to expire, as 
the homo sacer. Translated into Derrida’s spirit of justice, the one singled out, 
otherwise defined as the exception, is the anointed; that is, the exception is 
exceptional for being the unjustified victim of exclusion, or, as Hamlet’s case 
suggests, is called to address the inherited debt for justice of a crime. Those 
anointed in Derrida’s philosophy are not, like Rosenzweig, survivors of the 
ecstasy of God’s glory, but survivors of grief and tragedy, like the figure 
Agamben defines in homo sacer. Derrida’s injunction to Marx’s spirit of equality 
and emancipation is bound to all kinds of exceptions which populate the 
courts, there for any number of reasons which Derrida does not list, or does not 
want to list, or cannot, or, to keep things in the spirit of openness to the future 
in a very Kafkaesque way, will not. If Derrida’s desertified messianism includes 
what has been excluded, it is a strategy that reveals the trauma motivating his 
work. Derrida’s abject anointed exceptions are inadvertent constructs, refuse or 
byproducts, of an invented universalism, the ideal benevolent inclusivity which 
makes visible the exception of Jesus Christ. 
There is a consistency in how Rosenzweig’s and Derrida’s engagement 
with conversion and messiah have inverted the terms of the objet a of Jesus 
Christ. In Rosenzweig’s articulation of the silent demand for conversion in 
secularism, a method homologous to Benjamin’s effort to put back into play the 
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religious paradigms that have gone underground in secular neutrality, 
Rosenzweig identified the Christ-factor of secularism as the false bar; secularism 
demands a conversion by all, but only those without God hear the call to 
convert, because those who already have God, like Rosenzweig, hear 
exclusion. Rosenzweig’s inversion of secular neutrality for religious ideology, 
which made this articulation possible, pointed to the unconscious trauma in 
secularism of the division created by Paul’s effort to create new terms of Gentile 
inclusion into the Judean faith: its effect was the opposite of inclusion, and led 
to a trauma the Judean faith has been living with since, returning in anti-Semitic 
persecution. In Rosenzweig’s work, the star stood to cover imperfectly over this 
trauma of secularism, and also, to signal his response to the injunction of the 
‘interpellation’; that is, the doubled messiah of two monotheistic religions 
remains undisturbed, while his identification with redemption, much like the 
Pauline experience of being ‘anointed’ by doxa, hides the transgressive critique 
of the Jesus factor. This critique of Paul, if we can read it to be as consciously 
devised as that verb suggests, returns us to the effect of Paul’s objet a as a 
dividing force which Derrida approaches more obliquely, and more forcefully 
in his version of the messianic.  
If, as Hollander implies, Derrida’s notion of messianicity handles the 
disjunction between Jewish election and universal equality by creating broader 
terms of inclusivity, another way to look at Derrida’s ‘handling’ is that he 
internalizes the paradox, much as Rosenzweig does, holding the self as the 
example of both the exception and the universal. In this move, Derrida follows 
Rosenzweig, as do Žižek and Agamben, who both focus on the exception as the 
solution of the universal. Yet, in thinking of Žižek’s promotion of the Christian 
paradigm as the solution to universalism in his conclusion to Puppet, Derrida’s 
‘universal’ stands out as full of unease and therefore as a critique of the putative 
solution. Derrida’s ‘chosen’, or ‘anointed’ are inversions of the ideal exception 
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of Jesus; they are the homo sacer, inversions of the Jewish distinction key to 
Nazi selection.	  In the effort to recreate the new terms of exception, he adapts 
Benjamin’s fracturing of the messiah along the lines of Isaiah’s commands for 
the nation of Israel, by unbinding messianism from national and ethnic politics, 
and transposing it into ‘splinters’ of messianic time. Once messianism has been 
erased of humanity and its sins, and along with it, the hope of its imminent 
arrival, the injunction for justice ‘for all’ becomes inverted in the particular of 
singularities, proliferating into the future, universalizing messianism by 
multiplying terms of the exception. Yet, no matter how sophisticated the 
variables of the mathematical equation can be, no result adds up to the 
universal, whose infinity, like the eternal, is as impossible to grasp as the 
mediated version of messianism’s translation. If the universal is projected on a 
future equality because equality is a factor of the infinite, the fact that this 
unknown future is the repressed past of a haunting of injustice, binds us to 
retroactive work that proves postponement to be necessary. For Derrida, this 
thing we call justice iterates the failure for secular society to reconcile its 
promise for equality, and I would say, that is not just because of the logic of the 
Apelles’ cut, but because the cut is ideologically, Jesus Christ.  
In secular society, the only way to reconcile the exception with the 
universal is through the original exception, Jesus Christ. This claim may initially 
seem to grant this figure an exclusive authority that is unfounded, except the 
texts reviewed show a pattern along these lines. The atheist scholars such as 
Žižek, Agamben, and Badiou, who are reaching back through Hegel, Kant, to 
the incipient efforts by Spinoza, are as comfortable as the religious scholars, 
such as Blanton, with the power of the exception to fulfill the universal; 
expressed in this comfort is a trust in the Christian paradigm to resolve what is 
incommensurable. Their comfort is in stark contrast to efforts by Derrida and 
Rosenzweig to reconcile the exception and the universal, especially on the 
 	  
  251	  
issue of exemplarity. In trying to devise terms for universal equality so central to 
secular politics, they offer different messianic solutions that, I have shown, 
engage to one extent or another with excluding or rewriting the Christian 
exception, Jesus Christ. The various ways with which Rosenzweig, Derrida, as 
well as Benjamin, have tried to resolve the universal with messianic ideas that 
are alternatives to Jesus describe the monopoly Jesus Christ has in secular 
thought on the issue of universal equality; this monopoly indicates the source of 
their unease. That is, the unease expressed by both Derrida and Rosenzweig 
reflect personal engagements with a systemic issue, symptomatic of the original 
exception whose instability rises from the fusion of the trauma initiated by 
Paul’s message: Jesus Christ may signal the call to equality, but that call is 
conditional on accepting him as Christ, i.e., converting. 
Both Rosenzweig’s and Derrida’s engagement with conversion and 
messiah point to what historical events repeat, that Christianity’s condition is 
antithetical to its promises: read exclusion and not inclusion, persecution and 
not emancipation. In comparison, Žižek’s thesis that the future involves the 
fulfillment of Christianity by destroying it, recycles the tired Christian 
resurrection which Badiou could not shake either. Clearly, there is more of 
Lacan’s ‘carrot’ lure in Žižek’s notion of the future, while there is more of 
Freud’s inversion in both Rosenzweig’s and Derrida’s erasure of the Christ 
factor. Do these different approaches to repressed trauma reflect different 
cultural subjectivities? Or do they reflect different conditions? By way of 
partially addressing these questions, I offer the following, the implications of 
which I cannot at this point determine: whereas Lacan identifies the objet a as 
the seal over the wound, its inverted status as a kind of optical trick, less an 
illusion than a pastiche effect on consciousness obscuring the future, Freud’s 
fundamental argument was that people experienced life semantically, which is 
why inversion as evidence of repression always appeared hidden in 
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metaphorical paradigms, substitutions, or even erasures. An interest in lexical 
markers could add a dimension to Hollander’s consideration of Derrida’s 
deconstruction as a Jewish philosophy212 but only if we limit our understanding 
of Freud’s concept of inversion as being determined by the same logic 
motivating Derrida’s attempt to destabilize the power dynamic in binaries.  
With respect to limitations, which are always good for seeing patterns, 
the next pattern intriguingly explains a particular cultural influence in the work 
reviewed in this case study. In crossing the Lacanian approach with the 
Freudian act of inversion over Rosenzweig and Derrida, a very interesting 
operation becomes visible; if the objet a stands as the lure that obscures the 
coming future, Derrida’s and Rosenzweig’s inversions seem to be pulling away 
at the image of Jesus Christ, as if it hung before them, obscuring what is at stake 
in the future. That is, if the exception is an integral aspect of secularism and our 
modern political ethics is limited to the symbolic of the universal, then doing as 
Derrida and Rosenzweig did, internalizing the paradox by clearing the objet a 





CASE STUDY #2: THE PARADOX OF THE MUSELMANN’S ABSENCE 
Žižek rewrites the imaginary significance of The Muselmann in Auschwitz as 
the Thing—that which was so close to the trauma that it represents the 
Nachträglichkeit, or, deferred action, in all its ambiguity. In Primo Levi’s eyes, 
the Muselmann was the husk man empty of life, inspiring dread because, in Elie 
Wiesel’s terms, “he was doomed for the crematorium” (Night 70). The 
Muselmann was so void of consciousness that Jean Améry mentions the figure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 See Hollander’s “Is Deconstruction a Jewish Science?” 135-136. 
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in his memoir only to dismiss him, regretfully (At Mind’s Limits 9). In Sarah 
Kofman’s autobiographical essay on Auschwitz, Smothered Words, there is no 
Muselmann. Since Kofman was never at Auschwitz, the absence of the term 
technically is not an issue.213 Yet, how can her text about Auschwitz be 
autobiographical, even if ‘in part,’ if she was never at Auschwitz? In this case 
study, I address this question by arguing that there is a Muselmann in Kofman’s 
putative autobiography, played out in absentia as the paradox of her testimony 
of Auschwitz, and the unease it inspires.  
What ground of desire Kofman is being asked to give up in confronting 
this ghosted figure, requires a preface about death and survival. As Kofman’s 
testimony attests, the Holocaust was not limited to the camps. Moreover, not all 
those who died at the camps were Jews, but included prisoners of war, 
resistance fighters, identified ‘deviants’, such as homosexuals, Roma, black 
people, and the mentally disabled. And of those who lived and died at the 
camps, not all died as a Muselmann. This short list of the variety of people 
rounded up by the Nazi project does not include the millions who, on arriving 
at Auschwitz, were sent directly to the showers; nor the countless others who 
never made it to Auschwitz but were shot, individually, or in mass executions 
and buried in unmarked graves in the territories occupied by the Nazis. It is the 
plurality of these murders by the Nazis, inside and outside the camps, that is the 
grave reality beyond my focus on “The Thing” of the Muselmann as 
representative of those who, subjected to his fate, either died in Auschwitz, or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Whether or not Muselmann was used only by men, or both men and women is a contested 
issue. For one, scholars have tended to consider the use of the term by the memoirs by men, 
suggesting it is only by men. For example, Agamben cites the various names used to name this 
most abject inmate in the other camps quoting from Sofsky (44); words such as ‘donkeys’, 
‘camels’, ‘swimmers’, in various camps, and in Ravensbrück, the noun for a female Muslim, 
Muselweiber, was used. Yet, as pointed out to me by Doris Bergen recently at a conference at 
which I presented a version of this paper, memoirs by women also use the term, Muselmann. 
I.e. Isabella Leitner Fragments of Isabella: A Memoir of Auschwitz, and Gisella Perl, I was a 
Doctor In Auschwitz. The scholarship, though indeterminate on this point, does not change 
either my thesis, or the conclusions of this project.  
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survived it. This case study aims to identify the singularity of this figure and its 
limit, through its ghosted form in Kofman’s uneasy testimony. 
The term Muselmann was used in Auschwitz to define the most abject of 
the inmates: the one who was so diminished by hunger that he could barely 
walk. If he did not die from dysentery or starvation, he was destined to be 
chosen for the gas chambers: “Their life is short, but their number is endless; 
they, the Muselmänner, the drowned, form the backbone of the camp, an 
anonymous mass, continually renewed and always identical, of non-men who 
march and labour in silence, the divine spark dead within them” (Levi, 90). 
Their death cannot even be described as death, Levi asserts, since they are not 
even living enough to fear death. In their sociological research with survivors, 
Ryn and Klodzinsky214 contextualize the religious connotation of this naming: 
“When you saw them from afar, you would think they were Arabs praying. 
Hence the name of the hunger- stricken in the camp, “Muslims” —
Muselmänner”.215 When Agamben notes that the Jewish inmate did “not die a 
Jew in Auschwitz” (45), we are alerted to yet another religious dimension to this 
naming, a dimension mainly overlooked by Agamben.  
In Remnants of Auschwitz, Agamben’s focus on the Muselmann aims to 
exemplify the exception as previously explored in homo sacer. He is the one 
not represented by the State, but present as excluded (24); the one who is 
relegated to the camps where she/he lives out a life reduced to mere existence, 
or ‘bare life’ (66). In this respect, the Muselmann is the ‘final limit’ (Remnants 
85) in that he is excluded not just from society for being in the camp, but 
excluded from participating in the camp because of his ‘inhumanness’. Drawing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Ryn, Zdislaw and Stanslaw Klodzinski. An der Grenze zwischen Leben und Tod. Eine Studie 
uber die Erscheinung des “Muselmanns” im Konsenstrazionslager, Auschwitz-Hefte, vol 1 
(Weinheim and Basel: Beltz 1987): 89-154. 
215 This translation is from Anidjar’s footnote on page 226; see a slightly different translation in 
Agamben Remnants 43. 
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on the title of Levi’s memoir, If this is a Man, Agamben theorizes that the 
Muselmann is reduced to organic functioning, whose muteness is a sign to the 
other inmates of the “wound of non-spirit, non-human chaos” (77). The one 
having looked upon the Gorgon, he arouses fear amongst inmates as the 
faceless vortex painted in the ‘true likeness of man’ (52).  
Buch makes the salient point that the monstrosity of the Muselmann is 
operative as a sacred figure of redemption.216 The sacred quality of this figure, 
O’Connor argues, indicates a contradiction in Agamben’s messianism. Though 
Agamben’s messiah is a human-based figure, O’Connor argues, the 
anthropocentric approach to the redemptive promise in this figure is 
undermined by the transcendent concept of “a form of divine spark of 
immortality”.217 That is, in Agamben’s treatment of the future redemption, the 
humanization of that sacred expectation is bound to a transcendent 
interference, something like Benjamin’s eternal of messianic time. Agamben’s 
use of the Muselmann to underscore a historical example of the homo sacer and 
thus provide a critique of Schmitt’s indifference to the ethical responsibility of 
the state to the exception, is essentially exploitive. This figure indirectly and 
problematically legitimizes the suffering of all those at Auscwhitz as sacred. 
This is especially evident in his adaptation of the remnant. 
 Central to the figure of the Muselmann in Agamben’s project is its part in 
the redeeming power of the remnant. Having witnessed the unspeakable, the 
Muselmann has been made senseless and inhuman; his ‘desubjectification’ 
invites the ‘ethical subject’ to “bear witness’ (151): “The authority of the witness 
consists in the capacity to speak solely in the name of an incapacity to speak” 
(158). In that respect, the relation between the Muselmann and the witness 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Robert Buch. “Seeing the Impossibility of Seeing or the Visibility of the Undead: Giorgio 
Agamben’s Gorgon”. The Germanic Review, 2007. Pp 179-196. P 185. 
217 Patrick O’Connor. “Redemptive Remnants: Agamben’s Human Messianism”. Journal for 
Cultural Research. Vol 13, No 3-4. (July-October 2009) p. 349.	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speaks the unspeakable of Auschwitz and so manifests the messianic power of 
the remnant; “the remnants of Auschwitz—the witnesses—are neither the dead 
nor the survivors, neither the drowned nor the saved. They are what remains 
between them” (163). The remnant of the redemptive future is the answer to the 
demand for justice created in the relation between the Muselmann and the 
survivor. While this remnant is ostensibly of the human order, it is bound 
through the Muselmann to that which is not just the inverse of the human as the 
inhuman but, signified by the image of “like a man,” is the superhuman 
element. The Muselmann may be seen as equivalent to the doxa in the mystical 
tradition or, in psychoanalytic terms, he is the Thing, partly of the unspeakable 
‘real’ and signaling the call of the ineffable divine to bear witness. What 
O’Connor does not consider in his critique is the ideological source of 
Agamben’s messianism. Since Agamben’s representation of the Muselmann 
inspires an ethical demand to witness, which involves a becoming of the Other 
of the Muselmann and so redeeming mankind in the future, the figure does not 
embody a generic messianism but the Christian one. In that respect, Agamben’s 
Muselmann has rehabilitated the ‘horror’ of the undead represented in Levi’s 
memoir by writing the religious signifier out of it at the same time that it 
instantiates the Christian ‘exception’.218 
While Agamben seems to be consciously secular, which explains how 
the Christian motif nestles unconsciously within his paradigms, he is, at the 
same time, obtuse to the religious significance of the name. Though he 
recognizes the ‘ferocious irony’ that the Jew does not die a Jew in Auschwitz, 
he seems indifferent to the fact that for a Jew, the connotation of this religious 
naming represents not only imminent death, but also the horror of that death as 
an unwilling ‘conversion’. This conversion is an important element that further 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  218	  The Christianization of the Muselmann is noticed by Geoffrey Hartman and then is bypassed 
as not being his “main concern” (“Testimony and Authenticity”, 7). 
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develops Anidjar’s recognition of the ‘theological threshold’ reflected in the 
naming (145), and modifies his conviction that the Jew and the Muslim are 
represented in this naming as equally exceptional in a secular world because 
they are not Christian. The modification to his assessment is this: the demand 
for conversion in this naming is meant only for the Jew.	   Agamben’s secular 
belief makes him blind to the fact that his representation of the Muselmann as 
messiah reflects an unconscious Christo-centricism, indicating a secularist’s 
denial of religion’s effect on modern cultural and historical events. Agamben is 
not alone in this blindness. Gil Anidjar is one of the few scholars who have 
asked why the Jew comes to be named a Muslim in the camps.219 As I will 
show, Anidjar’s analysis of the Muselmann points to the unconscious historical 
crises returning in the Muselmann, which in turn explains Agamben’s 
unconscious revision. 
In The Jew, The Arab, Anidjar’s intention is to show that there is what 
can be identified as a Semitic affinity between the Arab and the Jew in the eyes 
of Christo-centric Europe, assisted by centuries of literature (Shakespeare) and 
philosophy (Montaigne, Kant, and Hegel). He compares the literary Arab (moor) 
in Othello, and the Jew in the Merchant of Venice, noting they are intermixed as 
the ‘dangerous neighbour figure’ (103). This relation comes to be a centre-piece 
of Anidjar’s review of Freud’s Psychopathology of Everyday Life, as evidence of 
a kind of exchange between Abrahamic phantoms: “that a ‘blessed Jew’ could 
turn Moor, and that such a 'Blackmoor' could, in turn, turn ‘white’” (137). 
Anidjar’s use of the term ‘turn’ could qualify as an expression of conversion; it 
is this detail in Anidjar’s review of the Muselmann that I isolate in what follows. 
The Muselmann, Anidjar asserts, traces a “theologico-political history of 
absolute subjection” (140). He is “a cypher for the exception” so that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 This is noted in an unpublished presentation paper (2) by Professor Doris Bergen which she 
shared with me on the matter of the Muselmann.	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naming of the Jews in Auschwitz is a ‘ferocious irony’ since the Jew becomes a 
Muslim. Anidjar’s focus on seeing the exchange of Jewish identity traced 
through politics and represented in Auschwitz leads to identifying a messianic 
connection between the Muselmann and seventeenth-century diaspora Jews. 
What Primo Levi identifies as the ‘divine spark’ (f.n. 111, 228), Anidjar notes, 
iterates the Kabbalistic mystical practice of the gathering in of the ‘divine sparks’ 
as the ethical responsibility to the messianic future through tikkun, or healing or 
repair. This concept of repair was used to justify the conversion of seventeenth-
century Jewish Polish messianic-claimant, Sabbatai Zevi. At the height of his 
popularity, Sabbatai Zevi was given a choice by the Ottoman Sultan, Mehmed 
IV, between dying as a messiah or living as a convert to Islam. Zevi chose 
conversion and hundreds of families followed his example (Scholem 147). In 
order to justify his conversion, Kabbalistic principles were adapted to explain 
that his apostasy was the descent into the darkness of the Gentiles (kelipot, 
Scholem 99) from which he would rescue the divine sparks (nitzotzot), and so 
redeem mankind. As Anidjar’s reference suggests, whether Levi was conscious 
of it or not, a link existed between the Muselmänner and the apostate messiah 
aimed to fulfilling tikkun in “his descent into the Inferno of Auschwitz” (Anidjar 
161). 
Scholem tries to make sense of the rise of power of the Sabbatian 
movement in modern Judaism considering Zevi’s apostasy and argues it 
reflected the momentum of the political and spiritual aspects of contemporary 
European Jewish culture. Politically, the movement supported the growing 
population of murranos who saw in the messiah’s conversion the “highest 
justification of the apostasy of the Spanish Murranos in 1391and 1492.”220 
Spiritually, it fulfilled a growing interest in Kabbalistic practices and mystical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 Gershom Scholem. The Messianic in Judaism: And Other Essays on Jewish Spiritualit (1995) 
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experiences, which seemed triggered by the devastating massacre of the Jewish 
community in Poland in 1648-49.221 Both of these conditions inspired a 
growing following of Sabbatai Zevi, identified as the Messianic Revival in 1665-
6. Prior to this period, Zevi was known by few as a laughing-stock, a false 
messiah, torn between deep depressions and fits of ecstasy. Nathan of Gaza, 
taking on the role of the prophet to the messiah, was able to change opinion 
against Zevi by claiming this suffering affirmed Zevi’s messianic status 
(Scholem, 1995, 60).222 Much like the work done by followers of Jesus in the 
first century, Scholem notes, Zevi’s handlers worked hard to prove he was who 
he claimed to be: “Endless biblical verses were cited to prove that the Messiah 
was fated to be contemned as an outcast and criminal by his own people” 
(Scholem, 1995, 98.) Parallels between the Sabbatian movement and early 
Christianity “obtrude,” as do parallels between Zevi and Paul: “The Sabbatian 
notion of pure faith, unaccompanied by the specific works and requiring the 
sign or miracle, has its predecessor in Paul’s doctrine of faith” (Scholem, 1992, 
322).223 Zevi was the “holy sinner” whose iconoclastic antinomianism, Scholem 
suggests, was similar in form to Pauline theology (Scholem, 1995, 58), but more 
radical: he promoted abrogation of sexual taboos and the incest prohibition 
(Scholem, 1995, 74) and initiated orgiastic ritual practices that continued 
amongst followers of the movement until about 1900.  
Scholem argues against theories that blame the orgiastic activities in the 
radical branches of the Sabbatian movement on the corrupt influence of ancient 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 Scholem. “The Mystical Messiah” (289-334) in Essential Papers On Messianic Movements 
and Personalities in Jewish History (1992) 290. 
222 In “Sabbatai Zevi: The Mystical Messiah”, Scholem reflects on the personal mental disorder: 
“… his inner life was autistically centered upon himself, a paranoid streak in his psychosis” 
(321).	  
223 Howard Caygill considers the links between Zevi and Christianity as proposed by Scholem as 
well as Taubes, by highlighting Taubes’ conviction that Zevi ruined Judiasm and so made 
possible Jewish Enlightenment, and that “believers of Messiahs” are to blame for leading “the 
way into the abyss” (205) in “The Apostate Messiah: Scholem, Taubes and the Occlusions of 
Sabbatai Zevi” (205). 
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Kabbalistic literature. Rather, he contends, the movement reflected the 
devastating effect of messianic frenzy on the Jewish faith: “In actual fact we are 
dealing with developments within Judaism that show how very acute and 
radical Messianism that is taken seriously tears open an abyss in which by inner 
necessity, antinomian tendencies, and libertine moral conceptions gain 
strength” (Scholem 1995, 164). What Scholem identifies as the violence of the 
formation of the abyss, whose effect was the fracturing of Judaism into factions 
reconsidering the laws and the fundamentals of the faith, clearly indicates a 
trauma. What that trauma is can be garnered from Anidjar’s reviews of research 
on the significance of the Muselmann and his summation that this Islamic 
signifier remains obscure: “an unreadable cypher or a sign for--Christianity. Or, 
simply, for Religion” (161). According to Harris Lenowitz in The Jewish 
Messiahs, Anidjar notes, the Muselmann figure “echoed the conversions of Jews 
of Iberia to Catholicism” (161). This is an interesting series of points that Anidjar 
runs through, which I would like to consider through the condition of trauma.  
If the naming of the Muselmann in Auschwitz as the unwilling 
conversion indicates the disguised return of Zevi’s willing conversion, and 
Zevi’s act was the disguised return of the forced conversions of the Jews in 
Spain and Portugal, we find an iteration of the first-century conflation of the call 
in Jesus Christ as an ambivalence towards conversion. The conflation issue I 
raised in the introduction to this chapter signals, here evident as ambivalence, 
reflects a trauma experienced by those followers of Jesus who were of the 
Judean cult. In accepting the ‘call’ of the new way through Jesus, these 
individuals were forced to break with their community but eventually were also 
forced to break with the laws of their own faith. That is, the Judean faction of 
the new community around Jesus was forced to see ‘resurrection’ as a 
cancellation of what distinguished them as Judeans: their election. It is this 
aporia of election that returns in all its ambivalence and stress in Derrida’s 
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exception which he tries to rehabilitate by erasing the partisan nature of the 
messiah, because within that partisan figure hides the coerced conversion 
which his family escaped four hundred years ago, and which returns with all its 
malevolent irony as the Muselmann.  
 
KOFMAN’S Paroles suffoquées 
In honour of Maurice Blanchot’s deconstructive project on writing of the 
disaster of the Holocaust,224 Kofman wrote Smothered Words (Smothered).225 It 
was ostensibly a philosophical meditation on Auschwitz, the place which is 
“neither a concept nor a pure name, but a name beyond naming” (7), but it was 
also her personal testimony, “as a Jewish woman intellectual who survived the 
Holocaust” (7.) Madeleine Dobie interprets Kofman’s work as serving an ethical 
imperative through the testimonial structure of autobiography.226 Eilene Hoft-
March notes about Smothered that “Kofman’s description of the work as, in part 
‘autobiographical’ strikes me as peculiar considering how little of it represents 
her life.”227 The aporia signaled by Hoft-March’s observation demarcates how 
Kofman’s work is obliquely encoded with her personal story, which reflects 
how the ethical imperative she responds to is associated with her role as a 
survivor, especially conflicted since, as Steven Jaron notes, she is neither a first 
nor a second generation survivor, but a “member of a liminal generation”, those 
who survived the Holocaust by avoiding being sent to the death camps.228 
Decoding what Kofman means by surviving would be aided by a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 The Writing of the Disaster, 1995. 
225 In her introduction to the English translation of Smothered Words, Madeleine Dobie explains 
that Kofman’s “Smothered Words was initially conceived in 1985 for a volume of Les Cahiers de 
l’Herne to be devoted to the politics of the writer and philosopher, Maurice Blanchot” (vii). The 
project never came to fruition and so Kofman published her text on its own in 1987.   
226 Madeleine Dobie, “Sarah Kofman’s Paroles suffoquées: Autobiography, History, and Writing 
‘After Auschwitz’”, 320.	  	  
227 Eilene Hoft-March. “Still Breathing: Sarah Kofman’s Memoires of Holocaust Survival”, 110. 
228 Steven Jaron, “Autobiography and the Holocaust: An Examination of the Liminal Generation 
in France”, 209. 
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psychoanalytic approach, an approach encouraged by her personal 
engagement with Freud in her work and expressed in one brief 
autobiographical text, “‘My Life’ and Psychoanalysis”: “I always wanted to tell 
the story of my life. The entire beginning of my analysis was me telling a story.” 
(Selected Writings 250). Taking this at face value, I will read Smothered as an 
autobiographical work, adapting Kofman’s interpretation of Freud’s method as 
my own: “… For every text is tissue that masks at the same time that it reveals. It 
invites us also to distinguish in it, as in a dream, a manifest and a latent 
content” (Selected Writings 44).   
The only explicit autobiographical material reflected in Smothered 
Words is her claim to having “survived the holocaust” (7), indicating so little 
especially in comparison to her Rue Ordinaire, Rue Labatt (RORL) written some 
seven years after Smothered, in which she explains that she survived the 
Holocaust by pretending to be Christian, hidden with her mother by a French 
woman, Mémé, during the war years in Paris.229 The only autobiographical 
element in Smothered which connects her to Auschwitz is her father: “My 
father, a rabbi, was killed because he tried to observe the Sabbath in the death 
camps: buried alive with a shovel for having—or so the witnesses report—
refused to work on that day in order to celebrate the Sabbath, to pray to God for 
them all, victims and executioners… And they could not bear that a Jew, that 
vermin, even in the camps, did not lose faith in God” (34). It is noteworthy that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
229 For an analysis of Kofman’s ambivalent relationship to the mother figure, as a dichotomy 
between her birth mother and the mother she finds in Mémé see Sara Horowitz’s article, “Sarah 
Kofman et l’ambiguïté des mères” (Témoignages de l’après-Asuchwitz dans la littérature juive-
française d’aujourd’hui: Enfants de survivants et survivants-enfants. Ed. Annelise Schulte 
Nordholt. Amsterdam and New York: Editions Rodopi B. V., 2008). In one section, Horowitz 
compares Kofman’s work on Freud’s analysis of Da Vinci’s double mothers in a painting of Jesus 
with St. Anne and the Madonna, and Kofman’s analysis of her two mothers in her own 
childhood (109), where Da Vinci’s Jesus and Kofman’s childhood are ironically paralleled. 
Horowitz’s analysis contributes to my argument that Kofman’s self-telling is permeated with an 
ambivalent relation to the Christian paradigms dominating western European culture. 
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Kofman highlights the witnesses’ report230 as the source of this representation of 
her father’s death. In psychoanalytic terms, the fact she missed her father’s 
death, in the physical temporal sense, exemplifies its traumatic impact for her; 
his death was a trauma because she came to know about it long after the fact, a 
literal Nachträglichkeit. The afterwardsness of the event becomes in Lacanian 
terms, the ‘fantasy’, courtesy of the witnesses. The problem with the fantasy is 
that no evidence is available to substantiate the witnesses’ claim. In fact, the 
ephemeral quality of the testimony is emphasized by a single document 
recreated in the body of the book about rabbi Kofman’s deportation to 
Auschwitz: his name listed as one of a thousand Jews rounded up on July 16, 
1942. This document affirms that he died not anywhere but at Auschwitz; yet it 
cannot verify that he died as the witnesses’ testimony implied, still believing in 
God. The fact that her father made it to Auschwitz and lived and worked there, 
raises questions about the narrative of his deportation which the document 
opens, like a window onto the unknown: of those deported, how many made it 
to Auscwhitz; of those who made it, how many were sent immediately to the 
gas chambers; of those who lived, how many survived; who became a 
Muselmann? The absence of proof of how her father died adds stress to the 
testimony which serves a kind of restless energy behind Kofman’s responsibility 
to witness. 
In RORL, we are given an account of the day he was taken away to 
Auschwitz. Her father did not resist. He waited at home for the police to come, 
knowing his resistance would only endanger his family. On the day he was 
taken, she recalls, “the memory of the sacrifice of Isaac (whose depiction in an 
illustrated Bible, my Hebrew textbook from early childhood, had often worried 
me) fluttered through my mind” (5-6). Whether that memory is true of that time, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
230 In comparison to the plural witness in Smothered, Kofman mentions only one witness in 
RORL; this raises the question about whether the plural in Smothered reflects a fact or is 
rhetorical.	  
 	  
  264	  
or an insertion after the fact, is irrelevant to the symbolic function of this image; 
it speaks of his docile acceptance of his fate, which contrasts his act of 
resistance at Auschwitz. His apparent submissiveness in being apprehended by 
the French police as a self-sacrifice in giving himself up to the Nazis so as to 
save his children is inconsistent with the grotesqueness of the meaningless and 
obscene sacrifice at the hands of the “Jewish-butcher-turned Kapo” who killed 
him with a shovel (RORL 10). Her father’s death is the trauma that returns in the 
text, obscured by time and by the impossibility of Auschwitz.  
This brief testimony of rabbi Kofman’s death in Smothered is contrasted 
by Kofman’s intellectual focus on Auschwitz, which makes up the body of the 
project. Through quotations from Robert Antelme’s memoir The Human Race 
and Blanchot’s fascist-period short stories, Kofman creates a representation of 
Auschwitz through her own impossible testimony. Her use of these works to 
represent the impossible reflects a studied and thoughtful irony since, Antelme, 
who was a French resistance fighter interned in Gandersheim, passed through 
Auschwitz only briefly and Blanchot, a French intellectual who converted to the 
French resistance from his fascist affiliations, was never at Auschwitz. These 
French secular intellectuals are the voices she uses to give meaning 
retroactively to what happened while she was a mere child. Implicated in what 
these voices articulate is that there is no witness to tell the truth of Auschwitz. In 
fact, the only witnesses to Auschwitz are the dead who cannot speak. In 
Kofman’s text, the dead witness is her father. His silent presence in her work is 
a strategy of the limit of testimony which can be understood through Geoffrey 
Hartman’s understanding of the dynamic between testimony as a non-fiction 
genre and the ‘authenticity’ of literature that “create[s] forms of representation 
that open a blocked channel of transmission” (“Truth and Testimony” 11). In 
this sense, the authenticity of her father’s testimony as silence is enabled 
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through her use of Blanchot’s literature and Antelme’s memoir.231 Hartman also 
observes that the Muselmann is a ‘limit experience’ (7); this point grounds the 
homology I will shortly argue for seeing between Rabbi Kofman and the 
Muselmann. 
In starting her meditation, Kofman reformulates Adorno’s assertion that 
“to write a poem after Auschwitz is barbaric” (citation) in the following 
statement: “About Auschwitz and after Auschwitz no story is possible” (14). 
Emphasizing the impossibility of fiction, she selects particular elements of 
Blanchot’s short story, “The Idyll,” written during his fascist period, about a 
stranger entering the close community of a small village. This story ironically 
represents her father arriving at Auschwitz. In parentheses, she quotes from a 
scene when the inhabitants order the Stranger about behaviour: ”(‘Wash well: 
we’re very concerned about hygiene here’)… A forced ‘baptism’, a veritable rite 
of passage intended to cleanse this repulsive stranger of the mud of the outside 
which clings to his skin, which marks as if with a branding iron, his non-
belonging to the country of light…” (19). This bathing reference and the “vast 
row of showers” identified as an ironic Christian ritual must to be read through 
the knowledge of Auschwitz and its showers where Jews were gassed to death. 
Blanchot’s fiction points to the manifest content of Kofman’s limited experience 
of Auschwitz; she is only able to apprehend this place “beyond naming” 
through the mediation of others’ testimonials, or in the case of Blanchot’s work, 
fiction. And since to read this story after Auschwitz means that a shower is not 
without ideological significance, Kofman forces us to see that Auschwitz caused 
a conversion whose ideology is lethal and “emanates from a region with no 
representable horizon”. If Kofman’s access to Auschwitz is based on the limit of 
what is ‘true’, what is true is that Auschwitz has no limit to its persistence, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Hartman focuses primarily on the trouble with ‘authenticity’ of testimony, and cites issues of 
“forgeries” and “imitation” (13). I think that perspective remains limited to privileging the kind 
of objectivity promised by the non-fiction of testimony.  
 	  
  266	  
geographically, affecting every corner of Europe by deporting millions of Jews, 
and temporally, recreating the terms for reading fiction written before 
Auschwitz. 
Her father died for refusing to work on the Sabbath, thus, labour in 
Blanchot’s fiction becomes Kofman’s means of dramatizing how, after 
Auschwitz, the meaning of work is different: “Its goal is not to destroy the object 
of revulsion outright, but to make him renounce his foreignness, even if this act 
of reappropriation also signifies the loss of the Incommensurable and the 
infinite distance” (Smothered 33). If labour before Auschwitz was socialization, 
in Auschwitz, the meaning of work was transformed into enabling death, which 
in turn, changed her father: “Work is the exact equivalent of death”, an 
impossible claim equivalent to “the impossibility of death”232 (34). It is against 
this impossibility that she identifies a parallel between Blanchot’s change and 
her father’s resistance. It is against this ‘disaster’ that Blanchot writes after 
Auschwitz as a man having been changed by what the SS wanted to do at 
Auschwitz: divide the race into those who can live, and those who must not. It 
is against this divide that rabbi Kofman is remembered by the witnesses as 
resisting the SS, drawing on a power beyond the SS. 
While Blanchot’s fiction is used to express the unknowability of her 
father’s life at Auschwitz, Antelme’s memoir becomes for Kofman the source for 
the impossible act of the survivor’s witnessing the ways in which Auschwitz 
killed. It killed with language, with food, with shovels, by suffocating people’s 
humanity: “a strange double bind: an infinite claim to speak, a duty to speak 
infinitely, imposing itself with irrepressible force, and at the same time, an 
almost physical impossibility to speak, a choking feeling” (39). Kofman does not 
relent in describing the agony caused by words, “which stick in your throat and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 I cannot help but wonder if she wants to suggest these two work ethics, the one in the Village 
and the one in Auschwitz, are different and independent of each other, or if the former work 
ethic is the precursor of the latter: perhaps my question must remain un-resolved. 
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cause you to suffocate” (39), but, as if enacting the compulsive return of the 
trauma, she repeats herself in the next sentence: “To have to speak without 
being able to speak or be understood, to have to choke, such is the ethical 
exigency that Robert Antelme obeys in The Human Race” (39). Through 
Antelme, “choking” stands as the impossibility of witnessing, its physicality 
gesturing to Kofman’s father who, beaten with a shovel and buried alive, 
choked to death. As a shadow of this significance, a personal experience that 
echoes Kofman’s father’s suffocation is expressed in RORL. During the war, she 
was waiting in the parlor while her mother and Mémé were speaking to Father 
Devaux about her becoming baptized a Christian: “I was overcome by a strange 
malaise. I vaguely felt that this time something more was at stake than a 
separation from my mother. The door was open, I flee” (37). Note the tense shift 
within the last sentence, replicating in a crisis of grammar, the return of the past 
crisis as the present desire to escape. The fact that escape would offset the 
‘strange malaise’, suggests a sense of claustrophobia, or suffocation. This small 
scene which, in temporal terms, may have happened at the same time that her 
father died in Auschwitz, reflects Kofman’s inability to witness her betrayal in 
replacing her mother with Mémé, and her Jewish life with the Catholic home of 
her salvation, except as a Nachträglichkeit. This scene of a past trauma returns 
in her autobiographical investment in the project on Auschwitz as ‘smothered’ 
testimony, amplifying the ethical imperative to witness her father’s death as the 
coincidental conditions of her survival. 
Kofman relies on Antelme to show the SS strategy to kill men by erasing 
their humanity. Prisoners were made “unmen,” and “treated without dignity, as 
garbage, undermen, slaves, “Jews,” animals, horses, cows, oxen, as the beasts of 
burden…” (Smothered 42). Through language, the SS tried to change men into 
beasts and to exalt themselves as gods. The prisoners, rendered speechless, 
inhuman, animals or inanimate, were subject to the SS and their divine 
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authority to rule. The ‘gods’ shared no language in common with the prisoners, 
literally in that they spoke German and hardly any prisoner did; but also, 
metaphorically, the Germans shared no humanity with the inmates. Yet the 
strategy to recreate mankind through language was not foolproof, Antelme 
stressed, since prisoners could resist dehumanization: “against the glances and 
handshakes that shared in the power of powerlessness, nothing could prevail, 
“neither the barking of the thousands of SS troops, nor… barbed wire, nor 
famine, nor lice” (Smothered 55). The inmates’ acts of resistance are shadowed 
by Kofman’s father’s act of resistance, which was so great it led to his being 
killed. Through Antelme’s text, Kofman shows that the SS god collapses against 
this resistance inspired by a higher order, whether it is the divine, or the ethical 
order of humanity. Antelme is our witness to the fact that the Nazis were not 
gods with the power to change humans into something inhuman, but were 
human with the power merely to kill: “We are all nothing more or less than 
men, and there is nothing inhuman or superhuman in man” (Smothered 61). 
What Antelme acknowledges in the end, which Kofman relies on for her 
conclusion, is that the camps changed the enlightenment ideal of humanity. 
Antelme, having lost the idealism of the resistance fighter, was left with the 
sinister recognition that all humans are equal and equally capable of evil. This 
realization leads to Kofman’s double vision with which she ends: the 
indestructability of the human being exists with the limitless ability of the 
human to destroy (73). 
 Taking into account the changes endured by both Antelme, having 
survived the camps, and by Blanchot, who changed his political affiliation from 
fascist to resistance fighter as a result of the war, iterated by the metaphorical 
‘baptism’ in the fictional village, and the false ‘gods’ of the SS, we see that the 
underlying theme driving Kofman’s meditation is that Auschwitz changes 
people. In that respect, Kofman’s ‘survival’ shares something in common with 
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these men; she survived the Holocaust because she was ‘changed’ by living as a 
Christian, even though that change was conditional and uncomfortable because 
a part of her never changed, epitomized in the one feature to which Mémé 
repeatedly drew her attention: her Jewish nose (RORL 47/ Selected Writings 
(“Damned Food”) 247). If Blanchot and Antelme’s works gave Kofman the 
means to represent Auschwitz as the manifest content of the change within her, 
then the latent aspect of that ambivalence of her conditional conversion is the 
effect Auschwitz had on her father. Did he die as the witness said he did, still 
devoted to his God? Or, did he change, as she and so many others did. And if 
he did change, how did he?  
 
SHYLOCK AND THE UNWILLING CONVERT 
Published the same year as Smothered Words, Kofman’s article “Conversions: 
Le Marchand de Venice sous le signe de Saturne” (1988), provides the key to 
unveiling the latent content of her Auschwitz project. This article was written in 
response to Freud’s “The Theme of the Three Caskets”. In his analysis, Freud 
argues that the literary theme of the choice of three caskets containing either 
gold, silver, or lead, representing a choice between three women (“Theme” 
515) was a love theme which, on closer inspection points to the latent content 
of death (520). In Freud’s summation, death comes to be represented inversely 
as love. The tragedy of King Lear, Freud argued, is that, in rejecting his youngest 
and third daughter Cordelia, whose words of love may have sounded dull (lead) 
in comparison to those of her elder sisters’ but were in fact honest, compared to 
her sisters’, King Lear makes a mistake leading to the tragedy of his death. In 
The Merchant of Venice, the comedic nature of change means that, in 
comparison to the suitors who chose gold and silver, Bassanio’s choice of lead 
made him the winning suitor of Portia’s hand. In “Conversions”, Kofman 
critiques Freud’s analysis of two omissions: his idea of the sublimation of death 
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for love ignores the ambivalent symbolic significance of the metals, and the 
Merchant of Venice is entirely absent from his conclusion.  
The fact that Bassanio’s choice of the box full of lead in The Merchant 
makes him the winner of Portia’s hand, signals that the conversion from lead, as 
mean and base, to its opposite, gold, is success. The change implicit in the 
metallic symbolism of transformation, Kofman asserts, is made possible not 
because of metallurgy, but because of a factor Freud does not take into account: 
time. That is, Kofman argues, the ambivalence implicit in the field of choice 
between the metals is in their inversion. Since gold and silver are derived from 
lead, they each contain the possibility of their own reversal.233 This ambivalence 
manifests because of time: “with and because of time, which is thoroughly 
ambivalent, all conversions remain possible”: (avec et par le temps, 
foncièrement ambivalent, toutes les conversions restent possibles” 54). It is no 
coincidence that for Kofman, time is represented not as the chance or 
opportunity for a comedic happy ending, but in fact, as will be clear, the 
chance for the tragic crisis of conversion. 
In her article, Kofman finishes Freud’s analysis by returning to The 
Merchant and, in place of Freud’s ‘trilogy’ of the three suitors, she focuses on 
what she calls the “protagonists”: Antonio, the melancholic, Bassanio, the 
happy suitor who wins Portia’s heart, and Shylock, the Jewish merchant. If 
Shylock can argue that interest paid on loaned money reflects growth in time, 
then, Kofman argues, integral to time’s effect is also loss. In Kofman’s analysis, 
her emphasis on the nature of change is epitomized in Shylock who, associated 
with silver, undergoes such enormous transformation that he becomes 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
233 Kofman’s interest in the significance of change as a principle of metallurgic transformation is 
expressed in her autobiographical works, where a reference to her name as ‘caca’ in “Tomb for 
a Proper Name” (Selected Writings 248), returns in “’My Life’ and Psychoanalysis” as “Not in 
order that [my words] be given meaning, interpreted. But to establish an exchange that might 
transform ‘caca’ into gold” (Selected Writings 251).  
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degraded: “The lesson which his change allows us to draw about the Jew 
Shylock, contrary to all expectation, is that while he has a visceral hatred for 
Christians, he in the end converts to Christianity though against his will, it is 
true.” (“Cette leçon le juif Shylock a son tour permet de la tirer, lui qui en dépit 
de toute attente, alors qu’il possède pour les chretiens un haine viscérale, finit 
par se convertir au christianisme (contraint et forcé, il est vrai” (47)) The change 
Shylock in the end endures is loss: he loses his silver, his daughter to a Christian 
man, and even his own faith by ‘unwillingly’ converting to Christianity to stay 
close to his daughter. Thus, Kofman’s thesis of time is proven: “to stress only the 
ambivalence of love [as Freud does], is therefore to misrecognize the more 
general ‘theme’ of ambivalence, of the double face of time, the condition of all 
conversions, all reversals” (my translation, 68). In this respect, Kofman has 
politicized Shylock’s loss in the comedic play as a tragedy, a move laced with 
the latent content of her own biography.  
 In dedicating Smothered to her father, Antelme, and Blanchot we see 
Kofman iterating the trilogy evident in her “Conversions” article. As in The 
Merchant of Venice, one of the three ‘protagonists’ of her memoir, is Jewish. 
Unlike Shylock, however, rabbi Berek Kofman died a Jew, resisting the laws of 
the SS camps to honour the laws of his God. Like Shylock’s daughter, Sarah 
Kofman converted. If her conversion was necessary, though unwilling, and 
therefore incomplete, does Kofman represent Shylock’s daughter or Shylock, or 
both? That slippage is an important aporia that signals the double bind of her 
relation to her father. Kofman’s stress on the role of time in conversion raises 
the latent aspect of time’s effect on her father, leading to the question: how did 
Auschwitz change him because, as she expresses, in time “all conversions are 
possible”? If rabbi Kofman entered the camps as a believing holy man, did he 
die that way? Or, can we see that rabbi Kofman died in terms inverse to that 
described by the witnesses? If the witness claims he died praying, could rabbi 
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Kofman have, in fact, died, ‘as if in prayer’, like the Muselmann? This image, I 
argue, signals the Nachträglichkeit of the Kofman’s representation of Auschwitz 
as the presence of the Muselmann in the shadow, adding another dimension to 
the ‘suffocation‘ of her own testimony as her discomfort with the shadow of 
unwilling conversion. That is, in the real of Auschwitz, those who died there, 
including her father, were gripped by the threat of apostasy as the ‘ferocious 
irony’ of being called Muselmänner.  
 In one sense, we can say that the autobiography in Smothered Words is 
in how Auschwitz represents the trauma of her father’s death in her. It is her 
relationship to his death as a survivor of the Holocaust, and her survival by 
pretending to be a good little Christian girl, that Shylock’s ‘conversion’ in the 
tragic sense becomes visible as an uncomfortable possibility in her 
representation of her father there. Yet, in place of her father, her own testimony 
rises up in a guilt for what she had done. What she works through alongside this 
trauma of surviving in Smothered Words, is the guilt reflective of 
melancholia.234 In his research on depression, “Mourning and Melancholia”, 
Freud takes as his premise the symptoms of loss and sorrow found in people 
who are mourning loved ones who have died, and argues that the condition of 
depression reflects a death which is not actual but imaginary. The ‘death’ of a 
subject’s loved object is a self-inflicted separation from the object of love, 
usually done so out of necessity. The fact the loved one has not died only 
exacerbates the condition of mourning: there is no proper mourning which can 
be worked through and resolved because there is no proper death. Identifying 
who the subject has made dead inside her is indicated in how the subject 
speaks of the ejected loved-one. Freud notes that, “we perceive that the 
[subject’s] self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Kofman’s depression is clearly reflected in the narrative of RORL describing her rejection of 
her biological mother in place of a French ‘saviour’ kind of mother; I would argue a 
complementary depression is expressed in Smothered with respect to her father and her faith. 
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been shifted away from it on to the patient’s own ego” (586). That is, the death 
has happened only within the subject, and being the cause of that death 
contributes to a sense of guilt.  
In inadvertently causing her father’s death, and the death of her religion 
emotionally within her by taking Mémé as her mother and pretending to be a 
Christian girl, Kofman inflicted a kind of death of her father and her faith in her. 
Thus, her survival is riddled by the guilt of what she had done to her father’s 
legacy, tracing her adult life with a melancholic depression, which she tried to 
work through, through her work with Freud. If she is more Shylock than her 
father, then the unspeakable of the death camps, that Muselmann as the 
Christian exception who demands both conversion and an answer to the call to 
bear witness, leaves her choking. It is in that web of associations of which 
Kofman’s intellectual sensibility is famous, that her Auschwitz echoes with the 
unspoken name of the Muselmann. In that respect, what is consciously latent in 
Kofman’s personal trauma of her ambivalent survival and her father’s restless 
death, reflects an authentic representation of those who were, against their will, 





The philosophical texts of this chapter exemplify how the messiah and the 
Muselman return in secular thought to problematize the universal of equality, 
and so explain, to an extent, the tendencies introduced by my review of 
Benjamin’s and Freud’s works. While Rosenzweig sees the messiah as a 
contested figure that leads to his unconscious redefinition of redemption as 
non-partisan in the ethical call of The Star, Derrida takes a different approach. 
The messiah, the figure, is a partisan subject that is unable to address the 
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anticipated equality and salvation of all the singularities of the exception. In 
order to establish terms for the promise for justice for ‘all’, the partisan figure is 
essentialized as ‘desert-like messianism’. Visible in these two messianic returns 
is a particularly striking ambivalence to the Christian figure: that ambivalence is 
caused not because the Christian figure is hated, I would say, but because the 
Christian figure exemplifies the impossibility of equality. A different 
ambivalence is expressed in the Muselmann. His ghosted presence in Kofman’s 
memoir as signaling the nightmare of her father’s death, and her nightmare of 
surviving the holocaust, reflecting in a narrow sense how surviving was equal 
both inside and outside the camps, stands as the fulfillment of the Christian call 
to convert, which for the Jew is a betrayal both in life and death. You might say 
that the return of the messiah ‘without’ a face in Derrida, Benjamin and even 
Rosenzweig, is complemented by the grotesque guise of the Muselmann. 
Where Derrida loosely associated assimilation to western secular life as 
using, if not believing in, Christian culture, Kofman may be said to have 
philosophized conversion, as did Rosenzweig. Unlike Rosenzweig, Kofman did 
not embrace Judaism against secularism but in fact explored every avenue made 
available by secularism to find some resolution: in feminisms, psychoanalysis, 
and existentialist philosophy. What remains latent in her meditation on what is 
inexplicable about Auschwitz is her unconscious conversion to the secular 
culture represented by the human rights politics of Blanchot and Antelme. 
Perhaps she does not notice that the fight for the liberation of the exception in 
human rights discourse is a Christian project, though one could not say she did 
not recognize its perverse irony in Mémé’s efforts to save her. Thus, Kofman and 
Derrida, having chosen secular conversion, engaged with the exception in a 
state of unease, while Rosenzweig, perhaps privileged, as Paul was, to be 
‘anointed’ by an ecstatic event, his “interpellation beyond interpellation” to 
eternal life, answered by discarding the condition of conversion. Perhaps 
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Rosenzweig’s assertion that eternal life was the promise for ‘all’ people was a 
regression to Paul’s first-century position. I cannot be the judge of that, but I will 
say this: his personal and intellectual life resolved what Freud identified as the 
dilemma of a crime by answering the call intended for him, as a Jew.  
The exception points to the trauma which transformed Paul’s call for 
eternal life into a new call, that of equality on condition of the Christ. If human 
rights identifies the terms of the universal by including what has been excluded, 
returning as the endless deferral of the universal in Derrida’s sense of the 
messianic, then we may see the ‘exception’ as the correction integral to Paul’s 
trauma in his time. If the exception of human rights discourse is the return of the 
objet a of Jesus Christ in different terms, we see the long vision of the recurring 
pattern identified by Žižek in ideology: that which is excluded from the 
symbolic, returns in the real of history, ad infinitum. This cycle of secularism 
describes the cycle Žižek identifies as integral to ideology, which may or may 
not start with Paul. What is clear by this pattern is that Paul’s exception is found 
today in human rights discourse: it is the Thing, a piece of the real that not only 
has already returned differently, but will return again in a new guise.  
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CHAPTER 7: THE MESSIAH AND THE MUSELMANN IN CONTEMPORARY 
CULTURE 
 
   
INTRODUCTION 
 
Lacan makes the case that trauma never returns the same way; yet, its return as 
“unveiled” or invisible, is a consistent feature. The impossibility of looking for 
the repetition of what has no distinguishing features is a paradox explains why 
the remainder of the first-century trauma of the doxa, or the objet a, is the 
exception. The exceptional man, Jesus, returns through secularism in the guise 
of the political exception, the messianic as Rosenzweig’s ‘star’ or Derrida’s 
inhuman ‘messianism’, as well as the counter to the messianic in the 
Muselmann, the Jewish exception to the rule of the Nazi state that takes on a 
ghosted presence in Kofman’s memoir and a special figure of justice in 
Agamben’s revision. The differences amongst these objets a revolve around the 
binary of the exception: the one whose distinction makes him/her superior to 
the rule and the one whose distinction makes him/her inferior to the rule. This is 
the same binary that is at the root of the secular corrective project of human 
rights discourse. To say that this binary dates to Paul’s time, because of Paul or 
because of early Christianity, is a proposition based on the logic of Chapter 5, 
but is also a small part of a larger picture I have only been able to access in 
part. In this provisional sense, the logic that the first-century trauma is manifest 
as the ‘unveiled’ of the exception that returns in one of its forms explains my 
choice of the cultural examples of the objets a of my project.  
 As with my focus on the objets a in philosophical projects in the 
previous chapter, I shall consider cultural works in this chapter which appear to 
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have a connection with a traumatic event, but shall focus on the post-WWII 
cultural movement known as postmodernism. Cultural production during this 
time has been defined by Jameson in Postmodernism as being determined by 
the demands of late capitalism, where the aesthetic interest in “depthlessness” 
(9), a “waning of affect” (10), the breakdown in temporality reflected in the 
schizophrenic (30), must be seen as strategies for a ‘global cognitive mapping’ 
of the profusion of political ideological concerns “on a social as well as a 
spatial scale” (54). The social and political concerns paralleling Jameson’s 
vision of cultural production include: in the humanities and social sciences, a 
return to the Holocaust through the flurry of memoirs, coinciding with court 
cases and testimonial projects; on the scientific level, a growing concern with 
the threat of nuclear technology, cyborg dominance and global warming; and 
in Human Rights discourse, spearheaded by the Second- wave feminism, a fight 
for equality exemplified in identity politics, gay liberation, animal rights, and 
most recently, mental health survivor discourse. These concerns loosely define 
the social and political background of cultural material from which I have 
chosen two works as exemplary of the objets a for analysis in this chapter. 
 Science fiction is a secular cultural project wherein anxiety with the 
future bears out in ethical questions about science, the right of life, and the 
impact of the machine on life. It is not surprising, considering this tension, that 
the messianic figure is so prominent in this genre during the postmodern period. 
Ruppersburg observes that since the seventies, there has been a noted increase 
of messiah figures in science-fiction films, which are “reactionary in their 
rejection of science and their advocacy of the supernatural,” (“Alien Messiah in 
Recent Science Fiction Films” 160). The anticipation of the ‘one’, the exception 
as saviour, capable of defeating the cyborgs in The Matrix (1999) is a case in 
point. It is possible that the messianic figure in that film inspired Žižek to title 
his meditation on the attack of the World Trade Centre (WTC) on September 11, 
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2001, Welcome to the Desert of the Real, especially since, as Žižek argues, 
Benjamin’s messianic expectation associated with the future redemption returns 
in the aftermath of 9/11.  
The relation between film and philosophy is at the centre of Žižek’s text 
in which he argues that the event made real the crises of Hollywood disaster 
films, such as Independence Day, signifying the attack as the return of a past 
trauma. Taking Žižek’s implicit invitation to look for an anterior trauma of 9/11 
in film, I would suggest that, of the films that would be useful for this analysis, 
neither Independence Day nor The Matrix quite compares to Stanley Kubrick’s 
science-fiction film, 2001: A Space Odyssey (1968). This film stands out 
because of two compelling associations: for one, there is a messianic-like figure 
at the end of Kubrick’s film which promises at least a formalistic dialogue with 
Žižek’s post-9/11 messianic hope; for another, the resonance of the annum, 
2001, points to the future anterior structure of Freud’s idea of the unconscious 
in Where it was, there will I be. In imaginary terms, the film seems to be proof 
of Žižek’s theory that an American film did anticipate the return of the real in 
9/11. For the purposes of determining to what extent the exception of Paul’s 
real returns in secularism, I shall read Žižek’s event of 9/11 with Kubrick’s 2001 
as the first of two cultural analyses in this chapter. 
 With respect to my choice for the second cultural case study, my focus is 
on the protagonist of a postmodern text that is analogous to the singularity of 
the Jewish exception in Auschwitz. Bettelheim’s observation that the 
Muselmann behaved like his autistic patients is a strategy of analogy that 
inspired Santner retroactively to identify Schreber as “a sort of Muselmann” 
(Psychotheology 54). Catherine Malabou associates victims of brain lesions with 
psychotics like the Muselmann, whose inability to speak elicits from her a kind 
of Agambenian injunction to witness: “To gather the other’s pain is not to take 
his place, but to restore it to him” (The New Wounded 215). In his somewhat 
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flippant way, Žižek suggests that the Muselmann’s state of psychosis reflects 
“the new form of subjectivity (autistic, indifferent, deprived of affective 
engagement)… [which] is less a form of life than a form of death” (Living in End 
Times 296). Žižek’s predicate of ‘new’ to describe the autistic subject is 
somewhat misleading since the autist has been a part of psychoanalytic 
discourse for as long as schizophrenia has been.  
What is shared by Santner, Malabou and Žižek, is a recognition that 
autism is a psychosis. The psychotic subjectivity is expressed in the formalistic 
experiments of the postmodern movement known as language poetry,235 which 
draws on the experiments of the modernist period, such as Gertrude Stein’s 
Tender Buttons (1911) and James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939). Whereas 
Lacan focused on Joyce’s psychosis and his disabled relation to the NOF in 
Seminar XXIII, I aim to follow the avant-garde tradition inspired by Stein’s 
language games of homosexual love through to North American (Canadian and 
U.S.) postmodernism. Anne Carson’s Autobiography of Red is avowedly of 
Stein’s tradition and promises to give focus to the “new” subjectivity Žižek 
names, in that its protagonist, Geryon, is an autist. Yet Geryon is an autist in the 
postmodern aesthetic, being a pastiche of other identities of the exception. As a 
being resurrected from the ancient Greek winged beast, which killed Herakles, 
Geryon is the exception both of life (being un-dead) and humanity (being 
beast). His ‘bestiality’ is ironically paired with his homosexuality, otherwise 
expressing the exception of hetersoexual normativity. In Case Study #4, I shall 
analyse how Carson’s Red represents a new hybrid of the exception, which 
promises to offer interesting insights into the return of Paul’s real. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 A larger project would consider the variety of experiments in this tradition including work by 
Lyn Hejinian, Ron Silliman, and Christian Bök, as well as the more performance-based work by 
the Four Horsemen poets, bp Nichol, Paul Dutton, and Steve McCaffery, and to name a few. 
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As Žižek points out in Welcome to the Desert of the Real, the attack of the 
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, the event otherwise known as 
9/11, was more than a breach of security by religious fundamentalists; the ‘real’ 
of the event collided with the cinematic fantasy of Hollywood disaster films like 
Escape to New York, and Independence Day: “It is not that reality entered our 
image; the image entered and shattered reality (i.e. the symbolic coordinates 
which determine what we experience as reality)” (16). Evident in Hollywood 
disaster films, Žižek argues, is the fact that “we are haunted by nightmarish 
visions of catastrophes” (17) reflecting an anterior trauma that was missed: “… 
the true choice apropos of historical traumas is not the one between 
remembering or forgetting them: traumas we are not ready or able to remember 
haunt us all the more forcefully” (22). In Žižek’s terms, what haunts us is the 
unconscious recognition that what was missed was the “crucial ethical 
opportunity” to take action. If, as Žižek argues, the fantasy of catastrophe in 
America’s cinema can be seen as expressing a historical failure to act ethically, 
prefiguring the return of that original trauma in the breach of the “real” of 9/11, 
then I aim to make my way to the missed trauma by reading the event through a 
film.  
Before September 11, the year ‘2001’ had currency in American culture 
as the future conceived by Stanley Kubrick in his 1968 science fiction film, 
2001: A Space Odyssey; the film ended with an inexplicable image of a fetus 
looking down on earth. In Arthur C. Clarke’s novel, this ‘star child’ figure saved 
mankind from imminent destruction by detonating the nuclear weapons 
surrounding earth, giving the figure a messianic status; the open-ended quality 
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of this image in the last minutes of 2001 is ambiguous. As a result of 9/11, 
according to Slavoj Žižek, time stopped in America: “in the expectation of a 
Messianic Event, life comes to a standstill” (Welcome 7). Though Kubrick’s 
2001 is not ostensibly a film of catastrophe, in Žižek’s terms, I aim to explore to 
what extent we can read the future anterior of the event of 9/11 as prefigured in 
Kubrick’s science fiction film, and then consider whether or not the messianic 
tension in post-9/11 America is homologous with the ending of 2001. While I 
am using Žižek to establish the equality between film and the philosophical 
engagements with 9/11 through a trauma, I keep in mind Sinnerbrink’s concept 
of “film as philosophy” (134), paying attention to the relation between the 
aesthetic and affective elements that inspire “cinematic thinking—a non-
conceptual or affective thinking in images that resists cognitive closure or 
theoretical subsumption” (139). In looking at 2001 through the terms of film as 
philosophy, my approach is distinguished from the imaginary-based focus of the 
early psychoanalytic film scholarship as found in work by Christian Metz236 and 
Laura Mulvey,237 in that it adapts the more ‘real’ focused psychoanalytic 
approach to cinema as exemplified in work by Žižek238 and also Joan Copjec.239 
Taking the approach forged by these two latter scholars in seeing film as 
ideologically driven, my ulterior motive is to consider the phenomenological 
aspect of Žižek’s and Kubrick’s saviours; what do these saviours say of Paul’s 
real and do they say the same thing or not? 
  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
236 See Metz’s The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and Cinema, 1982. 
237 Mulvey argues that cinema is determined by the male gaze on the feminine subject in 
“Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Screen 16:3 (1975): 6-18.  
238 Žižek’s projects include one on Hitchock’s films, Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques 
Lacan Through Popular Culture (1992) and a project on Kieślowski’s films, Fright of Real Tears: 
Krzysztof Kieślowski Between Theory and Post-theory (1998).  
239 Copjec critiques the historicist approach in cultural analysis in Read My Desire: Lacan 
against the Historicists (1996). 	  	  
 	  
  282	  
DAWN OF TIME 
2001: A Space Odyssey was produced during the height of the Cold War and 
America’s space race with Russia. When it was released in 1968, a year before 
the Apollo 11 moon landing would be witnessed by the world on television, 
traditional film audiences complained about the film’s length and weak plot 
and negligible character development. Movie critic Renata Adler, writing for the 
New York Times, found the pacing unbearably slow: “almost a half hour passes 
before the first man appears and the first word is spoken, and an entire hour 
goes before the plot reveals itself.”240 In her review, she complained that only 
science fiction buffs could understand the film, concluding: “By the end, three 
irreconcilable plot lines—the slab, Dullea’s aging, the period bedroom—are 
simply left there like a Rorschach with murky implications of theology.” As if 
reflecting a generational divide, the difficulties Adler identified, which were 
shared by a mature audience, were not an issue for the younger crowd that 
found those ambiguities refreshing; the film became a cult classic.241  
According to Philip Kuberski, Kubrick “extended the modernist tradition 
initiated by Joyce and Pound” (10) in his adaptation of Homer’s Odyssey to 
mankind’s journey of Darwinian evolution, from hunter-gatherer ape-men to 
scientists exploring the universe. The half-hour introduction which Adler 
complains about is decidedly slow: its vistas of idyllic planes and large skies 
reinforce the aimless pace of prehistoric man passively waiting for food to 
appear, until the sudden appearance one dawn of the monolith initiates an 
evolutionary shift: mankind invents the tool to kill animals for food and other 
sapiens for territory. From the bone-wielding prehistoric man we leap thousands 
of years into the future to mankind’s space exploration in 2001. America has 
colonized the moon and in the process, has excavated another monolith. Its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
240 Renata Adler. “The Screen: ‘2001’ is Up, Up and Away.” New York Times, April 2, 1968. 58. 
241 Barton Palmer reviews the difference in reception of 2001 in his article, “2001: The Critical 
Reception and the Generation Gap” in Robert Philip Kolker’s Stanley Kubrick’s 2001 (2006). 
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mysterious origins lead the scientists to follow a signal it is emitting to Jupiter, 
initiating the Discovery mission manned by pilots, Dave Bowman and Frank 
Poole, assisted by Discovery’s artificial intelligence, HAL 9000. HAL’s 
unexpected move to seize control of the Jupiter mission by killing the scientists 
who are on board in hibernation tanks, and Frank, as well, leads Dave to 
‘disconnect’ HAL and take back the mission. Dave passes through the Star-Gate 
to arrive on Jupiter, living out his last days in a hotel room alone until an 
inexplicable event leads to the appearance of the “Star Child” with which the 
film ends. 
 The trouble audiences have had with the incommensurable narrative 
lines in 2001 situates the film in the postmodern tradition. In Postmodernism: 
Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Frederic Jameson argues that science 
fiction is the postmodern version of the historical novel; it projects the 
conditions of the present as the past of a distant future: “For if the historical 
novel ‘corresponded’ to the emergence of historicity… science fiction equally 
corresponds to the waning or the blockage of that historicity, and, particularly, 
in our own time [in the postmodern era] to its crisis and paralysis, its 
enfeeblement and repression” (284). Jameson identifies that crisis of history is 
an amnesia created by and in the cultural logic of late capitalism; engrossed in 
participating in the commodification of culture, the bourgeoisie can 
conveniently forget they were once just working class.242  
An enfeeblement of history, and even an ironic historical amnesia, can 
be seen played out in the film’s representation of prehistoric man in connection 
to the future space race, suggesting the film’s usefulness for Jameson’s research; 
even so, Jameson does not include 2001 in his chapter on science fiction, but in 
his chapter on architecture (116). Why does Jameson relegate 2001 to Kubrick’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
242 This sentiment is exemplified in his introductory definition of the postmodern: “It is safest to 
grasp the concept of the postmodern as an attempt to think the present historically in an age that 
has forgotten how to think historically in the first place” (Jameson Postmodernism ix.) 
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cinematic treatment of outer space reflecting a radical shift in gravity also 
played out by architects such as Frank Gehry, and sidestep its contribution to 
science fiction, utopia or other fictions? Perhaps 2001 was less effective than 
Philip K. Dick’s work because it did not directly prove his theory of the late 
capitalist culture since it is, as Adler noted, riddled with structural problems 
such as hardly any dialogue, over-long silences, narrative disruptions and 
‘irreconcilable plot lines’. The fact is, Kubrick’s work troubles Jameson’s Marxist 
postmodern reading. That is, 2001 may reflect a blockage of the past in 
terrifying anticipation of the future, but the tension that drives 2001 is not about 
suppressed class politics but the violence of race politics. The issue in 2001 is 
not historical amnesia but the return of the repressed. 
Susan Sontag critiqued 2001 because its cinematographic style emulated 
fascist conventions of art, suggesting its sympathy to Nazi totalitarian ideology: 
“Fascist aesthetics… flow from (and justify) a preoccupation with situations of 
control, submissive behaviour, and extravagant effort… The fascist dramaturgy 
centers on the orgiastic; choreography alternates between ceaseless motion and 
congealed, static, “virile” posing. Fascist art glorifies surrender, it exalts 
mindlessness; it glamorizes death.”243 Sontag’s sentiments about 2001 were 
framed by her critical response to a recent publication by Leni Riefenstahl, 
which, for Sontag, expressed the return of a fascist aesthetic in contemporary 
American culture.244 Film scholar, Robert Kolker concedes to Sontag’s 
assessment: “Yet, undeniably, the film points toward surrender to a hypnotic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Robert Phllip Kolker, A Cinema of Loneliness: Pen, Kubrick, Scorsese, Spielberg, Altman, 
127. 
244 Sontag’s sensitivity to the fascist aesthetic in 1970’s America is explained in her critical 
review of Leni Riefenstahl’s The Last of the Nuba, “Fascinating Fascism” (The New York Review 
of Books, (Feb 6, 1975). Sontag argues that “Riefenstahl’s films are still effective because, among 
other reasons, their longings are still felt, because their content is a romantic ideal to which 
many continue to be attached, and which is expressed in such diverse modes of cultural 
dissidence and propaganda for new forms of community as the youth/rock culture, primal 
therapy, Laing’s antipsychiatry, Third World camp-following, and belief in gurus and the occult” 
(part 1, second last paragraph).	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force and suggests that this surrender is inevitable” (Cinema of Loneliness 127). 
Some scholars have disputed whether a fascist aesthetic can even be defined, 
since, as Linda Schulte-Sasse points out, fascist projects draw from several 
genres, movements and images; even so, Schulte-Sasse re-contextualizes 
Benjamin’s interpretation of how National Socialism used art for ideological 
purposes,245 affirming a certain tendency in this aesthetic: “National Socialism 
turns the ‘kitsch of death’ experience into something real, inspiring and 
organizing people to march intoxicated to their own deaths” (142). As I will 
show, expressions such as “intoxication”, “orgiastic”, “hypnotic force”, and 
especially the prominence of death define what can be understood as a fascist 
sensibility in Kubrick’s film, but, contrary to Sontag’s and Kolker’s assessment, 
this aesthetic should not be seen as a liability.  
The distant future of this film is framed by its origin in the distant past, 
the idyllic landscape of prehistoric man. This initial scene would signal what 
Schulte-Sasse identifies as National Socialism’s “nostalgia to ‘colonize the 
fantasy of life’” (142): in 2001, the evolution of mankind justifies America’s 
technological development in space colonization. What Kolker identifies as 
‘inevitable surrender to a hypnotic force’ is indicated in the impact of the 
monolith on both prehistoric and modern man. Not only does this artifact 
connect prehistoric man to future man through the technology it inspires, its 
recurrence signals a destiny, which man blindly accepts. Kubrick’s film may 
start with “The Dawn of Man,” in which apes lived in caves and squabbled over 
who could drink from the water pool, but when that mysterious block of 
finished stone, the monolith, brings on Richard Strauss’s Thus Spoke 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  245	  As a complement to Schulte-Sasse’s work, I here quote from Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in 
the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”, which defines how fascism manipulated art to promote 
war:  “War is beautiful because it establishes man’s dominion over the subjugated machinery by 
means of gas masks, terrifying megaphones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful 
because it initiates the dreamt-of metallization of the human body. War is beautiful because it 
enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns”, (241).	  
 	  
  286	  
Zarathustra, the distant future contracts into the prehistoric as present, initiating 
a fusion between the beauty of the music and the violence of the image as if 
they had been predetermined by the monolith. As Strauss’s “Zarathustra” is used 
to choreograph the ape-man’s pulverizing of animal bones inter-cut with the 
death of a live bull in slow motion, mankind’s first animal killing is signified, 
followed by the killing of a member of the other tribe which signifies mankind’s 
first murder. As scholars have noted, this music signals how Kubrick has 
recreated the Darwinian narrative of evolution through the Nietzschean 
narrative of the Overman.246 Moreover, though the fusion of the pulverizing of 
the bones with the music expresses a fascist aesthetic of orgiastic ‘mindlessness’ 
in Sontag’s terms, or the “intoxication” identified by Schulte-Sasse, this scene 
does not promote fascistic ideology. Filmed from a low-angle shot, similar to 
Leni Riefenstahl’s framing of athletes in Olympia to emphasize classical 
representations of the human body, the ape-man’s hairy arms obscure muscles 
or any of the details associated with classical Greek beauty. In fact, his ecstatic 
performance of Strauss’s music indicative of the hope of the Overman can only 
be seen as ironic even as it critiques the fascist fusion of art and war. The fact 
these bones become tools of war, which through centuries, are transformed into 
tools for space colonization, highlights that Kubrick’s representation of the 
American space race through a fascist aesthetic reflects a criticism of the 
historical continuum of totalitarianism, and as I will shortly argue, that criticism 
is tied to a critique of Nazi fascism. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 In the final section, I will discuss how the Nietzschean-centered analyses by Jerold Abrams 
and Leonard Wheat falter in light of the fact that the monolith functions in the film as the “God 
concept”, to use Kubrick’s words in interviews with Eric Nordern for Playboy, (1968) 49 and 
Joseph Gelmis (1970) 93, in Gene D. Philip’s Stanely Kubrick: Interviews.  
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According to Geoffrey Cocks, Kubrick was obsessed with the Holocaust 
and Nazi race supremacy,247 an obsession that was expressed in most of his 
films, and is evident in 2001 in his choice of German-Habsburg music.248 
Specifically, Cocks points out that Kubrick chose a recording of the Berlin 
Philharmonic’s performance of Thus Spoke Zarathustra that had been directed 
by Herbert von Karajan, a conductor whose work Kubrick would use again in 
The Shining. Cocks draws attention to the fact that Karajan was a card-carrying 
Nazi who conducted orchestras for Nazi functions, including Hitler’s birthday 
(Wolf at the Door 119). He also criticizes Kubrick’s use of Strauss’s Zarathustra 
for reflecting “a desire to embrace cosmic evolution as a way out of the literal 
dead end of the machinations of Nazis” (117), which led to ignoring the 
pessimism of Nietzsche’s eternal return. This criticism presupposes Kubrick was 
promoting enlightenment progress in line with Clarke’s approach in the 
novel.249 Whether or not Clarke’s faith in mankind’s future determined Kubrick’s 
conscious choices in 2001, there is too much ambiguity and even ambivalence 
in the film, in conjunction with an oppressive determinism inspired by the 
monolith, not to see at least an unconscious expression of Nietzsche’s 
pessimism, reflected ironically and unsentimentally in Kubrick’s fascist aesthetic 
and his choice of music. Identifying a Nazi connection to Kubrick’s choice of 
Karajan’s version of Strauss’s “Zarathustra” seems to be observed only by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
247 In his analysis The Wolf At the Door: Stanley Kubrick, History & The Holocaust, Cocks 
makes the point that scholarship has yet to do full justice to the evidence of Kubrick’s indirect 
engagement with the Holocaust in his work (Cocks 2004 17).	  
248 It can be seen explicitly in his planned but never actualized Holocaust project, The Aryan 
Papers, based on Louis Begley’s Wartime Lies, and found implicit in imagery in The Shining, 
(Cocks 2004 2), and in the use of Habsburgian music. 	  249	  Clarke’s short story, “The Sentinel” (1948), inspired the script he and Kubrick wrote for the 
film, 2001, while Clarke’s novel of the same title was being written during the filming of 2001 
and was published after the film’s release.	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Cocks.250 Even though one could argue that Kubrick chose Karajan’s 
interpretation of Strauss because it was widely recognized as brilliant, it is 
noteworthy that Strauss’s music, much like Nietzsche’s philosophy, has another 
connection to the Nazi party. Strauss was appointed president of the 
Reichsmusikkamer (RMK) by Goebbels to promote German music for the nation 
and worldwide as an example of Germanic superiority.251 Though Strauss was 
not a party member, he took advantage of the regime’s investment in his 
work.252 What is evident is that these historical associations with Strauss’s 
“Zarathustra” happen to support the fascistic aesthetic with which Kubrick 
represents the monolith. In that respect, Strauss’s “Zarathustra” could be seen to 
exemplify the threat of the eternal return of totalitarianism in the imperial 
determinism of the space race in 2001. In short, the fascistic aesthetic 
permeating Kubrick’s choices come together as critical of America’s 
technological dominance, compelling future astronauts “to march to their 
deaths” at the limits of space and so become pawns for a dominant force from 
‘beyond the infinite’.253 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 “Kubrick probably knew something about [Karajan’s association with Hitler], if for no reason 
than in the 1950s Jewish groups in America had loudly protested engagements by former Nazi 
party members such as von Karajan and soprano Elizabeth Schwarzkopf” (Cocks 119.)  
251 In Composers of the Nazi Era: Eight Portraits (New York, Oxford U Press, 2000) Michael 
Kater outlines in detail the rise and fall of Richard Strauss in Nazi-ruled Germany, and the 
tension that was created between his self-interest in promoting his work for financial gain, and 
the Nazi regime’s interest in using his artistic reputation to promote German culture 
internationally (237).	  
252 In The Twisted Muse, (2001) Kater defines the music industry under the Third Reich, its 
cultural investment in the nation’s musicians and their cultural and artistic productivity. Strauss 
did well under the Nazi regime until his associations with Jews and other issues lead to his 
weakening reputation: in 1936, Strauss earned 80,000 marks for royalties on his music (10).	  
253 What I see as Kubrick’s critique of totalitarianism in 2001 is expressed in somewhat different 
terms by film critic, J. Hoberman who argues the film represents “a dim view of human nature”, 
as does Cockwork Orange, and both are similar in principle to the war films of Paths of Glory, 
Dr. Strangelove, and Full Metal Jacket, three films which focus on ‘state-sanctioned murder’. 
The question is, which of Kubrick’s films do not represent authority as sinister? “The Shining is 
about What? Room 237 Uses exegesis to uncover whether Kubrick’s film is about Indians, the 
Holocaust, or Bears”. The Tablet: A New Read on Jewish Life. www.tablemag.com. March 28, 
2013: 2. Web. July 26, 2013.  
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Kubrick’s reference to the Nietzschean super-man overlaid on the 
Darwinian narrative of the origins of man in 2001, draws us into the Nazi 
Zeitgeist as described by Hannah Arendt in The Origins of Totalitarianism. The 
trajectory of the Nazi rise to power, she argues, evolved from Darwinian 
evolutionary science as the ‘dawn of racism’ in combination with strategies of 
nineteenth-century imperialist expansion. Nazis adapted colonial methods of 
rule, wherein the proxy agents who maintained governance of imperialist 
colonies forced a separation between the lawmakers and the law enforcers, thus 
absolving the lawmakers of moral responsibility. In the sphere of science, 
Darwin’s secularization of the Biblical narrative, replacing Adam and Eve with 
ape as mankind’s ancestor, led to theories of racial superiority that were central 
to Nazi thinking: “Thanks to race an ‘elite’ would be formed […] the 
acceptance of a race, the race ideology as such, would become conclusive 
proof that an individual was well bred, that ‘true blood’ ran through his veins 
and that a superior origin implied superior rights.” (Arendt 1968 180). Race 
supremacy, Arendt highlights, was the blueprint for the Nazi revision of the 
“rights of man”, justifying the murder of millions of Jewish people under the 
guise of lawful execution (160). 
The determinism described by Arendt’s narrative of the rise of Nazi 
totalitarianism can be seen in the diegetic influence of the monolith on the 
space race in 2001. While scholars have interpreted the monolith as 
representing the aggressive alien identified in Arthur C. Clarke’s novel, 
Kubrick’s abstract notion of the “God concept”254 have led scholars such as 
Kuberski to associate the monolith with Jung’s principle of the “First Cause,” 
wherein “God would thus be not only the essence of spiritual light… but also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  254	  Kubrick’s words in interviews with Eric Nordern for Playboy, (1968) 49 and Joseph Gelmis 
(1970) 93, in Gene D. Philip’s Stanely Kubrick: Interviews.	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the darkest, nethermost cause of Nature’s blackest deeps”.255 As a supernatural 
force, the monolith may stand as the promise of the monotheistic concept of an 
ethical God, but its association with weapons of war makes it equal to the 
divine authority that served Nazi’s race-based ideology. This signals a 
threatening aspect of the artifact. It not only seems to inspire the apes to use the 
bone as a weapon for murder, it is connected to the relentlessness of the Jupiter 
mission evident in the struggle between HAL and Dave. Through Kubrick’s 
manipulation of the fascist aesthetic, this monolith emanates a silent supra-
human lethal energy through its causal role in technological developments used 
to secure territory and power; in effect, the space race is a sublimation of fascist 
totalitarianism. Manifested in the dual forces of transcendence and technology, 
the artifact’s anonymity embodies a question, which I argue is never resolved in 
the film: did the alien artifact inspire man to aggression? Or did man, on 
reflecting on the artifact’s surface, smooth and shiny like a mirror, find an 
aggression within himself/herself? This is one of several instances in which the 
film refuses interpretation or reductionism, in Sinnerbrink's terms of film-
philosophy (137). 
The traumatic content of technology is shown in the transition from the 
prehistoric “past” to the “present” of the film in the cut of two technological 
devices: the air-borne bone-weapon and the floating spaceship. The implication 
of the children apes throwing the bone in the air, is that the space race is 
similarly motivated by naiveté. Between the bone of the Darwinian narrative 
and the spaceship of Kubrick’s future, thousands of years of ongoing naiveté 
have been excised. Between the bone and the spaceship, advances in weapon 
technology have served to change the conditions of war and murder. The 
question is: what do weapons have to do with the space race? The Cuban 
Missile crisis in 1963 epitomized the intensification of America’s relations with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  255	  Kuberski 166 quoting from Jung’s Collected Works, Vol 8, 103	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its nuclear adversary, the USSR, and influenced Kubrick’s Dr. Strangelove 
(1964). Since the USSR was also America’s only adversary in the space-race, I 
would argue that America’s anxiety in the 1960s about world nuclear disaster 
informs the space race in 2001. Taking this historical detail into account, the 
film-cut between the bone and the space ship reeks like a newly sutured wound 
barely concealing what remains extraneous: nuclear disaster. Taking into 
account Jameson’s analysis of postmodernism, we see that, while history has 
been repressed in Kubrick’s 2001, the images have not been enfeebled, but 
rather, are charged with an overwhelming nihilism inspired by America’s 
nuclear technology. 
Considering that the technology of 9/11 is rudimentary, there is no 
obvious connection between the event and Kubrick’s film with respect to a 
shared trauma. Moreover, the ostensible trauma of 9/11, as understood from Bin 
Laden’s large-scale efforts to expose and undermine America’s imperial status in 
world politics, is centered on America’s role in the Middle East: “... the idea of 
attacking the Towers in New York came to [Bin Laden] when he saw Israelis 
and Americans attacking the tower blocks of Beirut in 1982.”256 That Bin 
Laden’s fantasy of the WTC aimed to punish America for brokering a one-sided 
kind of peace in the Middle East is less interesting than considering how his 
attack speaks to America’s fantasy of catastrophe in disaster films. That is, 
Independence Day may reflect an anxiety of alien invasion, but implicit in this 
anxiety, as Žižek points out, is an unconscious guilt in being an invasive world 
power. This implicit guilt seems to agree with Bin Laden’s judgment against 
America that justified the alleged attacks. Yet, since trauma only returns in 
disguise, as has been stressed by Freud and Lacan, then what Bin Laden accuses 
America of doing is probably not the trauma that returns in the event of 9/11. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Michael Mann Incoherent Empire 23. 	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The Twin Towers signified America’s place of superiority in the world economy; 
the fact that the WTC, with its global significance, was the target, would suggest 
that the guilt which American films seem to represent is not simply, or even not 
at all, about its involvement in the Middle East. As I will explain shortly, the 
doubled quality of the towers leads to a suggestive interpretation of the trauma 
that returns in 9/11. 
In Simulations, published just after the completion of the WTC, 
Baudrillard asks: “Why are there two towers at New York’s World Trade 
Center?” and answers himself: “The fact that there are two of them signifies the 
end of all competition, the end of all original reference... The two towers of the 
WTC are the visible sign of the closure of the system in a vertigo of 
duplication…” (136). While this is a fanciful statement, it is also suggestive. In 
ending competition, the towers could be seen as consolidating America’s 
superior worldwide status; ironically, its double nature could be seen to reflect 
America’s duplication around the world in its political, cultural and economic 
dominance. In that respect, the towers represent America’s worldwide authority. 
If, as Žižek suggests, the destruction of the Twin Towers cut the real of the 
symbolic of America’s dominant role in world economies and politics, what is 
referenced in this act is not contemporary historical conditions, but the return of 
a moment in history. Notably, America’s rise to dominance coincided with the 
two events that imitated the Cold War, the use of atomic weapons on Japan to 
end WWII in August 1945. Baudrillard asks, “Why two towers?” I cannot 
answer that, but there is an uncanny parallel between the implosion of two 
towers in an American city and the nuclear bombing of two Japanese cities in 
1945. The fact America never witnessed the atomic bombings could signal what 
Žižek identifies as the haunting power of a historical event on the American 
psyche that was missed.  
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Can we see that the tools of war repressed by Kubrick’s suture erupt in 
the future of our temporal present of 9/11? It is a provocative idea, which is 
suggestive of how American Imperialism targeted by the 9/11 event appears 
equivalent to the Imperialism painted by Kubrick with his fascist brush in the 
Discovery mission heading to Jupiter. We can also propose that the guilt Žižek 
claims is represented in America’s catastrophe films, or in this case, 2001, is not 
about America’s policies in the Middle East, but about the nation’s naïve 
solution to a political problem wherein the government’s ‘crucial ethical 
opportunity’ to end WWII with nuclear experiments, implicated all American 
citizens. This is the place in which the philosophical representation and the film 
representation meet in an equivocal interpretation, especially since what is 
missed remains unknown. This interpretation is not meant to ignore the fact that 
the event and the film remain very different entities; one is real involving actual 
deaths, the other is imaginary, involving staged deaths. These significant 
qualitative differences only highlight how America’s trauma returned so 
‘forcefully’. If the associations I alluded to cannot be fully plumed, the question 
that is raised is: is there a phenomenological similarity between the salvationary 




The structure of world capitalism, WTC, on the American psyche affirmed 
America’s supreme role in global economies, and therefore, politics. It is this 
symbolic function that leads Baudrillard to write in the aftermath of the WTC’s 
destruction, that the Twin Towers elicit “a contradictory feeling of attraction 
and repulsion, and hence, somewhere, a secret desire to see them disappear” 
(Spirit of Terrorism 42). The attraction/repulsion dynamic is echoed in Spivak’s 
article responding to 9/11, in seeing the towers as the sacred site of America’s 
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imperialist power: “I will do no more now than represent the confrontation in 
September as the destruction of a temple—world trade and military power—
with which a state is associated” (“Terror: A Speech after 9/11” 91). Thus their 
destruction, or we might say, desecration, was inevitable. The fusion of 
sacredness and the inevitability of destruction presupposes Žižek’s theory of the 
trauma that leads to the messianic. Notable is the fact that the sacred energy of 
the monolith’s impact on the future 2001 is similarly fulfilled in the ‘star child’ 
figure with which the film ends. To what extent these figures share the same 
phenomenological significance shall be addressed now. 	  
As a single object from a low-angle shot reflective of the fascist aesthetic, 
the monolith stands as monstrous as a New York skyscraper. Like the Twin 
Towers, the monolith has a sacred value, indicated in the atonal chanting 
soundtrack we hear on the first few viewings. Unlike the towers whose 
attraction was rooted in its symbolic value as a totem of capitalism, inspiring 
repulsion and so destruction, the monolith is so unknowable its attraction 
inspires awe and fear. The apes feel its surface, tentatively; Dr. Hayward Floyd 
has that same hesitant touch when he faces it excavated on the moon. The 
monolith is so charismatic it even attracts the attention of the sentient computer, 
HAL, inspiring HAL’s error in diagnosing a potential breakdown of AE35. What 
HAL had hoped to achieve with this ‘error’ is never explained, but based on the 
precedent of ape-man’s aggression after seeing the monolith, we suppose but 
are never sure that the monolith had inspired HAL to commit this error as part 
of a ploy to take over the mission to Jupiter.  
HAL’s attraction to the monolith, inspiring the killing of Frank Poole and 
the three scientists, leads to the critical and disturbing scene in which Dave 
lobotomizes HAL. In this operation we witness a struggle for control of the 
Discovery mission. We trust that Dave is doing the right thing by shutting down 
HAL for having murdered four people and threatening the mission; moreover, 
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we assume that HAL, as a machine, feels no pain in the operation. Despite this 
logic, this scene plays out in entirely different and unexpected terms. As we 
listen to HAL beg Dave to give him another chance, Dave’s silent relentless 
operation on HAL’s mind seems cruel and heartless. HAL’s expressions are 
audibly emotional which stands out in this film in which hardly any emotion is 
expressed; in fact, Dave’s silent persistent operation takes on a sadistic quality 
against HAL’s pleas. As we watch Dave’s human body, his hands, in the 
innermost sanctuary of HAL’s consciousness we feel an uncanny empathy for 
HAL’s inhumanity, his physical inability to resist, as an almost human 
vulnerability: “I’m afraid. I’m afraid, Dave. Dave, my mind is going. I can feel it. 
I can feel, it Dave”. This scene literalizes a visual representation of a psychiatric 
lobotomy, concluding with HAL’s pathetic singing of “Daisy”, slowly sinking 
into incoherent base tones, creating an incongruous experience of hearing 
humanity leaking from something living, while signaling a perverse 
representation of psychological violence; perverse because, if one replaced 
HAL with a human, the illegal implications of what Dave did would be evident. 
Experiments with the mentally disabled would, interestingly enough, become 
the theme of Kubrick’s subsequent film, Clockwork Orange. 
Scholars have debated how to interpret the monolith in the film because 
of HAL’s apparent attraction to it (does the monolith not discriminate between 
man and machine, or does the monolith prefer machine?), though many see the 
artifact as a conduit for the aggressive aliens who plan to take over earth. On 
the metaphorical level, Susan White in her article, “Kubrick’s Obscene 
Shadows” cites Michael Chion’s interpretation that the artifact has a symbolic 
function, analogous to the biblical “[t]ablet of the Law without commandments” 
and argues that: “… the monolith triggers the functioning of a certain kind of 
evolutionary law, a Darwinian struggle for survival…” (130). This evolutionary 
law is related to “the social codes under which citizens of a state are required to 
 	  
  296	  
live” (130). The lack of a moral code, a law for ethical behaviour, is apparent in 
how the monolith ‘calls’ subjects to it. Its physical attraction calls the subject to 
touch; its ‘signal’ calls future mankind to its base in Jupiter; it apparently 
inspired the struggle between HAL and Dave. It is associated with inciting 
murder, deceit, manipulation, and relentless aggression in the struggle not only 
for survival, but supremacy. The monolith is represented as a sinister 
anonymous force of evil whose ‘call’ contrasts the ethical injunction of 
Rosenzweig’s “interpellation beyond interpellation”.  
Kubrick’s representation of the monolith’s “interpellation” as fascist 
indicates an unease with the ‘call’. The Nazis interpreted Nietzsche’s vision of 
the Overman as reflecting a racial distinction, which then initiated its 
implementation of the Jewish solution. I am reminded of Benjamin’s ‘weak 
messianic force’ here, and the fact that he identified how the call was 
manipulated by Social Nationalism for its self-serving project of world 
dominance. The Nazi’s delusional association of the call with aggressive acts of 
violence is echoed in Kubrick’s representation of the space race in 2001. Dave’s 
blind confidence in the value of his role in the mission reflects a blind faith in 
the benefit of the call from Jupiter. Dave eliminated HAL ostensibly because it 
overstepped its place in the anthropocentric imperial order by breeching the 
Robotic law of killing humans but also because it threatened man’s supremacy 
by answering to an authority beyond the human. The fact that both Dave and 
HAL are equally vulnerable to this ‘evil’ call points to the indiscriminate call of 
‘evil’ and to the dangers of its widespread effect in the guise of messianism. In 
one respect, this unease in the film can be equated with America’s response to 
the alleged suicide bombers’ attacking of the WTC, given voice by President 
Bush in his war against the ‘axis of evil’. The parallel ends there, however, since 
the politics expressed by the alleged bombers against America’s imperialist 
dreams shows some agreement with Kubrick’s critique of America’s space race. 
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Spivak parallels the alleged suicide bombers to liberation theologists and 
draws in Palestinian mothers as well, thereby indirectly acknowledging the 
ethical grounds of the alleged bombers’ actions, though qualifies her 
concession to their politics by her distaste for both ‘theology’ (“Terror” 88) and 
‘violence’ (95). Žižek lauds the alleged bombers for “shattering America’s 
liberal democratic consensus” (154); they “share something with Antigone” 
(142) acting out a “sacrifice to the obscure gods”; they are responding to an 
ethical call to correct an imbalance caused by America’s imperialist aims. As 
Spivak’s resistance to their religious motivations shows, what remains 
incomprehensible for the majority of western secular scholars is that political 
action done in the name of God. Žižek notes that this secular reaction against a 
religious dimension to politics inspires a new anti-Semitism, which leads to his 
question: “Is then the invisible fundamentalist terrorist the last embodiment of 
the Wandering Jew?” (151). To rephrase Žižek’s provocative point, the political 
Muslim is made alien by his/her difference to the secular west which is a 
difference identified in the Jew. In that respect, Arendt’s idea of “the discourse 
of universal human rights” is always qualified, Žižek argues; the West promises 
political inclusion until it is faced with the ‘alien’ other whose extreme 
difference defined as ‘terrorist’ justifies excluding him/her (Welcome 150). What 
Žižek identifies as the double effect of the law of human rights as protective and 
exclusive, identifies a secondary aspect of what Chion defines as the absence of 
law and social codes in the monolith as indicated by HAL’s ‘independence’. It 
also repeats the thesis this work is exploring: that the trauma of secularism is 
rooted in the double demand within secularism to achieve equality on 
condition of the Christ exception. 
The struggle between Dave and HAL in 2001 projects a future ill-
equipped to deal with the ethical terms of inhuman rights; questions about 
whether consciousness is a sign of life, and what kind of life has rights, points to 
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inadequate terminology for life in contemporary politics/policy which persist 
today.257 For the very reason that HAL the computer has a consciousness of the 
human, as it has language with which to express emotions, and even equal to 
human, exemplified in the fact it hears the call of the monolith as humans do, 
Dave’s shutting down of HAL is anthropomorphized as the lobotomy scene. In 
what transpires, the absence of law signals the limit of equality in a totalitarian 
regime wherein only certain ‘life’ is deemed worthy of being sacred enough to 
be protected. HAL is the homo sacer by default. Unlike the Muselmann who 
has been made the exception, HAL does not exist within the law to be unmade 
by it; yet, what HAL shares with the Muselmann is its inhuman status, a 
condition reflected in the psychotic’s resistance to recognizable human 
behaviour. The machine’s vulnerability to the law is in some ways similar to 
that experienced by psychotics in institutions, as described by Foucault in 
Madness and Civilization. To what extent, in cultural representation at least, 
there is a correlation between the cyborg/psychotic and the homo sacer as both 
being, in part, of the inhuman and therefore, excluded from human rights, shall 
be considered to an extent in the next section on the Muselmann. With respect 
to 2001, HAL is emblematic of the exception that exists in an antithetical 
relation to the messiah at the end of 2001; this dynamic contrasts that 
represented by Žižek’s life after 9/11, where the relation between the alleged 
hijackers and the messianic waiting is complementary. The horror of the event 
was not what the alleged hijackers did, but the shock of the trauma’s return. 
Moreover, in Žižek’s terms, in fulfilling an ethical injunction, the alleged 
hijackers answered the ‘call’ that initiated a messianic change. For Žižek, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
257 Dick’s Do Electric Sheep Dream of Sheep? inspiring Blade Runner (1992) is an example of 
this ethical dilemma that has been theorized by Donna Haraway in “A Cyborg Manifesto”. That 
is, only a society determined by the hegemony of patriarchy, would enforce a hierarchy of the 
right to life, excluding the inhuman other, whether animal or cyborg from that right, though they 
develop and contribute to society as any human would. 
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call is connected to the messianic. What I have outlined as a difference 
between philosophy and film here may be indicative of genres, but as will 
become clear, it also signifies that there is a phenomenological difference 
between Žižek’s messianic change and Kubrick’s ‘star child’ that is ideological. 
In the hotel room furnished with Louis XVI furniture on Jupiter, Dave has 
a visitation by the monolith. His reach to the monolith is a gesture echoing 
Michelangelo’s painting on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel of David reaching 
for God, signifying a biblical connection in 2001. Blindly, Dave has exchanged 
God for the monolith. He does not see what we see in the relation between the 
monolith and tools of mass destruction. Can we see Kubrick making a political 
comment in this exchange of pre-modern religion for modern secularism? That 
exchange is echoed by the way Dave is exchanged for a fetus. The montage of 
transformation in the clip of Dave on his bed, a view of the monolith, a 
blackness signifying entrance (transcendence) into the monolith, ends in our 
encounter with the ‘star child’. The logic of the cuts suggests that the ‘star child’ 
owes its life to Dave and the monolith and, looking at earth, it is destined for 
earth.  
Considering the monolith is associated with deluded notions of the ‘call’, 
in Benjamin’s terms of the ‘weak messianic power’, the ‘star child’ can only 
bode ill. This reading contrasts many interpretations that see in the ‘star child’ a 
positive force. Kuberski, who sees the monolith as a symbol of positive 
transformation (161), interprets the significance of the ‘star child’ as the 
fulfillment of human evolution represented in the theme of Kubrick’s lighting 
choices: “From the opening scenes of the ‘Dawn of Man’ to ‘Jupiter and beyond 
the Infinite,’ ‘mankind’ is translated from animal unconsciousness beneath a 
bright sky to an enlightened consciousness mediated by light itself” (77-78). 
White notes that Gelmis and Nelson interpret the “star child” as “a singular 
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optimism in the bleak landscape of Kubrick’s films” (141). Ruppersburg 
maintains a kind of perversely positive interpretation of Kubrick’s ‘star child’: 
“The end of 2001 is a form of religious vision. It compels us to imagine a new 
kind of existence, identity, and understanding. It provokes wonder, confusion, 
shock” (165).258 In contrast to this positivity, Cocks identifies ambivalence. He 
notes that, whereas the ‘star child’ in Clarke’s novel destroys “the nuclear 
weapons orbiting earth”, which “ironically repeated the end of Dr. 
Strangelove”, the solitary saviour at the end of 2001 is enigmatic: “What has 
happened—or will happen—to human beings on earth? Have they all been 
transformed along with Bowman? Are they to be governed by the Star-Child? Or 
are they to die out ‘naturally’ in evolutionary competition with the new species? 
Or?” (Cocks 2004 1223-23.) I tend to follow Cocks’ lead, but with less 
ambivalence.  
Abram’s interpretation that Nietzsche’s Overman is found in the “star 
child” leads him to conclude that Kubrick’s Overman, is “a thin reflection of a 
Nietzschean persona” (261), because it undermines the central liberating crisis 
of Nietzsche’s project in the expression, “God is Dead”. Abrams is correct to 
see a failure of Nietzsche’s project in 2001, which was perhaps Kubrick’s point. 
The failure of Nietzsche’s ‘God is dead’ is articulated by Kubrick in the ‘God 
concept’ artifact. In line with Badiou’s observation, Kubrick’s project shows that 
the dead God does not lie there dead but returns. This cycle reflects the shock 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 In Ruppersburg’s analysis, films like Invasion of the Body Snatchers, and War of the Worlds, 
which signal an alien messianic force, raise interesting questions about the significance of the 
alien figure in film, as reflecting an anxiety with the other; this point leads to my issue with 
identifying the alien invasion as messiahs. Technically, there is nothing messianic about an 
invading force; however, the distrust of a messiah as a false claimant, would qualify a messianic 
claimant as a malignant, unwanted, alien. This of course, does not detract form his salient 
observation that the messianic figure appears variously in film as either the benign alien, as in 
The Day the Earth Stood Still, or a human with superhuman powers to travel through time, as in 
Terminator, or a figure of redemption, in the case of films like such as I am Legend, or Sunshine, 
or a redemptive remnant, as in McCarthy’s The Road.	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Deleuze sees in film as philosophy; the shock in 2001 is that the sinister 
influence of the monolith on humanity from the prehistoric age to the ‘future’, 
perpetuated by all scientific and social advances, returns disguised as salvation.  
I will emphasize that my analysis at this point shifts from Kubrick’s 
conscious aesthetic choices to the unconscious associations raised by Kubrick’s 
choices in 2001. Dave’s encounter with the monolith imagistically alludes to 
Michelangelo’s painting in a Christian Church. Since the ‘star child’ is 
represented as a fetus clearly of Dave and metaphorically of King David, it 
embodies the Old Testament prophecies of the messiah as defined by the 
Christian narrative. With the intervention of the sinister monolith, this ‘star 
child’ is a Christian messiah, leading to the question: is this fetus the miracle of 
Jesus’ birth, or the miracle of his resurrection? My answer is both. To reword 
what scholars identify as the transformation of Dave into the ‘star child’,259 I 
would suggest that Dave’s resurrection as the ‘star child’ makes the figure the 
second coming of Jesus. That motif is apparent in Clarke’s rendering of the child 
as bringing an end to nuclear apocalypse, an apotheosis Kubrick’s film avoids. 
Kubrick’s messiah is weighted by shadows. Along with the long shadow of the 
monolith on mankind’s history of technology and imperialism, there is another 
shadow reflecting an unconscious reflection of an element of Jewish tradition 
which, as Hollander identified, returns in Rosenzweig’s and Derrida’s versions 
of the messiah: that shadow is the significance of the star. Recall that Num 
24:17 was the pericope used by R. Akiva to identify a Judean warrior as Bar 
Kokhba (son of the star), or the messiah; his miserable failure to emancipate the 
Judeans from Roman oppression led rabbis to call him ‘bar kosiva’, ‘son of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
259 Abrams writes: “… the aliens and the monolith act directly on Bowman’s mind and transform 
him into the Star Child” (256). Wheat notes, “When the star child appears, Bowman is reborn, 
symbolically at any rate” (126). Cocks is more ambiguous in his description of Bowman’s 
transformation: “The conclusion to 2001 represents the transition of Dave Bowman and thus of 
all humanity into a higher life form” (122). 
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liar’, or the ‘false messiah’. As I reviewed in Chapter 3, Num 24:17 was used by 
Justin the Martyr’s to affirm Jesus’s messianic status. Visible through the fascist 
aesthetic in 2001, the monolith’s determinism reflects back on the shadow of 
Christianity’s centuries-long persecution of Jewish people, culminating in the 
atrocity of the Holocaust, and returning in Kubrick’s ‘star child’, as a false 
harbinger of salvation. Jesus is rewritten in 2001 as a bar kosiva. In this respect, 
2001 may be considered the real prequel to the alien invasion of Independence 
Day. The irony is that 2001 ends with Dave victoriously flaunting his offspring 
as his resurrected self, perhaps a conscious contrast to Nazi Germany’s 
devastating loss of WWII, while in 9/11, Žižek’s messianic awakening appears 
not to be fettered by negativity at all. 
The question is: what do the trauma of 2001, the film, and the 
philosophical meditation of 9/11 have to do with the messiah? As a project 
ending with the figure which saved mankind from atomic devastation, I suggest 
that it is possible to see that 2001 already encapsulates the trauma that will 
return in 9/11, which is America’s experimentation with nuclear weapons on 
Japanese civilians through the limits circumscribed by Žižek: the return of a 
trauma that cannot be remembered. The way 9/11 figures in Kubrick’s film can 
be understood through the ‘shock’ of Nietzsche’s eternal return. Kubrick’s 
exploitation of a fascist aesthetic to define the space race of the future is 
articulated in paralleling the totalitarian impulse of America’s colonization of 
the universe in its space race, driven by technological advances whose origin is 
the weapon of war. America’s colonization of space in Kubrick’s 2001 is 
founded on its nuclear authority established in August 1945. From this event, a 
‘messiah’ is born linking Nazi totalitarianism with American imperialism. This 
messiah is neither the one we want nor the one we anticipate: it is the 
enervating force of fascistic messianism, which, noted in chapter three, 
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Benjamin warned against, and I would suggest, it is the threat Derrida worked 
so hard to erase. 
The Christian foundation to Kubrick’s messiah returns in Žižek’s messiah 
with the same demand to convert, but Žižek’s representation reflects an entirely 
different response. Žižek sees the politics of the suicide bomber as a positive 
force in acting against America’s aggressive imperialism. He is full of jouissance 
in the aftermath of the event as the hope of the future redemption; the only 
unease is excitement about the imminent changes aroused by the messianic 
arrival. This hope may suppose a Marxist reading of the Muslim action, perhaps 
reflecting what Qutb identified as an affinity between Marx’s communism and 
the social responsibility inherent to Islamic doctrine, except one critical element 
distinguishes them. Žižek’s political reading is strictly not religious, in contrast 
to Qutb, and those of the alleged suicide bombers, whose devotion and 
political actions were strictly religious. Žižek, finding an affinity with them in 
their political motivations, does not judge their religiosity but can only see these 
alleged terrorists as alternatives of the Jew—other wanderers of the desert, in 
exile, more examples of the exception. That is, the ‘exception’ launches the 
messianic expectation of the ‘resolution’ of the ‘universal human rights’ in 
Christian terms in Žižek’s reading. It is on the ideologically driven issue of the 
‘Christian resolution’ that the messiah of the film and the philosophy show a 
phenomenological difference. Whereas Kubrick’s film exposes the messiah as 
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Frederic Jameson’s argument that historical amnesia has manifested in 
postmodern culture as schizophrenic a-temporality (Postmodernism 27) may 
help explain why autism has become such a prominent trope in culture since 
the production of Rainman, in 1988,260 but a strictly Jamesonian analysis is 
somewhat thwarted by the fact that autism has inspired a social anxiety about 
finding a cure for the condition that in severe cases, causes death.261 In light of 
Bettelheim’s identification of an autistic equivalence in the Muselmann, the one 
who has more of a relation to death than to life, I would propose that the 
particular psychosis of autism recently deployed in contemporary cultural works 
may reflect a Jamesonian a-temporality, but that time-trouble is not indicative of 
forgetting history but of the effort to reclaim the power of the eternal in the face 
of death through the exception.   
As I have previously argued in this project, what simmers beneath the 
surface of secularism is a vital attraction to the promise of a ‘new life’ of 
equality in Christ through Paul’s law of Christ as the resurrection, which 
changed the mortal function of the symbolic. The ‘letter’ of the law was 
exchanged for its ‘spirit’ and thus made the way to living eternally. The 
psychotic, who lives without the mortal function of the symbolic Name of the 
Father (NOF) because she has foreclosed the NOF at the “Oedipal stage,”262 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
260 Stuart Murray conducts an analysis of selected cultural works that represent autism in 
sentimental terms in “Autism and the Contemporary Sentimental: Fiction and the Narrative 
Fascination of the Present” (Literature and Medicine 26, no 1 (Spring 2006) 24-45. 
261 Majda Holmer Nadesan claims autism is a twentieth-century condition because it directly 
follows from modern society’s need to socialize children according to a normative standard 
(Constructing Autism, 2005); she, like Stuart Murray, recognizes a profusion of cultural works of 
autists which misinterpret the condition.	  	  
262 In the Diagnostic & Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), Autistic Spectrum 
Disorders (ASD) includes conditions from autism to Aspergers, which, as Tendlarz points out in 
Lacan & Childhood Psychosis (11), is similar in definition to, but differentiated from, 
schizophrenia. I use “autism” as different from Jameson’s schizophrenia, and in line with Ian 
Hacking’s definition of it in “Humans, aliens & autism” (49), as a polymorphic term. Not aiming 
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exists immersed in the ‘hallucinations’ of the real of living263 and therefore may 
be said to represent the state of ecstasy Paul experienced in his encounter with 
the Christ of Jesus. According to the non-autist, what is pathological about 
psychosis is the lack of the death drive. From the symbolic angle, the ‘death of 
the drive’ in the autist suggests a passive suicide that can only be undone 
through ‘new life’. In short, the non-autist fantasy aims to rehabilitate the autist’s 
relation to death by translating it into the encounter with the eternal, or 
symbolically, the resurrection.  
Anne Carson’s Autobiography of Red264 is not an autistic fantasy like the 
Rainman, which is why it stands out as a case study for this project. Geryon is, 
ostensibly, a homosexual who is metaphorically associated with an ancient 
Greek mythic winged beast resurrected from the dead. What is interesting about 
these predicates is that his homosexuality disappears behind Geryon’s 
representation as an autistic subject enacting the resurrection motif. Thus, Red 
describes concerns raised by an autistic narrative such as Rainman, in that it is 
motivated by the desire to institute the functioning NOF through the symbolic 
resurrection. What distinguishes Red from other autistic fantasies is that the 
complicated quality of this persona acts like a prism through which exceptions 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to be a scientific study, my analysis shall remain limited to the psychosis of the condition, not 
dealing with neurological issues that have become more prominent in recent research.   
263 For Lacan, “the hallucination is located in the real” (Seminar III 136). 
264 Considering my analysis and focus on Geryon in this chapter is centered on his autistic 
nature, understanding how Carson’s Red Doc is a sequel to Red raised only red flags. Geryon’s 
sensibility dominates Red; in Red Doc, he disappears. The fact that Red Doc did not follow 
through on the promise of Geryon initially troubled me until I recognized the power of the 
narrative voice; it was a new subjectivity that replaced the role Geryon had in Autobiography of 
Red. The thing is, Red Doc’s narrator has no face. That is, when I considered the slipperiness of 
the narrative, the way its omniscience seems to have no bounds (no character is favoured, no 
character is safe), nor is it bounded by semantics or conventional narrative either, I recognized 
the narrator has a subjectivity that repeats that ‘autistic’ destabilizing force of the autistic fantasy 
of Geryon. The subject of Red Doc is in this disorder. Taking that logic further, if Geryon stood 
for Carson in Red, then the narrator in Red Doc must be Carson herself, represented as a 
subjectivity existing somewhere on the psychotic spectrum. Red Doc describes a sane world 
from a psychotic’s perspective, where G seems the sanest of the bunch of characters and the 
most opaque.  
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such as homosexuality and even the inhuman undead, are crystalized in the 
dominant fantasy of the autist. Through the course of this analysis, I will address 
the question: what unconscious desire is being represented in this autistic 




According to Lacan, the autist is signified by the One265 who forecloses the 
NOF, and has no Other or object. The apparent a-sociality of the subject is 
manifested in two ways. There is a disarming self-absorption evident in the 
autist, which Lacan explains as reflecting her immersion in the imaginary 
without the symbolic to interpret it: “As the name indicates, autistic children 
hear themselves. They hear many things. This even ends up normally in 
hallucination, and the hallucination always has a more or less vocal character” 
(Tendlarz 16). Yasmin Gasser articulates the autist’s inability to grasp the 
symbolic function of language to the extent that it can lead to the infant’s 
inability to demand food: “Autism’s weight of words corresponds (…) to a 
serious slowing down of language serial games—and not to a state of the 
infants’ being—a slowing down which may go so far as to seal itself in a deathly 
silence.”266 The autist’s inability to discern the difference between the image 
and language’s power as representation means that the autist is unable to use 
language in anything but literal terms, if the subject even acquires language. All 
of these issues have led to an interest in finding a cure, which involves the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265 Jacques-Alain Miller articulates this concept as “Autism means that the one is dominant and 
not the other”. “Lacan’s Later Teaching” translated by Patricia P. Fulks. Lacanian ink 21 (2005), 
Web. www.lacan.com.  
 
266 This quote by Yasmin Grasser “The Weight of Words”, translated by Jorge Jauregui. Lacanian 
Ink 1, (1990.) Web. The auditory nature of the psychotic’s hallucinations is discussed by Lacan 
in “On the Question Prior to Any Possible Treatment of Psychosis” (Écrits 446).	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assimilation of the non-autist into the symbolic, with little understanding of 
what symbolic assimilation means for the autist.  
In response to the growing attention by parents and health-care 
professionals to cure autists of their condition, E. L. Bragg’s video In My 
Language (2007) on youtube testifies to the value of the autistic life. Divided 
into two, the first half of the video is composed of static framed shots of Baggs 
fiddling with objects, moving her hands and arms as if flying or playing with a 
slinky. The second half, titled “A Translation,” introduces a computerized voice-
over that is meant to “translate” the visual collage of her motion which “is about 
being in a constant conversation with every part of my environment,” she 
explains. Her translation retroactively signifies for us that, what we saw as 
aimless activity is actually a meaningful dialogue, not in symbolic but in sensual 
terms. That is, when she says that we should not read the water symbolically 
while watching water from the tap run onto her hands, she wants to stress that 
what we read imagistically in the video is, for her, evidence of the foreclosure 
of the NOF because it is a purely sensory experience; the word ‘water’ literally 
means her experience of flowing wet. What is striking is that the computer-
generated voice with which she asks us not to see the water as symbolizing 
something, has the symbolic quality of representing her as alien and alienating 
herself from who she is.267 In conveying the truth of her life by utilizing the very 
symbolic order she forecloses as an autist, her testimony is explicable at the 
very moment that her autistic relation to the real eludes us. We are witnessing 
her struggle with harnessing the symbolic to ‘mean’ her subjectivity that is 
uncomfortable with meaning; all that we can access of her is her compromised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 Baggs’ symbolic alien is echoed in Hacking’s article title, “Humans, aliens & autism” and, as 
he outlines, is a metaphor for autism used by both autists and non-autists alike; for example, the 
organization, Cure Autism Now (CAN) equate	  children’s autism as being taken by aliens 
(“Humans” 44) and there are the autists themselves who claim that being amongst non-autists is 
like being amongst Martians (50.)	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relation to the symbolic which is the inversion of her experience of the real 
clearly of the ecstatic quality where she remains, free of the symbolic that grips 
us, her non-autist viewer. Even this interpretation of her discomfort clearly 
symbolizes her experience as a fiction testifying to her relation to the symbolic 
order.  
In comparison to Baggs’ experience, Anne Carson’s Red is not an autistic 
representation by an autist. Yet, it is not a Hollywood ‘realistic’ representation 
of an autistic life either, since it authentically represents the conditions of living 
that Baggs’ expresses. Having made that point, Carson’s text is not like Bragg’s 
autobiography; whereas Baggs makes the case that she needs neither pity nor 
cure, Red represents a metamorphosis of assimilation signaling the importance 
of the cure. If Baggs’s text can be seen literally as the trauma of the symbolic, 
which intersects the real, the trauma of Carson’s Red is not autistic but of the 
non-autist’s oedipalization played-out, in ‘slow motion’ one might say, of the 
assimilation/integration of the autistic exception into the social fold. 
Carson’s contention that “genres are conventional” and “Conventions 
exist to be renegotiated”268 defines an approach to her writing that serves the 
interest of this project for exploring a ‘general textuality’. Her experiments with 
prose and poetry through secularizing mystical sources exemplified in her first 
publication, the series of prose-poems, Short Talks (1992), recurs as experiments 
with generic structures in all her subsequent works.269 Red announces its 
experiment as a fusion of the narrative of ‘fiction’ with the metaphorical power 
of ‘verse’ through re-creating the autobiography of the mythic winged-beast 
named Geryon. He is a ‘monster’ who fashions himself on (or is fashioned by) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268 Anne Carson interviewed by Mary di Michele and published in The Matrix Interviews: 
Moosehead Anthology #8 (8).  269	  The form of the essay recurs in her work fused with the lyric in Plainwater: Essays and Poetry 
(2000), with the metaphor in Eros the Bittersweet: An Essay (1998) and with the novel as 
tangoes in a text following the publication of Red, The Beauty of the Husband (2001).	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the biography in the extant ancient Greek fragments of Stesichoros’ story of the 
winged-figure named Geryon who was killed by the half-mortal, Herakles. As 
we read Carson’s argument that Stesichoros’ story is important because it tells 
about Herakles from the perspective of the monster he killed, we are alerted to 
a new subjectivity, that of the exception embodied by the beast. Carson’s 
allusion to Gertrude Stein’s experimental autobiography,270 Autobiography of 
Alice B. Toklas, qualifies that new subjectivity in terms both of gender and 
queer politics, and also frames the experimental fiction as post-modern. If 
Stein’s testimony hides the truth of her masculine-like authority and lesbian love 
in a fictional self-telling by Alice B. Toklas while creating a representation of 
herself through a fictional collaboration with her ‘other,’ we are to recognize 
that Geryon is the exception of heterosexual society represented in an ironic 
literalization of the derogatory expression of the homosexual as ‘beast’, living 
out a contemporary romance with Herakles, which may or may not be seen as 
reflecting Carson herself. Though the autobiography of Red may be Anne 
Carson’s reflexive self-telling through the ‘fictional other’ of Geryon,271 that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 In The Limits of Autobiography: Trauma and Testimony, Leigh Gilmore argues that the 
formalistic and ethical problems of the autobiographical genre inspire experiment (11); 
moreover, as a ‘limit-case’ genre, autobiographies of traumatic experiences are extreme 
examples of limit-cases (19). Since I consider any text to be the work of a subject’s trauma, then 
technically any text can be read autobiographically, a point that complements Gilmore’s 
paraphrasing of Valery’s idea that “every autobiography is a fragment of a theory” (12), but 
leads me to question why she distinguishes autobiographies of trauma from other memoirs. I 
believe her perspective on trauma is reflective of the juridical subtext of testimonial prejudices 
in autobiographical testimony as a genre within North American culture where issues such as 
‘false memories syndrome’ are real political and judicial issues (28). Stein’s text troubles truth, 
and Carson follows her example.	  
271 In considering the autobiographical aspect of Red, Sharon Wahl formulates two aspects of 
the same complaint. On the one hand, she argues that events or details in Red seem arbitrary 
because “Carson [has] simply attached some of her own interests or experiences to the 
characters”. When identifying a parallel in Geryon’s self-telling and that of the narrator of 
“Water”, Wahl argues “this similarity makes Geryon less convincing a monster”, because he is 
more a reflection of Carson herself (“Erotic Sufferings: Autobiography of Red and Other 
Anthropologies”. Iowa Review, (29:1), 1999 Spring, pp. 184-185.) Wahl’s description of the 
root of her frustration reflects how Carson, consciously or not, frustrates the distinction between 
truth and fiction in autobiographical testimony. To what extent Carson is engaging with Stein’s 
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personal story is of less importance for me than the significance of the literary 
resurrection of the primordial mythic exception that is the focus of this 
project.272   
The autistic sensibility in Geryon is indirectly verified not by Stuart 
Murray’s article on representations of autistic subjects, but on his analysis of 
Carson’s novel itself. He first notes Carson’s philosophical question of 
autobiography which he associates with Heidegger’s idea that life is a subject 
that is “resistant to representations and linguistic conventions”;273 this resistance, 
he claims, is played out in Carson’s use of language: “Carson unmoors the 
underlying conditions of intelligibility, throwing into question the power of 
signification, the reliability by which words name things, and the fragility of the 
social convention that would uphold both the authority to name and the 
authority of the name” (106). This dilemma of expression is tied to the dilemma 
of perception, Murray contends, which is why he takes a phenomenological 
approach to Red through Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy: “Merleau-Ponty claims 
that our primordial experience in the lifeworld is a synaesthetic experience, a 
natural commingling of the senses; however, this experience is forgotten, and it 
has been replaced by logic and an overly analytical attitude” (110). Merleau-
Ponty’s sense of loss for the non-verbal state of childhood points to the 
oedipalized subject that can still sense its pre-Oedipal life. Murray’s recognition 
that Carson privileges the phenomenological sensory experience over meaning 
in her novel, because “language is slippery” (106) and for Geryon, “’Red’ is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
very formal engagement with that trouble is a question worth posing if one is reading Red as 
Carson’s autobiography. 
272 The formalistic complications of Carson’s testimony which my paper does not consider are 
specifically the following parts: Stesichorus’ fragments of the story of Geryon, which is followed 
by two Appendixes which, rather than follow, precede the ‘novel in verse’: “Testimonia on the 
Question of Stesichoros’ Blinding By Helen” and the rebuttal, “Clearing up the Question of 
Stesichoros Blinding by Helen.”   
273 Stuart J. Murray, “The Autobiographical Self: Phenomenology and the Limits of Naarative 
Self-Possession in Anne Carson’s Autobiography of Red,” 102.	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never stable, is never purely adjectival, and when it is, it stretches the bounds of 
sense and descriptiveness” (111), can be translated into psychoanalytic terms as 
representing the sensibility of the autist.  
We are introduced to Geryon on the first day of school traumatized by 
his condition of synaesthesia, hearing sound in colour. The colour he hears 
most deeply is red, the colour with which he identifies himself. His condition 
leads him to experience “red” as sound and, as seen in the following passage, 
as smell: “He was focusing hard on his feet and his steps./ Children poured 
around him/ and the intolerable red assault of grass and the smell of grass 
everywhere/ was pulling him towards it” (Autobiography 23). Note that in 
seeing grass as ‘red’, Geryon’s colour-blindness makes ‘red’ not ‘red’, further 
complicating the autist’s already troubled relation to language’s failure to 
‘mean’. Geryon’s physical reality is a confusion of what can be identified as 
hallucinatory experience: colour is noise and people are currents that exert a 
force on him. The poetic nature of the language amplifies the instability of his 
environment and social reality. Telescoping of details anchors the boy against 
the anxiety induced by the liquidity of children on his first day of School, but 
creates that self-focused attention at the exclusion of exterior stimuli. The boy’s 
hallucinatory sensory overload, perhaps similar to Baggs’ sensory life, is 
exacerbated when his brother abandons him, sending him into crisis: “the 
world dropped away” and what would have served as a map to help him get 
into the school was void of symbolization as a “deep glowing blank” (24). 
Geryon’s a-sociality, his lack of friends, is compounded by the fact that he has 
the linguistic troubles Gasser defines as the “weight of words”: “The words each 
blew towards him and came apart on the wind” (26). What is important to 
acknowledge is that the experience described here is suggestive of the 
childhood described by Merleau-Ponty, experienced by a shy child on his first 
day at school, but it also is no less indicative of that which is endured by an 
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autistic sensibility; in this parallel, what this representation maintains is that this 
condition requires symbolic rescue made possible by the symbolic function 
enabled here by the non-autist poet, Carson. 
In this self-telling, Geryon is literally saved from autistic trouble through 
a kind of Kleinian therapy in autobiographical representation. As with Klein’s 
symbolic intervention, this self-telling is masterminded by the poet for Geryon’s 
sake. Implicit in the relation between writer and character is a compound 
barred subjectivity of an oedipalized subject. By way of establishing the 
narrative of Geryon’s assimilation, oedipalization is signaled by starting his 
autobiography: “he set down all inside things/ particularly his own heroism… 
he coolly omitted/ all outside things” (29). Clearly, in identifying the inside from 
outside and demarcating the field of omission, a prohibition central to the NOF 
has occurred; he has passed through the Oedipal stage. If Geryon, the 
character, is domain of inside sensations of the real which has been marked off 
from the outside, he will, through the course of the novel be aided in organizing 
the outside through a compromised symbolic of his autistic project of the self; 
the poet-author as the non-autist who, controlling the symbolic rudder of the 
Master signifier by which the autist is portrayed, provides him with the symbolic 
order required to be the ‘other’ to himself, performed through third-person 
narrative. 
The tension between Geryon’s inner and outer is expressed 
formalistically by Carson’s innovative use of italics. Typically used in literature 
to denote an inner voice or a supplementary narrative voice as in Daphne 
Marlatt’s Taken, italics are used in Carson’s Red to indicate speech by Geryon 
and those around him. If Geryon’s third-person autobiography leaves him 
silently listening to an ‘other’ tell his story, then italics can be read as another 
layer of autistic listening, represented as a silence that persists within Geryon’s 
self-narrative. Geryon’s inner self, displaced through oedipalization in the third-
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person voice, is further displaced from the outer world by emanations of a 
‘silent’ dialogue with the unconscious happening within him. The ambivalence 
in the text between an inward-ness and outward-ness of this silent dialogue, 
recalls that tension Baggs expresses with her autistic self and the computerized 
voice-over. Are these dialogues in Geryon’s autobiography self-generated 
hallucinations or has the autistic Geryon absorbed the outside into himself as 
One? We could say both propositions are true in this autistic fantasy.  
Not only is the autist represented as immersed in auditory hallucinations 
but the prime signature of his self-telling is expressed through a symbolic 
manipulation of the literalizing tendency of the autist. Klein’s seminal research 
on autistic children evolved from her famous case study with a boy named 
Dick. In therapy sessions, when Dick played with toys, Klein understood that 
the toy train was for Dick literally a train. Through play therapy, Klein was able 
to teach Dick to transfer symbolic significance to the toy; that is, once he was 
able to see himself as the train, he was then able to perform subsequent 
symbolic associations such as seeing his mother as the “station”. This working 
through of symbolic meaning cured Dick of his separation anxieties (Klein 102) 
that had inhibited socialization. In Lacanian terms, Dick’s recognition of the 
train’s metaphorical trick indicated his oedipalization; that is, Dick began to see 
his mother as replaceable through the imaginary object a after which symbolic 
fantasies became possible. 
The autist’s tendency to see “everything symbolic become real” 
(Tendlarz 13), means that the object a does not stand in for the real as lack, but 
rather, is accepted literally. The autist’s literalization becomes the primary factor 
in Geryon’s photograph-based autobiography. Murray suggests that the photo is 
“Geryon’s fetish of choice” (114). I would argue that fetish can only be applied 
to a fully oedipalized subject which does not describe Geryon in these initially 
stages of Carson’s representation, and or, the literalization of the image exploits 
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semantic tensions. I would argue for seeing the photo to be the objet a that 
remains void of autobiographical significance in itself.274 Technically, the photo 
demands neither verbal processing nor even an interest in the metaphorical 
function of representation to initiate. It is like Baggs’ water, a literal relation to 
the imaginary dimension in autistic sensibility. While the cognitive disruption 
that occurs for the overwhelmed autist may be documented in the objet a as a 
copy of the real, the experience cannot be rendered as autobiography until the 
Master Signifier renders it with symbolic value. What distinguishes Geryon’s 
autistic self-telling as a fantasy in Red, as opposed to a literal self-telling like 
Baggs’s In My Language, is that the photographs are all represented through 
language: the objets a are autobiographical because they exist in the symbolic 
register through the oedipalizing contribution of the narrator/poet. In the effort 
to stay true to the autistic subject, Carson’s photographic representation of a life 
in poetry exploits what is literal for a figurative outcome.  
The literalness of Geryon’s photo-autobiography is expressed in titles. 
The following title is an example: “It is a close-up photograph of Geryon’s left 
leg just below the knee” (Autobiography 137). The title literalizes the image. Yet 
the title does not tell us that it was a photo taken accidentally when Ancash’s 
mother moved Geryon’s camera down and out of sight of the soldiers who had 
suddenly appeared. Anyone who has been in a war-torn country or at a 
contested border knows the threat of soldiers looking for the spy disguised as an 
innocent tourist with a camera. For Geryon, the photo is literally an accidental 
shot of his leg; as an accident whose event was both unanticipated and missed, 
it is, in metaphorical terms, a representation of a wound which the soldiers did 
not cause, but could have, if Ancash’s mother had not saved him. This is the 
symbolic significance of the image which the narrator shares with us. In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274 I find it ironic that my analysis of Carson’s text indirectly counters Solway’s criticism of 
Carson’s poetry as being “autistic” (“The Trouble with Annie” 24). 
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author’s hands, this photo is the occasion of the accidental tuché of being saved 
by Ancash’s mother, retroactively constituted as the object a of Geryon being 
saved from death, a trope initiated by his resurrection from Stesichoros’ 
fragments and repeated compulsively through the autobiography. As is 
exemplified in this photograph of Geryon’s leg, the photos of his autobiography 
express a tension between literal and figurative understanding, similar to the 
dilemma defined by Bragg’s aural (oral) testimony. This tension may explain 
why those readers primarily interested in recognizable poetic structure, such as 
critic, Adam Kirsch, who condemns her poetry as merely prosaic,275 or Wahl 
who complains the narrative is not fantastic enough276, or David Solway, who 
hears merely “drab writing”, (Solway 24), miss the psychic poesy Carson is 
tracing. 
McCallum makes an interesting argument that the punctum—that 
moment which disappears in the flash of the shutter—represents the traumatic 
moment of forgetting (McCallum I, par. 12 and II, par. 43). Drawing on Roland 
Barthe’s theory of the punctum in photography, McCallum contextualizes 
Carson’s literary innovation: “the synesthetic power of the punctum, thus, is 
central to what Carson brings to a theory of photography” (II par. 28.) The fact 
that the punctum signifies a trauma at the heart of photographic representation 
is not only a powerful interpretation of modern technology as a device for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 In “All Mere Complexities: Autobiography of Red”, Adam Kirsch’s conclusion to his critical 
review is worth reading in full: “Carson neither feels her thoughts nor thinks her feelings. Yet it 
is the role of poetry to bring those two halves of experience together, a fusion, which is made 
possible by translating moments of being into musical patterns of words. Lacking a commitment 
to the rigor of such patterns—a commitment to verse—Carson attains neither poetry’s music nor 
poetry’s wisdom” (New Republic, May 18, 1998, 41). Kirsch’s classical understanding of what 
makes good poetry explains his resistance to Carson’s experimentation with the poetic genre.	  
276 Sharon Wahl writes: “Look what Red starts with: a character who is a ‘monster’, and one 
with mythical origins; wings capable of flight; the scholarly framing, the book’s formal beauty… 
I was disappointed that the narrative didn’t go along with this, and take a direction for which 
those wings were necessary. In my enthusiasm for the premise and Carson’s writing I imagined 
a book like an eagle’s aerie built into a cliff face; a place you couldn’t get to any other way” 
183. 
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psychic interventions but, in my analysis, it also serves to show how the 
machine functions much like Baggs’ computer generated voice; it oedipalizes 
the subject while freeing the subject from oedipalization. For the autistic 
Geryon, who has “progressed” to the symbolic Oedipal through the holophrasis 
of the photo, the punctum and its non-verbal, pure sensory flash, do the 
impossible by leaving the autist’s real inassimilable. Without the 
narrator/author’s role in framing the punctum as a photograph retroactively with 
a title, the photographs would be too literal to have meaning; without the 
author’s frame, Geryon’s salvation would be missed. 
The curative power of Dick’s train evident in Geryon’s starting of the 
autobiography is fulfilled in Geryon’s use of the photograph, the technology of 
the mirror stage of the ego. The photo becomes the positive step, in Oedipal 
terms, to the individuation symbolized in autobiography. As an image-
generating technology, it reconciles Geryon’s language troubles like 
synaesthesia, but most importantly, it keeps the outside world out and the inside 
protected. The narrator/author makes possible a collusion between Geryon’s 
symbolic self-recording through the technology of the camera and the 
technology’s relation to Geryon’s real, in that the moment of the photographic 
capture which becomes the oedipal subject’s objet a, relieves the autist of 
signifying duties. In turn, this collusion also makes the autist stand as the object 
a of the author’s fantasy project. As becomes evident through the narrative 





Blanchot’s The Instant of My Death, a short personal account of being caught 
by the Germans in WWII, sentenced to death, and then suddenly being let free, 
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is an inexplicable event, or, as Jacques Derrida claims in an accompanying 
essay, Demeure, a miracle: “The miracle is the essential line of union between 
testimony and fiction” (75). Derrida’s use of miracle is meant in secular terms: it 
metaphorically reflects how Blanchot was saved from death while it also reflects 
Blanchot’s feeling of the eternal as an experience of immortality that overcame 
him on realizing he would not be killed (The Instant of my Death 5). That 
indifference to death, expressed by the eternal of the real, is the trope that I 
have noted Žižek recognizes as integral to the Muselmann. This relation to 
eternity, reflected ironically by Levi’s reference to their ‘endlessness’ in the 
camps, is interpreted by Žižek in the autist as the ‘death drive’ that is dead. 
From the non-autist’s perspective, the autistic subject’s relation to death 
demands salvation as a ‘life after death’. 
In The Ticklish Subject, Slavoj Žižek notes that there is no resurrection 
for Lacan, there is only death, which the living can express through negation as 
a self-withdrawal:   
What ‘Death’ stands for at its most radical is not merely the passing of 
earthly life, but the ‘night of the world’, the self-withdrawal, the absolute 
contraction of subjectivity, the severing of its links with ‘reality’—this is 
the ‘wiping the slate clean’ that opens up the domain of the symbolic 
New Beginning…” (179)  
 
Blanchot’s Instant of my Death focuses on that “instant” when he experienced 
“an abrupt return to the world” (5), which is intermittently repeated in the 
telling (6). That returning to “reality” points to the fact that there was a “severing 
of links with reality” or an “absolute contraction of subjectivity,” evident in 
Blanchot’s encounter with death as an experience of immortality. What 
Blanchot experienced can technically be understood as a psychotic event in 
that normal time was disrupted by the eternal of the real. Blanchot’s return from 
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the real that initiated a symbolic ‘New Beginning’ is a resurrection motif that is 
visible in Carson’s Red. 
Geryon’s photography is not simply a device to symbolize the autist’s 
acculturation to a symbolic centered existence; rather, and more importantly, it 
is a device, which establishes Geryon’s special relation to the eternal real. I 
would argue that what McCallum identifies as the camera’s apotropaic function 
(McCallum II par. 22) is a powerful concept only in recognizing its significance 
for Geryon, the autist. The magic of his photos is not just indicated by the 
technology’s ability to make a print of reality, but is reflected in the 
photograph’s ability to represent the autistic tendency to see “everything 
symbolic become real”: it literalizes the symbolic order. As such, that disruption 
of meaning is echoed in a kind of disruption of temporal time as reflected in 
Žižek’s ‘night of the world’, or Blanchot’s miracle. The interruption of temporal 
reality with the autist’s eternal plays out as the resurrection, the first one 
performed over Geryon’s mythic ancient grave, and all those repeated 
compulsively with every photo. 
Carson explains the document of Stesichoros’ telling of the classic 
mythic story to stress that, whereas Geryon, the beast, was killed by Herakles, in 
the modern retelling, Geryon is resurrected into a hero. Thus, the ancient killing 
event is recreated metaphorically as the romance in which Geryon is so in love 
with Herakles that Herakles’s emotional indifference ‘slays’ Geryon. In response 
to the breakup, Geryon is represented as literally dying: “…weak as a fly 
Geryon crouched against the sink/ with his fist in his mouth/ and his wings 
trailing over the drainboard” (Autobiography 71). Note how Geryon’s wings are 
here represented as insect-like; a trace of his identification with the fly in 
melodramatic grief is exacerbated by the pathetic fallacy of rain, setting the 
terms for the magical signification of Geryon’s photo-based autobiography. 
Utilizing the same fifteen-minute exposure of the volcano photo which had 
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been titled, “Red Patience,” Geryon photographs a fly in a pail of water; his 
finished photo shows the insect “Drowned but with a strange agitation of light 
around the wings.” Here, the prolonged exposure makes visible the dying 
throws of the fly in “agitation of light.” That is, in that temporality of death 
captured by the photo, we see represented in the dying of the fly, Blanchot’s 
“instant” in which Geryon’s dying was stopped; the mortal wound by which 
Stesichoros’ Herakles killed the winged Geryon is metaphorically repeated by 
this photo. Geryon’s miracle is that the photo is analogous to the ‘shot’ of a gun, 
which the fly, as the alter ego, magically takes for Geryon, in conjunction with 
a pun on the literal significance of the photo being ‘taken’. The magic of the 
camera, represented by the punctum, saves Geryon from death; it “wipes the 
slate clean”, so to speak, which like Blanchot’s instant, leads to a symbolic 
‘New Beginning’, a life after death.  
In Lacanian terms, since the symbolic kills the thing (because the 
symbolic confronts the subject with his/her mortality)277 the photo of the fly 
reveals something important for Geryon: Geryon’s undead immortal status is 
maintained because the fly is the thing killed in Geryon’s place, a substitution 
made possible because of the autist’s magic ability to see the symbolic as real 
through the technological device that maintains the autistic foreclosure of the 
NOF. Every withdrawal into the “night of the world” of his photographic essay, 
every contraction of himself into his autistic self-representation, prolongs 
Geryon’s life, or, in metaphorical terms, immortalizes him. 
Geryon’s new relationship to death connects to his obsessive 
questioning, “what is time?” Professor Yellowbeard responds that “time is an 
abstraction we impose on motion” (Autobiography 90). This logic quickly 
becomes subjected to Geryon’s photographic magic when he concludes: 
“Much truer/ is the time that strays into photographs and stops” (93). In the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
277 Lacan. “Position of the Unconscious,” Écrits 719. 
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photograph, which shows the clock as “five minutes to six,” the absence of 
motion is the timelessness of the punctum as the eternal of the real. In that 
photo, Geryon literally grasps eternity by stopping time. What is provocative is 
that the photo maintains a contradiction; it shows Geryon as the one who 
forever exists retroactively in the symbolic order as the fantasy of immortality, 
while remaining true to his autistic nature as rejecting the NOF.  
 If Geryon the human can be seen as exhibiting autistic tendencies, and 
his secret is this mythic winged self that attracts the death sentence from which 
he is repeatedly rescued by his magic punctum, then the only autobiography 
that can resist the fantasy-making compulsion must be a photograph sans 
punctum. In McCallum’s thorough analysis of the photographic revolution in 
Carson’s text, she overlooks the anomaly of the double puncti in photograph 
#1748, subtitled, “It is a photograph he never took, no one here took it” 
(Autobiography 145). In this image, Carson drops her “authorial pants” 
figuratively by representing space for a photograph that is not a photograph 
since it alludes to a poem by Emily Dickinson, “1748”;278 she problematizes her 
authority by breaking the grammatical rules of the sentence and using a comma 
in place of a period or semi-colon. Photograph #1748 is the most paradoxical 
moment in the autobiography because it is not only a photo that no one took, it 
is also not a photograph and not just because it refers to a poem. When Geryon 
is flying over the eye of the volcano, far from the author’s “here”, “and he 
smiles for the camera” (145,) there are two devices that are recording, the 
volcano’s eye and Geryon’s tape recorder, neither of which creates a 
photograph, and both of which the author separates from the “here” of her 
writing. As a self-document of Geryon, the photographic moment of the 
volcano exists only metaphorically, and is encountered by the inside of Geryon 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Carson is referencing Emily Dickinson’s poem #107, “The Reticent Volcano keeps”, Emily 
Dickinson: Complete Poems (1924). http://www.bartleby.com/113/1107.html. July 7, 2013. 
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only. What is literal of Geryon, what reflects the real as the impossible eternal, 
is operative in the following fact: the author who documents all outside things is 
noticeably “blind” to the “there” of the real document from “here” and is 
framed as missing and equal to the impossible idea of resurrection. The 
volcano’s camera eye, the primordial undead real of it, apotropaically protects 
Geryon from being consumed by the volcanic flames—a sort of symbolic 
representation of the Real encountering the Real. It is as if Carson, the narrator, 
has chosen to represent her own autistic nerve as that which returns again and 
again to exploit the magic of the literal. 
It is not until Geryon flies over the volcano that we understand, “he has 
not flown in years” (145). Ironically, this moment in which we realize these 
wings actually function, retroactively interjects the real into the symbolic. In 
opposite terms, the symbolic disappears into the real when we read: “The Only 
Secret People Keep”. The secret that this testimony keeps, because the author 
cannot represent it in language, is the recorded sound of the real entering the 
symbolic order: Geryon’s flying. Apart from Geryon’s survival, the only material 
document of this real flight is the audio tape which this literary testimony 
cannot represent, bringing us to a moment of not “hearing things” as the audio 
of an autist “listening to himself.” The sound recording of an immortal winged 
being over a volcano is an intellectual feat that remains beyond the bounds of 
prosaic verse and its particular literary silences, pushing the NOF away as a 
poetic tension gestures to the silence of beyond. Thus, Photograph #1748 
covers over the rupture made by Geryon’s real immortality, after which, the 
slate has been wiped so clean that his magic can be shared with Herakles and 
Ancash where they stand with “immortality on their faces” (146). For the reason 
this sharing supposes a kind of cure of autism through socialization, and 
because this text is a self-reflexive autobiography, an aporia is visible. 
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Monique Tschofen suggests that the end of Red reflects a sort of 
transcendent moment, which “lets us reach beyond ‘outside’ things to connect 
with immortality itself” (40). While we can read Carson’s fire as an idealistic 
retreat from the modernity of the camera to the primordial world, accepting 
Tschofen’s interpretation would involve a misreading of Geryon’s particular 
relationship to the technology of the camera, Carson’s role in this 
autobiography, and most importantly, the importance within the text of autistic 
literalness about the last detail that remains unspoken: Geryon’s homosexuality. 
The volcanic fire, found in the baker’s oven, the fire which is mankind’s source 
of life and symbol for life, is the technology which is internal to the 
photographic process: an image is burned into the film with light. I argue that 
this baker’s fire is simply the last photographic holophrasis, whose precedent 
was the volcanic eye, which targeted the exception in his act of freedom, in his 
physical truth of winged bestiality, pushing ironically at the Christian doctrine’s 
condemnation of homosexuality as bestial. In that respect, the last objet a of 
three individuals standing as one, with “immortality on their faces” (146), is the 
punctum of the exception transformed into the resurrected: echoing Geryon’s 
photo of the fly in the throws of dying, this image is the substitute of that which 
the symbolic kills and it leaves Geryon free to exist in eternity. With the “night 
of the world” at their back, with the dark struggle of their soul behind them, the 
symbolic ‘New Beginning’ of Geryon, the beast he was, has been transformed 
into the exception amongst others of the anointed Jesus Christ in the trinity.  
The argument goes that without the symbolic work Paul did to identify 
the ‘exception’ of Jesus and the promise his exceptionality offered to ‘all’, 
eternal life would be limited to the ‘elect’, the adept, the mystic or psychotic. As 
Paul did with the cursed Jesus, Carson-the-narrator created the terms by which 
the ‘excluded’, the disenfranchised, persecuted queer Geryon, whose ‘magic’ 
ability to fly has been pejoratively represented as his bestiality, could be seen as 
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his angelic and unmediated relation to the eternal. In that distinction, Geryon 
has been beaitifed in the universal promise of salvation. Carson’s apparent 
argument in this project that the autist need not always be an autist, because 
psychosis may be only a temporary event as indicated in the ecstatic 
experiences of the mystic, reflects the valuable questions raised about the 
dichotomy of insanity/sanity. On the other hand, the fact that Carson’s work 
suggests that the ‘denigration’ or persecution of the exception is a symbolic 
function that can be unmade is problematic. Geryon is represented as the 
inhuman pagan winged-thing whose transformation into the exulted figure by 
which he ‘immortalizes’ his friends, clearly emulates the Christian tradition of 
salvation. He has not only passed through oedipalization, he is the exceptional 
convert; he is a Christ.  
While Carson’s Red is not an autistic narrative per se, it iterates the 
problems raised by autistic subjectivities created by non-autists, especially 
when compared to autistic representations such as A. M. Baggs's testimony. In 
her self-made video, Baggs’ makes quite clear that she needs no saving from 
herself. Carson’s Geryon, on the other hand, is nothing without the author’s 
oedipalization salvation. The fact that this cure is done through a Christian 
paradigm of conversion points to a limitation that we unconsciously live with as 
modern secular/sectarian subjects. Yet, even while Carson sustains a prejudice 
for Christian conversion, she shows a slight but significant critique of the 
Christian paradigm in Geryon’s final moment. Geryon’s salvation at the end is 
not singular, indicative of the Protestant Reformation’s emphasis on Jesus as the 
only and uncorrupted saviour; with his friends, Geryon forms a holy trinity. The 
Catholic intervention of the Protestant ideal in this last image is a provocation 
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CONCLUSION 
As has been made clear in the case studies reviewed so far, the sense of unease 
with conversion, or assimilation, described by the philosophical works in 
Chapter 6 exists also in cultural texts in very similar ways. What stands out is 
that the difference amongst works does not divide along disciplinary or cultural 
lines, but on the subject’s relation to the exception. That is, the star evident in 
Derrida’s and Rosenzweig’s projects is also in Kubrick’s film, but differently. 
Whereas Rosenzweig’s unease with the Christ messiah was weakly reflected 
through the abstraction of redemption in the star, Derrida’s and Kubrick’s work, 
reflected a strong unease. This might suggest that a subject with religious 
affiliations experiences less unease with the messiah than a secular subject. In 
contrast to Derrida’s unease expressed in the abstract ‘desertified messianic’, 
Kubrick’s ‘star child’ messiah is decidedly Christian, and I would argue that that 
is why it is represented by Kubrick as a clear threat, consciously or not. In 
contrast to the sinister fetus, Žižek’s messianic is decidedly comforting which, I 
would argue, is unconscious because, though it borrows the unease reflected in 
Benjamin’s abstract idea of time, as does Derrida’s abstract messianicity, it is 
represented in a positive light. Žižek has already defined the term of 9/11 as 
something he can convert to: an anti-globalization politics in line with 
Marxism. Žižek’s comfort, which is similar to what we see in Badiou and 
Blanton about the universal, affirms that atheist secular scholars, who do not 
have a negative relation to the exception, have a more positive relationship to 
the messiah. This comfort contrasts those who express an ambivalent relation to 
the exception and resist messianic expectation and an easy path to the 
universal. 
 While Agamben’s homo sacer serves to explain the correlation between 
Carson’s autist and Kofman’s Muselmann, the “new subjectivity” in Red 
contrasts the figure haunting Auschwitz in Kofman’s philosophical meditation. 
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Seeing this difference of the “exception to the rule” as being based on either 
discipline or genre overlooks the fact that Red is not about surviving Auschwitz. 
What is described in this difference is the effect of human rights discourse on 
social networks. Agamben’s figure explains the relation between the homo 
sacer relegated to the camps during WWII and the exception after WWII: the 
post-war climate is traced by human rights and its efforts to include the 
excluded, a very Pauline impulse. As I hope I have made clear, the impulse for 
correction in human rights is qualified by a demand for conversion, which is 
performed in the autistic fantasy of Red as the Oedipal cure. Carson’s Geryon, 
as with Žižek’s messiah, expresses a comfort in the conversion promised by the 
exception of Christ, which contrasts the unease in works that are created by 
those who have a troubled relation to the exception.  
This point raises two final observations. How would a text by a Muslim 
engage with the Christian exception in secularism? Considering Islam, like 
Christianity, is a faith centered on conversion, would the Muslim’s relation to 
the exception reflect something other than the dis-ease reflected in texts by 
Jewish writers? On the question of differences, I note that, Carson’s composite 
exception as the autist, the homosexual and the inhuman ‘fantastic’ animal, 
points to something that Žižek’s messiah cannot. Geryon is neither a singular 
figure, nor is he alone in his final moments seeing as he is a part of a trilogy. 
This pattern, I propose, reflects a symbolic allusion to the Catholic trinity that 
counters the singularity of Christ of the Protestant tradition inherited by 
secularism. In short, Carson’s text encourages seeing the religious paradigms of 
the Christ factor not as a dichotomy of two camps, but as a variety of responses 
within and without the Christian camp as defined by the Protestant fathers of 
secularism. Taking Carson’s work as an example, I would argue against 
critiquing a text for its partisan ideological bent, even the one that speaks from 
deep inside the ideology that has the most to lose by exposing its power, even 
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secularism. Rather, the messianic phenomenology reflects the trauma we each 
are forced to work through in our engagement with the ‘correction’ initiated by 
the Christian interpellation that we take up in our western secular or sectarian 
lives. 
 Implicit in the analyses of the objets a of the messiah and Muselmann 
and other exceptions, is that they are the disguised return of the exception, 
where the ‘exception’, further displaced from the imaginary as it has no 
determinate form, is an abstract remainder of the real equal to The Thing. As the 
exception, it inspires what Žižek identifies as the “che vuoi”, denoting an 
anterior or even interior aspect of the tuché, that cusp of the real which Dolar 
identified as the terrifying indeterminacy of the aural objet a: the ‘call’. The call 
is the closest we get to the mystery of the real: the call is always unknowable, 
and consistently manifests ‘unveiled’, invisible. It is the indeterminate demand 
with which every individual struggles to understand and so answer.
 	  






I set out in this project to consider how the cause of an apparent anomaly in a 
social phenomenon, the recurrence of religious terms in secular discourse, was 
a symptom of a trauma in secular society. I followed through on work of other 
scholars who identified traumas in cultural phenomena. Blumenberg traced a 
Freudian concept of trauma in our modern age to the Gnostic teacher, Marcion; 
Badiou, focusing on twentieth-century events, defined the volatility of a 
“passion for the real” in the compulsive return of nineteenth-century idealism. 
Adapting both approaches, but shaped by the objets a of the messiah and 
Muselmann, I identified an anterior ‘cause’ in the term ‘messiah’ through Paul’s 
representation of his encounter with the real of Jesus. In my focus on Paul’s 
texts I recognized an affinity with Northrop Frye’s Biblical-studies approach to 
literature that inspired his thesis that literature was deeply influenced by the 
Bible. If Paul’s experience can be heard as returning in the religious objets a 
used in intellectual and cultural works of the twentieth century, it seemed that 
Frye’s theory about literature’s dependence on the Bible could be applied to 
other disciplinary works, such as philosophy. In dismantling the disciplinary 
divide through Lacan’s concept of ‘fantasy’, I have made a case for hearing 
biblical material in philosophical and cultural ‘fantasies’ equally, at the same 
time that I have provided reason to see that Paul’s first-century theology can 
also be considered fantasy contextualized by a long tradition of religious 
‘fantasies’ of the doxa.   
For all my work to analyze fantasies through the objet a, this project has 
only ever been about the real; as part of that objective, I have tried to uncover 
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the factor that is common to both the messiah and the Muselmann. The 
disparity between the real of the ecstatic event and its weakened deflated form 
in the symbolic-centered fantasy explains my focus on the evidence of the real, 
visible in patterns of interference in the symbolic. In my effort to trace what is 
inexpressible of the real through first-century fantasies of Paul and his time, 
from the messiah to laws to his message of conversion, and reading these first-
century fantasies against twentieth-century objets a of the messiah and the 
Muselmann, I have managed only to describe the aura of recurring interrelated 
traumas. For all this vagueness, I have added a dimension to Taubes’ ‘messianic 
logic’, which qualifies Santner’s observation that secularism is riddled with 
fantasies of the exception. It is the exception that flags the common factor of the 
ethical aspect of the Thing of the question, che vuoi: it is the ‘call’. The ‘call’ is 
the objet a whose proximity to the real gives it an indeterminacy that can be 
accessed only through its manifestation in the contradictory faces of the 
exception. 
Before reviewing the contradictions emanating from the exception in the 
pages ahead, I would like to make some qualifying remarks about my 
conclusion. The parameters by which I circumscribed my analysis, two 
seemingly disparate terms, was an impulse of attraction, which I can only 
explain as unconscious. I might have used other religious objets a instead of 
those I chose, terms such as homo sacer and “God is dead”, but I did not. 
Unconsciously or accidentally (can there be one or the other?) the fact that both 
terms identified that the trauma was reflected in the exception, an idea explicit 
to the Home Sacer and implicit as the Christ in ‘God is Dead’, proves not only 
the value of this research, but also indirectly affirms the premise of this project: 
that secularism contains a trauma which manifests in the interference of the 
exception.  Another set of search parameters may add nuances I overlooked or 
redress unconscious prejudices. I also recognize that my privileging of Paul as 
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an anterior ‘cause’ of the ‘messiah’ over other possible causes such as Moses, 
Isaiah, or other prophets, has given this project a decidedly Christian focus to 
reading secularism. That is, even if modern western secularism has a foundation 
in Protestant Christianity, its development over time may be indebted to non-
Protestant or non-Christian cultural influences, which this project did not trace. 
As such, the conclusions I offer in the pages ahead are provisional and are 
given in the spirit of laying the ground for future debate.  
 
PART 1 
Despite the central failure of this project as being about the real which eludes 
symbolic capture, there are some significant symbolic conclusions generated by 
this research, the first being that there is evidence for how secularism sustains 
Christian ideology’s promotion of equality based on the exception of Christ. 
Notable about Benjamin’s messianic, driven as it is by a Marxist ‘call’ for 
equality, is that it is qualified by the Kabbalistic paradigm of tikkun which 
seems to be used as a way to resolve the symptom of the exception. Agamben 
overlooks this effort in claiming that Benjamin was inspired by Paul in his ‘weak 
messianic power’, Britt claims. Britt’s critique of Agamben reflected 
unconscious motivations that helped to isolate the source of his concern: he 
wanted to disqualify the effect of the exception Agamben claimed to hear 
because it would contaminate Benjamin’s work with Schmitt’s association with 
Nazi fascism and its race policies. As my research showed, hearing the Pauline 
inflection in Benjamin’s work does not contaminate it. Only on reviewing what 
Paul could have meant by the law of love and especially the Law of Christ, 
could I begin to explain that the tension apparent between Agamben and Britt 
was rooted in the contradictory nature of the Christian exception. The law that 
excepted the Gentile from the Judean clan was the one that became 
insignificant in the face of the call to eternal life, according to Paul. Eternal life 
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was accessible for the non-Judean on the condition of accepting Christ, or the 
Law of Christ that replaced natural law. The salvation Paul promoted is the ‘call’ 
of the superior exception, denoted by the cursed man who God blessed with 
eternal life: that was Jesus Christ. The Christian impulse for inclusiveness 
determined Christ’s return in defining two groups of ‘exceptions’: those who 
converted and so were exceptions in the spirit of Jesus, and those who did not 
convert and were excluded from Jesus’ spirit. This dynamic returned sublimated 
in secular politics as a dynamic between Schmitt’s exception and the exception 
that Human Rights aimed to bring in from the cold. What I hope Britt and 
scholars like him recognize as a result of this research is that his distrust of 
Schmitt’s exception is an unconscious reaction to the Christian principle that 
has defined it and determined secular ideology. 
 My intention in offering the historical review of the first-century messiah 
in this project was not meant to be comprehensive in the historical sense, but to 
problematize Britt’s argument that not all messiahs after Paul are Christian, a 
claim that is based on the assumption that Paul’s messiah was Christian. This is 
a paradoxical claim because we know it is not true, as Britt attempted to prove, 
but also because we know it is true in that the Christian tradition dominates 
western culture. Jesus is the unique divine figure who grants believers new life. 
He is the one who suffers for all mankind annually and refuses to lie down and 
die finally, as Badiou, Caputo, and Lacan have individually warned. Jesus is 
God incarnate, according to the faith. In the aim to expose the fantasy of this 
mighty idea, I have pointed out how the singular Christian messiah has roots in 
the original multiplicity of the figure in Judean culture. I have also shown how 
Paul distinguished Jesus with a term, not integral to the Judean faith, but to the 
Greek culture and its concept of the ‘anointed’, Christos. Moreover, I offered 
some proof for seeing that Paul’s creative use of Isaiah for himself may have 
inspired him to identify Jesus as a suffering servant, also. If, in Isaiah, the 
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suffering servant was ‘anointed’, a messiah, in that he was chosen by God to 
preach to the Nations, Paul’s letters suggest that he self-identified with the figure 
as a member of the chosen people: he claimed to have been chosen by God to 
spread the good news of redemption to all. These allusions to Isaiah about 
himself imply several things. For one, according to the historical material we 
have, Jesus was probably not identified as a ‘suffering servant’ until long after 
his death. It is highly likely that Jesus was not commonly understood as the 
suffering servant during Paul’s early ministry. This means that his use of the term 
for himself did not reflect competition with the Christian Jesus, but shows that 
he identified with the Isaianic figure at a time when the principle of the 
‘mesiach’ centered on a political responsibility shared by all Judeans, thus the 
messianic multiplicity. It is possible that Paul’s creative use of Isaiah’s ‘suffering 
servant’ inspired the use of this biblical material to prove Jesus’s messianic 
status. The result of this research is that, while I agree with Britt’s claim that “not 
all messianic roads lead to Paul,” I respond to his second assertion that not all 
roads lead from Paul, to argue that at least the main messianic arteries do, 
offering support to Agamben’s thesis and subsequently lending support to 
Taubes’ assertion that Christianity owes its debt to the first-century Judean and 
not to the ghost of Jesus.  
 In this project I have made a case for seeing that the Jesus we know has 
been constructed in history, and have shown how that construction is related to 
the fantasy Paul rendered of his ecstatic event as the gospel to the Gentiles. In 
psychoanalytic terms, Jesus Christ is Paul’s remainder of the event that seals 
over the crisis. What seems inexplicable in the fact that a personal objet a can 
have become a mandate for world politics within centuries attests to how 
tangled our perspective on history is, and how my research is limited: I followed 
only some strands of that tangle, one being Paul’s language. In privileging belief 
over facts, the spirit over flesh, eternal life over mortality, Paul made the 
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invisible more vivid than reality for his listeners. That is, the proof of eternal life 
in Christ’s resurrection is a tautology, which explains why its ‘dazzling 
splendour’ has persisted as the core of Christian ideology: the only evidence 
required has been deferred to the day of his return. The only proof of its validity 
is the faith with which believers wait for his return. People were and continue 
to be attracted to his message not for its symbolic sense but for its literalness: by 
enforcing the impossible as possible, Paul brought the real into the symbolic 
which, ironically, attests to the return of the exception in secular ideology. 
The interface between the real and the symbolic is explained by Badiou’s 
idea that Jesus’ crucifixion/resurrection is obviously a fable, but it is also the 
truth of the event. The question is: of the event what truth is accessible? My 
effort to answer that question brought me to an analysis of Paul’s letters, which 
are notable for being the earliest extant documents about Jesus. By the time Paul 
knew Jesus, Jesus was dead; paradoxically, the significance of Christ’s 
resurrection gains definition through Paul who was not there for the crucifixion. 
Paul used himself as proof of his encounter with the unknown Jesus; the miracle 
of the resurrection was articulated in Paul’s own death and resurrection in the 
Christ. The fact is, both Shantz’s neurobiological approach to the ecstatic event 
and Lacan’s concept of the encounter with the real highlight the same 
fundamental quality of Paul’s message; since ecstatic experience disables the 
linguistic capability of the brain, then anything Paul has said about his 
experience, his encounter, his dying and being resurrected, can only be 
understood as the fantasy of his trauma. That is, as I have argued in Chapter 5, 
the power of Paul’s message as literal uses the historical Jesus symbolically to 
cover over the real of a personal ecstatic event.  
If Paul’s trauma reflected a personal encounter with the doxa, then how 
did it come to dominate the world through the Christian narrative? While 
historical method makes it feasible to trace the spread of Paul’s belief into our 
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present day, I have made a case for understanding how its spread into the 
present can be found in a momentum from the past reflected by the themes in 
the contemporary Greek novel, Joseph and Aseneth. In that narrative, the 
anonymity of the “son of man” figure that visits Aseneth points to a tradition 
about angelic visitations represented in Merkabah literature: the visitor ‘looks 
like a man’ but is not a man. The countenance of the real encounter, which 
appears human, is experienced as giving and inspiring love. In seeing Aseneth’s 
fantasy as similar to Paul’s fantasy, two anomalies in Paul’s letters stands out. If 
Christ was Jesus, how could Paul have recognized him in his ecstatic 
experience if he had not known the living Jesus? If Christ was Jesus, why did 
Paul delay spreading the good news of Jesus to the Gentiles, as he admits in 
Galatians 1:15-24279? One more question exposes the knot of Christian 
teleology: how can Paul encounter love in a figure he did not love but, as is 
implied in his language of inversions, probably despised for inspiring the 
heretical movement infiltrating his faith? Tradition, as defined in Acts, argues 
that the figure who visited Paul was the real Jesus with the power to love the 
one who persecuted him through his followers. That argument is true only if 
Paul actually encountered Jesus. By way of cutting the knot, I ask: What if Christ 
was not Jesus but the ‘doxa’, in mystical terms simply Aseneth’s ‘one like a 
man’? What if Paul’s resurrection was not about literal death but about 
encountering his own immortality, as the fictional Aseneth did, and as has been 
documented in Merkabah literature? These are the questions this project cannot 
answer except to pose them in the effort to expose the weakness in the Christian 
fantasy of Jesus’ crucifixion and resurrection, and thereby contribute to Badiou’s 
effort to delink Paul’s experience from the ‘historical’ Jesus and so re-envision 
the impact of his message on secularism.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 “I did not confer with any human being, nor did I go up to Jerusalem to those who were 
already apostles before me, but I went away at once to Arabia, and afterwards I returned to 
Damascus. Then after three years I did go up to Jerusalem to visit Cephas…” 
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Since Paul’s message to the Gentiles evolved from a Nachträglichkeit, a 
delay of three years after his ecstatic experience, we must accept the 
independence of the real of Paul’s ecstatic event from the symbolic nature of his 
message. Paul’s terms for including the excluded in God’s salvation involved 
allegorizing an existing rite of conversion: circumcision. His message to the 
Gentiles was that they need not be circumcised to gain eternal life; the only 
condition for entering the fold of God’s redeemed people was to circumcise in 
the heart. For the reason that Paul understood conversion as an act done by the 
Gentile who wanted to enter eternity with the Judean, Paul was no convert; 
Paul was not preaching a new religion but preaching a new way for the 
excluded to participate as equal in his faith. Whatever his altruistic intentions, 
the effect of his fantasy of his personal doxa was devastating. Roman-occupied 
Asia Minor and Judea was riddled with mass apocalyptic anxiety that inspired 
charlatans, as Josephus described the false messiahs, and also motivated honest 
mystics, such as Paul and even St. John the Baptist, to save those who sought 
solace in the Judean cult. While Paul aimed only to assist these Gentiles, 
attracting more and more believers, his mission indirectly caused a trauma 
within the Judean clan, within families, within individuals. Those Judeans who 
believed in Jesus eventually were encouraged to exist with those who did not 
live Judean lives. Living separated by blood relatives was a hardship secondary 
to the crisis they endured which was also experienced by those left behind. In 
the revolution of Christ in the Gentile world, something broke for both the 
Judean follower of Jesus and the Judean clan, and that was the principle of the 
exception. If, before Paul, the Judean was distinguished as exceptional because 
he/she was chosen by God, after Paul, exceptionalism became split between the 
one who is excepted as excluded and inferior and the one who is excepted as 
superior. Identifying which exception applies depends on which side of the 
fence one is standing on. The fact the ‘exception’ is so unstable explains its 
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symptomatic function in secularism as the radical contradiction of equality, and 
the driving force of its compulsive return. Its compulsion is to hide its 
contradiction by attempting to resolve it. In simple terms, the ‘kernel‘ of the 
trauma of secular ideology is articulated in this semantic rupture.  
 
PART II 
The exception is expressed in the ‘call’ whose shifting terms were roughly 
outlined in Chapter 5: Paul’s call to eternal life became centered on the 
condition of Christ wherein the Gentile who accepted Christ would be saved by 
immortality; Paul’s message to the Gentiles caused a second trauma within 
Judaism, which comes to us as the call to equality of the ‘all’ conditional on the 
Christ exception. The  ‘all’, defined by conversion to Christ identified the line of 
inclusion and indirectly reframed exclusion. That paradoxical demand in the 
call for equality is expressed in the problem raised by human-rights discourse in 
our modern secular life. Take, for example, Gourgouris’ assertion that all must 
accept the non-religious order of secularism; his claim articulates the 
conditional nature of inclusion (conversion) expressed in the issue of young 
women being forced to take off the hijab in France’s public schools. This 
Muslim woman stripped by state law epitomizes how profoundly correct 
Santner is to claim that secularism is riddled with fantasies of exception. Not 
only has this Muslim woman been forced to erase the ‘exceptionalism’ of her 
cultural/religious identity and so ‘secularize’ as a citizen, a coerced conversion, 
she is also expected to be thankful for being freed from religious constraints. 
The human-rights argument goes that the Muslim woman is liberated from 
religious oppression because of the law that allows her to be free of her hijab; 
meanwhile, the law that forces her to attend classes as a secular citizen does 
not see she is naked for herself in her community in conforming to secular 
ideology.  
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In Chapter 1, I problematized Anidjar’s assumption that secularism was 
Christian by noting the discontinuities between some secular projects, such as 
pro-choice and gay rights, and Christian principles. In recognizing that these 
exceptions are determined by human rights, I have made a case for seeing that 
the apparent discontinuity is superficial. One could say that those Christian 
denominations that have somewhat secularized, such as the United Church, are 
arguably more Christian than the conservative Christian ecclesia. Secularism is 
Christian because it is determined by the exception. What is Christian about the 
exception is its promise: universalism can only be achieved by integrating the 
exception in its new form as assimilated, a process that is defined by the 
principle of what Paul defined as conversion. That dynamic points to the 
contradiction which Žižek claims is at the core of ideological fantasy; if 
Habermas claims that secularism needs religion to distinguish its superiority 
over religion, then it follows that secularism also needs the exception to define 
its promise for equality. The exception is the symptom of secular ideology, 
which is articulated in the conundrum expressed by Freud about Jewish 
criminality: just as Jewish ‘election’ defines the criminal targeted for Christian 
rehabilitation, so Jewish election serves the secular machine for the ‘all’. One 
more turn of the screw of this logic leads to its perversion in anti-Semitic 
ideology. In Auschwitz, secular equality returns as the impulse to abolish the 
difference of the Muselmann who is the Jew who “does not die a Jew in 
Auschwitz” because his ‘election’ is extinguished through conversion. 
The extent to which I agree with Anidjar that secularism is Christian, is 
the extent to which secularism has sublimated universal equality as a project of 
assimilating the exception through human-rights discourse. What my research 
shows is that the exception is not just a simple function of the sovereign’s divine 
decision, as Schmittians assert, but as a complication of the Christian condition. 
Equality is possible for ‘all’ on the condition of conversion. This demand within 
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Christianity becomes the infrastructure of secularism which is heard as a double 
demand in the call to equality, a term of correction admired by all 
contemporary citizens, and which unconsciously causes unease for those who 
recognize that equality is conditional which makes it a ‘falsity’.	  This unease is 
clearly marked in the representation of the messiah in Derrida’s and Kubrick’s 
works. Derrida knows that there is no ‘all’ because, as a living member of a 
people excluded as the ‘exception’, he recognizes that the condition of the ‘all’ 
would require he erase his distinction in favour of the force that demands 
assimilation: the Christ. That is why there is no messiah in his work, just a 
rendering of Benjamin’s abstract idea of a salvation as ‘messianicity’, wherein 
fulfillment is always deferred. Kubrick clearly sees the future messiah as the 
threat of the Christian one, not to be trusted. In contrast to Kubrick’s sinister 
fetus, Žižek’s full support of the messiah as the new much anticipated beginning 
stands out. What also stands out is how Rosenzweig cut the Secular/Christian 
conflation of conversion/interpellation in his personal and intellectual life. By 
stepping away from secularism’s coercion to reject his election and to 
assimilate, he identified the call to equality as reflecting a demand for 
conversion by those who do not have a direct access to eternity, as do the 
Jewish people.	  
The Muselmann returns in twentieth-century thought as a figure of 
conversion and thereby more explicitly points to the negative exception of Jesus 
Christ. The autist in the postmodern text points to another version of the 
excluded exception. The two cases of this ‘excluded’ exception, the Muselmann 
and the autist, point to different positions to the demand for correction implied 
by conversion; an unease equal to Derrida’s and Kubrick’s works evident in 
Kofman’s text contrasts the positivity in Carson’s autist-become-messiah story, 
equal to Žižek’s messiah. The demand to convert in Smothered Words has the 
horrifying physical effect of choking. The monster of Kofman’s survival as a 
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faux-Christian figure shadows her father’s unwitnessed death; whether or not 
she or her father were ever Muselmänner does not change the dis-ease inspired 
by Auschwitz’s ‘gorgon,’ the perversion of the secular impulse to erase religion 
as the genocide of a people who were distinguished for election. In almost 
completely opposite terms, Carson’s Geryon stands as the fulfillment of the 
Christian exception whose monstrous a-sociality is transformed by 
oedipalization into a divine figure. His victorious assimilation at the end only 
affirms how Lacan’s NOF is over-determined by the Christian demand for 
conversion as the condition of socialization (assimilation), which leads me to 
see a homology between Baggs’ choice for an ambivalent isolation and 
Kofman’s survival. 
Apart from the implications of this research which I have touched on, I 
will conclude with considering two more issues in these last pages: a new way 
of thinking of trauma and how to proceed with secularism’s condition of the 
exception. The fact that in Lacanian terms any text is an expression of trauma 
means that technically any secular text in my project could have been used to 
isolate the ‘kernel’ of the real in secularism; I have done my best to exploit this 
fact in this research. Taking Lacan’s concept to its limit, my project identified 
that disaster-centered Trauma Studies has a monopoly in humanities research 
that inhibits the scope of its application to broader cultural political analyses. It 
is true that there is no equality between the benign and prevalent condition of 
the Oedipal event and what survivors of the Holocaust experienced. Nor does it 
make sense to equate the Holocaust event and the ecstatic event of Paul or 
Rosenzweig. Even so, these are all examples of the subject’s encounter with the 
real. The onus is on those of us who do Trauma Studies to find ways to 
accommodate these differences and I shall consider some approaches now, 
with respect to the research of this project. 
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Based on the limited scope of my research, it would seem that the 
monopoly that trauma has had on Holocaust Studies has led to a conflation of 
symptoms of other pathologies experienced by survivors. Kofman’s work, for 
example, may reflect the trauma she suffered as a survivor, but it also expresses 
the ‘guilt’ that recurs in survivor testimony, signaling the debilitating enervating 
energy of melancholia, the condition which manifests in an explicable fusion of 
an ambiguous emotional loss and an equally ambiguous sense of guilt. 
Kofman’s testimony explains this melancholic response to her father’s death tied 
to her choosing secularism over the faith with which she was raised until the 
war. Melancholia is not trauma; the former is the result of the subject’s 
unconscious introjection of the love object that has gone or been rejected, 
while the latter reflects the subject being affected by external circumstances. I 
want to emphasize that this is merely one example in which two symptoms 
have become associated with each other because of the particular cirumstances 
of a particular field of research. Does this signify a problem with the use of the 
psychoanalytic method in humanities-based research? If the evidence suggests it 
does, the problem does not necessarily indicate the failure of this method; 
rather, it provides perspective on how to develop the psychoanalytic method in 
the future of humanities research. 
Another issue I raised about Trauma Studies scholarship centered on La 
Capra’s warning that the rise of the use of the psychoanalytic theory of trauma 
as a method in scholarship of humanities-based disciplines fosters a cult of 
victim to the extent that the perpetrator becomes invisible. Based on Tasso’s 
story of Tancred, I have made the case for seeing that crime is a legal term that, 
while differentiating between perpetrator and victim in order to bring justice, 
does not apply to trauma. In fact, legalese discourse exploits trauma in 
identifying the victim to be rescued for justice, which denies the ‘perpetrator’ 
the right to her/his trauma. Considering psychoanalysts recognize that trauma is 
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a human condition of life experience from the subject’s first word to the last, 
there is a problem in denying some people their experience to it, as if suffering 
is a privilege. While privileging the victim’s suffering perhaps reflects an 
impulse to bring justice where the courts do not, this privilege misuses the 
trauma diagnosis leading to the obfuscation of the actual issue in La Capra’s 
warning. Furthermore, the conflation of law with psychic life complicates the 
work needed to identify where and how justice needs to be done.  
With respect to the prevalence of trauma, I also want to stress two things. 
It is misleading to think of it as the new universal. Since trauma only exists in its 
return (through fantasy), those who do not have a means of creating that return 
are technically without trauma, the logic being that without a symptom there is 
no condition. This is a true statement only for those of us who exist in the 
symbolic. How does A. M. Baggs experience trauma, for example? This 
question points to the necessity for developing new nerve endings in the 
dexterity of psychoanalytic approaches used in the health care and humanities 
fields. In that respect, understanding how different experiences can be 
considered trauma suggests that we must accommodate a spectrum under the 
category of the experience. My contribution to understanding this spectrum was 
to consider where the objets a of the messiah and the Muselmann fit into it. In 
relation to the Oedipal event, both these objets a reflected not the interpellation 
of the subject into the ideology of mankind, as per the laws established in 
ancient history from the incest prohibition of the primal horde to the Mosaic 
laws but rather, the objets a came to articulate the second interpellation, the 
interpellation beyond interpellation, of the ‘call’ from beyond secular ideology. 
It is tempting to suggest that the ‘extreme’ conditions of the ‘ecstatic’ call are 
equal in intensity to the ‘extreme’ conditions of those who endured the 
Holocaust, reflecting a spectrum from joy to horror, love to hate, heaven to hell, 
and everything else falls within this spectrum. Yet, to plot these experiences 
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along a single axis I think occludes understanding what is meant by the fact that 
the messiah and the Muselmann exist at polar ends.    
As I suggested in the introduction, the unconscious use of these terms in 
secular projects identified the desire in the ‘call’ that comes from heaven. Each 
of the case studies articulated differences, which I suggested reflected a different 
response to the call, seeing in the ‘call’ the consistency of the unveiled quality 
of the real. One might say that this second call is equal to the Oedipal call in 
that it demands an answer; and as with the Oedipal call, its demand is, as Dolar 
articulates, terrifyingly indeterminate. This second call is at times, however, in 
conflict with the socialized ‘call’, as exemplified in Antigone’s choice to heed 
the ‘call’ of the gods rather than the laws of the state. Thus, this second ‘call’ is 
ethical in Lacan’s concept of the law of desire and also in Badiou’s association 
of the subject with the truth of the Event. Perhaps what can be said about this 
second call, as the case studies are considered together, is that not all receive 
the ‘call’ in the same way. Paul’s ‘call’ and, I would say, Rosenzweig’s ‘call’ 
could be defined as equivalent to the tradition of ecstatic experiences: they 
experience this interpellation as signaling a break with their culture. With 
respect to Derrida, Kofman, Badiou and Žižek, the ‘call’ may be interpreted 
through their scholarship, and Kubrick and Carson in their art. The variety of 
responses to secular ideology within the two trends of unease and comfort 
points to the complicated quality of tracing the real. Perhaps the trauma of the 
“interpellation beyond interpellation” is, as with Lacan’s concept of the law of 
the desire, singular and thus fundamentally incomparable.  
In all the fantasies reviewed, it may be possible to suppose that we have 
seen an answer to Lacan’s question: “Have you acted in conformity with the 
desire in you?” Those whose politics have been defined by Christian principles, 
such as the atheists Žižek and Lacan or the Christian Blanton, reflect a fidelity to 
the truth of the Christian event, determining their comfort with the exception. In 
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these cases, we can understand that doing responsible scholarship involves 
accepting culpability in the Christian effort for correction and have a personal 
interest in equality. Those who do not see any truth in the Christian event, but 
still uphold a faith in equality and human rights, can do no more than remain 
true to the desire in them with respect to the ‘exception’. I have reviewed some 
very vivid examples of the unease inspired by the Christian truth-event 
expressed in works by Freud, Benjamin, Derrida, Kofman, etc., and their 
different responses point to the fact that there is a fidelity to the truth of an event 
that is not Christ. Rosenzweig’s ‘new thinking’ is an example of this fidelity to 
the truth which perhaps more explicitly identifies an event expressed in the 
Book of Isaiah. What is new in Rosenzweig’s thinking technically is not so new, 
but I hope this research has helped readers see its profound significance. In not 
converting to Christianity, Rosenzweig answered the demand in secularism to 
assimilate and the demand in Christianity to believe in Christ, by accepting the 
‘call’ implicit in his election as a Jew; what was not explicit before but which 
his choices make new through his introduction of Isaianic thinking into 
secularism is that eternity is the destiny for all, but not all are required to get 
there in the same way.  
The messiah and the Muselmann express the post-secular because they 
engage secularism’s ideology in its contradiction: the exception. It is through 
this contradiction that I want to conclude by returning to Britt’s discomfort with 
Agamben’s analysis of Benjamin’s messianic. As far as Britt was concerned, 
Agamben was a Schmittian because he theorized about the exception. Britt’s 
inability to see Agamben’s idea of the exception as anything other than 
Schmitt’s “thing” of an abnormal product of normalcy signals a broader trend in 
contemporary thought on the topic of the exception: a focus on Schmitt’s 
binary. This tendency in scholarship was made visible for me at a panel on the 
exception at the ACLA conference at U of T this spring, (2013). In addressing 
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the conflict aroused by the exception, one panelist focused on incidences of the 
‘unexceptional’, or the normal.280 It was an interesting presentation because her 
effort revealed both the desire to break free from Schmitt’s binary and the 
unconscious hold it has on our thinking. In recycling Schmitt’s binary, she 
missed the trouble evident in the definition of exception, which my work on the 
trauma of secularism has made the effort to bring to light. The ‘exception’, this 
product of a semantic rupture, reflects the remnants of a defining moment of 
conflicting interpellations of the exception: there is the exception attributed to 
Schmitt against normalcy which is the perversion in secularism of the Christian 
exception that determines the call of the ‘all’ of the universal; and there is 
Jewish exemplarity, Hollander’s expression for election. Thus, what emanates 
from the Thing of the exception is not one call, but all these calls together 
within secular and sectarian terms, each of which demands an ethical response. 
The way beyond Schmitt is not to listen to him or erase him, but to listen 
through him to the three interpellations emanating from this Thing all at once, 
articulating the return of Paul’s real.	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